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ABSTRACT	
	
Interactions	between	Courts	and	Administrative	Authorities	in	EU	Competition	Law	
Enforcement	
	
The	EU	competition	law	reforms	of	2004	decentralised	enforcement	from	the	European	
Commission	to	national	competition	authorities	and	national	courts,	while	the	European	
Commission	remains	central	to	the	system.	This	thesis	responds	to	a	need	for	research	into	
how	institutions	interact	in	this	system	of	concurrent	competences	to	effectively	enforce	
the	EU	competition	rules.	It	explores	the	constitutional	consequences	of	the	methods	for	
ensuring	coherent	interpretation	and	effective	application	of	the	EU	competition	rules,	
through	case	studies	on	the	interaction	between	courts	and	administrative	authorities	and	
between	the	supranational	and	national	levels.	With	a	focus	on	the	role	of	courts,	the	thesis	
draws	on	the	EU	principle	of	institutional	balance	and	the	concept	of	interpretative	
pluralism.	It	finds	that	while	apparently	empowering	(national)	courts,	the	post‐2004	
regime	still	limits	the	ambit	of	judicial	competence	in	favour	of	administrative	bodies.	The	
European	Commission	can	influence	interpretation	of	the	competition	rules	in	national	
court	proceedings	as	well	as	in	the	European	Competition	Network	of	competition	
authorities,	in	which	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	has	in	effect	handed	over	
responsibility.	In	an	extension	of	national	courts’	obligation	not	to	rule	counter	to	a	
European	Commission	decision,	forthcoming	legislation	proposes	they	should	be	bound	by	
national	competition	authority	decisions.	The	thesis	argues	that	there	should	be	more	
emphasis	on	horizontal	relationships	between	courts,	led	by	judges	themselves.	This	
would	not	only	lend	itself	to	coherent	–	and	effective	–	application	of	competition	law,	but	
would	allow	courts	to	push	back	against	the	apparent	dominance	of	administrative	
authorities	in	this	area.		
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CHAPTER	1:		INTRODUCTION	
	
European	Union	competition	law	is	of	central	importance	to	the	functioning	of	the	internal	
market.	Since	the	2004	reform	of	EU	competition	law	the	number	of	courts,	administrative	
authorities	and	quasi‐judicial	bodies	involved	in	enforcement	of	the	rules,	and	the	scope	of	
their	functions,	has	increased.	The	reform	was	described	as	a	“legal	and	cultural	revolution	
in	proposing	the	fundamental	reorganization	of	existing	responsibilities	between	the	
Commission,	national	authorities	and	national	courts”.1		The	interactions	between	these	
judicial	and	administrative	authorities,	and	between	the	supranational	and	national	levels,	
are	important	for	effective	application	of	the	competition	rules.	However,	the	tools	chosen	
to	promote	this	effectiveness	have	wider	constitutional	implications	for	the	roles	of	courts	
and	administrative	authorities.	The	thesis	therefore	investigates	these	interactions	and	
sets	them	within	the	literature	on	institutional	balance	and	interpretative	pluralism.	
	
This	chapter	first	sets	the	context	of	the	2004	reforms	and	developments	since	then.	The	
second	section	lays	out	the	research	questions,	the	third	section	outlines	the	contributions	
of	the	thesis,	and	the	fourth	section	discusses	the	methodology.	The	fifth	section	
contextualises	the	case	studies	in	the	later	chapters	of	the	thesis	by	introducing	a	diagram	
to	show	the	interinstitutional	relationships	in	the	EU	competition	enforcement	system.	
The	sixth	section	gives	an	outline	of	the	thesis	as	a	whole.	
	
	
1.	The	context	of	the	post‐2004	competition	enforcement	regime	in	the	European	
Union	
	
EU	competition	law	enforcement	has	been	subject	to	far‐reaching	reforms	over	the	last	
decade.		The	most	significant	reform	came	in	2004	with	Regulation	1/2003	on	the	
implementation	of	the	rules	on	competition	laid	down	in	Articles	81	and	82	(now	101	and	
102)	of	the	Treaty2	and	its	accompanying	Modernisation	Package.	3	Article	101	TFEU	
                                                 
1 C-D Ehlermann ‘The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy: A Legal and Cultural Revolution’ (2000) 
37 Common Market Law Review 537-574, 537 
2 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003,1-25 
3 Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the 
Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 123, 27.04.2004, 18-24; Commission 
Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, 43-53; 
Commission Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member 
States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, 54-64; Commission Notice on 
the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty OJ C 101, 
27.04.2004, 65-77; Commission Notice on informal guidance relating to novel questions concerning 
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governs	agreements	between	firms	and	Article	102	prohibits	the	abuse	of	a	dominant	
position.	These	articles	had	been	enforced	by	the	European	Commission’s	Directorate	
General	for	Competition	(DG	IV,	now	DG	COMP)	since	the	early	years	of	the	European	
Economic	Community,4	partly	because	Member	States	did	not	have	developed	competition	
authorities.	While	national	courts	and	competition	authorities	were	in	principle	able	to	
apply	the	rules,	firms	were	required	to	notify	their	agreements	under	Article	101	TFEU	to	
the	Commission	for	approval.	Having	found	an	anticompetitive	agreement,	only	the	
Commission	was	empowered	to	grant	an	exemption	and	approve	it	under	what	is	now	
Article	101(3).	Member	State	civil	courts	were	not	able	to	consider	whether	an	agreement	
could	be	exempted,	and	so	were	stymied	in	their	ability	to	adjudicate	disputes	between	
private	parties	based	on	the	EU	competition	rules.		
	
A	number	of	factors	led	to	reform.	Eventually	a	backlog	of	notifications	accumulated	and	
the	Commission	had	to	implement	a	solution	of	‘comfort	letters’	which	were	of	uncertain	
legal	status.5	The	Commission	was	faced	with	increasing	criticism	from	the	late	1990s,6	by	
which	time	a	number	of	Member	States	had	their	own	functioning	competition	authorities.	
The	notification	system	was	also	ineffective	at	targeting	the	most	harmful	cartels,	and	the	
Commission	needed	to	free	up	resources	to	do	so.	Faced	with	EU	enlargement	from	15	to	
25	Member	States	in	2004,	with	a	further	two	in	2007,	the	centralised	system	looked	
increasingly	unworkable.		
	
The	2004	reforms7	brought	about	two	significant	changes,	ending	the	Commission’s	
dominance	over	enforcement.	One	was	the	abolition	of	the	notification	procedure.	The	
                                                                                                                                               
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that arise in individual cases (guidance letters) OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, 
78-80; Commission Notice - Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, 81-96; Commission Notice - Guidelines on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, 97-118 
4 Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty [1959-1962] OJ 13, 21.2.1962,  204 
5 See e.g. B Wodz ‘Comfort Letters and Other Informal Letters in EC Competition Proceedings – Why 
the Story is Not Over’ (2000) 21(3) European Competition Law Review 159-169 
6 See e.g. P Massey ‘Reform of EC Competition Law: Substance, Procedure, Institutions’, in B Hawk (ed) 
Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 1996 (Juris Pub Inc, 1997), 91; A Pera & M 
Todino ‘Enforcement of EC Competition Rules: Need for a Reform?’ in the same volume, 125. M 
Siragusa ‘Rethinking Art 85: Problems and Challenges in the Design and Enforcement of the EC 
Competition Rules’ Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 1997 (Juris Pub Inc, 
1998), 271  
7 For assessment of the reforms see e.g. C-D Ehlermann ‘The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy: A 
Legal and Cultural Revolution’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 537-574; H Kassim & K Wright 
‘Bringing Regulatory Processes Back In: The Reform of EU Antitrust and Merger Control’ (2009) 32(4) 
West European Politics 738-755; A Riley ‘EC Antitrust Modernisation: The Commission Does Very 
Nicely – Thank You! Part 1: Regulation 1 and the Notification Burden’, (2003) 24 (11) European 
Competition Law Review 604-615; A Riley ‘EC Antitrust Modernisation: The Commission Does Very 
Nicely – Thank You! Part 2: Between the Idea and the Reality: Decentralisation under Regulation 1’ 
(2003) 24 (11) European Competition Law Review 657-672;  J Venit ‘Brave New World: The 
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second,	more	important	for	these	purposes,	was	the	decentralisation	of	enforcement,	
empowering	national	competition	authorities	and	national	courts	to	apply	Articles	101	
and	102	in	their	entirety,	including	assessing	whether	conduct	falls	under	the	exempting	
conditions	of	Article	101(3),	previously	within	the	exclusive	jurisdiction	of	the	European	
Commission.	This	is	not	a	complete	decentralisation,	as	the	European	Commission	still	
retains	the	competence	to	apply	the	rules	and	retains	a	central	role.	This	differs	from	the	
general	model	of	EU	law,	which	is	enforcement	at	the	national	level.	As	a	result,	there	are	
concurrent	competences	between	the	supranational	and	national	levels,	and	between	
courts	and	administrative	(or	quasi‐judicial)	authorities.		
	
A	further	aim	of	the	2004	reform,	and	subsequently	of	the	European	Commission’s	White	
Paper	on	damages	actions,8	was	to	encourage	private	enforcement	of	competition	law	by	
firms	and	individuals	through	national	courts,	without	it	compromising	public	
enforcement	through	national	competition	authorities.	This	would	free	up	resources	for	
the	Commission	and	competition	authorities	to	detect	and	investigate	the	most	harmful	
anticompetitive	activity	in	the	public	interest.	In	decentralising	enforcement	to	national	
courts	as	well	as	competition	authorities,	the	door	is	open	to	claimants	to	act	as	enforcers	
(‘private	attorney	generals’9)	closest	to	infringements.	It	also	allows	those	who	suffer	
losses	as	a	result	of	competition	law	infringements	to	gain	individual	redress	–	while	they	
can	impose	fines,	competition	authorities	are	less	well	placed	to	compensate	individuals	
who	are	harmed	by	competition	law	breaches,	and	the	Commission	itself	is	not	
empowered	to	grant	damages.	
	
There	is	a	balance	to	be	struck	to	ensure	that	public	and	private	enforcement	are	
complementary.	10	The	principal	aim	of	public	enforcement	is	deterrence,	through	
punishment	such	as	fines	or	imprisonment.		Private	enforcement	can	also	contribute	to	a	
                                                                                                                                               
Modernization and Decentralization of Enforcement under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty’ (2003) 40 
Common Market Law Review 545-580 
8 Commission White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2008) 165, 
Brussels 2.4.2008 
9 Particularly used in the US context where private actions in competition enforcement are more 
prevalent. In the EU literature see e.g. A Andreangeli 'From Complainant to "Private Attorney General": 
the Modernisation of EU Competition Enforcement and Private Antitrust Action before National Courts' 
in J Peay and T Newburn (eds) Policing: Politics, Culture and Control. Essays in Honour of Robert 
Reiner (Hart Publishing, 2012) 229-54; K Cseres ‘Governance Design for European Private Law: Lessons 
from the Europeanization of Competition Law in Central and Eastern Europe’ in F Cafaggi (ed) Making 
European Private Law: Governance Design (Edward Elgar, 2008) 138-196,  143 
10 See e.g. W Wils ‘Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe? (2003) 26(3) World 
Competition 473; C Jones ‘Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: A Policy Analysis and Reality 
Check’ (2004) 27(1) World Competition 13; A Komninos ‘Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in 
Europe: Complement? Overlap?’ (2006) 3(1) Competition Law Review 5-26; W Wils ‘The Relationship 
Between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages’ (2009) 32(1) World 
Competition 3  
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deterrent	effect	if	firms	are	exposed	to	liability	in	damages.	This	is	particularly	likely	if	a	
private	party	claims	for	damages	after	a	competition	authority	has	found	an	infringement	
and	perhaps	already	imposed	a	fine.	However,	firms	are	less	likely	to	come	forward	and	
admit	anticompetitive	conduct	under	a	leniency	programme	if	that	admission	will	then	be	
used	against	them	in	private	actions	for	damages.11	Primarily	in	private	enforcement	the	
court	is	called	upon	to	compensate	a	firm	or	individual.	Legislation	was	expected	in	late	
2012	on	damages	actions,12	inviting	an	examination	of	how	public	and	private	
enforcement,	and,	institutionally,	competition	authorities	and	courts,	interact.	
	
The	decentralisation	of	enforcement	of	Articles	101	and	102	TFEU,	and	the	recent	
emphasis	on	private	enforcement,	has	led	to	an	increase	in	the	powers	and	jurisdiction	of	
national	courts	as	well	as	competition	authorities.	Decentralised	enforcement	carries	
greater	risks	of	divergent	application	of	EU	antitrust	enforcement	rules.	National	
competition	authorities	are	closely	linked	to	each	other	and	the	Commission	through	the	
cooperation	mechanisms	of	the	European	Competition	Network	(ECN),	with	its	rules	for	
case	allocation	and	consistent	application	of	Community	competition	law.13	However,	no	
such	mechanism	exists	for	national	courts	(unless	they	are	also	designated	as	competition	
authorities	by	the	Member	State).	This	is	for	the	practical	reason	that	there	are	numerous	
judges	throughout	the	EU	who	could	hear	competition	claims;	but	also	from	a	
constitutional	perspective,	it	would	be	seen	to	interfere	with	principles	of	judicial	
independence	and	national	procedural	autonomy.		
	
As	a	result,	there	are	certain	tools	in	Regulation	1/2003,	in	the	forthcoming	draft	directive	
on	damages	actions	and	in	the	wider	EU	legal	system	which	aim	at	coherent	application	of	
the	rules	by	competition	enforcers	and	bridging	public	and	private	enforcement	of	
competition	law.	The	preliminary	reference	procedure,	in	which	national	courts	ask	
questions	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	(CJEU)	on	the	interpretation	of	EU	
law,	remains	an	important	judicial	link,	but,	as	shown	in	this	thesis,	is	likely	to	exclude	
national	competition	authorities	(except	where	a	national	court	is	also	designated	a	
competition	authority).	Building	on	existing	case	law	in	which	national	courts	should	
follow	Commission	decisions,	Regulation	1/2003	includes	the	possibility	for	the	
Commission	to	give	opinions	in	national	court	proceedings	with	an	instrument	analogous	
to	the	preliminary	reference,	and	also	to	intervene	at	its	own	initiative.	The	White	Paper	
                                                 
11 The issue in C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-0000 
12 Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee Of The Regions, Commission Work 
Programme 2012: Delivering European renewal, Brussels, 15.11.2011 COM (2011) 777 final, 3 
13 Commission Notice of 27 April 2004 on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, 
OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, 43-53 
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and	forthcoming	draft	directive	on	damages	actions	includes	a	proposal	for	the	decisions	
of	national	competition	authorities	to	bind	national	courts	throughout	the	EU.		The	
following	chapters	consider	these	tools	in	detail.	
	
An	important	question	is	to	what	extent	the	independence	of	the	judiciary	is	valued	when	
weighed	against	the	Commission’s	–	and	NCAs’	‐	potential	loss	of	effectiveness.		This	
situation	raises	broader	questions	about	the	partnership	and	tensions	between	judicial	
and	administrative	bodies,	administrative	intervention	in	judicial	decision‐making	and	the	
role	of	soft	law14	in	a	system	in	which	the	Commission	has	legislative,	executive,	as	well	as	
judicial	functions.	15	While	the	CJEU	is	the	ultimate	interpreter	of	EU	law	generally,	the	
Commission	derives	a	high	degree	of	authority	from	its	historical	position	as	primary	
competition	enforcer	in	the	Union.	This	calls	into	question	the	principle	of	institutional	
balance	in	the	European	Union	on	the	supranational	level,	and	‘diagonally’	between	
executive	agencies	and	courts	between	the	supranational	and	national	levels.	(I	use	the	
term	‘diagonal’	in	reference	to	the	diagram	in	section	5	of	this	chapter.)	This	is	especially	
so	given	the	concurrent	competences	in	the	post‐2004	system.	
	
	
2.	Research	questions	
	
The	overarching	research	question	is:		
	
 What	are	the	constitutional	implications	of	interaction	between	courts	and	
administrative	authorities,	between	the	supranational	and	national	levels,	in	EU	
competition	law	enforcement?	
	
Deriving	from	that,	with	a	focus	on	the	role	of	courts,	
	
 What	impact	do	the	2004	and	more	recent	competition	reforms	have	on	national	
courts	and	judicial	autonomy?		
                                                 
14 “Rules of conduct that are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed legally binding 
force as such, but nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal effects, and that are aimed at and may 
produce practical effects.”: L Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart, 2004), 112, 
developed from F Snyder, ‘The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, 
Tools and Techniques’ (1993) 56(1) Modern Law Review 19-54, 32: “rules of conduct which, in 
principle, have no legally binding force but which nevertheless may have practical effects.” 
15 See, for example, W Wils, ‘The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the 
Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis’ (2004) 27(2) 
World Competition 201-224 
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 How	can	and	does	the	European	Commission	impact	on	judicial	decision‐making	at	
the	national	level?			
 To	what	extent	does	the	European	Commission	challenge,	or	complement,	the	
judicial	role	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union?		
	
 Taken	together,	how	does	the	interaction	of	different	mechanisms	for	coherent	
interpretation	and	application	of	EU	competition	law	impact	on	the	relationship	
between	judicial	and	administrative	authorities?	
	
	
3.	Contributions	of	the	thesis	
	
This	thesis	responds	to	a	recognised	need	for	research	into	how	institutions	interact	in	the	
post‐2004	competition	enforcement	system	in	the	European	Union.16		It	addresses	the	
constitutional	consequences	of	the	methods	for	ensuring	coherent	interpretation	and	
effective	application	of	the	EU	competition	rules,	through	case	studies	on	the	interaction	
between	judicial	and	administrative	authorities	at	the	supranational	and	national	levels.	
Going	further,	it	investigates	the	impact	of	the	interaction	between	those	tools.	Given	its	
institutional	focus	on	the	relationships	between	courts	and	executive	agencies,	the	thesis	
has	significance	for	EU	law	and	governance	more	broadly	beyond	competition	law.		
	
This	thesis	takes	forward	the	understanding	of	the	relatively	new	concept	of	interpretative	
pluralism17		through	case	studies.	Chapter	2	lays	out	this	theoretical	context	by	linking	this	
with	the	traditional	EU	principle	of	institutional	balance	and	with	the	role	of	judges	in	
ensuring	coherence.	Interpretative	pluralism	–	an	aspect	of	constitutional	pluralism	–	
suggests	that	there	is	a	heterarchy	rather	than	a	hierarchy	of	interpretations	of	law	in	the	
EU	system,	notwithstanding	the	position	of	the	CJEU	as	ultimate	interpreter	of	EU	law.	
This	makes	some	sense	in	a	system	of	concurrent	competences	such	as	in	the	post‐2004	
competition	enforcement	regime.	As	coined	by	Maduro,	it	means	that	courts	do	not	have	a	
monopoly	on	the	interpretation	of	the	law	and	that	no	one	institution	needs	to	have	the	
last	word.	The	case	studies	investigate	the	plausibility	of	this	idea.	They	also	respond	to	
                                                 
16 K Cseres ‘Editorial: Ten Years of Modernized European Competition Law in Floris Vogelaar’s 
Landmark Notes’ (2010) 37(1) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 1-4, 4:“How institutional designs 
and interactions between various institutional actors enforcing competition law influence effective 
enforcement merits further research...Institutional actors matter, not only how they individually enforce 
the law but also how they are linked to each other…” 
17 M Poiares Maduro, ‘Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional 
Pluralism’ (2007) 1(2) European Journal of Legal Studies 1-21; J Komarek ‘The Institutional Dimension 
of Constitutional Pluralism’ in M Avbelj & J Komarek (eds) Constitutional Pluralism in Europe and 
Beyond (Hart 2011) 231-247 
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Komarek’s	observation	that	research	on	courts’	deference	to	administrative	agencies’	
interpretation	of	the	law	“seems	to	be	entirely	missing	in	the	EU.”18		However	the	case	
studies	in	this	thesis	suggest	that	the	findings	and	interpretation	of	competition	
authorities	(the	majority	of	which	are	administrative	or	quasi‐judicial	authorities19),	
particularly	the	European	Commission,	have	greater	weight.	The	Commission	can	
influence	interpretation	of	the	competition	rules	in	national	court	proceedings	as	well	as	
in	the	European	Competition	Network,	in	which	the	CJEU	has	handed	over	responsibility.	
Interpretative	pluralism	relates	to	the	concept	of	institutional	balance,	the	EU’s	version	of	
the	separation	of	powers.	If	there	is	an	institutional	hierarchy	of	administrative/executive	
agencies	over	courts	then	this	challenges	the	institutional	balance	and	judicial	autonomy	
at	the	national	level.	A	plurality	of	interpretations	–	and	interpreters	–	of	the	law	suggests	
a	looser	concept	of	unity	or	coherence.	However,	the	interpretation	of	national	judges	is	
supervised.	As	the	case	studies	show,	in	the	decentralised	system	‘coherent’	application	of	
the	rules	appears	to	mean	‘effective’	application.	While	coherence	is	a	central	aspect	of	the	
rule	of	law	as	overseen	by	judges,	effectiveness	can	be	supervised	by	administrative	
authorities.	Traditional	judicial	independence	considerations	are	also	trumped	by	the	
need	for	effectiveness	and	efficiency.	
	
In	addition	to	its	theoretical	contribution,	the	thesis	investigates	the	emerging	practice	in	
the	post‐2004	regime.	This	is	particularly	evident	in	the	contrast	between	chapter	3	on	
NCAs’	apparent	lack	of	access	to	the	CJEU,	and	chapter	4	on	European	Commission	
intervention	in	national	court	proceedings.	Chapter	4	sets	out	a	detailed	presentation	of	
how	Article	15	Regulation	1/2003	operates,	tracking	all	cases	in	which	the	Commission	
has	provided	an	opinion	or	intervened	in	national	judicial	proceedings.	This	shows	the	
shape	of	the	Commission’s	role	in	the	decentralised	system.	In	addition,	with	the	potential	
for	private	enforcement	in	national	courts	increased,	it	is	important	to	investigate	what	
actually	happens	in	the	Member	States.	More	broadly,	it	contributes	to	knowledge	on	how	
EU	law	is	applied	in	Member	State	courts.		
	
The	thesis	is	informed	by	original	research	into	the	travaux	préparatoires	behind	
Regulation	1/2003	and	its	accompanying	package	of	notices	and	guidelines,	the	basis	of	
the	reforms	which	came	into	force	on	1	May	2004.	This	research	involved	consulting	
drafts	and	documents	relating	to	the	negotiations	in	the	Council	of	the	European	Union	
                                                 
18 J Komarek ‘The Institutional Dimension of Constitutional Pluralism’ in M Avbelj & J Komarek (eds) 
Constitutional Pluralism in Europe and Beyond (Hart 2011) 231-247 
19 Although some are courts acting in a public enforcement capacity – this is discussed in more detail in 
chapter 3. 
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available	through	the	Council’s	database.20	Although	deliberations	in	the	Council	are	
usually	secret,	it	is	possible	to	discover	individual	Member	States’	positions	on	particular	
articles	through	footnote	annotations	in	these	publicly	available	documents.	The	
documents	also	include	European	Commission	staff	working	papers	communicated	to	the	
Council,	which	often	give	further	details	of	particular	proposals.	Chapter	5	also	considers	
the	consultative	process	behind	the	forthcoming	EU	directive	on	damages	actions	through	
consideration	of	the	responses	to	the	2008	White	Paper	on	damages	actions.21	
	
Various	parts	of	the	thesis	also	draw	on	a	series	of	semi‐structured	interviews	with	EU	and	
national	officials	on	the	processes	leading	to	the	reforms;	and	on	experiences	in	the	first	
few	years	of	the	European	Competition	Network.		These	interviews	were	carried	out	in	the	
context	of	another	project	at	the	ESRC	Centre	for	Competition	Policy,	and	were	co‐
designed	and	co‐conducted	with	Prof	Hussein	Kassim.22		
	
The	thesis	also	uses	original	diagrams	to	illustrate	some	concepts.	As	a	framework,	the	
interinstitutional	relationships	discussed	in	the	thesis	are	conceptualised	in	the	original	
diagram	below	in	part	5	of	this	Introduction.		
	
	
4.	Methodology	
	
The	thesis	has	doctrinal,	theoretical,	empirical	and	case	study	elements.	The	primary	
approach	is	doctrinal	analysis	of	case	law,	decisional	practice,	legislation	and	policy	
documents.		It	is	based	around	three	case	studies.	A	logical	basis	for	the	selection	of	these	
case	studies	is	shown	through	the	diagram	of	interactions	between	different	institutions	in	
the	competition	enforcement	system.		As	its	theoretical	basis	underlying	the	case	studies,	
the	thesis	draws	on	themes	of	EU	constitutionalism	through	the	concept	of	interpretative	
pluralism,	which	is	especially	relevant	in	the	competition	enforcement	system	of	parallel	
                                                 
20 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/documents?lang=en (accessed 18.8.2006) 
21 White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules COM (2008) 165, 2.4.2008. 
Consultation responses available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments.html  (accessed 
6.7.2010) 
22 The interviews on the reform were carried out between July 2005 and July 2006 and included 20 
interviewees. The interviews on the European Competition Network were carried out between April 2008 
and May 2009 and included 15 interviews. See e.g. H Kassim & K Wright ‘Bringing Regulatory 
Processes Back In: The Reform of EU Antitrust and Merger Control’ (2009) 32(4) West European 
Politics 738-755;	H Kassim and K Wright ‘The European Competition Network: a Regulatory Network 
with a Difference’ Paper presented at European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Standing 
Group on Regulatory Governance, Third Biennial Conference, Dublin, 17-19 June 2010 
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competences,	and	the	EU	principle	of	institutional	balance.	The	thesis	also	benefits	from	
insights	gained	through	empirical	research	in	the	form	of	semi‐structured	elite	interviews.		
	
Regarding	the	research	into	Commission	intervention	in	national	courts,	as	with	any	legal	
research	using	case	law,	it	is	obviously	easier	to	uncover	the	cases	in	which	the	
Commission	has	intervened,	rather	than	those	where	it	has	not.	I	uncovered	23	cases	
where	the	court	had	requested	an	opinion	and	9	where	the	Commission	intervened	at	its	
own	initiative.	It	is	difficult	to	get	an	accurate	picture	of	all	cases	involving	the	EU	
competition	rules,	but	there	are	335	cases	in	the	Commission’s	national	court	judgments	
database.	23	It	is	also	difficult	to	observe	and	measure	the	impact	of	the	Commission’s	
opinion	in	the	national	court	proceedings.	Nevertheless,	it	is	possible	to	make	some	
findings	from	individual	cases.	
	
	
5.	The	interinstitutional	relationships	in	EU	competition	law	enforcement	
	
The	 diagram	 below	 is	 designed	 to	 show	 the	 interinstitutional	 relationships	 in	 EU	
competition	law	enforcement	and	serves	as	a	framework	for	the	case	studies	in	chapters	3,	
4	 and	 5.	 The	 case	 studies	 relate	 to	 the	 diagonal	 links	 between	 the	 supranational	 and	
national	 levels,	 between	 judicial	 and	 executive	 actors;	 and	 the	 horizontal	 link	 at	 the	
national	 level	 which	 is	 affected	 by	 EU	 rules.	 While	 the	 thesis	 concentrates	 on	 these	
interactions,	the	other	interinstitutional	links	are	also	briefly	described	below	to	give	the	
wider	context.	
	
	
                                                 
23 Coverage of cases here is not complete, as acknowledged in the Report on the Functioning of 
Regulation 1/2003 in 2009 (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council: Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003, Brussels 29.4.2009, COM (2009) 206 final). 
However, it is the most reliable overview. 
10 
 
	
Fig	1.	The	institutional	system	of	EU	competition	law	enforcement	[original	in	colour]	
	
Key:		
Com	–	European	Commission	
DG	COMP	–	European	Commission	Directorate	General	for	Competition	
GC	–	General	Court	of	the	European	Union		
CJEU	–	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	
Prelim	refs	–	Preliminary	references	under	Article	267	TFEU		
Nat	cts	–	national	courts		
NCAs	–	national	competition	authorities	
ECN	–	European	Competition	Network	
‘Masterfoods’	and	‘Syfait’	refer	to	cases	
	
	
European	 Commission‐General	 Court/Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 the	 European	 Union:	
judicial	review	
	
The	 General	 Court	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 is	 responsible	 for	 judicial	 review	 of	 the	
European	Commission’s	competition	decisions.	Under	Article	263	TFEU	an	affected	firm	or	
individual	 may	 apply	 to	 the	 General	 Court	 for	 annulment	 of	 a	 Commission	 decision	
relating	to	Articles	101	or	102	TFEU	or	 to	Regulation	1/2003.	The	Court	of	 Justice	 itself	
hears	cases	on	points	of	law	on	appeal	from	the	General	Court.	Through	judicial	review	the	
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EU	 courts	 imbue	 the	 Commission	 with	 the	 values	 and	 standards	 it	 should	 use	 in	 its	
decision‐making,	 for	 example,	 the	 standard	 of	 proof	 for	 finding	 an	 infringement.	 On	
appeal,	the	CJEU’s	concern	may	be	overall	coherence	of	competition	law	with	EU	law.	
	
This	relationship	is	affected	by	decentralisation	only	insofar	as	decisions	which	may	have	
been	 taken	by	 the	Commission,	 subject	 to	 review	at	 the	Community	 level,	 could	now	be	
taken	at	the	national	level	by	an	NCA,	subject	to	review	in	a	national	court.	Atanasiu	and	
Ehlermann	argue	that	this	implies	a	qualitative	impact	‐	a	higher	standard	of	review	and	
closer	scrutiny	of	Commission	decisions.24		
	
	
Commission‐National	 Competition	 Authorities;	 National	 Competition	 Authorities	
among	themselves:	European	Competition	Network	
	
The	 relationships	 between	 the	 European	 Commission	 and	 NCAs	 and	 NCAs	 amongst	
themselves	are	managed	within	the	European	Competition	Network.	NCAs	are	obliged	to	
apply	 EU	 competition	 law	 alongside	 national	 competition	 law	 where	 trade	 between	
Member	States	 is	affected.	Article	3	Regulation	1/2003	encapsulates	a	convergence	rule:	
an	NCA	may	not	allow	a	practice	which	is	prohibited	by	Article	101	or	102.	If	practice	is	
not	prohibited	under	Article	101,	an	NCA	cannot	apply	stricter	national	rules	to	prohibit	it	
(but	a	Member	State	may	choose	to	apply	stricter	standards	in	relation	to	conduct	covered	
by	Article	102).	NCAs	cannot	contradict	or	overrule	an	existing	Commission	decision	(Art	
16(2)).	Only	the	Commission	can	make	an	EU‐wide	finding	that	Article	101	or	102	is	not	
applicable	to	a	practice,	which	binds	all	national	competition	authorities	(Art	10).		
	
Regulation	1/2003	and	the	Network	Notice25	also	incorporate	mechanisms	for	consistent	
application	of	the	rules	and	for	case	allocation	and	cooperation	amongst	members	of	the	
Network.	 These	 include	 informing	 each	 other	 when	 opening	 an	 investigation	 or	 before	
adopting	 a	 decision	 (article	 11(3)	 and	 (4)	 respectively).	 The	 case	 allocation	 rules	 are	
based	on	 the	notion	 of	 the	 ‘well	 placed	 to	 act’	 competition	 authority.26	The	Commission	
retains	 the	power	 to	 relieve	an	NCA	of	 its	 competence	by	 initiating	 its	own	proceedings	
                                                 
24 I Atanasiu & C-D Ehlermann ‘The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law: Consequences for the Future 
Role and Function of the EC Courts’ (2002) 23(2) European Competition Law Review 72-80, at 72-3: 
“…direct applicability of Article [101(3) TFEU] will oblige the European courts to switch from the self-
imposed limited control exercised under the current [pre-2004] system to a normal-standard type of 
judicial review.” 
25 Commission Notice of 27 April 2004 on cooperation within the network of competition authorities, OJ 
C 101, 27.04.2004, 43-53 
26 Network notice [8]-[15] 
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under	Article	11(6)	in	exceptional	cases.27	Where	relevant	these	rules	are	discussed	in	the	
case	study	chapters.		
	
	
National	courts	among	themselves:	(potential)	judicial	cooperation	mechanisms	
	
There	are	no	formal	links	among	national	judges	in	competition	law	enforcement.	There	is	
scope	for	cooperation	through	soft	fora	such	as	the	Association	of	European	Competition	
Law	Judges,28	in	which	members	meet	to	exchange	best	practice	rather	than	to	cooperate	
in	specific	cases.	The	Commission	provides	funding	for	training	judges	in	developments	in	
EU	competition	law	and	assessing	economic	evidence.	This	thesis	suggests	that	horizontal	
judicial	cooperation,	led	by	judges	themselves,	should	be	strengthened	to	enhance	the	role	
of	 courts	 relative	 to	 competition	 authorities	 and	 to	 make	 EU‐wide	 enforcement	 more	
effective.	 More	 broadly,	 the	 Brussels	 I	 Regulation	 deals	 with	 recognition	 of	 judgments	
from	other	Member	States	in	civil	and	commercial	proceedings.29		
	
	
Court	of	Justice‐national	courts:	preliminary	reference	procedure	
	
The	link	between	the	CJEU	and	the	national	courts,	and	the	primary	tool	for	the	consistent	
interpretation	 of	 EU	 law	 throughout	 the	 Member	 States,	 is	 the	 preliminary	 reference	
procedure.	Through	the	doctrine	of	direct	effect,	national	courts	are	also	EU	courts.30	The	
CJEU	is	not	involved	in	day‐to‐day	enforcement	of	EU	competition	law,	but	is	the	ultimate	
interpreter	 of	 Articles	 101	 and	 102	 of	 the	 Treaty	 and	 related	 legislation.	 This	 judicial	
relationship	 is	 not	 directly	 affected	 by	 the	 2004	 reforms.	 Several	 commentators	
hypothesised	 that	 decentralised	 enforcement	 would	 lead	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 preliminary	
references,31	 but	 it	may	 still	 be	 too	 early	 to	 say	whether	 an	 increase	 has	materialised.32	
                                                 
27 Network notice [54] 
28 http://www.aeclj.com/ (accessed 9.12.2011) 
29 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 012, 16.01.2001, 1 
30 A-M Slaughter,  A Stone Sweet and J Weiler (eds), The European Courts and National Courts: 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart,1997)  particularly Karen Alter’s contribution, ‘Explaining National 
Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal 
Integration’ , 227;  I Maher ‘National Courts as European Community Courts’ (1994) 14(2) Legal Studies 
226-243 
31 I Atanasiu & C-D Ehlermann ‘The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law: Consequences for the Future 
Role and Function of the EC Courts’ (2002) 23(2) European Competition Law Review 72-80; K Lenaerts 
& D Gerard ‘Decentralisation of EC Competition Law Enforcement: Judges in the Frontline’ (2004) 
27(3) World Competition 313-349 
32 A team led by Barry Rodger carried out a multinational study of preliminary references in competition 
law only up until the 2004 reforms: B J Rodger (ed) Article 234 and Competition Law: An Analysis  
(Kluwer, 2008) 
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One	 potential	 factor	 in	 this	 respect	 is	 the	 opportunity	 for	 national	 judges	 to	 ask	 the	
European	Commission	for	an	opinion,	as	discussed	in	chapter	4.		
	
	 	 	
*Commission‐national	courts:	obligations	in	case	law;	Article	15	Reg	1/2003	
	
This	 relationship	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 chapter	 4.	 Article	 6	 Regulation	 1/2003	 explicitly	
provides	that	national	courts	shall	have	the	power	to	apply	Articles	101	and	102	TFEU	in	
their	 entirety.	 Before	 the	 reforms,	 only	 the	 Commission	 was	 empowered	 to	 grant	
exemptions	 under	 Article	 101(3),	 making	 it	 difficult	 for	 national	 courts	 to	 conclusively	
rule	on	a	case.	If	the	national	judge	took	the	view	that	individual	exemption	was	possible	
in	the	case,	s/he	was	meant	to	suspend	the	proceedings	until	the	Commission	had	made	a	
decision,	 whilst	 being	 free	 to	 adopt	 interim	 measures	 in	 the	 meantime.	 Where	 the	
Commission	closed	proceedings	by	 ‘comfort	letter’	to	the	parties	rather	than	by	a	formal	
decision,	the	national	court	was	not	formally	bound	but	had	to	take	that	letter	into	account	
in	 determining	 whether	 the	 agreement	 or	 conduct	 in	 question	 infringed	 what	 is	 now	
Article	101.33		To	minimise	divergence	in	the	decentralised	application	of	Articles	101	and	
102	 (and	 especially	 the	 exempting	 conditions	 under	 101(3)),	 the	 convergence	 rule	
mentioned	above	in	relation	to	the	Commission	and	NCAs	(Art	3	Reg	1/2003)	also	applies	
to	national	courts.		
	
Article	15	of	Regulation	1/2003,	provides	for	the	European	Commission’s	intervention	in	
national	 court	proceedings.	Member	State	courts	may	ask	 the	European	Commission	 for	
information	 or	 for	 its	 opinion	 on	 questions	 concerning	 the	 application	 of	 the	 EC	
competition	 rules	 (15(1)).	 The	 European	 Commission	 and	 national	 competition	
authorities	may	also	make	own‐initiative	written	interventions,	and	oral	submissions	with	
the	permission	of	the	judge,	in	legal	proceedings	between	private	parties	(15(3)).		Chapter	
4	investigates	how	this	tool	has	been	used	so	far.	
	
The	Masterfoods	CJEU	judgment,34	codified	in	Article	16	of	the	Regulation,	established	that	
where	the	Commission	reaches	a	decision	in	a	particular	case	prior	to	the	national	court,	
the	court	cannot	take	a	decision	running	counter	to	that	of	the	Commission.	There	is	also	a	
duty	to	avoid	adopting	a	decision	that	would	conflict	with	a	decision	contemplated	by	the	
Commission,	 which	 goes	 further	 than	 NCAs’	 obligations	 not	 to	 counter	 an	 existing	
decision.	This	means	that	where	the	Commission	finds	an	infringement,	it	must	be	treated	
                                                 
33 Case 99/79 Lancôme v Etos (1980) ECR 2511 [11] 
34 C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd (t/a Mars Ireland) v HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000] ECR I-11369 [60] 
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as	proof	of	the	existence	of	the	infringement	in	national	court	proceedings.	An	extension	of	
this	effect	to	NCA	decisions	is	also	discussed	in	chapter	5.	
	
	
*Court	 of	 Justice‐National	 Competition	 Authorities:	 (potential)	 preliminary	
reference	procedure	
	
This	relationship	is	the	subject	of	chapter	3.	As	discussed	above,	the	preliminary	reference	
procedure	is	a	link	between	the	CJEU	and	national	courts.	Article	267	TFEU	provides	that	a	
‘court	 or	 tribunal’	 may	 address	 a	 reference	 to	 the	 CJEU.	 ‘Court	 or	 tribunal’	 is	 an	
autonomous	concept	of	EU	law,	and	does	not	rely	on	how	an	authority	is	designated	in	the	
Member	State.	This	raises	the	question	of	whether	a	competition	authority	as	an	executive	
agency	with	judicial	functions	such	as	ability	to	find	an	infringement	and	to	impose	fines,	
has	access	to	the	CJEU	through	the	preliminary	reference	procedure.			
	
	
*National	Competition	Authorities‐national	 courts:	national	 law,	but	EU	proposals	
affect	this	relationship	
	
Aspects	of	 this	 relationship	are	discussed	 in	chapter	5.	 It	 is	 important	 to	distinguish	 the	
different	capacities	of	national	courts	in	competition	law	enforcement.	They	may	act	in	a	
public	 enforcement	 role	 as	 a	 designated	 competition	 authority;35	 as	 civil	 courts	 called	
upon	to	apply	the	competition	rules	 in	disputes	between	parties	 in	private	enforcement;	
or	as	appeal	or	review	courts.	The	relationship	between	a	national	competition	authority	
and	 court	within	 the	 same	Member	 State	 is	 largely	 a	matter	 for	 national	 law.	However,	
some	EU	obligations	do	 impinge	on	 this	 relationship.36	For	example,	Art	15	Reg	1/2003	
confers	on	NCAs,	as	well	as	the	Commission,	the	possibility	to	intervene	in	their	domestic	
jurisdiction	in	court	cases	between	private	parties	on	issues	relating	to	the	application	of	
Art	101	or	102	TFEU.	National	rules	must	facilitate	this	possibility.	In	addition,	the	White	
Paper	on	damages	actions	includes	a	proposal	for	the	cross‐border	binding	effect	of	NCA	
decisions	on	civil	courts	throughout	the	EU:	the	focus	of	chapter	5.	
                                                 
35 Under Art 35 Reg 1/2003 “Member States shall designate the competition authority or authorities 
responsible for the application of Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty in such a way that the provisions 
of  this regulation are effectively complied with…. The authorities designated may include courts.” 
36 See e.g. the recent Belgian case of VEBIC, C-439/08 Vlaamse Federatie van Verenigingen van Brood- 
en Banketbakkers, Ijsbereiders en Chocoladebewerkers (VEBIC) v Raad voor de Mededinging, Minister 
van Economie [2010] ECR I-0000, in which the CJEU found that national law is contrary to EU law if it 
does not give an NCA the possibility to participate in review proceedings against its own competition 
decisions. 
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6.	Outline	of	the	thesis	
	
Chapter	2	lays	the	basis	for	the	case	studies	in	the	subsequent	three	chapters	by	exploring	
the	relatively	new	concept	of	interpretative	pluralism,	linked	with	the	established	EU	
principle	of	institutional	balance.	Interpretative	pluralism	suggests	that	there	is	a	
heterarchy,	rather	than	a	hierarchy,	of	interpretations	of	law	in	the	EU	system.	This	is	
relevant	in	a	system	of	concurrent	competences	such	as	in	the	post‐2004	competition	
enforcement	regime,	in	which	consistent	application	of	the	rules	is	important	for	the	
effectiveness	of	the	system,	but	various	courts	and	administrative	authorities	with	quasi‐
judicial	functions	enforce	the	law	and	have	different	claims	to	authority.		The	principle	of	
institutional	balance	is	the	EU’s	version	of	the	separation	of	powers	at	the	supranational	
level,	but	the	functions	of	legislative,	executive	and	judiciary	are	not	vested	in	respective	
single	institutions.	It	is	questionable	whether	there	can	be	a	‘diagonal’	institutional	
balance	between	the	supranational	and	the	national	levels,	which	activates	the	judicial	
autonomy	of	Member	State	courts.	However,	there	is	a	duty	of	loyal	cooperation	between	
the	EU	institutions	and	authorities	and	courts	at	the	sub‐state	level.			
	
Chapters	3‐5	are	the	case	studies	exploring	the	effects	of	tools	for	coherence	on	the	
interactions	between	courts	and	administrative	authorities.	Chapter	3	considers	the	
diagonal	relationship	between	national	competition	authorities	and	the	Court	of	Justice	
through	their	(lack	of)	access	to	the	Court’s	preliminary	reference	procedure	under	Art	
267	TFEU.		The	preliminary	reference	procedure	is	important	as	the	primary	means	for	
encouraging	coherence	of	EU	law	through	the	CJEU’s	interpretation.	It	first	sets	the	context	
by	surveying	the	post‐2004	landscape	of	EU	competition	law	enforcement,	in	particular	
multiple	enforcers	and	the	challenge	of	consistent	application	of	antitrust	rules	in	
decentralised	enforcement;	and	the	quasi‐judicial	nature	of	competition	enforcement	
undertaken	by	these	multiple	enforcers.	It	goes	on	to	consider	the	Member	States’	
designation	of	institutional	structures	for	public	enforcement	of	competition	law	under	
Article	35	Regulation	1/2003	and	assesses	the	significance	of	these	designations	for	
obligations	under	Reg	1/2003.		Then	the	discussion	turns	from	the	designation	of	courts	
or	administrative	agencies	as	competition	authorities	at	the	national	level,	to	the	criteria	
in	the	EU’s	autonomous	definition	of	a	‘court	or	tribunal’	for	the	purposes	of	the	
preliminary	reference	procedure.	It	considers	how	the	CJEU	including	its	Advocates	
General	have	defined	and	developed	the	concept	through	specific,	albeit	occasionally	
flexible,	criteria.	These	criteria	are	important	for	determining	which	national	bodies	have	
access	to	the	CJEU’s	advice	and	interpretation	of	the	law.	Of	particular	relevance	are	the	
need	for	the	referring	body	to	have	an	inter	partes	procedure	i.e.	to	be	a	third	party	
16 
 
adjudicator	between	the	parties,	to	be	independent,	and	to	have	compulsory	jurisdiction	
leading	to	a	decision	of	a	judicial	nature.		
	
The	chapter	focuses	on	the	Syfait	case37	in	which	the	Greek	Competition	Commission,	as	a	
competition	authority	with	integrated	investigative	and	adjudicative	functions,	addressed	
a	reference	to	the	CJEU	but	was	ultimately	refused.	The	chapter	analyses	whether	the	
judgment	bars	all	NCAs	from	access	to	the	CJEU.		The	analysis	focuses	on	first	the	CJEU’s	
interpretation	of	the	independence	criterion	and	secondly	the	Court’s	reasoning	that	the	
Commission	may	always	potentially	relieve	an	NCA	of	its	competence	under	Article	11(6)	
Regulation	1/2003,	implying	that	proceedings	initiated	before	the	NCA	will	not	necessarily	
culminate	in	a	‘decision	of	a	judicial	nature’.		In	practice	this	latter	criterion	could	bar	
references	from	all	NCAs,	since	they	are	all	subject	to	Art	11(6)	within	the	European	
Competition	Network.	The	chapter	argues	that	the	CJEU’s	judgment	was	flawed	as	the	
effects	of	Art	11(6)	apply	only	to	the	prosecuting	authority,	according	to	Art	35(4)	
Regulation	1/2003.	In	addition	the	Commission	had	not	in	practice	activated	Art	11(6).	
However,	even	if	the	legal	argument	can	be	made	for	the	Court	to	accept	preliminary	
references	from	NCAs,	it	is	argued	that	the	message	sent	in	Syfait	has	effectively	frozen	
them	and	the	Court	has	curtailed	its	own	jurisdiction.		
	
There	is	certainly	a	bias	towards	dualist	NCAs	i.e.	those	which	separate	their	investigative	
and	decision‐making	functions.	Integrated	administrative	NCAs,	the	most	prevalent	NCA	
model	in	the	EU,	have	an	extra	hurdle	to	overcome	because	they	do	not	have	the	structural	
separation	of	functions	required	to	meet	the	independence	requirement.	As	a	result	they	
do	not	have	the	same	opportunity	to	seek	guidance	from	the	CJEU.		A	consequence	of	this	
is	uneven	access	to	the	judicial	tool	of	the	preliminary	reference	procedure,	dependent	on	
institutional	structure.		
	
As	a	result,	Chapter	3	finds	that	there	are	asymmetric	avenues	to	the	supranational	level	
for	national	courts	and	competition	authorities.	From	the	CJEU’s	perspective,	it	seems	
motivated	to	preserve	its	dialogue	between	courts	only	and	to	exclude	quasi‐judicial	NCAs	
with	integrated	functions.	This	may	be	to	manage	its	own	caseload.	However,	if	the	CJEU	
adopts	a	narrow	definition	of	a	court	or	tribunal,	it	constrains	its	own	jurisdiction.	By	
emphasising	in	Syfait	that	NCAs	are	required	to	work	in	close	cooperation	with	the	
Commission	in	the	context	of	the	European	Competition	Network,	the	CJEU	effectively	
                                                 
37 C-53/03 Synetairismos Farmakopion Aitolias & Akarnanias (Syfait) v GlaxoSmithkline Plc [2005] ECR 
I-4609  
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passes	over	responsibility	to	the	Commission	for	how	NCAs	should	interpret	and	apply	
competition	law.	
	
Meanwhile,	the	European	Commission,	as	a	supranational	administrative	authority	with	
quasi‐judicial	functions,	has	extended	its	sphere	of	influence	by	strengthening	its	links	
with	national	courts.	Chapter	4	investigates	this	other	diagonal	relationship.	Previously,	
the	Court	of	Justice’s	preliminary	reference	procedure,	a	‘dialogue	between	courts’,	was	
the	only	formal	link	between	the	courts	of	the	Member	States	and	the	supranational	level.		
Chapter	4	shows	how	the	European	Commission	has	added	to	this	general	(EU	law)	
institutional	link	through	the	specific	(to	competition	law)	instrument	of	opinions	and	
own‐initiative	interventions	to	national	courts	in	competition	cases,	under	Art	15	Reg	
1/2003.	This	is	placed	within	the	context	of	the	broader	relationship	between	the	
European	Commission	and	national	judges	in	EU	competition	law	through	case	law,	in	
particular	the	effect	of	Commission	decisions	and	other	pronouncements	on	national	
courts.	Informed	by	original	research	into	the	legislative	background	of	Art	15	Reg	
1/2003,	it	explains	how	this	tool	is	designed	in	the	absence	of	a	formal	judicial	network	to	
promote	consistent	application	following	decentralisation.		Chapter	4	argues	that	this	
raises	constitutional	questions	about	the	effect	of	concurrent	competences	on	the	
institutional	balance	at	the	supranational	level	between	the	Commission	and	the	Court	of	
Justice,	and	diagonally	in	terms	of	the	effect	on	national	judicial	autonomy.		
	
The	discussion	takes	both	a	theoretical	and	a	practical	approach.	Through	the	soft	law	
literature,	the	theoretical	element	examines	the	legal	nature	of	the	Commission	opinion	as	
an	EU	instrument.	It	argues	that	the	Commission’s	opinion	in	this	context	is	a	unique	
instrument	and	as	such	its	legal	effects	are	uncertain.	It	does	not	fit	easily	into	the	category	
of	soft	law	instruments	establishing	‘rules	of	conduct.’	However,	it	could	become	binding	
through	the	national	court’s	judgment.	After	exploring	the	theoretical	context,	the	chapter	
contributes	original	research	on	how	Art	15	works	in	practice.	It	seeks	to	trace	all	of	the	
opinions	and	own‐initiative	interventions	to	date.	The	chapter	reports	23	opinions	under	
Art	15(1)	and	9	interventions	under	Art	15(3),	with	varying	degrees	of	success	in	
identifying	the	parties	and	how	the	opinion	was	dealt	with	by	the	national	court.		The	
chapter	finds	a	de	facto	third	category	between	Art	15(1)	and	15(3):	cases	in	which	the	
Commission	was	‘invited’	to	intervene	but	no	specific	questions	were	put	to	it.	In	relation	
to	Art	15(3),	the	chapter	discusses	the	Commission’s	reason	for	intervention	(where	this	
can	be	observed)	and	whether	the	national	judge	followed	the	Commission.	
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The	preliminary	ruling	in	X	BV	is	analysed	in	detail,	as	it	relates	to	the	admissibility	of	Art	
15(3)	interventions.	The	CJEU’s	response	gives	the	Commission	wide	scope	to	intervene	in	
a	national	court	case	related	to	the	effective	application	of	Articles	101	and	102	TFEU,	
even	if	the	court	is	not	directly	applying	them.	Chapter	4	finds	that	the	case	suggests	an	
emphasis	on	effective	–	not	only	coherent	‐	application	of	the	EU	rules,	and	that	it	implies	
that	a	Commission	intervention	could	extend	to	national	cases	concerning,	for	example,	
contract	disputes,	follow‐on	damages	actions,	or	criminal	proceedings	‐	not	initially	
intended	by	Regulation	1/2003.		
	
Chapter	4	calls	for	transparency	through	the	publication	of	observations,	ideally	in	
different	language	versions.	Some	interventions	are	available	on	the	Commission’s	
website,	but	they	are	not	formally	published,	for	example	in	the	Official	Journal.	The	
Commission	has	made	available	most	of	its	own‐initiative	observations.	These	are	the	
cases	in	which	it	has	felt	compelled	to	intervene,	and	so	represent	competition	issues	
which	it	finds	to	be	most	important	for	coherent	application.	As	such	it	is	in	the	
Commission’s	interest	to	publish	them.	By	contrast,	only	around	a	quarter	of	the	opinions	
requested	by	national	courts	under	15(1)	have	been	publicised.	This	lack	of	transparency	
raises	questions	about	the	‘back	door’	influence	of	these	opinions	in	the	judicial	
proceedings.	Publication	would	contribute	to	legal	certainty	and	consistent	application	
throughout	the	EU,	also	by	promoting	awareness	among	judges	of	cases	in	other	Member	
States.		
	
Art	15(3)	Reg	1/2003	also	allows	national	competition	authorities	to	intervene	in	national	
judicial	proceedings	in	their	own	Member	State.	Together	with	the	proposal	discussed	in	
chapter	5,	that	could	bring	national	courts	indirectly	into	the	European	Competition	
Network.		That	could	have	positive	benefits	for	the	consistent	application	of	the	EU	
competition	rules,	but	also	brings	judicial	autonomy	into	question.	Chapter	5	discusses	the	
proposal	in	the	forthcoming	EU	directive	on	damages	actions	to	introduce	the	binding	
effect	of	national	competition	authorities’	decision	on	national	courts	throughout	the	EU.		
The	chapter	first	explains	the	context	of	the	rule	‐	to	incentivise	claimants	to	bring	private	
enforcement	cases	in	civil	courts	by	alleviating	their	burden	to	prove	an	infringement	–	
and	its	scope.		It	then	goes	on	to	highlight	its	much	broader	constitutional	significance	in	
terms	of	the	interaction	between	judicial	and	administrative	institutions	and	their	
decisions.	It	argues	that	the	proposed	rule	creates	an	apparent	hierarchy	of	administrative	
decisions	over	court	judgments,	narrowing	the	field	of	civil	courts’	jurisdiction.	It	also	
implies	a	certain	burden	on	judges:	that	civil	courts	must	be	aware	of	all	NCA	infringement	
decisions	throughout	EU	‐	and	show	that	they	are	taken	into	account	in	their	reasoning.		
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This	chapter	demonstrates	the	asymmetric	effects	deriving	from	the	status	of	civil	courts	
and	national	competition	authorities.	NCA	decisions	would	be	binding	on	national	courts,	
but	there	would	be	no	similar	horizontal	binding	effect	on	fellow	NCAs	within	the	
European	Competition	Network.	The	assumption	is	that	a	hard	rule	binding	NCA	with	each	
other’s	decisions	is	not	needed	given	the	cooperation	rules	within	the	ECN,	but	there	is	no	
guarantee	that	the	ECN	will	continue	to	operate	according	to	these	rules.	There	are	also	
possible	uneven	effects	concerning	Member	States’	courts	being	bound	by	decisions	of	a	
foreign	NCA	but	not	by	those	of	the	domestic	NCA.		
	
The	chapter	considers	the	basis	for	this	rule.	Explicitly,	it	is	an	extension	of	Masterfoods	,	
which	obliges	EU	Member	State	courts	not	to	make	a	ruling	running	counter	to	one	made	
or	contemplated	by	the	European	Commission.	As	such	the	chapter	revisits	the	different	
understandings	of	Masterfoods.	The	chapter	argues	that	the	binding	effect	rule	could	be	
understood	as	a	delegation,	or	devolution,	of	the	Commission’s	enforcement	powers.	But	if	
national	courts	are	also	EU	courts,	in	the	system	of	concurrent	competences,	national	
judges’	interpretation	of	EU	law	is	as	valid	as	the	Commission’s,	and	by	extension	an	
NCA’s.	
	
The	chapter	also	examines	the	horizontal	duty	of	loyal	cooperation	between	sub‐state	
bodies,	and	the	analogy	with	the	Brussels	I	Regulation	on	jurisdiction	and	recognition	of	
judgments	between	Member	States.		It	argues	that	the	binding	effect	rule	should	have	at	
least	the	same	safeguards	as	Art	34(1)	Brussels	Reg,	which	would	allow	a	civil	court	to	
refuse	to	recognise	an	authority’s	decisions	in	exceptional	circumstances	.	If	this	were	not	
the	case,	decisions	of	administrative	bodies	would	be	afforded	a	privileged	position	
relative	to	judgments	of	civil	courts	–	another	example	of	asymmetric	effects.	However,	
questioning	other	Member	States’	compatibility	with	fair	legal	process	standards	may	
undermine	trust	currently	fostered	in	the	ECN.		
	
The	chapter	concludes	with	an	assessment	of	the	possibility	of	the	rule	being	adopted,	
including	issues	surrounding	legal	base	of	the	directive	and	views	in	the	Member	States.	
The	proposal	clearly	has	benefits	in	terms	of	alleviating	the	burden	of	proof	on	claimants	
seeking	redress	for	competition	damages.	However,	currently	the	only	Member	State	to	
impose	the	binding	effect	of	foreign	NCA	decisions	is	Germany.	In	a	number	of	Member	
States	there	would	need	to	be	constitutional	reform	for	the	rule	to	be	adopted.		The	
chapter	suggests	that	one	way	around	this	may	be	a	semantic	one	–	packaging	the	finding	
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of	infringement	as	an	‘irrebuttable	presumption’	as	at	least	a	symbolic	gesture	to	
independence	of	the	judiciary.		In	particular,	the	word	‘binding’	should	be	avoided.		
	
Chapter	6	concludes	by	arguing	that	national	courts	should	develop	their	horizontal	
relationships,	both	to	promote	coherent	application	of	EU	competition	law	and	to	
safeguard	their	own	autonomy.	It	also	identifies	directions	for	future	research.		
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CHAPTER	2:	INTERINSTITUTIONAL	THEMES	
	
1.	Introduction		
	
This	chapter	lays	the	basis	for	the	case	studies	to	follow.	The	thesis	explores	interaction	
between	courts	and	administrative	authorities	in	the	post‐2004	EU	competition	law	
enforcement	regime.	This	chapter	therefore	discusses	the	significance	of	coherence	in	the	
system,	the	concept	of	interpretative	pluralism	in	a	system	of	concurrent	competences,	
and	how	this	relates	to	the	European	Union	principle	of	institutional	balance.	
	
The	thesis	explores	these	institutional	interactions	by	investigating	the	operation	of	tools	
for	coherence	in	the	decentralised	system.	Consistent	application	of	the	competition	rules	
is	important	given	the	centrality	of	competition	to	the	internal	market.	However,	a	system	
of	concurrent	competence	suggests	that	all	institutions’	interpretations	of	the	law	are	
valid.	The	chapter	therefore	takes	forward	the	understanding	of	the	concept	of	
interpretative	pluralism	in	this	specific	context.	Interpretative	pluralism	would	suggest	a	
looser	interpretation	of	unity	or	coherence.		
	
Any	discussion	of	the	relationships	between	institutions	and	types	of	authority	also	needs	
to	acknowledge	the	principle	of	institutional	balance,	the	EU’s	version	of	the	separation	of	
powers.	At	the	EU	level,	the	legislative,	executive	and	judicial	functions	are	not	vested	in	
respective	single	institutions.	The	thesis	focuses	particularly	on	the	judicial	and	executive	
functions,	and	judicial	functions	carried	out	by	executive	agencies.	The	Court	of	Justice	of	
the	European	Union	is	responsible	for	the	overall	unity	of	EU	law.	However,	in	competition	
law	the	European	Commission’s	role	has	been	central.	As	the	thesis	also	explores	the	
diagonal	relationships	between	courts	and	administrative	authorities	between	the	
supranational	and	national	levels,	it	must	also	be	asked	whether	a	diagonal	institutional	
balance	is	possible.	The	closest	to	this	is	the	mutual	duty	of	loyal	cooperation	in	EU	law.		
This	links	back	to	interpretative	pluralism,	according	to	which	institutions	should	
accommodate	each	other.	As	coined	by	Maduro,	it	means	that	courts	do	not	have	a	
monopoly	on	the	interpretation	of	the	law	and	that	no	one	institution	needs	to	have	the	
last	word.	The	case	studies	to	follow	in	subsequent	chapters	investigate	the	plausibility	of	
this	idea.	They	also	respond	to	Komarek’s	observation	that	research	into	courts’	deference	
to	administrative	agencies’	interpretation	of	the	law	“seems	to	be	entirely	missing	in	the	
EU.”1		
                                                 
1 J Komarek ‘Institutional Dimension of Constitutional Pluralism’, in M Avbelj & J Komarek (eds) 
Constitutional Pluralism in Europe and Beyond (Hart 2011)  231-247, 235 
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The	chapter	first	considers	the	EU	principles	of	institutional	balance,	and	of	loyal	
cooperation.	It	then	considers	the	(judicial)	function	of	norm	interpretation	and	precedent	
setting	in	safeguarding	different	types	of	coherence,	and	the	CJEU’s	and	Commission’s	
concurrent	functions.	This	includes	a	consideration	of	soft	law.	Finally	the	chapter	
discusses	interpretative	pluralism.	
	
	
2.	The	EU	Principle	of	Institutional	Balance	
	
Institutional	balance	is	a	fundamental	constitutional	principle	as	affirmed	by	the	Court	of	
Justice	in	the	Chernobyl	case:		“Observance	of	the	institutional	balance	means	that	each	of	
the	institutions	must	exercise	its	powers	with	due	regard	for	the	powers	of	the	other	
institutions.”2	However,	its	content	is	not	entirely	clear,	as	Lenaerts	&	Verhoeven	note.3	
This	is	because	the	EU’s	institutional	balance	does	not	rest	on	an	organic	separation	of	
powers	with	each	institution	having	one	function	of	legislature,	executive	or	judiciary.4	
That	means	that	different	institutions	share	functions	–	such	as	the	Commission	and	the	
Court	on	the	supranational	level.	There	is	a	“partial	exercise	of	the	power	of	one	branch	by	
another.”	5		In	the	EU,	“the	classic	constitutional	frontiers	between	executive/legislative/	
judicial	power	[are	blurred]”.6	Discussions	of	institutional	balance	take	in	the	evolving	
roles	of	the	EU	institutions	and	in	particular	the	European	Parliament,	with	the	Court	of	
Justice	as	an	adjudicator	of	the	balance	‐	but	not	as	an	institution	whose	powers	should	be	
taken	into	account	within	it.	It	is	assumed	that	the	Court	guards	the	institutional	balance,7	
but	that	its	own	judicial	role	does	not	need	to	be	balanced	or	protected.	
	
One	understanding	is	that	this	is	based	on	a	balanced	interaction	between	representatives	
of	various	interests.8		First	introduced	by	Pescatore,	this	means	that	the	EU	institutions	
each	encapsulate	legislative,	executive	and	judicial	functions	and	therefore	derive	their	
                                                 
2 Case 70/88 Parliament v Council [1990] ECR I-2041 [21]-[22], also known as the Chernobyl case 
3 K Lenaerts & A Verhoeven ‘Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for Democracy in EU Governance’ in 
C Joerges & R Dehousse (eds) Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (OUP, 2002) 35-88, 35 
4 See e.g.	K	Lenaerts ‘Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the EC’ (1991) 28 Common 
Market Law Review 11-35; S Smismans ‘Institutional Balance as Interest Representation’ in C Joerges & 
R Dehousse (eds) Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market, 89-108, 94; Lenaerts & Verhoeven 
(2002), 47 
5 G Conway ‘Recovering a Separation of Powers in the European Union’ (2011) 17 European Law 
Journal 304-322, 319 
6 A Vauchez ‘Political Sociology of the European Community of Law: Elements of a Renewed Research 
Agenda’, EUI WP RSCAS 2007/23, 6.  
7 E.g. J-P Jacqué ‘The Principle of Institutional Balance’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 383-
392, 385 
8 Lenaerts & Verhoeven (2002) 42.  
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legitimacy	from	four	types	of	interests:	the	common	interest,	the	States,	judicial	values	and	
popular	forces.9		This	interests‐based	approach	allows	consideration	of	different	EU	
governance	structures,	such	as	networks,	which	may	operate	outside	the	traditional	roles	
of	the	EU	institutions.10	In	this	understanding,	checks	and	balances	are	created	by	
“dividing	up	power	by	creating	different	institutions	which	control	each	other	via	
necessary	cooperation.”11		
	
In	the	light	of	these	governance	structures,	it	could	seem	that	the	traditional	separation	of	
powers	is	outdated.	However,	it	is	not	clear	how	these	different	interests	should	be	
mediated,	or	conflicts	resolved	between	them.	Conway	argues	that	the	concept	of	
separation	of	powers	is	still	important.	The	principle	of	institutional	balance	is	too	loosely	
defined	and	there	is	no	way	of	determining	its	correct	application.12		An	examination	of	
institutional	balance	means	“weighing	the	exercise	of	functionally	undefined	power	by	one	
institution	with	its	exercise	by	another.”13	This	becomes	more	complex	where	there	are	
layers	of	institutions	performing	overlapping	roles.	This	affects	accountability.	The	Court	
of	Justice’s	first	reference	to	the	principle	of	institutional	balance	in	Meroni	14	suggested	
that	the	principle	was	“not	only	to	maintain	the	divisions	of	powers	between	the	
institutions,	but	also	to	protect	the	interests	of	private	individuals”.15	This	is	relevant	to	
individuals	and	firms	in	competition	law,	if	one	institution	takes	over	the	function	of	
another.	
	
                                                 
9 P Pescatore  ‘L’exécutif communautaire: justification du quadripartisme institutionnel’ (1978) 4 Cahiers 
de Droit Européen, 394, quoted in A Vauchez ‘Political Sociology of the European Community of Law: 
Elements of a Renewed Research Agenda’, EUI WP RSCAS 2007/23, 6. See also D Halberstam, who 
posits that “Different authorities make claims based on voice (representation of relevant political will), 
expertise (knowledge or instrumental capacity to decide upon a particular issue) and protection of rights. 
‘Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the United States’ in J 
Dunoff and J Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global 
Government (CUP, 2009), drawing from Ackerman’s identification of principles motivating the modern 
doctrine of separation of powers: B Ackerman ‘The New Separation of Powers’, (2000) 113 Harvard Law 
Review 633, 634: ‘democracy, professionalism [what could also be understood as expertise], and the 
protection of fundamental rights.’  
10 G De Búrca, ‘The Institutional Development of the EU: a Constitutional Analysis’, in P Craig and G de 
Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law1st edn (OUP, 1999), at 57-60 and 73-75. 
11 S Smismans ‘Institutional Balance as Interest Representation’ in C Joerges & R Dehousse (eds) Good 
Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market, 89-108, 94 (emphasis added) 
12 G Conway ‘Recovering a Separation of Powers in the European Union’ (2011) 17 European Law 
Journal 304-322, 319 
13 Conway (2011) 319 
14 Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community [1958] ECR 133, 152: 
“in the balance of powers which is characteristic of the institutional structure of the Community [inferred 
from Art 3 EEC is] a fundamental guarantee in particular to the undertakings and associations of 
undertakings to which it applies.” The Community’s objectives set out in Art 3 EEC are binding on “the 
institutions of the Community ... within the limits of their respective powers, in the common interest”. 
15 J-P Jacqué ‘The Principle of Institutional Balance’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 383-392, 
385 
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In	a	federal	context,	separation	of	powers	can	refer	to	vertical	distribution	of	power	
between	a	central	government	and	its	sub‐national	governments.16	In	the	EU	context,	this	
would	be	between	the	supranational	and	Member	State	levels.17	However,	there	is	no	
disaggregation	between	the	different	branches	of	State	at	those	two	levels,	and	the	
diagonal	relationships	between	them.	At	the	enforcement	and	implementation	level,	the	
Member	States	(and	their	component	institutions,	such	as	courts	and	competition	
authorities)	acting	on	behalf	of	Union	interests,	through	the	duty	of	loyal	cooperation,	are	
more	involved	in	the	exercise	of	the	executive	and	judicial	functions.	This	is	a	case	of	
executive	federalism,	allocating	legislative	power	to	the	supranational	level	and	executive	
power	to	the	national	levels.	In	competition	law,	this	is	made	more	complicated	as	
legislative/executive/judicial	power	is	also	retained	by	the	Commission	at	the	
supranational	level.	As	Lenaerts	states,	“each	power	can	fulfil	its	tasks	in	an	efficient	way	
only	when	at	least	one	other	power	cooperates	to	its	effect”.18	This	focus	on	efficiency	and	
cooperation	is	pertinent	in	the	case	of	concurrent	powers	in	the	competition	enforcement	
system.	There	needs	to	be	communication	between	institutions	–	this	is	discussed	further	
below	in	the	discussion	of	interpretative	pluralism.		
	
A	key	question	is	how	the	institutional	balance	plays	out	where	institutions	with	different	
functions	interact	between	the	supranational	and	national	levels	i.e.	can	there	be	a	
‘diagonal’	institutional	balance?	The	closest	thing	to	this	is	the	mutual	duty	of	loyal	
cooperation.	
	
	
3.	Diagonal	institutional	balance?	The	duty	of	loyal	cooperation	
	
The	duty	of	loyal,	or	sincere,	cooperation	in	Art	4(3)	TEU	(ex	Art	10EC)	19	is	concentrated	
on	the	EU	and	its	Member	States	assisting	each	other.	One	aspect	of	this	is	the	vertical	
                                                 
16 D Halberstam ‘Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary’ in K Whittington, D Kelemen & 
G Caldeira (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (OUP, 2008) 142-164 
17 J Weiler	‘The Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism’ Yearbook of European 
Law (1981) 257-306 (a) normative supranationalism: relationship and hierarchy between policies and 
legal measures at EU and Member State level (executive dimension) (b) decisional supranationalism – 
institutional framework and decision-making (legislative/judicial dimension) 
18 K Lenaerts ‘Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the EC’ (1991) 28 Common Market Law 
Review 11-35, 11 
19 “Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual 
respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. The Member States shall 
take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of 
the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate 
the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment 
of the Union’s objectives.” The previous version in Art 10 EC focused on the obligation of the Member 
States towards the Union, rather than a mutual duty: “Member States shall take all appropriate measures, 
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nature	of	the	duty,	between	the	Union	institutions	and	the	Member	States.	However,	loyal	
cooperation	also	implies	a	horizontal	element	‐	the	duties	of	Member	States	to	assist	each	
other	in	carrying	out	tasks	which	flow	from	the	Treaties.		
	
The	duty	of	loyal	cooperation	Art	4(3)	TEU	is	the	basis	of	a	possible	diagonal	institutional	
balance.	This	is	on	the	basis	that	the	duty	is	not	only	between	Member	States	themselves	
and	the	EU	institutions,	but	extends	to	sub‐state	bodies20.	The	duty	is	not	a	stand‐alone	
one,	and	must	be	used	in	conjunction	with	another	provision.	In	competition	law	this	
would	emanate	from	Art	4(3)	TEU	and	the	Treaty	competition	rules,	and	Regulation	
1/2003.	This	would	suggest	a	vertical	relationship	(EU‐national),	and	diagonal	in	the	
sense	of	the	national	level	being	disaggregated	into	institutions	such	as	national	courts.	
Vertically	this	would	relate	to	the	relationship	between	national	administrative	authorities	
and	the	Commission,	and	between	national	courts	and	the	CJEU.	Diagonally	this	would	
relate	to	the	relationships	between	the	Commission	and	national	courts	and	between	the	
CJEU	and	NCAs.	This	is	discussed	more	fully	in	chapters	3	and	4.	But	the	duty	of	loyal	
cooperation	could	also	indirectly	give	rise	to	horizontal	links	(national‐national),	for	
example	between	NCAs	and	national	courts.	This	is	discussed	further	in	chapter	5.		
	
First,	the	vertical/diagonal	relationship.	The	duty	of	loyal	cooperation	suggests	that	
institutions	have	their	own	territories	and	competences	and	that	there	needs	to	be	an	
acknowledgement	of	each	other’s	functions.	The	duty	of	loyal	cooperation	in	competition	
law	specifically	was	established	in	the	CJEU’s	Delimitis	judgment.21	Walt	Wilhelm22	had	
previously	concerned	a	conflict	between	national	and	Community	substantive	competition	
laws,	and	possible	double	jeopardy	in	breach	of	both	systems	of	law;	whereas	Delimitis	
was	a	case	of	potential	institutional,	rather	than	substantive	divergence.	Delimitis	
concerned	a	conflict	between	national	court	and	Commission	proceedings	both	applying	
EU	competition	law,	and	created	an	obligation	of	cooperation	for	national	courts	not	to	
adopt	a	decision	contrary	to	one	of	the	European	Commission,	later	developed	in	
Masterfoods23.	Raising	the	separation	of	powers,	Ehlermann	questions	whether	Delimitis	
                                                                                                                                               
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting 
from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the 
Community's tasks. They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
objectives of this Treaty.” 
20 There is a duty on national courts and on other national authorities to disapply national rules which are 
incompatible with EU law – respectively, 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v 
Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629 and C-103/88 Fratelli Costanzo v Milano [1989] ECR 1839. For a 
discussion of specific duties see J Temple Lang 'The Duties of National Authorities under Community 
Constitutional Law'. (1998) 23 European Law Review 109 
21 C-234/89 Delimitis v Henninger Bräu [1991] ECR I-935 
22 Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1 
23 C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd (t/a Mars Ireland) v HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000] ECR I-11369 
26 
 
deference	still	holds	where	the	Commission	no	longer	has	a	monopoly	over	Art	101(3)	
TFEU	in	the	post‐2004	regime.24			
	
Some	have	explicitly	ruled	out	such	a	‘diagonal’	separation	of	powers.25		However,	this	
rather	one	way	expression	of	the	duty	of	loyal	cooperation	in	Delimitis	was	explicitly	
expanded	to	a	two‐way,	mutual,	duty	in	Zwartveld	and	later	enhanced	by	First	Franex,	
underlining	the	reciprocal	duty	of	the	EU	institutions	to	cooperate	with	national	courts.26		
These	cases	express	the	extent	of	the	Commission’s,	rather	than	national	authorities’	or	
courts’,	obligations.	However,	it	is	arguable	that	the	Commission’s	responsibility	is	not	
necessarily	based	on	its	duty	as	a	supranational	institution,	but	on	its	expertise.	
	
In	an	expression	of	this	mutual	duty	of	loyal	cooperation,	the	Commission	should	give	
priority	to	cases	which	have	been	stayed	by	national	courts	pending	the	Commission’s	
investigation.27	This	links	with	the	idea	of	the	institutional	balance	as	cooperation	to	
perform	tasks	in	an	efficient	way.	On	the	basis	of	Article	4	TEU,	if	a	national	court	needs	
information	that	only	the	Commission	can	provide,	the	Commission	has	a	duty	to	provide	
that	information	as	soon	as	possible	if	requested.	However,	the	Commission	may	refuse	to	
transfer	information	where	there	is	a	“need	to	preserve	the	interests	of	the	Community,	or	
to	avoid	interference	with	the	Commission’s	functioning	and	independence	in	particular	by	
jeopardising	the	accomplishment	of	the	tasks	entrusted	to	it”.	28	This	reflects	the	interests‐
based	approach	to	institutional	balance,	but	also	the	organic	independence	of	the	
Commission.	
	
On	the	horizontal	nature	of	the	duty	of	loyal	cooperation	in	competition	law,	specific	
horizontal	duties	between	NCAs	are	given	expression	through	the	European	Competition	
                                                 
24 C-D Ehlermann, in ‘Panel Discussion Three: Courts and Judges’ European Competition Law Annual 
2000: The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy (Hart, 2001), 518  
25 E Paulis ‘Coherent Application of EC Competition Rules in a System of Parallel Competencies’ in C-D 
Ehlermann, and I Atanasiu (eds) European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation of EC 
Antitrust Policy (Hart, 2001) 399-428 – perhaps unsurprisingly as a Commission official responsible for 
the 2004 reforms. 
26 C-2/88 Zwartveld [1990] ECR I-3365; C-275/00 European Community v First NV and Franex NV 
[2002] ECR I-10943; C Brown & D Hardiman ‘The Extent of the Community Institutions’ Duty to Co-
operate with National Courts – Zwartveld revisited’ (2004) 25 European Competition Law Review 299-
304.	In First and Franex, the duty to provide information was expanded not only where the national court 
applied EU law, but where national liability is concerned - in that case, ascertaining liability of the 
Belgian authorities. First & Franex asked the Belgian Court to require the Commission to appear before 
an expert committee making findings on damage arising from the Belgian dioxin crisis for the purposes of 
quantification and compensation. The rationale for this is that there is a duty when applying national law 
to guarantee the effectiveness of EU law – that is, national law is the channel for EU application. 
27 Commission Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member 
States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, 54-64 [12] 
28 Zwartveld [10]-[11], First Franex [49], T-353/94 Postbank v Commission [1996] ECR II-921 [93] - 
references from the Commission Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of 
the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, 54-64 [26].   
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Network.	Cooperation	between	national	competition	authorities	and	national	courts	is	
primarily	a	matter	of	national	law.	However,	the	relationship	could	be	subject	to	a	
horizontal	duty	of	loyal	cooperation	where	EU	law	is	applied,	and	in	cross‐border	
matters.29	This	is	discussed	further	in	chapter	5	on	the	effects	of	NCA	decisions	on	national	
courts.	This	horizontal	duty	is	likely	to	be	tested	in	the	case	of	follow‐on	private	damages	
actions.	30		
	
As	noted	above,	there	is	no	way	to	resolve	clashes	of	competence	and	preserve	coherent	
interpretation	of	the	law	in	these	diagonal	relationships.	This	raises	the	concept	of	
interpretative	pluralism	in	a	system	of	concurrent	competences,	discussed	below.	Courts	
do	not	have	a	monopoly	on	the	interpretation	of	the	law.	This	raises	the	question	of	
judicial	versus	executive	power.	In	competition	law,	executive	powers	between	the	
supranational	and	national	level	are	well	linked	through	the	European	Competition	
Network,	as	an	example	of	an	integrated	administration.	31		However,	there	are	no	
organised	horizontal	links	between	courts.	The	only	vertical	link	is	with	the	CJEU’s	
preliminary	reference	procedure.		This	militates	in	favour	of	executive,	rather	than	
judicial,	power.			This	is	made	more	complicated	by	the	different	capacities	of	courts	in	the	
competition	system.	They	can	be	called	upon	to	apply	the	law	directly	in	disputes	between	
private	parties	(private	enforcement	of	competition	law);	they	can	be	designated	national	
competition	authorities	in	a	public	enforcement	function;	or	they	can	act	in	a	judicial	
review	function.	As	well	as	having	implications	for	consistent	application	of	rules,	this	lack	
of	judicial	links	to	match	those	of	the	executive	between	the	supranational	and	national	
levels	gives	rise	to	an	“’accountability	gap’	between	the	different	degrees	of	integration	of	
the	legislative,	executive	and	judicial	branches.”32	This	is	all	the	more	important	in	a	
system	where	executive	agencies	also	exercise	some	judicial	functions.	
	
	
	 	
                                                 
29 J Temple Lang 'The Duties of National Authorities under Community Constitutional Law' (1998) 23 
European Law Review 109; J Temple Lang ‘The Duties of Co-operation of National Authorities and 
Courts under Article 10EC – Two More Reflections’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 84-93 
30 As demonstrated in the recent case of C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-0000, 
where the Court of Justice ruled that information obtained during a leniency application to a competition 
authority is not precluded from being disclosed to a claimant in private enforcement proceedings. 
31 H Hofmann & A Türk 'The Development of Integrated Administration in the EU and its Consequences' 
(2007) 13 (2) European Law Journal 253-271, and in H Hofmann ‘Constitutionalising Networks in EU 
Public Law’ (2009) University of Luxembourg Working Paper No 2009-06 
32 I Maher & O Ştefan ‘Competition Law in Europe: The Challenge of a Network Constitution’ in D 
Oliver, T Prosser & R Rawlings (eds) The Regulatory State: Constitutional Implications, (OUP, 2010), 
178-199, 199 
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4.	Judicial	functions	and	coherence	
	
In	any	system	of	law,	but	particularly	in	the	context	of	EU	law,	emphasis	is	placed	on	
coherence.	33				The	degree	of	coherence	is	dependent	upon	courts:	in	the	EU,	“systemic	
coherence	and	effectiveness	have	depended	on	how	the	CJEU	and	the	national	courts	have	
negotiated	their	relationship	with	one	another.”34		Courts	achieve	this	through	rulings35,	“a	
legal	system	is	coherent	if	its	components	fit	together,	either	all	of	them	(global	systemic	
coherence)	or	some	of	them	(…local	systemic	coherence)”36.	In	the	context	of	this	thesis,	
global	coherence	would	relate	to	the	body	of	EU	law	as	a	whole,	and	systemic	coherence	to	
EU	competition	law	as	a	particular	branch	of	law,	a	subset	of	EU	law.	There	is	also	the	
single	case	level.	In	competition	law,	there	are	concurrent	competences	at	two	levels:	on	a	
systemic	level	between	the	Commission	and	the	Court	of	Justice;	and	at	case	level	between	
the	Commission,	national	authorities	and	national	courts.	
	
On	the	global	level,	the	Court	of	Justice’s	primary	concern	is	for	coherence	in	the	EU	legal	
order	as	a	whole.	The	traditional	role	of	the	CJEU	is	to	safeguard	uniform	interpretation	
and	application	of	EU	law	throughout	the	Member	States.		The	CJEU	“has	been	concerned	
to	secure	not	just	uniformity	of	application	of	EU	law	but	also	an	interpretive	unity”37	on	
the	grounds	that	“every	EU	provision	should	be	given	a	uniform	interpretation,	
irrespective	of	the	circumstances	in	which	it	is	to	be	applied,	in	order	to	forestall	future	
differences	in	interpretation”.38	[emphasis	added].		
	
The	archetypal	way	to	achieve	this	is	through	the	preliminary	reference	procedure,		
linking	it	with	national	courts:	“Article	[267	TFEU]	is	essential	for	the	preservation	of	the	
Community	character	of	the	law	established	by	the	Treaty	and	has	the	object	of	ensuring	
                                                 
33 According to Moral Soriano, one approach of CJEU judges is “not [to] seek to determine what the law 
is according to the criterion of coherence, but, rather, they try to make the legal system (the existing law 
and previous decisions) a coherent unit (or whole).” (emphasis in original). L Moral Soriano ‘A Modest 
Notion of Coherence in Legal Reasoning: A Model for the European Court of Justice’ (2003) 16(3) Ratio 
Juris 296-323, 298 
34 A Stone Sweet ‘The European Court of Justice and the Judicialization of EU Governance’ Living 
Reviews in European Governance vol 5 (2010),  lreg-2010-2, 29 
35 Or‘normative adjudicative coherence’. For a discussion of different types of coherence in legal 
philosophy and their operation in the case law of the Court of Justice, see S Bertea ‘Looking for 
Coherence within the European Community’ (2005) 11(2) European Law Journal 154-172;  N 
MacCormick Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Clarendon, 1979); A Schiavello ‘On “Coherence” and 
“Law”: An Analysis of Different Models’ (2001) 14(2) Ratio Juris 233-43, 236 
36 S Bertea ‘Looking for Coherence within the European Community’ (2005) 11(2) European Law 
Journal 154-172, 157 
37 D Chalmers, G Davies & G Monti, European Union Law, 2nd edn (CUP, 2010) , 161 
38 Discussed in relation to C-297/88 & C-197/99 Dzodzi v Belgium [1990] ECR I-3673 
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that	in	all	circumstances	this	law	is	the	same	in	all	States	of	the	Community.”39	The	
national	courts	in	turn	have	a	role	in	coherent	application	of	the	law	in	the	domestic	
setting.	This	includes	reconciling	national	provisions	with	EU	law.	They	should	do	this	by	
interpreting	national	law	in	line	with	EU	law	as	far	as	possible40	and	by	disapplying	
national	rules	which	are	incompatible	with	EU	law.41	This	underlines	the	role	of	courts	in	
ensuring	coherence.	
	
However,	as	Bertea	observes,	“…the	pluralist	nature	of	the	Community	sits	poorly	with	the	
idea	of	unity”42.	This	pluralist	idea	of	unity	is	relevant	to	interpretative	pluralism	
discussed	below.		Whereas	uniformity	suggests	only	one	result,	coherence	is	a	matter	of	
degree.	On	a	practical	level,	it	becomes	important	when	investigating	the	operation	of	the	
tools	in	competition	law	for	‘uniform’,	‘coherent’	or	‘consistent’	application	of	the	rules,	as	
discussed	in	the	later	chapters.		
	
Coherence	is	important	because	“[a]ny	weakening,	even	if	only	potential,	of	the	uniform	
application	and	interpretation	of	Community	law	throughout	the	Union	would	be	liable	to	
give	rise	to	distortions	of	competition	and	discrimination	between	economic	operators,	
thus	jeopardizing	equality	of	opportunity	as	between	those	operators	and	consequently	
the	proper	functioning	of	the	internal	market.”43	[emphasis	added].	Therefore	coherence	is	
explicitly	linked	to	the	effectiveness	of	competition	at	the	heart	of	the	internal	market	–	
the	link	between	the	global	and	the	system	level.44	In	the	context	of	competition	
enforcement,	“in	a	system	of	parallel	powers	it	is	thus	crucial	to	…	design	rules	to	prevent	
conflicts	between	courts	of	different	fora	and	between	courts	and	competition	authorities,	
                                                 
39 Case 166/73 Rheinmühlen-Diisseldorf v Einfuhrund Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel [1974] 
ECR 33 [2] 
40 C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacionale de Alimentación SA [1990] ECR I-4135 
41 Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629 
42 S Bertea ‘Looking for Coherence within the European Community’ (2005) 11(2) European Law 
Journal 154-172, 155 
43 Report of the Court of Justice on certain aspects of the application of the Treaty on European 
Union, Luxembourg, May 1995, europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/eu-doc/justice/cj_rep.html, point 11, 
cited in J Komarek, ‘Federal Elements in the Community Judicial System: Building Coherence in the 
Community Legal Order’ (2005) 42(1) Common Market Law Review 9-34, 9  
44 As an example of the link between global and systemic coherence, the Crehan and Manfredi 
judgments, establishing a Community right to an effective remedy for breach of Community competition 
rules, can also be viewed in terms of global coherence of the system, as they echo Francovich-style 
wording: C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan, ECR [2001] I-6297 [26]; C-295/04 Vincenzo 
Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, ECR [2006] I-06619 [61];  C-6/90 Francovich and Others 
v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357 [33] “The full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired 
and the protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals were unable to obtain 
reparation when their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law “ 
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as	well	as	to	define	precisely	the	domains	of	application	of,	respectively,	national	and	E[U]	
competition	laws.	And	to	ensure	that	E[U]	competition	laws	are	applied	in	the	same	way.”45		
	
The	CJEU’s	emphasis	is	on	global	coherence	(of	EU	law	as	whole),	including	systemic	
coherence	(of	competition	law	as	a	central	part	of	the	single	market).		At	the	system	level,	
the	Commission	has	a	legislative	role	in	issuing	guidelines	and	notices,	but	these	
instruments	also	serve	a	judicial	–	interpretative	–	function.	The	Commission’s	judicial	
function	at	the	systemic	level	comes	about	through	soft	law,	discussed	below.	It	can	
establish	the	rules	and	elucidate	its	interpretation	of	EU	law	through	notices	and	
guidelines.		
	
Within	competition	law,	Gerber	and	Cassinis	also	refer	to	systemic	and	single	case	levels,	
where	systemic	consistency	is	consistency	in	outcomes	among	different	cases	within	the	
system	and	single	case	consistency	refers	to	treatment	of	a	single	set	of	facts	by	multiple	
institutions.	46	.	Competition	enforcement	is	characterised	by	agencies	with	quasi‐judicial	
functions.	47	At	the	single	case	level,	the	Commission	and	competition	authorities	have	
adjudicative	powers.	They	can	make	a	finding	of	(no)	infringement,	an	order	to	terminate	
certain	behaviour,	or	impose	a	fine	or	sanction.	As	well	as	acting	as	investigator,	and	
prosecutor,48	the	European	Commission	is	“initial	judge”	(in	the	sense	of	first	instance	
judge)	with	regard	to	Treaty	infringements.	49	However,	other	elements	of	the	traditionally	
judicial	functions,	such	as	norm	interpretation	and	precedent	setting,	have	been	less	
explored.		
	
                                                 
45 K Lenaerts and D Gerard ‘Decentralisation of EC Competition Law: Judges in the Frontline’, (2004) 
27(3) World Competition 313-349, 316 
46 D Gerber & P Cassinis ‘The “Modernisation” of European Community Competition Law: Achieving 
Consistency in Enforcement – Part I’ (2006) 27(1) European Competition Law Review 10-18, 14 
47 Appendix on the classification of functions in J Sterling, A Le Sueur, S De Smith, L Woolf, J Jowell 
De Smith, Woolf and Jowell’s Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Sweet & Maxwell, 1995), 831: 
“whether the performance of the function terminates in an order that has conclusive effect (does a 
decision have the force of law without needing to be confirmed or adopted by another authority?), or 
whether the process has certain formal or procedural attributes (has the decision-making body been 
endowed with the “trappings of court”: does it determine matters in cases initiated by parties? does it 
normally sit in public? Can it compel the attendance of witnesses? Can it impose sanctions and enforce 
the obedience of its own command?). Does the tribunal, in making its decision, also interpret, declare and 
apply the law?” 
48 See, for example, W Wils, ‘The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the 
Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis’ (2004) 27(2) 
World Competition 201-224 
49 Craig & de Burca (P Craig and G de Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (OUP, 3rd edn, 2002), 
56) characterise this as one of the Commission’s two judicial powers: the other being to bring actions 
against defaulting Member States under the Art 258 TFEU infringement procedure. Arguably the latter is 
better understood as a prosecutor role. Whereas the Commission recommends the level of penalty, it is 
still the Court of Justice which formally renders judgment.  
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One	way	in	which	coherence	is	achieved	is	through	precedent.	The	judge’s	role	is	to	
interpret	an	individual	case	within	the	framework	of	existing	legal	decisions	and	
constitutional	principles,	by	following	the	decisions	in	cases	with	similar	facts	(if	
necessary	distinguishing	the	current	case	from	earlier	ones,	expanding	or	limiting	the	
scope	of	the	earlier	decision).	In	this	way	the	judge	both	applies	precedents	from	previous	
cases	and	creates	precedents	for	the	future.	EU	law	does	not	formally	adhere	to	a	doctrine	
of	stare	decisis	as	understood	in	common	law	systems,	in	which	precedents	are	
authoritative	and	binding.	However,	in	practice	it	is	recognisable	in	EU	law.50		Precedent	
can	be	understood	more	widely,	and	is	not	confined	to	courts:	“stare	decisis,	far	from	being	
a	unique	set	of	rules	for	judicial	decision‐making,	[i]s	in	reality	only	a	peculiar	terminology	
for	expressing	a	decision‐making	strategy	followed	by	all	policy‐makers”.	51		
	
If	other	bodies	are	also	able	to	set	precedent	through	their	decision‐making,	this	would	
mean	that	the	only	thing	differentiating	this	precedent	from	that	set	by	courts	is	the	
response	of	those	‘bound’	by	the	precedent‐setter’s	decisions.	In	other	words,	the	
legitimacy	of	the	precedent‐setting	body	(the	competition	authority)	and	its	claim	to	
authority.	Precedent	defined	more	broadly	gives	legal	certainty	–	in	particular	in	the	
context	of	competition	law,	firms	are	able	to	adapt	their	behaviour	in	line	with	the	signals	
given	by	the	precedent‐setter.	This	is	particularly	true	in	the	post‐2004	regime	in	which	
firms	and	their	legal	advisors	and	required	to	make	their	own	determination	about	
whether	their	behaviour	is	compatible	with	the	law,	e.g.	deciding	whether	anticompetitive	
conduct	is	justifiable	under	the	conditions	of	Art	101(3).52		
	
Authorities	interpret	an	individual	case	within	the	framework	of	existing	legal	decisions	
and	Community	law	principles,	in	turn	also	laying	down	a	decision	to	be	followed	in	the	
future,	in	administrative	decision‐making.	In	terms	of	applying	precedent,	that	is	following	
its	own	decisions	which	it	has	taken	in	the	past,	it	is	logical	and	efficient	for	an	agency	to	
rely	on	experience	distilled	through	its	existing	decisions,	without	having	to	be	entirely	
                                                 
50 T Koopmans ‘Stare Decisis in European Law’ in D O’Keeffe, H G Schermers (eds) Essays in 
European Law and Integration (Kluwer, 1982), 11-27; J Komarek, ‘Federal Elements in the Community 
Judicial System: Building Coherence in the Community Legal Order’ (2005) 42(1) Common Market Law 
Review 9-34, 15-16. A fuller discussion is found in another version of Komarek’s paper, ‘Creating a 
Quasi-Federal Judicial System of the European Communities’, (2006) Institute for European Law at 
Stockholm University paper series, No. 54, 32-40. See also A Arnull ‘Owning Up to Fallibility: Precedent 
and the Court of Justice’ (1993) 30 Common Market Law Review 247 
51 M Shapiro (1965) ‘Stability and Change…: incrementalism or stare decisis’, cited in A Stone Sweet & 
M Shapiro On Law, Politics and Judicialization (OUP, 2002), 91 
52 Forrester notes that before the 2004 reforms “the Commission mainly pursued cases which it selected 
as good vehicles for advancing the law. This was especially true as to exemptions, where each individual 
exemption was a flagship piece of rule-making, setting precedent for the future”. I Forrester ‘A Bush in 
Need of Pruning: the Luxuriant Growth of Light Judicial Review’ in C-D Ehlermann & M Marquis (eds) 
European Competition Law Annual 2009: The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in 
Competition Cases (Hart, 2011), 6-7 
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novel	with	every	case.	Precedent‐setting	for	the	future	also	sends	message	to	firms,	
contributing	to	the	deterrence	objective	of	the	public	enforcement	role.	In	the	narrower	
sense,	a	finding	of	fact	of	the	Commission	is	binding.	The	binding,	or	at	least	persuasive,	
force	of	precedent	is	not	only	exerted	on	firms	but	on	courts	themselves.	It	implies	that	
Commission	decisions	may	not	only	be	binding	on	national	courts	in	the	same	case	with	
the	same	parties,	but	in	other	cases	too.			
	
At	the	single	case	level,	precedent	is	set	by	exemption	decisions	through	harder	law,	such	
as	block	exemption	regulations,	and	Art	101(3)	TFEU.	On	the	systemic	level	some	of	these	
precedents	are	set	through	soft	law,	through	the	Commission’s	interpretative	instruments	
and	guidelines.	Soft	law	is	defined	as	“rules	of	conduct	that	are	laid	down	in	instruments	
which	have	not	been	attributed	legally	binding	force	as	such,	but	nevertheless	may	have	
certain	(indirect)	legal	effects,	and	that	are	aimed	at	and	may	produce	practical	effects.”53	
Their	effects	are	felt	by	becoming	binding	through	a	court	judgment,	by	being	mixed	with	
hard	legal	principles.54	This	is	discussed	in	more	detail	in	chapter	4.	
	
In	the	context	of	the	roles	of	the	European	Commission	assuming	judicial	functions,	
regarding	the	EU	competition	rules,	the	Commission	and	the	Court	are	joint	trustees	of	the	
Treaty.55	Paulis	argues	that	both	the	Commission	and	the	Court	of	Justice	are	jointly	
responsible	for	uniform	application	of	the	competition	rules.56	There	are	concurrent	
powers	arising	outside	the	area	of	decision‐making	‐	the	Commission’s	power	to	adopt	
interpretative	instruments	and	the	CJEU’s	power	to	interpret	Union	law.57		This	implies	
that	the	Commission	should	communicate	the	CJEU’s	case	law,	somehow	without	giving	its	
own	interpretation	of	it.	Snyder	postulates	that	the	combination	of	Art	4	TEU	(the	duty	of	
loyal	cooperation,	discussed	above)	and	Art	211	EC58		(the	power	to	formulate	
recommendations	and	opinions	in	order	to	ensure	proper	functioning	and	development	of	
                                                 
53 L Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart, 2004), 112, developed from F Snyder, ‘The 
Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques’ (1993) 56(1) 
Modern Law Review 19-54, 32: “rules of conduct which, in principle, have no legally binding force but 
which nevertheless may have practical effects.” 
54 Ştefan explores the CJEU’s approach to the Commission’s soft law instruments and finds that it 
embeds competition and State aid soft law through fundamental EU legal principles. These soft law 
norms are then judicialised and integrated within future decision-making processes and litigation. O 
Ştefan ‘Hybridity Before the Court: A Hard Look at Soft Law in the EU Competition and State Aid Case 
Law’ (2012) 37(1) European Law Review 49-69. Snyder, 33, also suggests that a soft law act could 
become binding if one of the parties in private litigation invokes it. 
55 A Stone Sweet ‘The European Court of Justice and the Judicialization of EU Governance’ Living 
Reviews in European Governance vol 5 (2010), lreg-2010-2, 25 
56 E Paulis ‘Coherent Application of EC Competition Rules in a System of Parallel Competencies’ in C-D 
Ehlermann, and I Atanasiu (eds) European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation of EC 
Antitrust Policy (Hart, 2001) 399-428, 421 
57 L Senden, ‘Soft Law and its Implications for Institutional Balance in the EC’ (2005) 1(2) Utrecht Law 
Review 79-99, 93 
58 No equivalent in the Lisbon Treaty 
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the	Union)	“gives	the	Commission	both	the	power	and	the	duty	to	explain	CJEU	judgments	
and	spell	out	their	implications	for	national	governments	and	private	parties”59	[emphasis	
added].	However,	Snyder	does	not	explain	why	the	Commission	needs	to	act	as	an	
intermediary,	and	why	national	governments	and	private	parties	themselves	cannot	come	
to	their	own	view	of	the	implications	of	a	judgment.	Such	a	role	as	interpreter	of	the	law	
between	the	Member	States	and	the	Court	of	Justice	gives	the	Commission	the	opportunity	
to	restate	the	law	as	it	sees	it	and	could	encroach	on	the	competence	of	the	CJEU.		
	
The	use	of	soft	law	can	affect	the	institutional	balance	in	the	Union.	Art	19	TEU60	(ex	Art	
220	EC)	suggests	that	the	Court	of	Justice	has	a	monopoly	over	interpretation	of	Union	
law–	or	at	least	the	‘final	say’.		But	the	authoring	of	soft	law	rules,	which	flesh	out	the	
harder	Treaty	obligations	of	Art	101	and	102	TFEU,	and	their	day‐to‐day	application	is	
carried	out	by	the	Commission.	The	Commission’s	authorship	of	these	instruments	at	the	
legislative	level	suggests	its	interpretative	supremacy	at	the	enforcement	level.61	Where	
there	is	a	clash	between	a	soft	law	instrument	and	existing	case	law,	the	former	would	be	
in	breach.62	The	Commission	is	careful	to	stipulate	that	its	opinions	are	given	without	
prejudice	to	the	interpretation	of	the	CJEU	through	the	possibility	or	obligation	of	the	
court	to	have	recourse	to	the	preliminary	reference	procedure.	However,	in	applying	and	
enforcing	the	law	the	Commission	may	add	its	own	–	subjective	–	views	on	how	a	
particular	case	law	or	Treaty	or	secondary	law	provision	should	be	understood,63	or	
extend	its	scope.	In	those	circumstances,	it	would	overstep	the	boundaries	of	its	powers	
and	circumvent	the	role	of	the	CJEU.	64			
	
                                                 
59 F Snyder ‘The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and 
Techniques’ (1993) 56(1) Modern Law Review 19-54, 33 
60  ‘1. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall include the Court of Justice, the General Court 
and specialised courts. It shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is 
observed.’ (Although only ‘the Treaties’ are mentioned, it is assumed that all law should follow the 
Treaties.) 
61 Broberg and Fenger also suggest that in policy areas where the Commission can issue binding 
decisions, such as in competition and State aid, the Commission “arguably both can and should assist the 
national court.” M Broberg & N Fenger Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (OUP, 
2010) , 20 
62 O Ştefan ‘European Competition Soft Law in European Courts: A Matter of Hard Principles?’ (2008) 
14(3) European Law Journal 753-772, 764 
63 L Senden, ‘Soft Law and its Implications for Institutional Balance in the EC’ (2005) 1(2) Utrecht Law 
Review 79-99, 93 
64 Broberg and Fenger make a similar point: “…for the Commission to provide the national court with a 
form of assistance that the Treaty has placed in the hands of the Court of Justice could constitute a 
‘détournement de procédure’.”  M Broberg & N Fenger Preliminary References to the European Court of 
Justice (OUP, 2010), 21. Scott also points out several reasons to be concerned with this kind of 
interpretative or decisional guidance:  “guidance may be treated as authoritative by the Member States. It 
may influence their attitude and behaviour, generating significant practical effects.” (p. 344) and it 
excludes courts “from being able to evaluate and shape the processes leading to the adoption of guidance 
of this kind.” (p. 346):  J Scott ‘In Legal Limbo: Post-Legislative Guidance as a Challenge for European 
Administrative Law’ (2011) 48(2) Common Market Law Review 329-355 
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Another	element	in	the	sharing	of	functions	between	different	institutions	is	the	context	of	
governance,	particularly	multilevel	governance.65	In	this	context,	the	traditional	command	
and	control	role	of	courts	is	side‐lined	by	cooperative	processes	in	which	a	range	of	actors	
participate	at	multiple	levels	within	the	system.66	This	implies	lesser	importance	of	judicial	
adjudicative	processes,	and	invites	reconsideration	of	the	judicial	role	and	of	courts	as	
institutions.	One	feature	of	governance	is	the	rise	of	regulatory	agencies	and	networks	
between	them.		The	rise	of	regulatory	agencies	and	‘jurisdictional	power’	may	have	
occurred	at	the	expense	of	‘jurisprudential	power’.67	At	the	EU	level,	this	would	suggest	a	
tension	between	the	Commission	as	an	expert	agency	with	a	particular	wide‐ranging	
‘jurisdiction’	in	competition	policy,	and	the	Court	of	Justice	losing	‘jurisprudential’	power.		
It	would	also	link	with	the	dominance	of	an	integrated	executive	as	discussed	above.		
	
	
5.	Interpretative/institutional	pluralism	in	a	system	of	concurrent	competences	
	
“Institutional	pluralism,	contrary	to	the	Montesquieian	conception	of	separation	of	
powers,	whereby	legislative,	executive	and	judicial	functions	are	separated,	protects	
liberty	through	granting	the	same	actors	the	same	kind	of	legal	authority	to	interpret	the	
foundational	framework	–	the	Constitution.”68	In	general,	interpretative	pluralism	has	
been	defined	as	“simply	the	absence	of	a	single	binding	or	authoritative	interpretation”	or	
“openness	to	multiple	interpretations”.69		In	the	EU	context	interpretative	pluralism	is	one	
aspect	of	constitutional	pluralism.	70		As	the	name	suggests,	constitutional	pluralism	is	
founded	on	an	interactive	heterarchy	rather	than	hierarchy.	71		This	is	a	shift	from	the	
                                                 
65 R Rhodes ‘The New Governance: Governing without Government’ (1996) 44(3) Political Studies 652-
67; M Egeberg Multilevel Union Administration: The Transformation of Executive Politics in Europe 
(PalgraveMacmillan, 2006); C Sabel & J Zeitlin ‘Learning from Difference: the New Architecture of 
Experimentalist Governance in the European Union’ (2008) 14(3) European Law Journal 271-327; D 
Coen & M Thatcher ‘Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation: European Networks of 
Regulatory Agencies’(2008) 28(1) Journal of Public Policy 49-71; A Schout & A Jordan ‘Coordinated 
European Governance: Self-Organizing or Centrally Steered?’ (2005) 83 (1) Public Administration 201–
220 
66 J Scott & S Sturm ‘Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance’ 13 
Columbia Journal of European Law (2006-7) 565-594 
67 L Azoulai ‘The Judge and the Community’s Administrative Governance’ in C Joerges & R Dehousse 
(eds) Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (OUP, 2002) 109-137, 111; L Azoulai ‘The Court 
of Justice and the Community’s Administrative Governance’ (2001) 7(4) European Law Journal 425-
441, 428	 
68 M Avbelj & J Komarek (eds) Constitutional Pluralism in Europe and Beyond (Hart 2011), 11-12 
69 R Stith ‘Securing the Rule of Law through Interpretive Pluralism: an argument from Comparative Law’ 
book, 420  (also Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law and Justice working 
paper 01/07) 
70 M Poiares Maduro, ‘Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional 
Pluralism’, (2007) 1(2) European Journal of Legal Studies 1-21 
71 For a full analysis see M Avbelj & J Komarek (eds) Constitutional Pluralism in Europe and Beyond 
(Hart 2011)  
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classical	constitutional	conception	of	European	integration,	in	which	diversity	was	seen	as	
an	obstacle	to	integration.72	Uniformity	was	to	be	achieved	by	the	self‐evidently	
hierarchical	doctrine	of	supremacy,	and	the	focus	was	on	the	Member	State	as	a	unit.	The	
Court	of	Justice	had	the	role	of	safeguarding	the	unity	of	EU	law.	
	
The	concept	of	constitutional	pluralism	was	first	used	to	denote	the	relationship	between	
the	EU	and	national	orders,	in	spite	of	the	traditional	doctrine	of	EU	supremacy,	following	
the	Maastricht	Treaty	judgment	in	the	German	Constitutional	Court.	73			Since	then	it	has	
expanded	to	encompass	relationships	between	other	legal	orders	and	actors	at	the	“sub‐
state,	trans‐state,	supra‐state	and	on	other	non‐state	levels”:74	for	example,	between	
European	and	international	legal	orders;75	between	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	
Union	and	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights;	and	between	regulatory,	political	and	
judicial	spheres.	Particularly	this	latter	category	emphasises	the	relevance	of	the	concept	
for	the	multilevel	governance76	in	EU	competition	law.	
	
Komarek	explains	that	“constitutional	pluralism	obtains	when	various	constitutional	
authorities	compete	over	the	same	territory	and	the	same	legal	relationships....	these	
authorities	have	plausible	claims	to	legitimacy	and	authority	as	perceived	by	those	who	
are	subject	to	them.”77		This	is	relevant	to	competition	enforcement	given	the	cross‐border	
nature	of	competition	problems	and	the	claims	of	competition	authorities	(and	courts)	in	
different	Member	States,	as	well	as	the	European	Commission,	to	take	action,	for	example	
as	mediated	through	the	case	allocation	rules	of	the	European	Competition	Network.		
	
The	European	Commission’s	Directorate	General	for	Competition	had	a	long‐standing	
monopoly	over	competition	enforcement,	in	addition	to	issuing	rules	through	notices	and	
guidelines.	In	recent	decades	NCAs	have	also	built	up	considerable	expertise.	
Administrative	authorities	have	therefore	enjoyed	primacy	by	virtue	of	their	expertise	in	
competition	policy	and	enforcement.		The	burgeoning	role	of	economic	analysis	and	the	
                                                 
72 As shown in Case 166/73 Rheinmühlen-Diisseldorf v Einfuhrund Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und 
Futtermittel [1974] ECR 33 
73 N Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2001) 65 Modern Law Review 317 
74 See Introduction in M Avbelj & J Komarek (eds) Constitutional Pluralism in Europe and Beyond (Hart 
2011) , 3 
75 Cases C-402 & 415/05P Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council & Commission 
[2008] ECR I-6351 
76 See e.g. M Egeberg Multilevel Union Administration. The Transformation of Executive Politics in 
Europe (PalgraveMacmillan, 2006); F Scharpf ‘Notes Toward a Theory of Multilevel Governing in 
Europe’ (2001) 24(1) Scandinavian Political Studies 1-26; G Marks, L Hooghe & K Blank (1996) 
‘European Integration Since the 1980s. State-Centric versus Multi-Level Governance’ (1996) 34(3) 
Journal of Common Market Studies 341-378; A Jordan (2001) ‘The European Union: an Evolving System 
of Multi-Level Governance ... or Government?’ (2001) 29(2) Policy & Politics 193-208 
77 J Komarek ‘Institutional Dimension of Constitutional Pluralism’, in M Avbelj & J Komarek (eds) 
Constitutional Pluralism in Europe and Beyond (Hart 2011), 231-247, 231 
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more	economic	approach	following	the	2004	reforms	in	competition	enforcement78		also	
demonstrates	a	shift	from	legal	rules	and	the	role	of	courts.	
	
‘Those	who	are	subject’	to	those	authorities	would	most	obviously	be	firms	as	addressees	
of	the	substantive	competition	prohibitions	in	Articles	101	and	102	TFEU.	But	they	could	
also	be	other	institutions	e.g.	national	competition	authorities	subject	to	jurisdictional	
rules	such	as	parallel	application	of	national	and	EU	law	when	there	is	an	effect	on	trade	
between	Member	States;	a	national	court	bound	by	the	decisions	of	competition	
authorities	in	another	Member	State	(as	discussed	in	chapter	5).		
	
These	concurrent	competences	lend	themselves	to	the	idea	of	interpretative	pluralism	
From	an	institutional	perspective,	discussions	of	pluralism	have	primarily	focused	on	
relations	between	courts79	and	in	different	legal	orders	‐	that	is,	relations	between	
national	courts	and	the	CJEU,	or	between	international	courts	such	as	the	CJEU	and	the	
ECtHR	‐	rather	than	between	courts	and	executive	authorities,	which	is	this	thesis’s	area	of	
focus.		On	the	interplay	between	courts	and	other	actors,	Maduro	warns	that	“Courts	must	
be	aware	that	they	do	not	have	a	monopoly	over	rules	and	that	they	often	compete	with	
other	institutions	in	their	interpretation.”	80			
	
A	focus	on	Maduro’s	understanding	of	pluralism	is	appropriate,	and	in	particular	his	
category	of	interpretative	pluralism,	given	its	emphasis	on	institutions.	Maduro	identifies	
five	expressions	of	pluralism:	(1)	different	constitutional	sources;	(2)	pluralism	of	
different	jurisdictions/constitutional	sites	(e.g.	Kompetenz‐Kompetenz	–	court	deciding	
questions	of	its	own	competence);	(3)	interpretative	pluralism/pluralism	of	institutions	
(most	relevant	here);	(4)	pluralism	of	powers;	and	(5)	pluralism	of	polities/political	
communities.		
	
The	fourth	category,	pluralism	of	powers,	is	also	relevant	for	the	purposes	of	this	thesis.	
Maduro	recognises	that	“increasingly	[there	are]	new	forms	of	public	and	private	power	
that	challenge	traditional	legal	dogmatic	categories	and	raise	constitutional	questions	
because	they	affect	the	mechanisms	of	accountability	linked	to	those	legal	categories.”	
                                                 
78 A formal legal approach replaced by an effects-based approach to competition enforcement. See e.g. L-
H Roeller & O Stehmann ‘The Year 2005 at DG Competition: The Trend Towards a More Effects-Based 
Approach’ (2006) 29 Review of Industrial Organization 281–304 
79 As observed by M Goldoni ‘Constitutional Pluralism and the Question of the European Common  
Good’ (2012) 18(3) European Law Journal 385-406 
80 Comments of M Poiares Maduro in ‘Four Visions of Constitutional Pluralism: symposium transcript’, 
(2008) 2(1) European Journal of Legal Studies 325-370, 331 
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Regulatory	networks	such	as	the	European	Competition	Network	would	fall	into	this	
category.		
	
The	institutional	pluralism	in	the	third	category	refers	to	“a	pluralism	which	is	based	not	
only	on	different	sources	but	on	competing	interpretations	of	the	same	source	by	
institutions	that	are	not	organised	in	a	hierarchical	manner.”81	[emphasis	added]	It	is	
particularly	apposite	in	the	case	of	competition	law	because	at	the	supranational	level	the	
European	Commission	has	been	central	in	developing	the	law,	and	between	the	national	
and	supranational	levels.	Rules	are	organised	in	a	hierarchical	manner	e.g.	Art	3	Reg	
1/2003.	But	there	is	no	formal	institutional	hierarchy.	The	Commission	is	first	among	
equals	in	the	ECN.	Regarding	national	courts,	the	rules	are	hierarchical	due	to	the	
supremacy	of	EU	law,	apparently	not	according	to	the	Commission’s	status.82	
	
Tying	to	points	made	above	about	different	claims	to	legitimacy,	Komarek	notes	that	“…the	
complex	relationships	between	constitutional	authorities	also	involve	different	
institutions	which	make	claims	to	legitimacy	of	a	different	kind...	It	is	not	just	the	Union	on	
the	one	side,	and	its	member	states	on	the	other.”	He	goes	on	to	cite	interactions	between	
different	institutions	which	may	be	in	opposition	with	each	other	due	to	these	different	
claims	to	legitimacy,	alluding	to	some	of	the	diagonal	interactions	which	are	the	focus	of	
this	thesis:	the	Court	of	Justice	(sometimes	together	with	domestic	courts)	versus	
domestic	legislators,	the	Commission	versus	domestic	courts	83	or	courts	versus	the	market.84	
While	on	the	latter	point	he	makes	reference	to	social	regulation	versus	the	economic	
fundamental	freedoms,	this	could	equally	encompass	courts’	understanding	of	
competition	law	in	relation	to	the	dominant	economic	lens	of	consumer	welfare.	
                                                 
81 Comments of M Poiares Maduro in M Avbelj & J Komarek (eds) ‘Four Visions of Constitutional 
Pluralism: symposium transcript’, (2008) 2(1) European Journal of Legal Studies 325-370, 331 
82 Komninos argues “…primacy is not one of the Commission, as competition authority, over civil courts, 
but rather of the Commission, as supranational Community organ, over national courts.” (emphasis in 
original). Furthermore,  ‘Masterfoods establishes no primacy of the Commission over national courts, but 
rather imposes duties on the latter to apply Community law in a consistent way under the final control of 
the Court of Justice…’”: A Komninos, ‘Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: 
Complement? Overlap?’ (2006) 3(1) Competition Law Review 5-26, 16 
83 J Komarek ‘Institutional Dimension of Constitutional Pluralism’, in M Avbelj & J Komarek (eds) 
Constitutional Pluralism in Europe and Beyond (Hart 2011), 231-247, 235. Here he refers to the 
Masterfoods duty of a court not to take a decision counter to one of the Commission, as discussed in later 
chapters of this thesis.  Komarek argues that “Courts’ deference to administrative agencies’ interpretation 
of law is subject to a continuous debate in the U.S. (citing Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty. An 
Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass; London 2006) 
at 207-208), which seems to be entirely missing in the EU”.   
84 J Komarek ‘Institutional Dimension of Constitutional Pluralism’, in M Avbelj & J Komarek (eds) 
Constitutional Pluralism in Europe and Beyond (Hart 2011), 231-247, 235 fn 32. He supports this with 
reference to social regulation: AG Maduro’s opinion in C-438/05 Viking Line [2007] ECR I-10779 [41]-
[42] 
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As	with	institutional	balance,	pluralism	does	not	offer	any	way	of	resolving	conflicts.	
Maduro	suggests	that	institutions	should	use	institutional	comparison85	to	decide	who	is	
best	placed	to	act.	Kumm	posits	that	legal	actors	–	courts,	administrative	agencies,	
legislators	–	understand	their	actions	as	part	of	wider	practice.	As	such	there	is	a	division	
of	labour	and	powers.	“What	constitutionalism	does	suggest…	is	that	the	exact	nature	of	
each	actor’s	role	and	the	exact	limits	of	what	a	particular	actor	ought	to	be	doing	in	a	
particular	situation	given	decisions	by	other	legal	actors	is	very	rarely	determined	
exclusively	by	an	authoritatively	enacted	rule	regarding	competencies.”86	Constitutional	
pluralism	therefore	informs	the	debate	on	the	current	meaning	of	institutional	balance	
and	separation	of	powers.	Komarek	moves	the	focus	from	the	institution	which	takes	the	
decision	to	the	responses	of	other	institutions,	and	how	they	position	themselves	to	make	
space	for	their	own	decisions.87			
	
Goldoni	argues	Maduro	is	still	focused	on	a	‘single‐institutionalist’	perspective	of	courts	
despite	Maduro’s	statement	that	courts	need	to	be	aware	they	do	not	have	a	monopoly	
over	rules	and	their	interpretation.	This	is	because	this	perspective	focuses	on	the	need	
for	courts	to	accommodate	other	institutions	(including	other	courts),	and	to	take	
responsibility	for	mediating	the	interactions	between	them,	rather	than	incorporating	the	
necessary	cooperation	or	“institutional	awareness”	88	of	other	institutions	too.		In	this	way	
institutional	communication	is	designed	to	combine	actors’	competence	for	a	more	
legitimate	decision.	This	idea	of	constitutional	pluralism	is	also	encapsulated	in	Hofmann	
&	Türk’s	concept	of	an	integrated	administration.89	They	also	suggest	that	executive,	
parliamentary,	judicial,	and	mutual	control	together	should	be	applied	to	guarantee	the	
legality	and	the	legitimacy	of	inter‐administrative	cooperation	and	‘shared	sovereignty	’.	
The	problem	is	that	there	is	no	real	specificity	about	how	these	interactions	should	be	
resolved	in	practice.	The	following	chapters	explore	how	these	interactions	play	out.	
	
One	form	of	institutional	communication	is	through	the	preliminary	reference	procedure.	
This	is	traditionally	seen	as	a	formalised	dialogue	between	courts.	The	potential	for	the	
preliminary	reference	procedure	to	be	used	in	the	diagonal	relationship	between	national	
                                                 
85 M Poiares Maduro, ‘Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional 
Pluralism’, (2007) 1(2) European Journal of Legal Studies 1-21, 18, with reference to N Komesar’s 
comparative institutional analysis. 
86 Comments of M Kumm ‘Four Visions of Constitutional Pluralism: symposium transcript’, (2008) 2(1) 
European Journal of Legal Studies 325-370, 359 
87 J Komarek ‘Institutional Dimension of Constitutional Pluralism’ in M Avbelj & J Komarek (eds) 
Constitutional Pluralism in Europe and Beyond (Hart 2011), 231-247,  232 
88 M Goldoni ‘Constitutional Pluralism and the Question of the European Common Good’ (2012) 18(3) 
European Law Journal 385-406, 395 et seq; the role of non-judicial institutions at 400. 
89 H Hofmann & A Türk 'The Development of Integrated Administration in the EU and its Consequences' 
(2007) 13 (2) European Law Journal 253-271 
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administrative	authorities,	specifically	competition	authorities,	and	the	Court	of	Justice	is	
explored	in	chapter	3	below.	In	this	respect	Komarek	draws	attention	to	the	Costanzo90	
obligation,	according	to	which	an	administrative	authority	is	to	disapply	domestic	
legislative	rules	if	that	authority	believes	they	conflict	with	Union	law.	Following	Costanzo,	
administrative	authorities	have	no	opportunity	to	ask	for	advice	before	doing	so.	Komarek	
proposes	that	the	Court	of	Justice	should	accept	such	references	if	there	is	no	appeal	to	a	
court	and	further	“if	[the	referring	authority]	carries	out	judicial	duties	in	accordance	with	
a	rule	which,	by	virtue	of	form	or	content,	is	constitutional.”	91	It	is	arguable	that	the	
competition	rules	are	central	to	the	Union’s	constitution.	
	
Beyond	how	the	principle	can	be	realised	in	practice,	the	principal	controversy	with	
constitutional	pluralism	is	whether	it	is	even	possible	to	have	unity	and	coherence	without	
one	ultimate	authority	having	the	last	word.92	Given	that	a	constitution	is	the	highest	
source	of	law,	some	scholars	are	understandably	sceptical	about	the	concept	of	
constitutional	pluralism.93	Davies	argues	that	it	is	an	empty	idea	on	the	basis	that	“Where	
there	are	multiple	sources	of	apparently	constitutional	law	one	always	takes	precedence	
and	the	other	is	then	no	longer	constitutional.”	94		Conversely,	Maduro	believes	that	it	is	
possible	to	have	unity	and	coherence	without	an	authoritative	decision.95	This	raises	
questions	about	the	ultimate	role	of	the	CJEU,	particularly	in	competition	law	in	which	the	
Commission	has	been	so	central.	One	way	to	understand	this	would	be	that	interpretative	
pluralism	suggests	a	looser	interpretation	of	unity	or	coherence	itself.		
	
In	its	current	state,	it	is	not	clear	whether	pluralism	relates	to	different	systems	of	law,	or	
the	interpretations	of	different	institutions	within	that	system.	96		In	the	case	of	Member	
State	authorities	and	courts,	it	can	be	argued	that	they	are	applying	two	constitutional	
                                                 
90 C-103/88 Fratelli Costanzo v Milano [1989] ECR 1839. See also C-198/01 Consorzio Industrie 
Fiammiferi v Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato [2003] ECR I-8055 
91 J Komarek ‘Institutional Dimension of Constitutional Pluralism’, in M Avbelj & J Komarek (eds) 
Constitutional Pluralism in Europe and Beyond (Hart 2011), 231-247, 239 citing the AG’s opinion in C-
205/08 Alpe Adria Energia [2009] ECR I-11525 [48]: AG Colomer showing his concern for the judicial 
role, as in De Coster, discussed in further detail in the following chapter.  
92 Comments of J Baquero Cruz in M Avbelj & J Komarek (eds) of Constitutional Pluralism: symposium 
transcript’ (2008) 2(1) European Journal of Legal Studies 325-370, 340 
93 E.g. J Weiler ‘Prologue: Global and Pluralist Constitutionalism: some doubts’ in G de Burca & J 
Weiler (eds) The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (CUP, 2011) “reacts against the ubiquity and 
vacuity of the term constitutional pluralism”, preferring ‘constitutional tolerance’.  
94 G Davies ‘Constitutional Disagreement in Europe and the Search for Pluralism’ in J Komarek & M 
Avbelj (eds) Constitutional Pluralism in Europe and Beyond (Hart Oxford 2012), 281. See also Baquero 
Cruz; Avbelj in the same volume. 
95 Comments of M Maduro in response to J Baquero Cruz in M Avbelj & J Komarek (eds) of 
Constitutional Pluralism: symposium transcript’ (2008) 2(1) European Journal of Legal Studies 325-370, 
340  
96 Baquero Cruz draws a distinction between pluralism within a legal order and pluralism between legal 
orders in M Avbelj & J Komarek (eds) of Constitutional Pluralism: symposium transcript’ (2008) 2(1) 
European Journal of Legal Studies 325-370, 333 
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systems	of	law	–	national	law	and	EU	law,	albeit	that	national	law	is	embedded	within	EU	
law	due	to	the	latter’s	supremacy.	In	competition	law,	the	convergence	rule	in	Art	3	Reg	
1/2003	requires	parallel	application	of	EU	and	national	law.	However,	at	the	
supranational	level,	the	Commission	and	the	Court	are	interpreting	the	same	system	of	–	
EU	‐	law.	In	that	sense,	where	is	the	pluralism?	One	answer	is	that	these	institutions	may	
still	have	different	interpretations.	Halberstam	distinguishes	between	two	kinds	of	
constitutional	pluralism:	interpretive	pluralism	(pluralism	of	interpreters)	and	normative	
pluralism	(pluralism	of	sources).	97	This	goes	some	way	to	responding	to	Davies’	argument	
that	constitutional	pluralism	is	an	empty	idea	on	the	basis	that	“Where	there	are	multiple	
sources	of	apparently	constitutional	law	one	always	takes	precedence	and	the	other	is	then	
no	longer	constitutional.”	98		[emphasis	added].	In	this	thesis	the	emphasis	is	on	pluralism	
of	interpreters	–	the	European	Commission,	the	Court	of	Justice,	national	competition	
authorities	and	national	courts	‐	as	they	are	often	drawing	on	the	same	source,	such	as	the	
judgment	in	a	previous	case,	a	Regulation,	or	a	notice.		
	
The	Commission	often	rehearses	that	its	opinion	is	without	prejudice	to	the	interpretation	
of	the	Court	of	Justice.		However,	others	have	found	that	the	Commission	uses	both	judicial	
and	legislative	channels	of	influence,	and	that	the	Commission	puts	pressure	on	the	
Council	of	Ministers	in	legislative	mode	through	its	intervention	in	the	judicial	mode.	99	It	
does	this	through	intervening	in	proceedings	in	the	Court	of	Justice.100	The	emphasis	here	
is	on	the	judicial	law‐making	of	the	Court,	and	the	influence	of	the	Court’s	judgment	on	the	
Member	States.		
	
However,	it	does	not	acknowledge	the	influence	of	the	legal	opinion	of	the	Commission	
itself	in	the	Court	proceedings.		Harlow	notes	that	the	Commission	habit	of	appearing	
regularly	as	amicus	curiae	or	intervener	in	preliminary	references	is	a	strategy	designed	
to	enhance	its	position	next	to	the	Court.101	Others	have	found	that	the	Court	of	Justice	
aligns	its	judgment	with	the	Commission's	observations	in	the	vast	majority	(around	90%)	
                                                 
97 D Halberstam ‘Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the 
United States’ in J Dunoff and J Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International 
Law and Global Government (CUP, 2009) 326-355 
98 G Davies ‘Constitutional Disagreement in Europe and the Search for Pluralism’ in J Komarek & M 
Avbelj (eds) Constitutional Pluralism in Europe and Beyond (Hart Oxford 2012), 281 
99 A Hofmann ‘Litigation Strategy and Litigation Dynamics – The European Commission Before the 
Court of Justice’ paper delivered at European Consortium on Political Research (ECPR) Standing Group 
on EU Politics conference, Sept 2008, Riga 
100 This aligns with Scharpf’s supranational-hierarchical mode of policy-making: “Given the Court’s 
power of judicial legislation and its own enforcement powers, the Commission is then able to avail itself 
of t[hese] distinct legislative options”. F Scharpf ‘The Joint-DecisionTrap Revisited’ (2006) 44(4)  
Journal of Common Market Studies 845-864, 852 
101 C Harlow ‘Three Phases in the Evolution of EU Administrative Law’ in P Craig & G de Burca (eds) 
The Evolution of EU law, (OUP, 2nd edn, 2011) 439-464, 449 
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of	cases.	In	a	review	of	various	empirical	studies,	Conant	reports	that	the	Court	of	Justice	is	
“most	likely	to	agree	with	the	legal	analysis	of	the	Commission”.102	(emphasis	added).	This	
reference	to	legal	analysis	is	interesting	as	it	emphasises	that	the	Commission	also	has	a	
‘judicial’	view	alongside	the	Court.		The	impact	of	the	Commission’s	intervention	gives	an	
indication	of	what	will	happen	at	the	national	level	where	the	Commission	intervenes	in	
national	judicial	proceedings	(explored	more	fully	in	chapter	4).	It	also	highlights	the	gap	
between	vertical	and	horizontal	accountability	mechanisms	when	a	supranational	
executive	actor	intervenes	in	a	national	court.		
	
	
6.	Conclusions	
	
Interpretative	pluralism	suggests	that	there	is	a	heterarchy,	rather	than	a	hierarchy,	of	
valid	interpretations	of	law	in	the	EU	system.	This	is	relevant	in	a	system	of	concurrent	
competences	such	as	in	the	post‐2004	competition	enforcement	regime.	The	principle	of	
institutional	balance	is	the	EU’s	version	of	the	separation	of	powers	at	the	supranational	
level.	However,	the	functions	of	legislative,	executive	and	judiciary	are	not	vested	in	
respective	single	institutions.	Alongside	the	CJEU,	the	European	Commission	has	judicial	
functions,	evident	in	competition	law	–	in	individual	cases	it	can	declare	infringements	and	
impose	fines;	and	at	the	system	level	it	gives	its	interpretation	of	the	law	through	notices	
and	guidelines.	Despite	their	soft	law	status,	these	interpretations	have	weight	given	the	
Commission’s	historical	centrality	in	the	competition	system.	The	Commission’s	
authorship	of	soft	law	instruments	at	the	legislative	level	suggests	its	primacy	in	the	
interpretation	of	those	instruments	at	the	enforcement	level.	The	concurrent	powers	of	
the	CJEU	and	Commission	suggest	that	where	the	Commission	authors	soft	law	
instruments	at	the	legislative	level,	or	makes	a	quasi‐judicial	decision	(such	as	imposing	a	
fine)	regarding	specific	parties,	it	has	primacy	over	interpretation	at	the	enforcement	
level.	In	addition,	the	Commission	now	has	the	ability	to	intervene	in	individual	cases	
before	courts	with	legal	opinions.		It	is	questionable	whether	there	can	be	a	‘diagonal’	
institutional	balance	between	the	supranational	and	the	national	levels,	which	activates	
the	judicial	autonomy	of	Member	State	courts.	However,	there	is	a	duty	of	loyal	
cooperation	between	the	EU	institutions	and	authorities	and	courts	at	the	sub‐state	level.		
A	plurality	of	interpretations	–	and	interpreters	–	of	the	law	suggests	a	looser	concept	of	
unity	or	coherence.	The	following	chapters	consider	the	impact	of	mechanisms	for	
coherence	and	show	how	these	institutional	interactions	play	out	in	practice:	NCAs	and	
                                                 
102 L Conant ‘Review Article: The Politics of Legal Integration’ (2007) 45 issue supplement s1 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 45-66. She cites various studies (e.g. Stone Sweet, Cichowski) covering 
preliminary references as well as direct actions.  
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the	Court	of	Justice;	the	European	Commission	and	national	courts;	and	national	
competition	authorities	and	national	courts	where	NCAs	decisions	are	binding.	
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CHAPTER	3:	NATIONAL	COMPETITION	AUTHORITIES’	(LACK	OF)	ACCESS	TO	THE	
COURT	OF	JUSTICE	
	
1.	Introduction	
	
This	chapter	explores	the	diagonal	relationship	between	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	
European	Union	(CJEU)	and	national	competition	authorities	(NCAs).	Given	the	
relationship	of	NCAs	with	the	European	Commission	through	the	European	Competition	
Network	(ECN),	taken	together	with	the	following	chapter	it	contributes	to	the	question	of	
how	the	Commission	challenges,	or	complements,	the	role	of	the	CJEU.	The	chapter	
investigates	the	CJEU’s	concept	of	a	‘court	or	tribunal’,	through	the	admissibility	
requirements	of	the	preliminary	reference	procedure	under	Article	267	TFEU.1		This	is	
significant	because	only	a	‘court	or	tribunal’	has	jurisdiction	to	address	a	question	to	the	
Court	of	Justice.	The	preliminary	reference	procedure	is	important	as	the	primary	means	
for	encouraging	coherence	of	EU	law	through	the	CJEU’s	interpretation.		
	
This	chapter	considers	how	a	national	competition	authority	as	a	quasi‐judicial	agency	has	
attempted,	unsuccessfully,	to	use	the	judicial	tool	of	the	preliminary	reference	procedure.		
As	such	it	demonstrates	practical	effects	of	judicial	and	administrative	institutional	
definitions.	
	
In	2003	the	Hellenic	Competition	Commission	requested	a	preliminary	ruling	from	the	
CJEU	in	the	Syfait	case2	on	the	substantive	question	of	parallel	imports	and	the	potential	
abuse	of	a	dominant	position	under	Article	102	TFEU.	In	ruling	its	request	inadmissible,	
the	Court	has	in	effect	blocked	NCAs	with	a	particular	structure	from	engaging	with	it.	In	
terms	of	the	diagonal	relationships	in	Figure	1’s	institutional	diagram	in	the	introduction:	
it	is	argued	that	while	the	European	Commission,	as	a	supranational	administrative	
authority,	has	strengthened	its	links	with	national	courts	through	amicus	curiae	
                                                 
1 The text of Article 267 TFEU reads: 
“The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings 
concerning:  
(a) the interpretation of the Treaties; [clearly this includes Articles 101 and 102] 
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the 
Union; [this includes Council Regulations and Commission Decisions] 
... 
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or 
tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give 
judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon.  
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member 
State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or 
tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court.” [emphasis added] 
2 C-53/03 Synetairismos Farmakopion Aitolias & Akarnanias v GlaxoSmithkline Plc [2005] ECR I-4609  
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mechanisms,	as	demonstrated	in	the	following	chapter,	the	Court	of	Justice	seems	
motivated	to	preserve	its	dialogue	between	courts	only	and	to	exclude	quasi‐judicial	
national	authorities.	However,	if	the	CJEU	adopts	a	narrow	definition	of	a	court	or	tribunal,	
it	constrains	its	own	jurisdiction.	
	
National	courts	have	parallel	avenues	of	communication	with,	or	intervention	from,	EU	
supranational	bodies	in	competition	law	–	one	through	Commission	opinions,	and	one	
from	the	preliminary	reference	procedure.	For	example,	the	following	chapter	uncovers	a	
number	of	cases	particularly	in	the	Spanish	courts	under	Article	101	TFEU	concerning	
treatment	of	agency	agreements	in	the	service	station	sector,	in	which	the	courts	asked	
both	for	advice	of	Commission	and	Court	of	Justice.	However,	NCAs	with	integrated	
functions	are	effectively	barred	from	seeking	a	preliminary	ruling	from	the	Court	of	Justice	
as	they	do	not	meet	the	definition	of	a	court	or	tribunal	following	the	CJEU’s	judgment	in	
Syfait.	The	most	common,	although	not	universal,	institutional	model	of	competition	
enforcement	among	the	Member	States	is	the	integrated	administrative	authority.	As	such,	
NCAs’	assistance	with	interpreting	the	law	is	with	the	European	Commission	through	the	
European	Competition	Network	(ECN).		
	
This	has	implications	for	the	consistent	application	of	EU	competition	law	first	as	between	
types	of	authorities,	since	some	may	find	preliminary	ruling	requests	denied	while	others	
are	admitted,	depending	on	the	Member	State’s	institutional	design	of	its	competition	
enforcement	regime.	Secondly,	NCAs	involved	in	public	enforcement	and	national	courts	
in	private	enforcement	are	subject	to	different	mechanisms.		
	
	
1.1	Outline	of	the	chapter	
	
The	chapter	is	structured	as	follows.	It	first	sets	the	context	by	surveying	the	post‐2004	
landscape,	in	particular	multiple	enforcers	and	the	challenge	of	consistent	application	of	
antitrust	rules	in	decentralised	enforcement;	and	the	quasi‐judicial	nature	of	competition	
enforcement	undertaken	by	these	multiple	enforcers.	It	goes	on	to	consider	the	
implications	of	Article	35	Regulation	1/20033,	according	to	which	Member	States	can	
decide	the	appropriate	institutional	structures	for	public	enforcement	of	competition	law.	
In	the	second	part	the	discussion	turns	from	the	designation	of	courts	or	administrative	
                                                 
3 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003,.1-25, in force 1.5.2004. In 
particular, the Regulation grants national competition authorities and national courts the power to grant 
exemptions under Article 101(3) TFEU, previously the exclusive domain of the European Commission. 
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agencies	as	competition	authorities	at	the	national	level,	to	the	criteria	in	the	EU	definition	
of	a	‘court	or	tribunal’	for	the	purposes	of	the	preliminary	reference	procedure.	It	
considers	how	the	CJEU	including	its	Advocates	General	have	defined	and	developed	the	
concept	through	specific,	albeit	occasionally	flexible,	criteria.	The	third	part	focuses	on	the	
Syfait	case.	Whereas	the	Advocate	General	would	allow	the	reference,	the	Court	declared	it	
inadmissible	in	a	relatively	brief	judgment.	The	analysis	focuses	on	the	CJEU’s	
interpretation	of	the	independence	criterion,	and	the	possibility	for	the	Commission	to	
deprive	the	Hellenic	Competition	Commission	of	its	jurisdiction	under	Article	11(6)	
Regulation	1/2003.	The	remainder	of	the	chapter	analyses	whether	the	judgment	does	bar	
all	NCAs	from	access	to	the	CJEU;	the	interests	of	NCAs	and	the	Court;	and	wider	
considerations	of	judicial	economy,	the	floodgates	argument,	expertise,	and	consistent	
application	and	interpretation	of	the	law.		The	chapter	concludes	with	an	assessment	of	
the	asymmetric	avenues	to	the	supranational	level	for	national	courts	and	competition	
authorities.	
	
	
2.	The	post‐2004	landscape	
	
2.1	Multiple	enforcers	and	the	challenge	of	consistent	application		
	
In	post‐2004	EU	competition	enforcement,	multiple	enforcers	with	parallel	powers	
operate.	Decentralisation	of	enforcement	of	Articles	101	and	102	TFEU	under	Regulation	
1/2003	has	led	to	an	increase	in	the	powers	and	jurisdiction	of	national	competition	
authorities	(NCAs)	and	national	courts.4	National	courts	may	be	involved	in	competition	
law	enforcement	by	adjudicating	in	disputes	between	private	parties;	as	a	competition	
authority;	or	in	a	judicial	review	function.	Given	the	greater	number	of	competition	
enforcers	and	the	possibility	for	burden	sharing,	the	decentralised	regime	should	give	rise	
to	more	effective	enforcement	and	more	efficient	allocation	of	resources.	However,	
decentralisation	also	increases	the	risk	of	divergent	application	of	the	rules.		
	
                                                 
4 For an account of the reforms, see for example C-D Ehlermann ‘The Modernization of EC Antitrust 
Policy: A Legal and Cultural Revolution’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 537-574; D Gerber 
‘Modernising European Competition Law: A Developmental Perspective’ (2001) 22(4) European 
Competition Law Review 122-130; J Venit ‘Brave New World: The Modernization and Decentralization 
of Enforcement under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty’ (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 545-
580; H Kassim & K Wright (2007) ‘Revisiting Modernisation: the European Commission, Policy Change 
and the Reform of EC Competition Policy’, ESRC Centre for Competition Policy working paper 07-19; H 
Kassim & K Wright ‘Bringing Regulatory Processes Back In: Revisiting the Reform of EU Antitrust and 
Merger Control’ (2009) 32(4) West European Politics 738-755  
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Such	divergent	application	could	manifest	itself	in	various	ways.	5		First,	there	could	be	
differential	application	of	EU	law	between	jurisdictions.	Secondly,	there	could	be	
inconsistency	between	EU	and	national	competition	law.	The	third	category	is	diagonal	
divergence,	in	which	there	may	be	a	substantive	clash	between	EU	competition	law	and	
national	laws	in	other	policy	areas.6	The	final	category	of	potential	divergence,	most	
relevant	to	this	chapter’s	discussion,	can	be	characterised	as	institutional	divergence.	This	
relates	to	different	categories	of	enforcers	–	national	competition	authorities	as	public	
enforcers,	and	national	courts	in	private	enforcement	between	individual	parties.	NCAs	
select	their	cases,	whereas	courts	are	reactive.	NCAs7	are	linked	to	the	administration	and	
operate	according	to	overarching	policy	and	resource	priorities,	whereas	judges	
autonomously	decide	individual	cases	on	the	basis	of	the	issues	brought	before	them	by	
the	parties.	National	competition	authorities,	by	definition	specialising	in	competition	law	
on	a	daily	basis,	should	have	more	expertise	than	generalist	national	judges	delivering	
judgments	alone.	A	related	issue	is	the	different	interpretations	of	economic	analysis	in	
competition	cases.8	
	
More	crucially,	national	competition	authorities	in	a	public	enforcement	function	are	
closely	linked	horizontally	with	their	counterparts	and	vertically	with	the	European	
Commission,	specifically	DG	COMP,	through	the	cooperation	mechanisms	of	the	European	
Competition	Network	(ECN),	with	its	rules	for	case	allocation	and	consistent	application	of	
Community	competition	law.9	However,	there	is	no	such	mechanism	involving	national	
courts,	respecting	the	principles	of	judicial	independence	and	procedural	autonomy	of	the	
Member	States.			
	
	
	 	
                                                 
5 These categories relate to single case consistency – see e.g. D Gerber & P Cassinis ‘The 
“Modernisation” of European Community Competition Law: Achieving Consistency in Enforcement – 
Part II’ (2006) 27(2) European Competition Law Review 51-57, and on some types of divergence D 
Gerber & P Cassinis ‘The “Modernisation” of European Community Competition Law: Achieving 
Consistency in Enforcement – Part I’ (2006) 27(1) European Competition Law Review 10-18, 11; K 
Lenaerts and D Gerard ‘Decentralisation of EC Competition Law: Judges in the Frontline’, (2004) 27(3) 
World Competition 313-349, 316 
6 M C Lucey 'Unforeseen Consequences of Article 3 of EU Regulation 1/2003’ (2006) 27 European 
Competition Law Review 558-563, 561 
7 Taken as a whole without disaggregating their investigatory and adjudicatory functions 
8 E.g. I Lianos ‘“Judging Economists”: Economic Expertise in Competition Litigation: a European View’ 
in I Lianos & I Kokkoris (eds) Towards an Optimal Competition Law System (Kluwer International, 
2009) 185-320; E Barbier de la Serre & A-L Sibony ‘Expert Evidence Before the EC Courts’ (2008) 
Common Market Law Review 941-985   
9 Commission Notice of 27 April 2004 on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ 
C 101, 27.4.2004, 43-53 (the Network Notice) 
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2.2	Multiple	enforcers	in	a	quasi‐judicial	environment	
	
In	addition,	these	multiple	enforcers	operate	in	a	quasi‐judicial	system	of	competition	
regulation	and	enforcement:	‘quasi‐judicial’	in	terms	of	both	institutional	structure	and	
function.	This	quasi‐judicial	nature	encompasses	several	elements.	Investigative,	decision‐
making	and	enforcement	functions	may	be	carried	out	by	a	single	agency.	Competition	
authorities	have	the	competence	to	make	binding	legal	determinations,	but	they	are	
integrated	into	the	public	administration.	There	are	different	configurations	of	
administrative	and	judicial	bodies	making	and	enforcing	the	law	and	there	are	different	
degrees	of	persuasive	or	binding	force	attached	to	the	rules	they	apply	and	make.	At	the	
systemic	level	rules	are	elucidated	through	soft	law	instruments	as	well	as	hard	rules.	
Finally,	administrative	authorities	have	become	more	juridified	in	terms	of	formality,	
approach	to	evidence,	procedural	rights	and	reporting	of	decisions.10		
	
The	European	Commission	itself	has	been	characterised	as	investigator,	prosecutor	and	
judge11	in	its	enforcement	of	competition	policy,	and	at	the	national	level	there	are	
different	models	for	public	enforcement.	In	some	Member	States,	courts	are	involved	in	
public	as	well	as	private	enforcement	of	competition	law.	We	therefore	see	cross‐over	of	
the	judicial	and	administrative	spheres.	This	becomes	relevant	for	the	definition	of	a	‘court	
or	tribunal’	in	the	preliminary	reference	procedure.		As	Advocate	General	Ruiz‐Jarabo	
Colomer	stated	in	De	Coster		“’exercise	of	‘judicial	functions'	and	'judicial	body'	are	not	
synonymous	terms.”	12	
	
	
2.3	Article	35	Regulation	1/2003	and	choice	of	institutional	structure	
	
Article	35	of	Regulation	1/200313	allows	Member	States	to	decide	the	appropriate	
institutional	structures	for	public	enforcement	of	competition	law,	subject	to	the	
                                                 
10 See generally, L C Blichner and A Molander ‘Mapping Juridification’ (2008) 14(1) European Law 
Journal 36. In the context of competition law, I Maher ‘Juridification, Codification and Sanction in UK 
Competition Law’ (2000) 63(4) Modern Law Review 544-569 
11 See, for example, W Wils, ‘The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the 
Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis’ (2004) 27(2) 
World Competition 201-224 
12 Case C-17/00 De Coster v Collège des Bourgmestre et Échevins de Watermael-Boitsfort [2001] ECR I-
9445 [117] 
13 “Article 35: Designation of competition authorities of Member States 
1. The Member States shall designate the competition authority or authorities responsible for the 
application of Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty in such a way that the provisions of this regulation 
are effectively complied with. The measures necessary to empower those authorities to apply those 
Articles shall be taken before 1 May 2004. The authorities designated may include courts. 
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principles	of	effectiveness	and	equivalence;	that	is,	that	the	effectiveness	of	Community	
law	is	not	impeded	and	that	equal	treatment	is	ensured	throughout	the	Community	with	
equivalent	proceedings	implementing	national	and	EU	law.14	According	to	Commission	v	
Greece,	Member	States	must	establish	a	system	of	sanctions	which	are	effective,	
proportionate	and	which	dissuade	infringements	of	EU	law.15	Member	States	must	also	
mutually	recognise	the	standards	of	each	other’s	competition	enforcement	structures,	
regardless	of	the	differences	across	the	EU.16		
	
The	lack	of	prescription	about	specific	institutional	structure	is	a	manifestation	of	the	
Member	States’	procedural	autonomy.		Article	35(2)	was	drafted	to	reflect	the	reality	of	
the	status	quo	in	the	Member	States	rather	than	establishing	a	common	institutional	
model.	17		But	subsequently,	membership	of	the	ECN	has	had	an	impact	on	national	
enforcement	structures,	with	most	opting	for	an	integrated	administrative	agency.	
	
Three	models	are	identified:	an	integrated	monist	structure	carrying	out	investigative	and	
adjudicative	functions,	and	two	breeds	of	dualist	structure	‐	or	monist,	dualist,	and	appeal	
                                                                                                                                               
2. When enforcement of Community competition law is entrusted to national administrative and judicial 
authorities, the Member States may allocate different powers and functions to those different national 
authorities, whether administrative or judicial. 
3. The effects of Article 11(6) apply to the authorities designated by the Member States including courts 
that exercise functions regarding the preparation and the adoption of the types of decisions foreseen in 
Article 5 [require that infringement be brought to an end; order interim measures; accept commitments or 
impose fines, periodic penalty payments or any other penalty provided for in their national law]. The 
effects of Article 11(6) do not extend to courts insofar as they act as review courts in respect of the types 
of decisions foreseen in Article 5. 
4. Notwithstanding paragraph 3, in the Member States where, for the adoption of certain types of 
decisions foreseen in Article 5, an authority brings an action before a judicial authority that is separate 
and different from the prosecuting authority and provided that the terms of this paragraph are complied 
with, the effects of Article 11(6) shall be limited to the authority prosecuting the case which shall 
withdraw its claim before the judicial authority when the Commission opens proceedings and this 
withdrawal shall bring the national proceedings effectively to an end.” 
Recital 35 Reg 1/3002: “In order to attain a proper enforcement of Community competition law, Member 
States should designate and empower authorities to apply Articles [101] and [102]  of the Treaty as public 
enforcers. They should be able to designate administrative as well as judicial authorities to carry out the 
various functions conferred upon competition authorities in this Regulation. This Regulation recognises 
the wide variation which exists in the public enforcement systems of Member States. The effects of 
Article 11(6) of this Regulation should apply to all competition authorities. As an exception to this 
general rule, where a prosecuting authority brings a case before a separate judicial authority, Article 11(6) 
should apply to the prosecuting authority subject to the conditions in Article 35(4) of this Regulation, 
where these conditions are not fulfilled, the general rule should apply. In any case, Article 11(6) should 
not apply to courts insofar as they are acting as review courts.” 
14 Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989 [5];  
Commission Staff Working Paper, Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Implementing Articles 
81 and 82 EC, National Courts in public enforcement (Article 36) [now Art 35], SEC (2002) 408, 
Brussels 11.4.2002,  3 
15 Case 68/99 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965 [23]-[25] cited in the Network Notice, n.9 [2] 
16 Joint Statement of Council and Commission on the functioning of the network, Council document no. 
15435/02 ADD 1, [8] 
17 Commission Staff Working Paper, Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Implementing 
Articles 81 and 82 EC, National Courts in public enforcement (Article 36) [now Art 35], SEC (2002) 408, 
Brussels 11.4.2002, p. 3 (SWP on national courts in public enforcement) 
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structure	as	they	are	named	in	the	Commission’s	staff	working	paper	on	public	
enforcement.	18			
	
(A)	an	integrated	agency,	competent	to	investigate	and	to	take	decisions,	with	potential	for	
judicial	review	or	appeal	of	the	final	agency	decision	before	a	court;		
(B)	split	functions,	with	the	investigation	carried	out	by	an	administrative	agency,	and	the	
final	decision	on	whether	there	is	an	infringement	taken	by	a	court	or	specified	tribunal,	
again	with	the	possibility	of	judicial	review	of	the	final	decision;	and		
(C)	an	administrative	agency	investigates	and	may	decide	that	there	is	no	infringement,	
but	if	it	determines	that	there	is	an	infringement,	a	court	must	pronounce	a	prohibition	or	
impose	sanctions,	with	the	possibility	of	that	decision	being	appealed	to	a	higher	court.		
	
These	models	are	best	seen	on	a	continuum	rather	than	in	strictly	separated	categories,	as	
there	are	nuances	within	each	category.	Examples	of	integrated	NCAs	(type	A)	include	the	
German	Bundeskartellamt,	the	Italian	Autorità	garante	della	concorrenza,	Dutch	
Nederlandse	Mededingingsautoriteit,	Portuguese	autoridade	da	concorrência,	Hungarian	
Competition	Authority,	the	Slovak	Monopoly	Office,	Czech	Office	for	the	Protection	of	
Competition	and	the	United	Kingdom	Office	of	Fair	Trading	(OFT).	The	UK	is	to	adopt	an	
‘enhanced	administrative	model’	in	the	planned	Competition	and	Markets	Authority,19	
merging	together	the	competition	functions	of	the	OFT	and	the	UK	Competition	
Commission,	which	is	not	currently	a	member	of	the	European	Competition	Network.	
Within	type	A,	some	authorities	have	an	investigatory	arm	which	makes	recommendations	
to	a	decision‐making	board	or	council,	for	example	the	Danish	Competition	Council,	the	
Latvian	Competition	Council	and	the	Hellenic	Competition	Commission.	
	
Examples	of	a	type	B	dualist	structure,	where	there	is	a	court	making	the	final	
determination	as	to	anti‐competitive	conduct,	include	Belgium,	whose	Competition	
Council	is	an	administrative	court	in	national	constitutional	terms.	Until	recently,	France	
and	Spain	fell	into	this	category,	but	have	now	opted	for	an	integrated	structure	along	the	
lines	of	DG	COMP.	Estonia	is	a	special	case,	where	civil	penalties	can	be	imposed	by	the	
authority	but	a	court	must	deal	with	misdemeanour	or	criminal	matters.	
	
According	to	dualist	structure	(C),	the	investigating	agency	must	go	to	a	court	to	request	
imposition	of	penalties.	Again,	there	are	differences	within	this	category.	In	Ireland	only	
                                                 
18 SWP on national courts in public enforcement, 4. See also Network Notice recital 2. 
19 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), ‘Growth, Competition and the Competition 
Regime: Government Response to Consultation’, March 2012, available at 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/consumer-issues/docs/g/12-512-growth-and-competition-regime-
government-response.pdf  (accessed 16.4.2012) 
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the	court	can	formally	find	an	infringement,	as	well	as	impose	fines.	In	Finland	the	
competition	authority	may	make	the	declaration	of	infringement	but	must	go	to	court	to	
impose	the	fine.	In	Sweden,	any	court	may	impose	penalties	but	the	Market	Court	
(Marknadsdomstolen)	is	the	final	appeal	court	in	competition	cases.20	
	
In	some	Member	States,	the	declaration	of	an	infringement	itself	is	viewed	as	a	penalty.	
For	example,	in	the	Czech	Republic	Tupperware	case21	Brno	Regional	Court	ruled	that	the	
Czech	competition	authority’s	declaration	of	a	concurrent	breach	of	Czech	and	Community	
competition	laws	violated	the	principle	of	ne	bis	in	idem	despite	one	joint	penalty	being	
imposed.	This	was	subsequently	overturned	by	the	Czech	Supreme	Administrative	Court.22		
	
In	deciding	on	the	institutional	design	of	their	competition	regimes,	and	in	particular	the	
role	 of	 courts,	 tribunals	 or	 administrative	 agencies,	 Member	 States	 must,	 implicitly	 at	
least,	 consider	 the	 trade‐offs	 identified	 by	 Trebilcock	 and	 Iacobucci23:	
independence/accountability;	 	 expertise/detachment;	 transparency/confidentiality;	
administrative	efficiency/due	process;	predictability/flexibility.	A	Member	State	may	need	
to	 designate	 a	 court	 as	 a	 competition	 authority	 for	 constitutional	 reasons,	 for	 example	
certain	penalties	can	only	be	imposed	by	a	court.		
	
In	the	configurations	outlined	above,	courts	are	involved	in	a	public,	as	opposed	to	private,	
enforcement	role,	and	are	viewed	as	competition	authorities	for	the	purposes	of	
Regulation	1/2003	and	the	Network	Notice.	In	their	private	enforcement	capacity,	
relations	between	the	national	courts	and	the	Commission	are	covered	by	certain	
provisions	of	Regulation	1/2003	elaborated	by	the	Courts	Notice.24		
	
                                                 
20 For more discussion of Member States’ structure see S Brammer ‘Co-operation Between National 
Competition Agencies in the Enforcement of EC Competition Law ‘ (Hart, 2009)  at 113-122; ‘Current 
Developments in Member States’ (2010) 6(3) European Competition Journal 709-785; L Idot ‘A 
Necessary Step to Common Procedural Standards of Implementation of Articles 81 and 82 EC without 
the Network’ in C-D Ehlermann and I Atanasiu (eds) European Competition Law Annual 2002: 
constructing the EU Network of competition authorities (Hart, 2004) 211-221 and C Gauer ‘Does the 
Effectiveness of the EU Network of Competition Authorities Require a Certain Degree of Harmonisation 
of National Procedures and Sanctions?’ in the same volume, 187-201. Aspects of Idot’s analysis are now 
out of date. She was writing at a time when “the main choice for Member States [wa]s not between an 
ordinary court and an administrative body, but between a government department and an independent 
administrative authority.” Idot also asserts that all such authorities are courts and tribunals for purposes of 
Art 267 TFEU, while acknowledging that the definition is stricter for the purposes of Art 6 ECHR and Art 
47 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.   
21 Case No. 62 Ca 4/2007-115, Tupperware, Brno Regional Court, 1.11.2007 
22 For a fuller discussion see M Petr  ‘The Ne Bis in Idem Principle in Competition Law’ (2008) 29(7) 
European Competition Law Review 392-400 
23 M Trebilcock and E Iacobucci  ‘Designing Competition Institutions: Values, Structure and Mandate’ 
(2002) 25 World Competition 372–80 , 361 
24 Commission Notice of 27 April 2004 on the cooperation between the Commission and the courts of the 
EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, 54-64 
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2.4	Duality	and	the	significance	of	being	‘	judicial’	and/or	‘administrative’:	double	
obligations	on	NCAs?	
	
The	Courts	Notice	accompanying	Regulation	1/2003	defines	its	scope	as	the	relationship	
between	the	European	Commission	and	“those	courts	and	tribunals	within	an	EU	Member	
State	that	can	apply	Articles	[101]	and	[102]	and	that	are	authorised	to	ask	a	preliminary	
question	to	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	[Union]	pursuant	to	Article	[267	TFEU]	…”	
(recital	1).	Therefore	if	the	CJEU	did	consider	a	reference	from	an	NCA	to	be	admissible,	it	
would	fall	within	the	scope	of	both	the	Court	Notice	and	the	Network	Notice.	Recital	2	of	
the	same	Notice	explicitly	states	that	where	a	national	court	is	also	designated	as	a	
competition	authority	pursuant	to	Article	35(1)	of	the	Regulation,	cooperation	with	the	
Commission	is	covered	both	by	the	Courts	notice	and	the	Network	Notice	–	does	this	imply	
dual	powers	and	obligations?	
	
The	relevant	obligations	are	those	to	inform	the	Commission	without	delay	after	the	first	
formal	investigative	measure	(Art	11(3)	and	informing	the	Commission	at	least	30	days	
before	a	decision	is	taken	on	the	existence	of	an	infringement,	or	a	decision	to	accept	
commitments	or	to	withdraw	the	benefit	of	a	block	exemption	under	Art	29	(art	11	(4)),	
and	the	competence	of	the	Commission	to	remove	a	case	from	the	national	body’s	
jurisdiction	(article	11(6)	Regulation	1/2003).		
	
This	means	that,	depending	on	the	national	designation,	some	national	competition	
authorities	engaged	in	public	enforcement	will	be	subject	to	only	the	Network	Notice,	
whereas	others	will	be	subject	to	both	the	Network	Notice	and	the	Courts	Notice.		A	court	
cannot	only	be	covered	by	the	Courts	Notice	when	it	is	involved	in	public	enforcement.		
	
Article	5	lays	down	the	powers	of	decision	of	competition	authorities:	they	may	require	
that	an	infringement	be	brought	to	an	end;	order	interim	measures;	accept	commitments;		
impose	fines,	periodic	penalty	payments	or	any	other	penalty	provided	for	in	their	
national	law;	or	decide	that	there	are	no	grounds	for	action.	This	negative	clearance	does	
not	affect	other	NCAs,	or	the	Commission’s,	competence	to	take	action	in	their	own	
jurisdictions.			
	
The	Regulation	is	not	similarly	prescriptive	for	the	powers	of	the	national	courts.	Article	6	
merely	states	that	they	shall	have	the	power	to	apply	Articles	101	and	102	of	the	Treaty.	
An	examination	of	the	pre‐legislative	Council	of	Ministers	documents	reveals	that	the	
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emphasis	was	in	recognising	courts’	power	to	apply	those	articles	in	their	entirety.25		The	
explicit	distinction	also	originates	from	the	Council	negotiations,	in	which	some	Member	
States	wished	to	clearly	differentiate	between	courts	as	competition	authorities	and	courts	
deciding	disputes	between	private	parties.26	 
	
Article	11(6)	of	Regulation	1/2003	provides	for	the	possibility	of	the	Commission	opening	
its	own	investigation	and	taking	over	a	case	where	an	NCA	is	already	dealing	with	the	
matter,	in	certain	limited	circumstances.27	However,	the	Commission	may	not	take	over	
while	an	appeal	or	review	is	ongoing	in	a	court	–	“The	effects	of	Article	11(6)	do	not	
extend	to	courts	insofar	as	they	are	acting	as	review	courts…”		(Article	35(3)	and	Recital	
35	of	the	Regulation).	Recital	35	of	the	Regulation	states	that	where	the	public	
enforcement	function	is	separated,	as	in	configurations	B	and	C	described	above,	and	a	
prosecuting	administrative	authority	brings	a	case	before	a	separate	judicial	authority	for	
an	infringement	decision,	prohibition	pronouncement	or	to	impose	a	fine,	the	effects	of		
Article	11(6)	only	apply	to	the	prosecuting	authority.	The	prosecuting	authority	should	
withdraw	its	case	before	the	judicial	authority	when	the	Commission	opens	proceedings,	
bringing	the	national	proceedings	to	an	end.		
	
NCAs	must	notify	the	Commission	when	an	investigative	procedure	is	opened	(Art	11(3)).	
NCAs	must	also	inform28	the	Commission	of	an	intended	decision	30	days	before	it	is	
                                                 
25 The original wording in the proposal was “National courts before which the prohibition in Article 81(1) 
[now 101(1)] of the Treaty is invoked shall also have jurisdiction to apply Article 81(3) [now 101(3)].” 
Germany requested that national courts also be given full competence to apply Article 82 [102]. 
In addition, according to Council Document 5158/01 Secretariat to delegations, 11.1.2001, Spain had a 
reservation on greater involvement of national courts in the application of Community competition law; 
and France, Ireland and Finland requested a clear definition of the term ‘national courts’. The ultimately-
adopted wording was a Swedish Presidency proposal (Council Document 9999/01 Secretariat to 
delegations, 27.6.2001)  
26 During the negotiations in the Council of Ministers, Ireland and Finland noted the problematic division 
between competition authorities and courts for their respective national systems. Ireland’s competition 
authority is not empowered to take the decisions envisaged under Article 5. Regarding co-operation 
between the Commission and NCAs (Art 11), Belgium, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Finland all 
requested clarification on the role of courts and other separate bodies which constitute NCAs - Council 
Document 5158/01 Secretariat to delegations, 11. 1.2001. Under Article 35 [36 in the original proposal], 
Ireland and the Netherlands requested a clear statement of the powers exercisable by an NCA - Council 
Document  9999/01 Secretariat to delegations, 27. 6. 2001 
27 Circumstances in which Art 11(6) may be activated are listed in Network Notice at [54]:  if network 
members envisage conflicting decisions in the same case; network members envisage a decision which is 
obviously in conflict with existing case law; a network member is unduly drawing out proceedings in the 
case; or there is a need to adopt a commission decision to develop Community competition policy to 
ensure effective enforcement. 
28 In the original Regulation proposal, the Commission drafted that NCAs were obligation to ‘consult’ the 
Commission before adopting a position. Most Member States objected to this, and through Council 
negotiations, this was softened to “inform”. Record of the reform negotiations in Council of Ministers – 
Council document 5158/01 Secretariat to delegations , 11.9.2001 
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formally	adopted	(Art	11(4))	with	a	view	to	the	Commission	making	observations	if	
consistent	application	of	the	rules	is	threatened.29		
	
If	the	functions	are	split	between	agencies,	the	body	which	starts	an	investigation	has	the	
obligation	to	inform	the	Commission	under	Art	11(3),	but	the	decision‐making	authority	
has	the	obligation,	under	Art	11(4),	to	notify	its	decision	before	it	is	adopted.	In	Member	
States	where	the	finding	of	infringement,	or	imposition	of	a	penalty,	is	performed	by	a	
court	following	an	investigation	by	an	authority,	the	authority	will	be	responsible	for	
fulfilling	the	obligation	under	Art	11(3)	(notifying	the	Commission	of	initiation	of	formal	
investigative	measures)	whereas	the	court	will	be	responsible	under	Art	11(4)	(informing	
the	Commission	30	days	before	adopting	a	decision).	
	
One	practical	illustration	of	the	importance	of	distinguishing	between	the	two	functions	
once	the	court	has	been	designated	a	competition	authority	is	that	where	a	court	grants	an	
injunction	it	may	be	regarded	as	an	Article	5	decision	requiring	that	an	infringement	be	
brought	to	an	end.	This	would	trigger	the	Art	11(4)	duty	to	inform	the	Commission	30	
days	before	such	a	decision	is	adopted,	resulting	in	the	court	having	to	postpone	
(“reserve”)		judgment	when	the	decision	is	clearly	well	founded.	Worse,	it	would	allow	the	
competition	infringement	to	continue	until	the	30	days	were	up.	Following	the	letter	of	the	
Regulation,	the	resulting	judgment	would	also	need	to	be	forwarded	to	the	Commission	
once	delivered,	under	Article	15(2),	which	would	be	an	unnecessary	duplication,	since	
both	articles	serve	the	same	function	of	keeping	the	Commission	apprised	of	decisions	in	
the	Member	States.30		
		
There	is	some	confusion	around	this	obligation.	Rapporteurs	to	the	FIDE	Congress	
reported	that	courts	have	been	notifying	envisaged	decisions	when	supposedly	they	do	
not	have	to	do	so.31	But	this	is	a	misunderstanding	of	the	obligation	in	Article	11(4).	Art	35	
Regulation	1/2003	does	not	say	that	courts	(as	public	competition	authorities)	are	not	
bound	by	11(4),	only	that	they	are	not	affected	by	11(6)	i.e.	the	Commission	cannot	take	
over	the	cases	at	that	stage.	
                                                 
29 Incidentally, interview evidence suggests that once notified, unless an immediate problem is identified 
the decision tends to “sit in a drawer” for the 30 days, and the Commission officials are not overzealous 
about making suggestions if they agree with the substantive result, even if they disagree with the drafting 
(interview with DG COMP official, Brussels, 13.7.2006) 
30 See in respect of Ireland, N Mackey ‘Which Hat Should I Wear Today? Reflections on the Courts as 
Competition Authorities: Ireland’s Implementation of Regulation 1/2003’ Paper delivered at the Irish 
Centre for European Law, 8.5.2004. Available at http://www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/documents/2004-05-
08%20ICEL%20Noreen%20Mackey.pdf (accessed 21.1.2011) 
31 Proceedings of the 2008 Fédération Internationale de Droit Européen (FIDE) Congress: J Bornkamm & 
R Grafunder ‘General Report’ in H Koeck & M Karollus (eds) The Modernisation of European 
Competition Law: First Experiences with Regulation 1/2003 (Nomos, 2008) 487-516, 498-499 
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Notification	of	an	envisaged	decision	is	also	a	point	on	which	national	courts’	obligations	
differ	from	those	of	NCAs’.	According	to	Art	15(2)),	national	court	judgments	do	not	have	
to	be	notified	to	the	Commission	until	after	they	are	handed	down.	Further,	the	obligation	
to	notify	falls	to	the	Member	State	rather	than	the	court	itself.	As	such,	there	is	only	ex	post	
notification	of	a	first	instance	decision,	with	the	result	that	the	Commission	could	only	
make	an	intervention	if	the	case	proceeded	to	appeal,	or	if	it	found	out	about	the	case	
through	communications	with	an	NCA.	This	is	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	following	
chapter.	
	
Under	Article	29	Reg	1/2003,	a	national	competition	authority	may	withdraw	the	benefit	
of	a	block	exemption	in	an	individual	case,	pertaining	to	its	own	territory,	if	it	constitutes	a	
distinct	geographic	market.	A	national	court	cannot	exercise	a	similar	power	unless	acting	
in	a	public	enforcement	capacity.	
	
The	choice	of	model	determines	the	avenues	for	communication	which	national	bodies	
have	with	the	Commission	and	the	Court	of	Justice.	This	is	important	for	a	number	of	
reasons.	One	reason	is	the	possibility	of	advice	from	a	supranational	body	which	oversees	
the	consistent	application	of	EU	competition	law	(or	of	EU	law	generally)	in	different	
Member	States.	Another	is	the	nature	of	advice,	and	its	degree	of	legal	force	or	formality.	A	
third	reason	resonates	again	with	interpretative	pluralism	–	at	the	supranational	level,	is	
more	than	one	institution	qualified	to	give	advice	on	the	interpretation	of	the	law?	The	
preliminary	reference	procedure	under	Article	267	TFEU	has	been	the	classical	tool	for	
promoting	consistent	application	of	EU	law.32	
	
	
	 	
                                                 
32 K Alter, ‘Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical 
Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration’ in A-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), 
The European Courts and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart, 1997) , 227; T Tridimas 
‘Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance in the Preliminary Reference 
Procedure’ (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 9 
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3.	The	EU	concept	of	a	court	or	tribunal	
	
The	above	discussion	has	considered	the	potential	dual	obligations	on	national	
competition	authorities	depending	on	their	designation	of	‘judicial’	or	‘administrative’.	
This	section	demonstrates	the	implications	of	an	authority’s	designation	for	its	access	to	
the	European	Commission	and	the	CJEU.		
	
If	Article	267	is	read	literally,	only	a	‘court	or	tribunal’	has	jurisdiction	to	address	a	
question	to	the	European	Court	of	Justice.33	The	concept	of	‘court	or	tribunal’	is	not	
defined	in	the	Treaty,	hence	the	Court’s	ability	to	formulate	its	own	concept	and	control	
access.	Importantly	in	the	context	of	the	designation	of	competition	enforcement	bodies	
under	Article	35	Regulation	1/2003,	the	definition	of	a	‘court	or	tribunal’	for	the	purposes	
of	the	preliminary	reference	procedure	is	an	autonomous	EU	concept.		As	affirmed	in	
Broekmeulen,34			
	
“if	[court	or	tribunal]	were	to	be	construed	as	a	reference	to	national	law,	Member	States	
would	have	it	in	their	power	to	take	away	from	certain	decision‐making	bodies	which	have	
to	apply	Community	law	the	right,	and	in	some	cases	the	obligation,	to	request	a	
preliminary	ruling,	by	making	provision	to	that	effect	within	their	system	of	
administration	of	justice.	This	would	eventually	lead	to	the	fragmentation	of	Community	
law,	which	is	precisely	what	the	procedure	under	Article	[267]	is	designed	to	avoid.	Thus	the	
law	of	the	Member	States	can	be	relevant	only	in	so	far	as	that	law	is	able	to	determine	
whether	the	minimum	characteristics	required	by	Community	law	are	present	in	a	given	
case.”	(emphasis	added)	
	
A‐G	Reischl	favoured	throwing	the	net	wide	to	references	to	promote	coherence.	Twenty	
years	later	in	De	Coster35,	taking	the	opposite	view,	Advocate	General	Ruiz‐Jarabo	Colomer	
used	his	Opinion	to	criticise	and	attempt	to	address	the		uncertainty	of	shifting	
interpretations	of	what	constituted	a	‘court	or	tribunal’.	Attempting	a	clearer	formulation	
and	suggesting	different	criteria	for	judicial	and	quasi‐judicial	bodies,	the	latter	being	
‘exceptions’,	he	proposed	a	test	that	“a	body	that	is	part	of	the	court	system	of	a	Member	
State	which	acts	independently	to	decide	a	case,	in	accordance	with	legal	criteria,	in	
                                                 
33 M Broberg ‘Preliminary References by Public Administrative Bodies: When are Public Administrative 
Bodies competent to Make Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice’ (2009) 15(2) 
European Public Law 207-224;and M Broberg & N Fenger Preliminary References to the European Court 
of Justice (OUP, 2010) address the shifting interpretations and the width of the Court’s definition over 
time. 
34 Case 246/80 Broekmeulen v Huisarts Registratie Commissie [1981] ECR 2311. Opinion of Advocate-
General Reischl, at 2336 
35 C-17/00 De Coster v Collège des Bourgmestre et Echevins de Watermael-Boitsfort [2001] ECR I-9445 
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adversarial	proceedings,	always	constitutes	a	court	or	tribunal	within	the	meaning	of	Art	
[267].”36	(emphasis	added)		The	exception	to	the	rule	is	“where	no	further	legal	remedy	
can	be	pursued	and	provided	that	safeguards	of	independence	and	adversarial	procedure	
are	available.”37			
	
Criteria	for	assessing	whether	a	body	was	a	court	of	tribunal	were	first	laid	down	in	
Vaassen‐Goebbels38.	Initially	the	independence	requirement	was	not	one	of	the	criteria	for	
assessing	admissibility,	despite	it	being	a	core	factor	in	the	judicial	function.39	The	criteria	
as	they	now	stand	were	established	in	Dorsch	Consult40,	a	case	concerning	a	German	
review	body	for	public	service	contracts.	In	order	for	the	CJEU	to	respond	to	the	
preliminary	reference,	the	referring	body	must:		be	permanent;	be	a	body	established	by	
law;	apply	rules	of	law;	follow	an	inter	partes	procedure;	be	independent;	and	have	
compulsory	jurisdiction.	A	further	criterion	is	whether	the	body’s	decision	is	final.	Some	
understand	this	as	being	subsumed	within	compulsory	jurisdiction.41	The	finality	of	the	
decision	was	particularly	important	in	Syfait,	and	will	be	discussed	below.	
	
These	criteria	are	not	absolute,	and	not	all	carry	equal	weight.	The	last	three	in	particular	
–	the	requirements	of	independence,	inter	partes	procedure,	and	compulsory	jurisdiction	
leading	to	a	decision	of	a	judicial	nature	‐	have	been	decisive.		This	is	largely	because	
permanence,	establishment	by	law,	and	applying	rules	of	law,	could	equally	apply	to	
bodies	engaged	in	administrative	rather	than	strictly	judicial	proceedings.	The	following	
discussion	will	concentrate	on	these	three	elements.	The	main	points	of	contention	
relating	to	NCAs,	as	illustrated	in	Syfait,	are	organisational	independence	of	the	referring	
body	and	capability	of	handing	down	a	final	judicial	decision,	as	one	element	of	
compulsory	jurisdiction.	42		
	
	
	 	
                                                 
36 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in De Coster, [85] 
37 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in De Coster, [95] 
38 Case 61/65 Vaassen-Goebbels [1966] ECR 261, [273]   
39 G Anagnostaras ‘Preliminary Problems and Jurisdiction Uncertainties: the Admissibility of  Questions 
Referred by Bodies Performing Quasi-Judicial Functions’ (2005) 30(6) European Law Review 878-890, 
884 
40 C-54/96 Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft v Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin [1997] ECR I-4961, 
[23] 
41 For example, Broberg (2009) states that one meaning of compulsory jurisdiction is that the decision 
must be “binding on the parties”, but he does not mention the finality of the decision. 
42 Incidentally, later there was a new preliminary ruling to the CJEU referred by the Appeal Court of 
Athens: C-468/06 - 478/06 Sot Lelos kai Sia EE v GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proionton, 
formerly Glaxowellcome AEVE [2008] ECR I-7139, in which there was no issue of admissibility and the 
substantive questions were answered.  
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3.1	Inter	partes	procedure	
	
Inter	partes	procedure	implies	due	process	–	particularly	that	the	defendant	has	the	right	
to	be	heard,	to	examine	the	evidence	presented	by	the	opposing	party	and	to	answer	the	
opponent’s	case.		Article	47	of	the	EU	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	refers	to	the	right	to	
be	“advised,	defended	and	represented.”	While	the	principal	parties’	(the	complainant	and	
defendant)	opportunity	to	present	their	respective	cases	seem	universally	recognised,	
rights	of	intervention	for	other	interested	parties	may	vary	among	courts	according	to	
national	procedural	rules	–	this	does	not	necessarily	render	them	any	less	‘court‐like’,	as	
affirmed	by	Advocate	General	Jacobs	in	Syfait.43	Particularly	in	competition	proceedings,	
the	complainant	who	triggered	the	investigation	by	the	prosecuting	competition	authority	
is	not	necessarily	represented	in	the	adjudicative	proceedings.	The	competition	authority	
is	the	principal	party	‘complainant’.	
	
An	individual	or	firm	who	has	lodged	a	complaint	with	the	Commission	shall	be	
“associated	closely	with	the	proceedings”	(Art	27	Reg	1/2003).	The	procedure	also	
provides	for	the	hearing	(in	writing	or	at	oral	hearing)	of	other	third	parties	who	have	not	
submitted	a	complaint	but	who	have	sufficient	interest	in	the	outcome.	The	Commission	
should	give	the	parties	the	right	to	be	heard	before	taking	a	decision.	According	to	
Regulation	773/2004	on	conduct	of	proceedings	and	the	handling	of	complaints	notice,	
once	showing	that	they	have	a	legitimate	interest	(Art	5	Reg	773/2004),	complainant	
firms	may	participate	by	receiving	a	copy	of	the	statement	of	objections.	The	complainant	
may	make	views	known	in	writing	within	a	time	limit,	and	the	Hearing	Officer	may	allow	
its	views	to	be	heard	at	an	oral	hearing	(Art	6).	However,	taking	the	CJEU’s	judgment	in	
BAT	and	Reynolds44,	the	handling	of	complaints	notice	at	[59]	explicitly	acknowledges	that	
proceedings	are	not	adversarial	between	the	complainant	on	one	hand	and	parties	on	the	
other,	so	complainants’	procedural	rights	fall	short	of	the	right	to	a	fair	hearing	entitled	to	
the	companies	which	are	the	subject	of	the	complaint. 	
	
An	indication	of	the	rights	specific	to	competition	law	proceedings	which	are	relevant	for	
the	inter	partes	criterion	can	be	found	in	a	number	of	provisions,	such	as	Art	27	Reg	
1/2003	on	the	hearing	of	the	defending	parties,	complainants,	consumers	and	others,	the	
Regulation	on	conduct	of	proceedings	by	the	Commission45	and	the	Notice	on	handling	of	
                                                 
43 At [41] 
44 Case 142 & 156/84 British American Tobacco & Reynolds v Commission [1987] ECR 4487 at [19]-
[20] 
45 Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by 
the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty OJ L 123 , 27.4.2004, 18-24 
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complaints	by	Commission,46	in	the	Network	Notice	and	in	the	recent	best	practice	
guidelines	on	the	hearing	officer.	These	provisions	concern	four	main	areas:	most	
relevantly	the	right	to	be	heard;	but	also	rights	at	the	investigation	stage,	particularly	
when	taking	statements;	in	handling	of	complaints;	and	access	to	the	file	and	treatment	of	
confidential	information.	47	
	
In	respect	of	the	right	to	be	heard	for	defending	parties,	the	Regulation	on	conduct	of	
proceedings	by	the	Commission	provides	for	the	‘parties	concerned’	to	have	a	right	to	
reply	to	the	statement	of	objections,	to	be	notified	in	writing	with	time	limits	for	views,	to	
have	the	opportunity	to	attach	documentary	evidence,	and	to	propose	corroborating	
witnesses	(Art	10);	decisions	should	only	deal	with	objections	on	which	parties	have	been	
able	to	comment	(Art	11);	oral	hearing	to	develop	arguments	if	parties	so	request	(Art	12);	
hearing	of	others	–	Commission	may	invite	parties	to	oral	hearing	if	those	parties	received	
the	statement	of	objections	(Art	13);	conduct	of	oral	hearings	by	the	hearing	officer	“in	full	
independence”	(Art	14).	At	the	investigation	stage:	when	taking	statements	the	
investigator	must	state	legal	basis,	purpose,	that	they	are	voluntary,	and	recorded	(Art	3);	
Art	4	allows	a	time	limit	for	the	firm	to	rectify	explanations	following	oral	questions	
during	inspections.		
	
The	fact	that	these	procedural	rights	are	adhered	to	in	administrative	proceedings	by	the	
Commission	shows	that	these	elements	of	inter	partes	procedure	are	not	decisive	for	the	
definition	of	a	court	or	tribunal.	The	significant	issue	is	the	interrelation	of	the	inter	partes	
and	independence	criteria.	The	inter	partes	criterion,	implying	that	both	complainants	and	
respondents	should	be	legally	represented	and	enjoy	procedural	rights,	may	be	weighed	
relative	to	the	independence	of	the	body	in	question.48		
	
In	the	CJEU,	arguments	surrounding	the	inter	partes	requirement	have	focused	on	a	third	
party	adjudicating	between	the	prosecutor	and	defendant.	In	this	respect	it	is	linked	to	the	
independence	requirement.	This	is	the	point	upon	which	due	process	criticisms	of	the	
European	Commission	itself	are	based.49	The	Commission	has	most	recently	attempted	to	
                                                 
46 Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the 
EC Treaty OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, 65-77 
47 see Ch 7: ‘Article 6 proofing’ EC competition proceedings?’ in A Andreangeli EU Competition 
Enforcement and Human Rights (E Elgar, 2008) for a full discussion of procedural rights of parties in 
European Commission competition proceedings.   
48 Case C-54/96Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft v Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin [1997] ECR I-
4961; Joined cases C-110-147/98 Gabalfrisa and Others [2000] ECR I-1577; Case C-17/00 De Coster v 
Collège des Bourgmestre et Echevins de Watermael-Boitsfort [2001] ECR I-9445. However, there was no 
‘weighing’ in the more recent Case C-96/04 Standesamt Stadt Niebüll [2006] ECR I-03561 
49 See e.g. I Forrester ‘Due Process in EC Competition Cases: A Distinguished Institution with Flawed 
Procedures’ (2009) 34(6) European Law Review 817-843; D Slater, S Thomas, D 
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address	these	concerns	and	ward	off	full‐scale	institutional	reform	by	issuing	Best	Practice	
guidelines	on	the	Hearing	Officer’s	role	and	conduct	of	its	hearings.50	Plans	for	a	new	UK	
Competition	and	Markets	Authority	also	place	emphasis	on	checks	and	balances	in	an	
“enhanced	administrative	model”.51	In	the	meantime	the	OFT	is	consulting	on	a	review	of	
investigation	procedures	in	competition	cases52	including	collective	judgement	(rather	
than	a	decision	by	a	single	officer);	a	senior	responsible	officer	for	each	case;	enhanced	
legal	oversight;	contact	between	the	parties	and	decision‐makers;	a	Procedural	
Adjudicator;	and,	most	importantly,	separation	of	the	investigation	team	and	decision‐
makers,	with	separation	of	individuals	authorising	the	opening	of	a	case	and	the	issuing	of	
a	statement	of	objections	and	those	responsible	for	making	the	decision	on	whether	there	
has	been	an	infringement.	
	
The	Court	of	Justice	has	affirmed	that	antitrust	proceedings	must	meet	the	requirements	
of	Article	6	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	(ECHR),	for	example	in	
Baustahlgewebe.53	The	Art	6(1)	ECHR	case	law	has	been	brought	into	the	debate	most	
frequently	in	respect	of	fines	imposed	for	antitrust	infringements,	which	the	European	
Court	of	Human	Rights	(ECtHR)	has	construed	as	being	of	a	punitive	and	therefore	
criminal	nature.54	Article	6	does	not	prevent	the	adoption	of	such	sanctions	by	an	
administrative	body,	but	there	must	be	a	possibility	to	bring	an	appeal	before	a	judicial	
body	that	has	“full	jurisdiction”	to	review	the	decision.55	In	the	context	of	its	damages	
action	and	the	Commission’s	reinvestigation	after	the	annulment	of	the	Commission’s	
Schneider/Legrand	merger	prohibition	decision,	Schneider	argued	that	the	Commission	is	
not	an	impartial	authority	within	the	meaning	of	Art	6	ECHR.	In	line	with	previous	case	
law,	the	General	Court	found	that	its	own	judicial	review	remedied	this	lack	of	impartiality.	
                                                                                                                                               
Waelbroek ‘Competition Law Proceedings before the European Commission and the Right to a Fair Trial: 
No Need for Reform?  (2008) Global Competition Law Center Working Paper 04/08; P Marsden 'Checks 
and Balances: EU Competition Law and the Rule of Law' (2009) 22(1) Loyola Consumer Law Review 51-
60 
50 Decision 2011/695/EU of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the 
function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings, OJ L 275, 
20.10.2011, 29; Best Practices in proceedings concerning articles 101 and 102 TFEU, OJ C 308, 
20.10.2011, 6-32 
51 UK Government response to Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) consultation at 
[6.29], 9 in executive summary, 118 
52 Office of Fair Trading ‘Review of the OFT’s Investigation Procedures in Competition Cases: A 
Consultation Document’, OFT1263con2, March 2012 available at  
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/policy/OFT1263con2, (accessed 17.4.2012) 
53 Case 185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417 – this turned on the requirement for 
a hearing ‘within a reasonable time’ rather than squarely on the independent and impartial tribunal 
requirement. 
54 Article 6(1) ECHR: “In the determination of civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law” 
55 E.g. Janosevic v Sweden [2002] 38 EHRR 22 concerning a tax authority investigating taxi operators. 
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The	Commission	was	not	bound	to	send	the	send	the	case	back	to	a	different	authority,	or	
to	a	differently	composed	branch	within	the	Commission.	56	
	
This	contrasts	with	the	European	Court	of	Human	Right's	understanding	in	Dubus	SA	v	
France57	concerning	the	French	Banking	Commission.	There	the	ECtHR	ruled	that	there	
must	be	no	prejudgment	about	guilt,	and	the	authority	must	avoid	even	the	impression	that	
guilt	had	been	established	at	the	start	of	the	procedure.	The	practical	effect	was	that	the	
department	may	need	to	be	reorganised	in	order	to	separate	the	investigative	and	
adjudicative	roles	currently	exercised	by	the	same	people.	
	
Previous	case	law	has	followed	a	trend	that	Article	6	would	not	be	violated	where	the	
second	tier	body	reviewing	an	administrative	decision	had	"full	jurisdiction".	More	recent	
case	law	of	the	ECtHR	has	tightened	up	this	‘compensation’	by	a	second	tier	tribunal.	In		
Tsfayo	v	UK	58	the	ECtHR	ruled	that	where	the	review	court	was	considering	a	finding	of	
fact	rather	than	an	exercise	of	administrative	discretion,	judicial	review	could	not	remedy	
the	lack	of	independence	at	first	instance	since	the	review	court	did	not	have	the	capacity	
to	make	its	own	findings	of	fact.	One	can	consider	how	this	might	apply	in	competition	
cases.	A	finding	of	fact	could,	for	instance,	be	a	finding	of	foreclosure.	Whether	a	court	
could	revisit	such	a	finding	was	the	subject	of	the	UK	Crehan59	case,	explored	in	more	
detail	in	the	following	two	chapters.		
	
The	full	jurisdiction	issue	arose	again	recently	in	respect	of	a	fine	imposed	by	the	Italian	
competition	authority	on	a	pharmaceutical	company	in	Menarini	.60	The	ECtHR	ruled	that	
the	judicial	review	must	be	able	to	re‐examine,	if	not	substitute,	the	administrative	
authority’s	findings	–	that	is,	investigate	the	substantive	decision	as	well	as	the	fine	
imposed.61	On	the	facts	the	Court	dismissed	the	claim	that	the	Italian	system	of	judicial	
review	was	incompatible	with	Art	6	ECHR.	
	
Following	Menarini,	the	CJEU	is	already	couching	its	judgments	differently.	It	is	relatively	
unproblematic	that	Art	261TFEU	and	Art	31	Regulation	1/2003	allow	for	unlimited	
jurisdiction	with	regard	to	fines.	However,	the	Court’s	formulation	of	its	standard	of	
review	with	regard	to	findings	of	fact	on	which	those	fines	are	based	has	become	stricter.	
                                                 
56 T-351/03 Schneider Electric v Commission [2007] ECR II-2237 at [181]-[186], [188] 
57 Dubus SA v France, Application no 5242/04, judgment of 11.6.2009 
58 Tsfayo v UK [2009] 48 EHRR 18; [2006] All ER (D) 177,  judgment delivered on 14.11.2006, 
concerning the UK Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit Review Board. 
59 Inntrepreneur v Crehan [2006] UKHL 38 
60 Menarini Diagnostics SRL v Italy, Application no 43509/08, 27.9.2011 
61 Menarini [63]-[66] 
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In	its	judgment	in	the	KME/Chalkor	appeal,62		the	CJEU	stated	that	in	a	review	of	legality	
“the	Courts	cannot	use	the	Commission’s	margin	of	discretion…as	a	basis	for	dispensing	
with	the	conduct	of	an	in‐depth	review	of	the	law	and	of	the	facts.”63	Despite	referring	to	
the	manifest	error	of	assessment	standard,		denoted	by	the	General	Court’s	references	to	
‘discretion’,	the	‘substantial	margin	of	discretion’	or	the	‘wide	discretion’	of	the	
Commission,	“such	references	did	not	prevent	the	General	Court	from	carrying	out	the	full	
and	unrestricted	review,	in	law	and	in	fact,	required	of	it.”64	[emphasis	added]	
	
The	ECtHR’s	case	law	has	traditionally	been	stricter	than	CJEU	case	law	on	the	question	of	
independence,	since	Art	6(1)	refers	to	an	independent	and	impartial	tribunal.	
‘Impartiality’	implies	a	stronger	type	of	independence,	not	only	structural.	In	McGonnell	v	
UK	65,	it	was	not	necessary	to	prove	lack	of	independence	and	impartiality,	only	to	show	
circumstances	“casting	doubt”	on	impartiality	or	“legitimate	grounds	for	fearing”	that	the	
court	may	be	influenced	by	what	happened	at	an	earlier	stage	in	proceedings.	
	
Tridimas	argues	that	using	the	Art	6	ECHR	case	law	is	not	appropriate	to	define	a	court	or	
tribunal	for	the	purposes	of	the	preliminary	reference	procedure.66	First,	the	Art	6	
definition	arises	in	the	context	of	claim	that	Art	6	has	been	infringed	and	that	an	injustice	
has	occurred.	In	receiving	a	preliminary	reference,	the	CJEU	is	not	ruling	on	that.	Secondly,	
the	CJEU	would	need	to	consider	and	pass	judgment	on	national	laws	and	procedures	
incidental	to	the	litigation,	beyond	its	jurisdiction.	Finally,		it	does	not	necessarily	enhance	
judicial	protection	to	exclude	some	bodies,	particularly	if	there	is	no	guarantee	that	an	
opportunity	for	a	reference	would	arise	at	subsequent	stage,	for	example	from	a	review	
court.	
	
In	the	CJEU’s	case	law	the	inter	partes	criterion	can	be	weighed	against	the	independence	
of	the	referring	body67	For	example,	if	the	parties	do	not	have	extensive	rights	to	plead	
their	case,	but	the	decision‐making	body	is	separate	from	the	executive	investigative	body,	
it	may	still	qualify	as	a	court	or	tribunal.	In	De	Coster,	the	Advocate	General	referred	to	the	
“diminishing	importance	of	the	inter	partes	requirement”68	–	for	example,	the	CJEU	had	
                                                 
62 C-389/10 P	KME Germany and Others [2011] ECR I-0000, judgment of  8.12.2011, not yet reported 
63 KME Germany [129] 
64 KME Germany [136] 
65 McGonnell v UK [2000] 30 EHRR 289    
66 T Tridimas ‘Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance in the Preliminary 
Reference Procedure’ (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 9-50, 31-32 
67 T Tridimas ‘Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance in the Preliminary 
Reference Procedure’ (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 9-50, 27; G Anagnostaras ‘Preliminary 
Problems and Jurisdiction Uncertainties: the Admissibility of Questions Referred by Bodies Performing 
Quasi-Judicial Functions’ (2005) 30(6) European Law Review 878-890 
68 A-G Colomer’s opinion at [29] 
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overlooked	it	in	Dorsch	Consult.	In	Gabalfrisa	(1999),	Advocate	General	Saggio	noted	that	
the	referring	body’s	lack	of	inter	partes	procedure	is	not	on	its	own	sufficient	ground	for	
excluding	its	status	as	a	court	or	tribunal.	However,	where	the	inter	partes	element	was	
lacking	(“in	summary	proceedings	where	the	defendant	was	not	present”),	the	reference	
would	only	be	allowed	where	it	was	“offset	by	a	high	level	of	impartiality	and	
independence	in	the	adjudicating	body.”69	
	
	
3.2	Independence	
	
As	noted	above,	surprisingly	the	feature	one	might	most	associate	with	the	judicial	
function		–	independence	‐		was	not	raised	as	a	factor	until	198770.		It	was	eventually	
defined	in	Corbiau71	(1993):	the	body	submitting	a	preliminary	question	should	act	as	a	
“third	party	in	relation	to	the	authority	which	adopt[s]	the	decision	forming	the	subject‐	
matter	of	the	proceedings”.	That	is,	would	the	adjudicative	part	of	the	authority	have	
jurisdiction	to	decide	a	case	between	its	own	secretariat	and	a	defendant?	There	would	
have	to	be	no	organisational	link	in	order	for	the	referring	body	to	constitute	a	third	party	
in	relation	to	those	involved	in	the	dispute.	This	strict	view	of	independence	focuses	on	
perceived	and	actual	impartiality	–	the	body	in	question	must	be	independent	and	seen	to	
be	independent.	This	view	of	independence	resonates	with	the	case	law	on	Article	6(1)	of	
the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights,	as	discussed	above.	This	formalistic	approach	
is	more	strict	than	before	or	since	until	Syfait.	
	
The	independence	criterion	suggests	both	structural	and	operational	elements,	in	which	
the	referring	body	must	act	as	a	third	party	towards	the	administration.	There	are	two	
elements	to	the	question	of	independence	of	competition	authorities:	the	individual	
independence	of	adjudicative	panel	members;	and	organisational	independence,	implying	
a	lack	of	structural	link	with	the	investigative	administration.	
	
The	Court	in	Dorsch	Consult	in	which	the	Public	Procurement	Awards	Supervisory	Board	
was	organisationally	linked	to	the	Bundeskartellamt	and	the	Ministry	for	Economic	
Affairs,	did	not	apply	this	third	party	criterion,	stating	that	the	body	should	only	have	the	
objective	of	carrying	out	its	task	“independently	and	under	its	own	responsibility”.	
Consider	the	position	of	NCAs	who	only	report	to	their	Parliament	rather	than	through	a	
Ministry,	for	example	–	they	would	meet	the	independence	criterion.		
                                                 
69 A-G Saggio’s Opinion at [14] 
70 Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò v Persons unknown [1987] ECR 2545 [7] 
71 C-24/92 Corbiau [1993] ECR I-1277 [15] 
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Moving	towards	a	more	functional	approach	of	operational	independence,	the	Court	
placed	emphasis	on	legal	safeguards	in	national	law	that	guaranteed	the	referring	body’s	
performance	of	its	duties	without	administrative	interference,	even	though	the	
composition	of	the	referring	authority	was	determined	by	a	body	subject	to	ministerial	
supervision.		
	
In	Gabalfrisa	the	CJEU	placed	particular	focus	on	the	relevant	Spanish	domestic	law	
ensuring	a	separate	of	functions	between	the	departments	of	the	tax	authority	charged	
with	recovery	and	management	of	taxes,	and	the	Tribunales	ruling	on	complaints	lodged	
against	the	decisions	of	those	departments.		The	Tribunales	Economico‐Administrativos	
were	held	to	be	third	parties	in	relation	to	the	State	authority	responsible	for	value	added	
tax.	This	implies	that	in	order	to	gain	the	status	of	a	‘court	or	tribunal’	for	the	purpose	of	
the	Article	267	procedure,	there	needs	to	be	an	absence	of	hierarchical	links	with	the	
administration.	In	this	respect	the	CJEU	distinguished	its	judgment	in	Corbiau,	where	the	
Directeur	des	Contributions		Directes	et	des	Accises	(head	of	the	Direct	Taxes	and	Excise	
Duties	Directorate)	was	not	considered	to	be	a	third	party.		
	
On	the	question	of	individual	independence,	in	Gabalfrisa	the	Tribunales	Economico‐
Administrativos	did	not	officially	belong	to	the	justice	department	but	were	incorporated	
into	the	Ministerio	de	Economica	y	Hacienda.	The	Minister	could	remove	members	of	the	
Tribunal	from	office,	under	circumstances	which	are	not	sufficiently	clearly	defined	for	the	
Advocate	General.	Nonetheless	the	CJEU	allowed	the	reference.	The	Gabalfrisa		approach	
was	criticised	by	AG	Colomer	in	De	Coster	for	not	having	due	regard	to	impartiality	in	
terms	of	individual	independence	of	its	members,	and	in	Syfait	the	Court	distinguished	its	
judgment	from	Gabalfrisa.	
	
Schmid	72(2002)	also	considered	the	admissibility	of	a	question	by	an	(Austrian)	appellate	
tax	authority,	focusing	on	whether	it	was	a	third	party	and	whether	its	procedure	was	
inter	partes.	In	contrast,	the	court	did	not	consider	the	tribunal	to	be	independent	given	
that	there	was	an	overlap	in	membership	between	the	administrative	side	of	the	authority	
and	the	appeal	chamber	–	two	of	the	five	members	of	the	appeal	chamber	belonged	to	the	
tax	authority.	The	President,	himself	directing	the	tax	authority	as	well	as	being	a	member	
of	the	appeal	chamber,	had	the	power	to	nominate	members	and	there	was	no	legislative	
provision	preventing	him	from	modifying	its	membership.	The	President,	under	the	
direction	of	the	Finance	Minister	could	also	bring	an	appeal/statutory	judicial	review	
                                                 
72 Case C-516/99 Schmid [2002] ECR I-4573 
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against	a	decision	of	the	appeal	chamber.	The	difference	appears	to	be	the	effect	of	the	
domestic	rules	on	separation	of	functions.	
	
Subsequently	Advocate	General	Colomer	in	De	Coster73	attempted	to	reassert	the	earlier	
understanding	of	independence	as	“equidistance	from	the	parties	to	the	case	and	from	the	
subject	matter	of	the	dispute”.	This	implies	freedom	in	relation	to	superiors	in	the	
hierarchy,	the	executive	‐	government	bodies,	other	national	authorities,	and	perhaps	
more	tenuously,	social	pressures.	He	argued	that	a	general	principle	of	non‐interference	in	
the	actions	of	administrative	bodies	of	the	State	is	not	sufficient	to	corroborate	status	of	a	
court	or	tribunal,	and	that	there	must	be	clear	and	specific	provisions	for	withdrawal,	
rejection	and	dismissal	of	its	members.	
	
The	independence	criterion	is	discussed	in	more	detail	in	relation	to	Syfait	below.	
	
	
3.3	Compulsory	jurisdiction	
	
There	can	be	different	interpretations	of	compulsory	jurisdiction,	both	from	the	
perspective	of	the	parties	and	the	court.	It	suggests	there	is	no	other	judicial	forum	for	the	
dispute	in	question.	One	interpretation	is	that	the	parties	have	no	other	forum	under	law	
to	resolve	their	dispute.	As	shown	below,	this	resonates	with	Advocate	General	Jacobs’	
definition	in	Syfait	–	since	the	HCC	had	sole	competence	to	impose	the	penalties	under	
Law	703/77,	the	parties	could	only	come	under	the	forum	of	the	HCC.	74	This	perspective	
on	compulsory	jurisdiction	is	also	the	reason	why	preliminary	references	from	arbitral	
tribunals	are	excluded,	since	the	parties	can	choose	that	forum75		
	
The	second	interpretation	is	whether	it	is	compulsory	on	the	part	of	the	adjudicating	body	
to	take	up	a	case	or	to	give	a	decision.	I	would	argue	that	this	is	the	defining	feature	of	a	
competition	authority	as	opposed	to	a	court.	As	noted	above,	competition	authorities	may	
prioritise	their	resources	and	decide	whether	or	not	to	investigate,	whereas	courts	are	
constrained	by	the	ambit	of	the	dispute	as	brought	by	the	parties.	
	
                                                 
73 [93] et seq 
74 The civil courts are not prima facie entitled to rule on the application of the provisions of Law 703/77 
on the Control of Monopoly, Oligopoly and the Protection of Free Competition [national provisions 
equivalent to Art 101, 102 TFEU and merger regulation], but can hear follow-on actions for damages as 
the HCC is not empowered to award them. See e.g. Global Competition Review Getting the Deal 
Through: Cartel Regulation (2005)  
75 Case 102/81 Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei Nordstern 
AG & Co KG [1982] ECR 1095 
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A	third	element	of	compulsory	jurisdiction	is	whether	the	body	has	competence	to	make	
final	legal	determinations	and	to	impose	penalties76	.	Even	in	competition	authorities	with	
a	dualist	structure	(types	B	and	C	above),	the	requirement	of	finality	is	not	straightforward	
when	one	considers	the	potential	for	appeal	or	judicial	review	of	the	decision.	This	final	
element	in	particular	was	relevant	in	the	context	of	Syfait	and	the	possibility	for	the	
European	Commission	to	relieve	an	NCA	of	its	competence	under	Article	11(6)	Regulation	
1/2003.	
	
	
4.	The	Syfait	case	and	its	implications	
	
4.1	Syfait	facts	
	
Syfait77	was	the	first	preliminary	reference	from	a	competition	authority	to	come	before	
the	Court	following	the	2004	reforms.	It	therefore	gives	a	good	indication	of	how	the	CJEU	
intends	to	deal	with	NCAs,	and	the	implications	for	agencies	of	different	designs.	The	
reference	in	question	was	submitted	by	the	Hellenic	Competition	Commission	(Epitropi	
Antagonismou)	to	the	CJEU	before	Regulation	1/2003	came	into	force,78	but	judgment	was	
given	on	31	May	2005.		
	
Syfait	was	an	association	of	pharmacists	and	pharmaceutical	wholesalers	on	the	Greek	
market,	supplied	by	GlaxoSmithkline,	the	pharmaceutical	manufacturer.		Prices	in	Greece	
were	fixed	at	a	low	level	by	State	intervention.	Syfait	exported	a	proportion	of	the	
products	to	other	Member	States,	where	prices	were	significantly	higher,	allegedly	
precipitating	a	shortage	on	the	Greek	market	due	to	quota	restrictions	also	imposed	by	the	
Greek	government.	GlaxoSmithKline	therefore	started	selling	directly	to	hospitals	and	
pharmacies	and	ceased	to	meet	Syfait’s	orders	in	full.	The	questions	referred	by	the	
Hellenic	Competition	Commission	concerned	potential	abuse	of	a	dominant	position	under	
Article	102	TFEU	and	the	circumstances	in	which	a	dominant	manufacturer	could	justify	a	
supply	restriction,	given	the	State	intervention	on	national	pricing	levels.	
	
                                                 
76 First established in Case 138/80 Borker [1980] ECR 1975 [4], concerning the Paris Bar Council. The 
Council could only give legally binding decision on its internal matters. The reference concerned one of 
its members being forbidden from pleading in a German court, over which the Council had no 
jurisdiction. This links with the Court’s jurisprudence that the preliminary reference must relate to a 
genuine dispute which the referring body has jurisdiction to resolve. 
77 C-53/03 Synetairismos Farmakopion Aitolias & Akarnanias v GlaxoSmithkline Plc [2005] ECR I-4609  
78 On 22 January 2003: Reference for a preliminary ruling by the Epitropi Antagonismou in the case of C-
53/03Sinetairismos Farmakopion Aitolias & Akarnanias — Syfait and Others against Glaxowellcome 
Aeve (subsequently called Glaxosmithkline Aeve), C 101/30 , 26.4.2003, 18   
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However,	in	the	event	the	CJEU	did	not	address	the	substantive	issues.	Although	Advocate	
General	Jacobs	decided	the	Hellenic	Competition	Commission	qualified	as	a	‘court	or	
tribunal’,	the	CJEU	disagreed,	declaring	the	reference	inadmissible	on	the	grounds	that	the	
Competition	Commission	was	not	sufficiently	independent	and	that	the	proceedings	were	
not	intended	to	lead	to	a	decision	of	a	judicial	nature.		
	
	
4.2	Independence	
	
4.2.1	The	opinion	of	Advocate	General	Jacobs	
	
Advocate	General	Jacobs	ultimately	declared	the	reference	admissible,	but	was	not	
without	doubts.	These	centred	on	the	structural	links	between	the	Competition	
Commission	–	that	is,	the	adjudicatory	arm	of	the	HCC	as	a	whole	‐	and	its	secretariat.	
Particularly	important	was	the	role	of	the	HCC	President	and	of	Ministerial	supervision.	
The	President	directed	the	secretariat,	which	was	responsible	for	investigating	cases	and	
making	proposals	to	the	Board	of	the	Commission.	However,	the	President	did	not	take	
part	in	drafting	such	proposals.	The	President	also	held	disciplinary	powers	over	
secretariat	staff,	and	over	the	other	members	of	the	Board	(an	issue	particularly	
emphasised	in	the	CJEU’s	judgment).79	The	Minister	of	Development	appointed	the	
President.	
	
His	Opinion	rested	on	the	independence	criterion,	and	its	relatedness	with	the	inter	partes	
procedure.	The	other	factors	“whilst	probably	necessary	for	any	judicial	authority,	would	
equally	apply	to	an	administrative	enforcement	agency.”80	Hence,	they	were	necessary	but	
not	sufficient	to	secure	the	status	of	‘court	or	tribunal’.	In	his	view	the	HCC	appeared	to	be	
“situated	very	close	to	the	borderline	between	a	judicial	authority	and	an	administrative	
authority	having	certain	judicial	characteristics.”81		
	
                                                 
79 The composition and independence of the Hellenic Competition Commission has since undergone 
revision. A revision of Law 703/1977 on Competition was adopted by the Greek Parliament on 12 April 
2011. The President and the newly introduced post of Vice‐President are now appointed by the 
Parliament. Previously an HCC member who submitted a reasoned opinion following an investigation by 
the directorate also had the right to vote on a decision by the adjudicative branch of the HCC, and this 
provision has now been abolished. In addition, all members are to be exclusively employed by the HCC, 
rather than holding other posts simultaneously. Members are appointed for a three-year term, renewable 
once. Specialist chambers of the Athens Administrative Court of Appeals now have competence to review 
competition cases. 
80 AG Jacobs’ Opinion at [21] 
81 AG Jacobs’ Opinion at [31] 
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While	finding	that	the	Greek	Competition	Commission	met	most	of	the	criteria	for	a	‘court	
or	tribunal’,	Advocate	General	Jacobs	acknowledged	that	there	was	a	fine	balance	on	the	
point	of	organisational	independence.	He	took	into	account	three	points:	(a)	in	practice	the	
President’s	disciplinary	power	over	the	secretariat	would	not	be	likely	to	influence	the	
conduct	of	any	given	investigation;82	(b)	there	were	sufficient	procedural	safeguards	
during	the	hearing	stage	to	allow	all	parties	to	present	their	case	which	outweighed	the	
possible	threat	of	disciplinary	power	in	(a);	and	(c)	the	persuasive	precedent	value	of	the	
reference	from	the	Spanish	competition	authority,	the	Tribunal	de	Defensa	de	la	
Competencia	Spanish	banks	case.83.	This	underlines	how	the	inter	partes	and	
independence	criteria	are	interrelated.	The	AG	concluded	that	the	reference	from	the	
Greek	Competition	Commission	was	admissible.84		
	
The	Advocate	General	took	a	somewhat	formalistic	approach	in	assessing	whether	the	
Competition	Commission	was	“judicial	in	nature”	by	focusing	on	how	many	of	its	board	
members	were	qualified	lawyers	or	judges.85	The	rules	stipulated	that	there	should	be	two	
lawyers	out	of	a	total	of	nine	members	on	the	Commission.	However,	two	further	posts	
were	to	be	held	by	people	with	experience	of	national	and	EC	economic	law	and	
competition	policy.	“…in	a	technical	field	such	as	competition	law	there	is	a	need	for	
economic	and	commercial	expertise	alongside	legal	qualifications.”86	Members	are	
explicitly	required	to	exercise	their	authority	in	accordance	with	the	law.	This	relates	to	
the	individual	independence	of	members	of	the	board,	who	are	“bound…only	by	the	law	
and	their	conscience”,	and	shall	“enjoy	personal	and	operational	independence”	according	
to	Article	8(1)	of	Law	703/77.	Although	admissibility	is	judged	on	the	Community	concept	
of	a	court,	the	national	rules	on	composition	of	the	authority	are	indicative,	as	shown	in	
the	previous	case	law	outlined	above.	
	
The	Advocate	General	showed	the	interrelatedness	of	the	criteria	in	considering	how	the	
possibility	for	an	inter	partes	hearing	could	offset	the	independence	issue:	“More	
distinctive	of	a	court	or	tribunal	is	the	hearing	before	the	Competition	Commission,	at	
which	both	complainants	and	respondents	may	be	legally	represented	and	are	accorded	
procedural	rights	similar	to	those	enjoyed	by	parties	to	ordinary	court	proceedings.	Such	
guarantees	go	some	way	to	supplying	the	necessary	inter	partes	element	to	the	
Competition	Commission’s	decision‐making	process.”87		“The	issue	at	stake	appears	to	me	
                                                 
82 AG Jacobs’ Opinion at [34] 
83 C-76/91 Asociacion Espanola de Banca Privada and Others [1992] ECR I-4785  
84 AG Jacobs’ Opinion at [46] 
85 AG Jacobs’ Opinion at [26] 
86 AG Jacobs’ Opinion at [33] 
87 AG Jacobs’ Opinion at [21] 
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to	be	closely	related	to	the	question	whether	the	procedure	of	the	Competition	
Commission	can	be	qualified	as	inter	partes	in	nature.	Only	if	the	secretariat	has	the	
necessary	degree	of	separation	from	the	Competition	Commission	can	it	qualify	as	a	third	
party	independent	of	both	the	party	being	investigated	and	of	the	Competition	
Commission	as	judge.”88	The	complainants	had	argued	that	interested	parties	were	not	
able	to	intervene	in	proceedings	before	the	HCC,	and	therefore	there	were	insufficient	
procedural	rights	for	the	HCC	to	rank	as	a	court	or	tribunal.89	The	Advocate	General	
rejected	this	argument	by	noting	that	the	complainants	had	been	able	to	participate	by	
lodging	their	complaint	in	the	first	place.	More	generally,	“judicial	bodies	may	legitimately	
vary	in	the	degree	to	which	they	allow	an	interested	third	party	to	intervene	in	the	
proceedings	without	thereby	jeopardising	their	status	as	a	court	or	tribunal”.90		
	
I	would	submit	that	Spanish	tribunal	in	Spanish	banks	was	a	type	B	authority,	whereas	the	
HCC	was	type	A.	If	there	were	a	sliding	scale	in	terms	of	the	three	configurations	above,	
type	A	would	be	least	likely	to	qualify	and	a	court	in	type	C	most	likely	to	be	granted	
access.	
	
Although	it	has	not	been	identified	by	other	commentators,	whether	it	is	compulsory	on	
the	part	of	the	adjudicating	body	to	take	up	a	case	or	to	give	a	decision	seems	the	most	
obvious	reason	why	an	integrated	national	competition	authority	may	not	have	
compulsory	jurisdiction.	Such	NCAs	have	the	discretion	to	prioritise	resources	and	to	
select	their	cases.91	Even	if	a	complainant	reports	a	firm,	the	NCA	can	decide	whether	or	
not	to	open	an	investigation.	A	true	court	only	has	jurisdiction	in	the	ambit	of	the	dispute	
brought	by	the	parties.92	The	only	way	the	adjudicatory	arm	of	an	integrated	authority	
could	have	compulsory	jurisdiction	in	this	way	would	be	if	national	rules	gave	it	no	
discretion	to	act	on	the	advice	of	the	secretariat.	Then	the	relevant	question	would	be	
whether	the	adjudicatory	arm	was	sufficiently	separate	from	the	investigating	secretariat,	
as	considered	under	the	independence	criterion.	This	includes	courts	in	a	public	
enforcement	capacity	in	duality	type	B	or	C	configurations	as	they	rely	on	the	prosecuting	
competition	authority	to	bring	a	case.	
	
	
	 	
                                                 
88 AG Jacobs’ Opinion at [29] 
89 AG Jacobs’ Opinion at [30] 
90 AG Jacobs’ Opinion at [41] 
91 See T-24/90 Automec v Commission [1992] 5 CMLR 431 in respect of the European Commission 
92 Joined Cases C–430 and 431/93 Van Schijndel ECR [1995] I–4705 
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4.2.2	The	judgment	of	the	Court	
	
In	rejecting	the	reference,	the	Court’s	judgments	rested	on	independence,	and	proceedings	
leading	to	a	final	decision.	The	Court	focused	on	issues	of	structure	and	rules	of	
appointment,	and	did	not	consider	procedural	rules	and	the	decision‐making	process	as	
explored	by	the	Advocate	General.	
	
Significantly,	the	Court’s	addition	to	the	Dorsch	Consult	criteria	outlined	above	was	that	a	
court	can	refer	only	“if	there	is	a	case	pending	before	it,	and	if	it	is	called	upon	to	give	
judgment	in	proceedings	intended	to	lead	to	a	decision	of	a	judicial	nature”.93	The	contrast	
with	the	Advocate	General’s	understanding	of	“whether	its	final	decision	is	judicial	in	
nature”94	could	be	a	reason	for	their	diverging	conclusions.	
	
In	assessing	the	independence	of	the	national	competition	authority,	three	factors	were	
relevant.	First,	the	Court	noted	that	the	HCC	was	under	the	supervision	of	the	government	
Minister	for	Development,	which	the	Court	considered	meant	that	he	could	under	certain	
conditions	review	the	lawfulness	of	the	HCC’s	decisions.	This	point	was	not	stressed	in	the	
AG’s	Opinion.95		
	
Secondly,	the	Court	considered	the	terms	of	appointment	of	members	of	the	Competition	
Commission.	Although	according	to	the	relevant	national	law	they	were	only	bound	by	
“the	law	and	their	conscience”	and	enjoyed	“personal	and	operational	independence”,96	
this	was	undermined	by	the	President’s	disciplinary	powers.	There	were	insufficient	
specific	effective	safeguards	concerning	their	dismissal	or	termination	of	employment,	and	
therefore	was	“no	effective	safeguard	against	undue	intervention	or	pressure	from	the	
executive”.97		In	addition,	the	President	exercised	disciplinary	control	over	the	secretariat	
personnel,98	a	fact	linked	to	the	third	factor.	
	
Third,	concerning	the	Commission	as	a	whole,	there	was	an	operational	link	between	the	
Competition	Commission	as	a	decision‐making	body	and	its	secretariat	as	a	fact‐finding	
body	upon	whose	proposals	it	adopted	decisions.	The	President	was	responsible	for	co‐
                                                 
93 Syfait judgment at [29], citing C-134/97 Victoria Film [1998] ECR I-7023, [1999] 1 CMLR 279 at [14] 
and C-195/98 Österreichisher Gewerkschaftbund [2000] ECR I-10497, [2002] 1 CMLR 14 at [24] in 
support 
94 Citing Case 138/80 Borker [1980] ECR 1975, [1980] 3 CMLR 638 at [4]; C-111/94 Job Centre [1995] 
ECR I-3361 at [9]; and C-182/00 Lutz and Others [2002] ECR I-547 at [15]-[16] in support 
95 Syfait judgment at [30] 
96 Art 8(1) of Law 703/77 
97 Syfait judgment at [31] citing C-103/97 Koellensperger and Atzwanger [1999] ECR I-551 at [21] in 
support 
98 Syfait judgment at [32] 
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ordinating	general	policy	and	directing	the	secretariat,	which	in	turn	carried	out	
investigations	and	made	proposals	to	the	Commission,	to	the	extent	that	the	Court	did	not	
consider	it	to	be	“a	clearly	distinct	third	party”	vis‐à‐vis	the	secretariat.99	Whereas	the	
Advocate	General	thought	that	this	power	over	the	secretariat	did	not	matter	as	long	as	
there	were	safeguards	for	the	parties	which	were	the	subject	of	the	Commission’s	
investigation	at	the	hearing	stage,	the	Court	did	not	take	into	account	this	trade‐off	
between	the	inter	partes	and	independence	requirements.		
	
The	Court	characterised	the	secretariat	as	a	“State	body”	–	presumably,	part	of	the	
executive	–	“which	may	be	akin	to	a	party	in	the	course	of	competition	proceedings.”100	
This	element	emphasises	the	need	for	the	adjudicating	body’s	third	party	equidistance	
between	the	parties	to	the	dispute:	that	is,	the	prosecuting	authority	and	the	respondent	
firm(s).		The	key	point	is	whether	the	Competition	Commission	as	secretariat	could	qualify	
as	a	third	party	independent	of	the	Competition	Commission	as	‘judge’	and	of	the	party	
which	is	the	subject	of	its	investigations.	Put	another	way,	it	would	not	be	possible	for	the	
secretariat	of	the	Competition	Commission	to	act	against	the	Commission	as	a	judicial	
panel.	
	
The	tribunal	must	be	independent	of	both	the	executive	and	the	litigants.	On	this	point	the	
CJEU	distinguished	its	judgment	in	Gabalfrisa101,	in	which	the	Tribunales	Economico‐
Administrativos	of	Spain	were	held	to	be	third	parties	in	relation	to	the	State	tax	authority	
responsible	for	VAT.	For	the	CJEU	in	Gabalfrisa	the	relevant	point	was	that	the	final	
decisions	of	the	Tribunales	could	not	be	overturned	or	modified	by	the	Administration	
except	in	cases	of	automatic	nullity	or	special	proceedings	for	revision.102	This	links	the	
concepts	of	organisational	independence	and	final	judicial	decision.		
	
Although	the	definition	of	a	court	or	tribunal	for	the	purposes	of	Article	267	is	an	
autonomous	EU	concept,103	in	practice	the	body’s	treatment	in	the	national	statutory	
framework	appears	to	be	a	strong	evidentiary	basis.	The	Competition	Commission	was	not	
among	the	five	independent	domestic	authorities	whose	membership	was	defined	by	
constitutional	provisions.	In	Syfait	the	Competition	Commission	was	classified	under	
national	law	as	an	independent	authority,	but	in	practice	it	did	not	offer	sufficient	
protection	against	administrative	interference.	The	Competition	Commission	was	not	
among	the	bodies	covered	by	specific	provisions	in	Greek	constitutional	law.	
                                                 
99 Syfait judgment at [33] 
100 Syfait  judgment at [33] 
101 C-110-147/98 Gabalfrisa and Others [2000] ECR I-1577; [2002] 1 CMLR 13 at para 33 
102 Syfait judgment at [28] 
103 Syfait judgment at [29] 
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	4.3	Compulsory	jurisdiction	and	a	(final?)	decision	of	a	judicial	nature	
	
The	question	of	independence	could	relate	to	any	quasi‐judicial	body.	It	is	the	Court’s	
reasoning	that	there	must	be	a	case	pending	before	it	and	the	proceedings	must	be	
intended	to	lead	to	a	decision	of	a	judicial	nature	that	is	more	specific	to	competition	
authorities.104		
	
As	noted	above,	this	can	be	viewed	as	one	element	in	the	referring	body’s	compulsory	
jurisdiction.	The	Advocate	General	did	not	find	it	necessary	to	go	into	detail	on	whether	
the	HCC’s	jurisdiction	was	compulsory	leading	to	a	final	legal	decision,	simply	noting	that	
it	had	sole	competence	to	impose	penalties	as	provided	for	under	the	Greek	national	
law.105		This	resonates	with	the	first	interpretation	of	compulsory	jurisdiction,	that	the	
parties	have	no	other	forum	under	law	to	resolve	their	dispute.	In	his	identification	of	the	
‘court	or	tribunal’	criteria,	the	issue	of	whether	the	entity’s	final	decision	is	judicial	in	
nature	106	was	not	explicitly	addressed.		
	
Specifically,	the	Advocate	General	did	not	address	the	operation	of	Article	11(6),	which	
the	court	ultimately	found	decisive.	The	CJEU	held	that	the	HCC’s	proceedings	did	not	
lead	to	a	decision	of	a	judicial	nature	as	there	was	the	potential	for	the	European	
Commission	to	relieve	the	HCC	of	its	jurisdiction	pursuant	Article	11(6)	Regulation	
1/2003.107	
	
The	Court’s	judgment	on	this	point	is	very	brief,	but	this	is	the	point	at	which	the	Court	of	
Justice	apparently	constrains	its	own	jurisdiction	over	the	interpretation	and	application	
of	EU	competition	law.	As	such	several	elements	need	to	be	examined.			
	
	
	 	
                                                 
104 Syfait judgment at [29]  
105 AG Opinion at [20], referring to Law 703/77 on the control of monopolies and oligopolies and 
protection of free competition. The Greek civil courts could only hear follow-on actions. 
106 Citing Case 138/80 Borker [1980] ECR 1975, [1980] 3 CMLR 638 at [4]; C-111/94 Job Centre [1995] 
ECR I-3361 at [9]; and C-182/00 Lutz and Others [2002] ECR I-547 at [15]-[16] in support 
107 Syfait judgment at [34] 
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4.4	Does	Syfait	bar	all	NCAs	from	preliminary	references?		
	
Syfait	appears	to	lock	the	door	of	the	Court	to	all	NCAs.108	An	argument	in	support	of	that	
view	is	that	the	court	refers	to	“a	competition	authority	such	as	the	Epitropi	
Antagonismou”	being	required	to	work	in	close	cooperation	with	the	European	
Commission.109	Since	all	competition	authorities	work	with	the	Commission	in	the	ECN,	it	
appears	to	cover	all	of	them.	An	alternative	interpretation	is	that	it	only	refers	to	
integrated	agencies	–	that	is,	those	with	a	structure	‘such	as’	the	HCC’s.110	As	will	be	
shown,	this	has	an	impact	both	on	the	independence	criterion,	and	regarding	the	effect	of	
Article	11(6)	on	an	authority’s	capacity	to	come	to	a	‘final	decision	of	a	judicial	nature’.	
	
The	first	point	is	that	the	Court	states	that	“Whenever	the	Commission	relieves	a	national	
competition	authority	such	as	the	Epitropi	Antagonismou	of	its	competence,	the	
proceedings	initiated	before	that	authority	will	not	lead	to	a	decision	of	a	judicial	
nature.”111	However,	the	national	competition	authority	would	only	be	relieved	of	its	
competence	if	the	Commission	actually	did	activate	Article	11(6).	The	Court’s	finding	is	
therefore	predicated	on	a	hypothetical	possibility.	In	practice,	the	Commission	has	been	
reluctant	to	take	over	jurisdiction	in	this	way.112	
	
Secondly,	the	assertion	that	“the	competition	authorities	of	the	Member	States	are	
automatically	relieved	of	their	competence	where	the	Commission	initiates	its	own	
proceedings”113	is	taken	from	recital	17	of	Regulation	1/2003.	However,	the	Court	did	
                                                 
108 See e.g. Anagnostaras who argues that it amounts to a blanket exclusion of Member State NCAs from 
the Article 267 procedure: G Anagnostaras ‘Preliminary Problems and Jurisdiction Uncertainties: the 
Admissibility of  Questions Referred by Bodies Performing Quasi-Judicial Functions’ (2005) 30(6) 
European Law Review 878-890 
109 Syfait judgment at [34] 
110 For example, all Irish civil courts are designated competition authorities for the purposes of Art 35 
Regulation 1/2003 and, whilst they are subject to its rules, they are not directly involved in the fora of the 
ECN. 
111 Syfait judgment at [36] 
112 Interview material reported in H Kassim and K Wright ‘The European Competition Network: a 
Regulatory Network with a Difference’ Paper presented at European Consortium for Political Research 
(ECPR) Standing Group on Regulatory Governance, Third Biennial Conference, Dublin, 17-19 June 
2010. Commission officials have expressed reluctance about invoking Art 11(6). One interviewee 
remarked that: “the worst case scenario would be the Commission intervening all the time”. The use of 
Article 11 (6) as a “cherry picking provision” would not only generate unnecessary work, but could lead 
to a breakdown in trust that would jeopardize the operation of the network. One national official said that 
they “almost had to persuade the Commission to take over a case” where three or more Member State 
markets were involved. According to the 2008 FIDE report (J Bornkamm & R Grafunder ‘General 
Report’ in H F Koeck & M M Karollus (eds) The Modernisation of European Competition Law: First 
Experiences with Regulation 1/2003 (Nomos: Vienna 2008), 487-516), in at least one case, even though 
three NCAs were investigating, the Commission did not take over the case as might be expected 
according to the guideline example in the Network notice, but the NCAs coordinated the investigation 
amongst themselves. 
113 Syfait judgment at [34], emphasis added 
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not	look	into	other	provisions	of	Regulation	1/2003,	in	particular	Article	35.	That	article	
reveals	more	nuanced	effects.	Pursuant	to	Article	35(3),	the	effects	of	Article	11(6)	do	
apply	fully	to	courts	which	“exercise	functions	regarding	the	preparation	and	adoption	of	
the	types	of	decisions	foreseen	in	Article	5”	–	that	is,	requiring	that	an	infringement	be	
brought	to	an	end;	ordering	interim	measures;	accepting	commitments;	or	imposing	
fines,	periodic	penalty	payments	or	any	other	penalty	provided	for	in	their	national	law.	
However,	Article	35(4)	guarantees	the	independence	of	courts	as	competition	
authorities	where	the	judicial	authority	is	“separate	and	different”	from	the	prosecuting	
authority.	Under	Article	11(6),	the	Commission	is	limited	to	taking	over	a	case	from	a	
prosecuting	authority,	which	should	in	turn	withdraw	its	claim	from	the	judicial	
authority.		
	
Article	11(6)	further	states	that	“if	a	competition	authority	of	a	Member	State	is	already	
acting	on	a	case,	the	Commission	shall	only	initiate	proceedings	after	consulting	with	the	
national	competition	authority”	and,	further	“if	the	NCA(s)	concerned	do	not	object”114.	
Given	the	lack	of	dispute	resolution	proceedings	regarding	case	allocation	in	the	ECN,	
could	the	Commission	legally	and	politically	enforce	this?		Arguably	infringement	
proceedings	against	the	Member	State	under	Art	258	TFEU	would	be	disproportionate,	
and	would	certainly	undermine	mutual	trust	within	the	ECN	among	competition	
enforcers.115		
	
This	 lends	 weight	 to	 the	 argument	 that	 it	 is	 the	 prosecuting	 authority’s	 decision	 to	
abandon	 proceedings,	 rather	 than	 the	 Commission’s	 competence,	 which	 leads	 to	 the	
termination	 of	 proceedings	 in	 the	 judicial	 branch,	 as	 Brammer	 argues.116	 	 If	 the	
prosecuting	authority	does	not	 take	such	a	decision,	 theoretically	 the	proceedings	 in	 the	
judicial	authority	could	continue.	The	Commission’s	power	to	relieve	a	national	authority	
of	its	competence	is	therefore	indirect.		
	
This	 is	 where	 the	 compulsory	 jurisdiction	 criterion	 meets	 the	 Court’s	 findings	 on	
independence.	 If	 the	HCC’s	 decision‐making	 body	was	 not	 sufficiently	 separate	 from	 its	
investigating	secretariat,	it	would	be	difficult	for	the	secretariat	to	“withdraw	its	claim”	in	
its	advisory	role	to	the	HCC	board.		
                                                 
114 Network notice [54(e)] 
115 See e.g. H Kassim & K Wright ‘Network Governance and the European Union: the Case of the 
European Competition Network’, paper presented at the Institute of European Law Conference, ‘After the 
First 50 Years: The Future of European Law and Policy’, University of Birmingham, 2-4 July 2008, 
based on original interview research. 
116 S Brammer ‘Co-operation Between National Competition Agencies in the Enforcement of EC 
Competition Law’ (Hart, 2009) 96 
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Thirdly,	the	Court	states	that	Article	11(6)	“essentially	maintains	the	rule	in	Art	9(3)117	of	
Regulation	17”.118	While	the	Court	seems	keen	to	preserve	continuity	of	the	former	
enforcement	regime,	in	the	pre‐2004	system	under	Regulation	17119		there	was	no	such	
distinction	between	prosecuting	and	judicial	functions	of	an	authority.	
	
BRT	v	SABAM120	recognises	courts	as	“authorities	of	the	Member	States”	for	the	purposes	
of	Art	9(3)	in	addressing	courts’	authority	to	act	under	that	provision.	However,	it	makes	a	
distinction	between	those	courts	whose	primary	function	is	enforcement	under	Art	88	
EEC,	that	is,	as	an	NCA	involved	in	public	enforcement121	and	those	courts	applying	ex	Arts	
85	and	86	EEC	by	virtue	of	their	direct	effect,	or	in	private	enforcement.		Art	9(3)	refers	
only	to	the	former,	public	enforcers.122	Interesting,	the	judgment	also	refers	in	the	first	
category	to	Member	State	authorities	tasked	with	ensuring	the	legality	of	that	application	
by	the	administrative	authorities	–	this	suggests	that	review	courts	would	be	relieved	of	
their	competence,	123	a	point	which	Brammer	does	not	address.	The	jurisdiction	of	review	
courts	is	now	explicitly	protected	under	Art	35(3)	Regulation	1/2003. 
 
Courts	involved	in	private	enforcement	retained	their	competence	so	as	not	to	deprive	
individuals	of	their	rights	under	the	Treaty,124	but	were	encouraged	to	stay	proceedings	
awaiting	the	outcome	of	the	Commission’s	action.125	Importantly,	“the	competence	of	such	
a	court	to	refer	a	request	for	a	preliminary	ruling	to	the	Court	of	Justice	cannot	be	fettered	
by	Article	9	of	Regulation	no	17.”126		This	seems	to	be	the	distinction	which	the	Court	is	
adhering	to	in	its	Syfait	judgment	so	as	to	reserve	access	to	‘true’	courts.	
	
However,	BRT	v	SABAM	does	not	deal	fully	with	the	consequences	of	authorities	with	
investigating,	prosecuting	and	adjudicating	functions.	In	addition,	Art	9(3)	begins	from	the	
                                                 
117 “As long as the Commission has not initiated any procedure under Articles 2 [negative clearance], 3 
[requiring infringement be brought to an end] or 6 [exemption decision pursuant to 85(3)], the authorities 
of the Member States shall remain competent to apply Article 85 (1) and Article 86 in accordance with 
Article 88 of the Treaty ; they shall remain competent in this respect notwithstanding that the time limits 
specified in Article 5(1) and in Article 7(2) relating to notification have not expired.” 
118 Judgment at [34] 
119 Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of 
the Treaty [1959-1962] OJ 13, 21.2.1962,  204/62 
120 C-127/73 BRT v Sabam (No 1) (1974) ECR 51 at [14]-[19]. The case confirmed the direct effect of the 
Treaty’s competition provisions, meaning that rights and duties conferred by EU law can be relied upon 
between individuals in national courts.  
121 BRT v SABAM at [18] 
122 See in this respect S Brammer ‘Co-operation Between National Competition Agencies in the 
Enforcement of EC Competition Law’ (Hart, 2009) 124-125 
123 BRT v SABAM at [19] 
124 BRT v SABAM at [17], [20] 
125 BRT V SABAM at [21] 
126 BRT v SABAM at [23] 
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starting	point	that	the	Commission	had	jurisdiction	under	the	pre‐2004	regime,	and	the	
Member	State	authorities	had	residual	power	to	act,	rather	than	being	‘relieved’	of	their	
competence.		Regulation	1/2003	operates	on	a	system	of	parallel	competences.	Given	the	
notion	of	the	‘well‐placed	to	act	authority’	in	Article	11	Regulation	1/2003	and	the	
Network	Notice,	DG	COMP	is	only	likely	to	take	over	jurisdiction	if	more	than	three	
Member	States	are	affected;	where	it	is	closely	linked	to	other	Community	provisions	
which	may	be	exclusively	or	more	effectively	applied	by	the	Commission;	if	Community	
interest	so	requires,	to	develop	Community	competition	policy,	for	example	where	a	novel	
issue	arises;	or	to	ensure	effective	enforcement	throughout	the	Community.	127		
	
The	fourth	element	to	be	considered	regarding	the	Court’s	stance	in	Syfait	on	a	decision	
of	a	judicial	nature	is	that	the	need	for	a	‘final’	decision	is	not	mentioned.	Indeed,	the	
requirement	of	finality	is	not	straightforward	when	one	considers	the	potential	for	
appeal	or	judicial	review	of	the	decision.128The	implication	is	that	a	decision	of	a	judicial	
nature	is	a	first	instance	decision	which	is	binding	and	capable	of	imposing	sanctions,	
albeit	subject	to	appeal.		It	could	be	argued	that	this	also	implies	that	a	decision	of	the	
European	Commission	following	an	investigation	is	a	decision	of	a	judicial	nature,	
despite	the	Commission	having	a	very	similar	structure	to	that	of	the	national	
competition	authority.	However,	previous	case	law,	and	the	due	process	debate	
surrounding	the	compatibility	of	Commission	procedures	with	Art	6	ECHR,	show	that	the	
Commission	itself	does	not	fulfil	the	court	or	tribunal	criteria.129	
	
One	way	of	dealing	with	the	issue	of	a	decision	of	a	judicial	nature	is	to	focus	on	whether	
the	jurisdiction	was	initially	compulsory,	rather	than	the	result.	That	is,	were	other	
possible	fora	exhausted	before	the	proceedings	arrived	at	the	body	referring	the	
preliminary	question?	In	Gabalfrisa,	whereas	the	Advocate	General	focused	on	decisions	of	
the	Tribunales	being	subject	to	appeal	in	the	administrative	courts,	the	CJEU	concentrated	
on	the	element	of	exhaustiveness	in	proceedings	and	allowed	the	reference.	Decisions	of	
the	tax	authority	could	be	challenged	in	the	administrative	courts	only	after	proceedings	
have	been	completed	in	the	Tribunales	Economico‐Administrativos:	no	other	forum.	In	
that	sense	their	jurisdiction	was	compulsory.		By	analogy,	decisions	of	integrated	NCAs	can	
only	be	challenged	once	they	have	been	reached.	
	
                                                 
127 Network Notice paras 14-15 and Joint Statement of the Council and the Commission on the 
Functioning of the Network of Competition Authorities, Council document nr. 15435/02 ADD 1,  para 
19, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/joint_statement_en.pdf  (last accessed 30.3.2012) 
128 This is also relevant for the discussion of res judicata in the proposal for the binding effect of NCA 
decisions on national courts throughout the EU, as explored in chapter 5. 
129 Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78 Van Landewyck v Commission [1980] ECR 3125 
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A	further	argument	for	the	‘judicial’	nature	of	NCA	decisions	can	be	derived	from	
Gabalfrisa.	An	indicator	of	the	binding	nature	of	the	decisions	of	the	Tribunales	was	that	
its	registrars	were	responsible	for	the	enforcement	of	its	decisions.	Even	if	the	European	
Commission	initiated	proceedings	relieving	an	NCA	of	its	competence,	and	its	investigation	
subsequently	led	to	a	prohibition	decision,	the	NCA	would	also	be	responsible	for	
enforcement	and	monitoring	compliance	with	the	Commission’s	decision	in	the	
framework	of	its	cooperation	duties	in	the	ECN.	
	
A	stronger	reading,	based	on	the	Court’s	own	language	in	Syfait,	is	that	at	their	outset	
proceedings	before	NCAs	are	always	intended	to	lead	to	a	judicial	decision.130	The	fact	that	
a	case	may	be	terminated	before	reaching	the	final	stage	does	not	change	the	nature	and	
objective	of	the	proceedings.131	This	interpretation,	focusing	on	the	beginning	rather	than	
the	end	of	the	procedure,	would	also	get	over	the	barrier	posed	by	the	Commission’s	
theoretical	possibility	of	relieving	an	NCA	of	its	competence	under	Article	11(6).	As	
Brammer	points	out,	proceedings	can	also	be	terminated	in	the	civil	courts,	for	example	by	
one	of	the	parties	withdrawing	the	action132	In	that	sense,	those	courts’	proceedings	would	
not	lead	to	a	judicial	decision	either	and	would	also	be	barred	from	submitting	
preliminary	references,	which	would	be	an	illogical	result.	
	
Finally,	if	the	CJEU	wanted	to	exclude	references	from	all	NCAs	it	could	do	so	explicitly.	
The	CJEU’s	intention	to	allow	some	references	from	domestic	competition	authorities	
could	be	implied	by	its	willingness	to	rehearse	the	arguments	at	the	admissibility	stage.	
The	CJEU	had	previously	given	a	ruling	in	response	to	a	preliminary	reference	from	a	NCA	
in	the	Spanish	Banks	(1992)	case.	In	that	case	admissibility	was	not	an	issue	and	its	status	
as	a	court	or	tribunal	was	not	raised	at	all.	
	
From	a	legal	perspective,	it	would	therefore	be	possible	to	allow	references	from	NCAs	
under	the	post‐2004	regime.	But	what	are	the	interests	of	NCAs,	the	Court,	and	the	wider	
competition	enforcement	system?	
	
	
	 	
                                                 
130 Syfait judgment at [28] 
131 G Anagnostaras ‘Preliminary Problems and Jurisdiction Uncertainties: the Admissibility of Questions 
Referred by Bodies Performing Quasi-Judicial Functions’ (2005) 30(6) European Law Review 878-890, 
890 
132 S Brammer ‘Co-operation Between National Competition Agencies in the Enforcement of EC 
Competition Law’ (Hart, 2009)  97 
 77
5.	Allowing	NCAs	access	to	the	CJEU		
	
5.1	The	perspective	of	NCAs		
	
The	motivation	of	an	NCA	seeking	a	preliminary	reference	is	interesting	in	the	context	of	
the	ECN.	It	may	be	noteworthy	that	the	HCC’s	reference	was	made	in	2003,	before	the	
current	enforcement	regime	came	into	force.	We	may	not	see	another	preliminary	
reference	from	an	NCA	for	two	reasons:	because	of	the	apparently	negative	message	sent	
in	Syfait,	and	because	of	closer	cooperation	with	the	Commission	and	other	agencies	
within	the	ECN.	
	
Nevertheless,	the	foundations	of	the	ECN	were	already	being	built	at	that	time,	and	there	
were	informal	links	with	the	Commission133.	There	are	other	possible	reasons	for	a	
reference.	The	most	obvious	is	the	legal	certainty	in	receiving	a	binding	ruling	from	the	
ultimate	interpreter	of	EU	law.	This	suggests	that	less	formal	advice	from	the	Commission	
would	be	less	satisfactory	from	the	perspective	of	the	NCA.	Art	11(5)	Regulation	1/2003	
provides	that	“the	competition	authorities	of	the	Member	States	may	consult	the	
Commission	on	any	case	involving	the	application	of	Community	law”.	While	this	legal	
provision	suggests	a	formal	consultation	process,	in	practice	advice	has	been	given	
through	more	informal	bilateral	communication	between	competition	officials	in	DG	
COMP	and	the	NCA.134	One	reason	for	submitting	a	reference	to	the	Court	of	Justice	may	be	
to	circumvent	the	influence	of	the	Commission	and	the	NCAs	duties	as	a	member	of	the	
European	Competition	Network.135	
	
A	further	reason	may	be	the	kudos	of	making	case	law,	which	is	tied	to	the	status	of	the	
competition	authority	in	its	domestic	environment,	for	example	relative	to	its	parent	
ministry,	but	more	pertinently	relative	to	the	appeal	courts.	A	ruling	from	the	CJEU	is	
likely	to	provide	a	safeguard	against	judicial	review	or	appeal	of	the	NCA’s	decision.		
	
These	parallel	channels	of	supranational	advice	from	the	Commission	and	the	CJEU	have	
been	used	particularly	by	the	Spanish	courts,	as	explored	in	the	following	chapter.	These	
parallel	channels	could	give	rise	to	interpretative	pluralism	where	the	opinions	differ.	
                                                 
133 H Kassim & K Wright ‘Bringing Regulatory Processes Back In: The Reform of EU Antitrust and 
Merger Control’ (2009) 32(4) West European Politics 738-755; interviews with national competition 
official 30.1.2008; H Kassim & K Wright ‘Network Governance and the European Union: the Case of the 
European Competition Network’, paper presented at the Institute of European Law Conference, ‘After the 
First 50 Years: The Future of European Law and Policy’, University of Birmingham, 2-4 July 2008 
134 Interviews on the functioning of the European Competition Network 
135 Komninos also makes this point: A Komninos ‘Article 234 and National Competition Authorities in 
the Era of Decentralisation’ (2004) 29(1) European Competition Law Review 106-114, 112 
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5.2	The	perspective	of	the	Court	of	Justice	
	
5.2.1	Jurisdiction	
	
Having	explored	the	motivations	of	NCAs	in	seeking	a	reference,	what	are	the	incentives	
for	the	CJEU	in	accepting	their	requests?	In	deciding	whether	to	accept	preliminary	
references	from	bodies	falling	outside	a	narrow	definition	of	‘court	or	tribunal’,	the	Court	
is	choosing	between	two	competing	imperatives.	One	is	to	extend	its	jurisdiction	over	a	
wider	range	of	institutions	at	the	national	level.	Substantively	this	would	give	it	more	
opportunities	to	shape	and	clarify	the	content	of	(here,	competition)	law.		This	incentive	
resonates	with	the	view	that,	as	in	other	institutions,	the	Court	of	Justice	and	the	judges	
and	personnel	within	it	are	self‐interested	actors	concerned	with	enhancing	their	own	
status	and	jurisdiction.136		
	
If	the	CJEU	adopts	a	narrow	definition	of	a	court	or	tribunal,	it	constrains	its	own	
jurisdiction.	Appraising	the	early	cases	in	which	the	CJEU	adopted	a	generous	approach	to	
the	independence	criterion,	Tridimas	asserts:	“The	overriding	concern	is	to	make	the	
preliminary	reference	procedure	available	as	widely	as	possible,	thus	ensuring	the	
uniform	interpretation	of	Community	law	and	the	availability	of	a	remedy	for	the	
protection	of	Community	rights.	The	Court,	behaving,	in	effect	as	a	rational	decision‐
maker,	widens	the	franchise	of	Community	law:	by	making	the	preliminary	reference	
procedure	available	to	as	wide	a	category	of	bodies	as	possible,	it	upholds	Community	rights	
at	the	lower	level	and	increases	their	immediacy	and	resonance.”137	
	
	
5.2.2	Floodgates	
	
However,	this	was	before	the	2004	enlargement,	coinciding	with	the	entry	into	force	of	the	
decentralisation	reforms.	The	Court’s	second,	competing,	incentive	is	to	control	its	own	
workload.	The	possibility	of	references	from	a	significantly	wider	constituency	of	national	
authorities,	many	of	which	had	no	experience	of	applying	EU	law,	brought	implications	for	
the	Court’s	caseload.	It	seems	likely	that	the	Court	was	concerned	about	opening	the	
floodgates	to	an	abundance	of	quasi‐judicial	bodies	more	generally,	not	only	NCAs,	when	it	
                                                 
136 A-M Burley and W Mattli ‘Europe Before the Court: A political Theory of Legal Integration’ (1993) 
47(1) International Organization 41-76, 60. This is countered by Karen Alter in ‘Jurist Advocacy 
Movements in Europe: The Role of  Euro-Law Associations in European Integration (1953-1975) in The 
European Court’s Political Power (Oxford OUP 2009) 63-91, 64 
137 T Tridimas ‘Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance in the Preliminary 
Reference Procedure’ (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 9-50, 30 (emphasis added) 
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formulated	its	strict	definition	in	Syfait.	Anagnostaras	notes	that	Syfait	departs	from	the	
“rather	liberal	way	in	which	the	criteria	for	determining	the	status	of	the	referring	
authorities	have	been	applied	in	the	past	possibly	implying	the	intention	to	move	towards	
more	rigorous	standards	in	the	future”.138			
	
In	arguing	that	preliminary	references	should	be	accepted	from	NCAs,	Komninos	does	not	
properly	address	this	floodgates	argument,	and	Anagnostaras	states	that	“judgment	does	
not	seem	to	have	been	influenced	by	effectiveness	and	practicality	concerns”139.	However,	
Syfait	was	the	first	antitrust	preliminary	ruling	case	following	the	entry	into	force	of	the	
Modernisation	Regulation.		
	
Ehlermann	&	Atanasiu	make	a	number	of	predictions	about	the	possible	effects	of	
modernisation	on	the	Court	of	Justice	and	its	caseload.140	One	argument	was	that	
preliminary	references	from	national	courts	would	increase	following	decentralised	
enforcement	of	Article	101(3).	Komninos	also	voiced	this	expectation.141	One	reason	could	
be	a	modest	level	of	private	enforcement.	Nonetheless,	at	the	time	of	the	Syfait	reference	
from	the	Hellenic	Competition	Commission,	the	judges	of	the	Court	of	Justice	may	have	
been	wary	of	opening	the	floodgates	to	references	from	national	competition	authorities,	
and	non‐judicial	bodies	more	broadly	in	policy	areas	beyond	competition,	in	addition	to	a	
possible	increase	in	references	from	national	courts	traditionally	defined.		
	
The	predicted	increase	does	not	appear	to	have	materialised.	In	its	2009	report	on	the	
functioning	of	Regulation	1/2003,142	the	Commission	voiced	concerns	that	national	judges	
were	applying	Article	101(3)	inconsistently.	This	suggests	that	judges	did	not	feel	the	need	
to	request	a	reference	from	the	Court	of	Justice.	If	the	forthcoming	draft	directive	on	
damages	actions	in	successful	in	its	goal	of	increasing	private	enforcement,	more	
references	may	be	expected	from	national	courts	as	they	become	involved	in	private	
enforcement,	especially	in	Article	101(3)	cases	where	they	have	jurisdiction	for	the	first	
time.	Many	of	these	are	general	civil	courts	with	little	specific	competition	enforcement	
experience.	Put	in	the	context	of	the	Commission’s	parallel	avenue	for	advice,	the	CJEU	is	
                                                 
138 G Anagnostaras ‘Preliminary Problems and Jurisdiction Uncertainties: the Admissibility of Questions 
Referred by Bodies Performing Quasi-Judicial Functions’ (2005) 30(6) European Law Review 878-890, 
878 
139 G Anagnostaras ‘Preliminary Problems and Jurisdiction Uncertainties: the Admissibility of Questions 
Referred by Bodies Performing Quasi-Judicial Functions’ (2005) 30(6) European Law Review 878-890, 
887 
140 I Atanasiu & C-D Ehlermann ‘The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law: Consequences for the Future 
Role and Function of the EC Courts’ (2002) 23(2) European Competition Law Review 72-80  
141 A Komninos ‘Article 234 and National Competition Authorities in the Era of Decentralisation’ (2004) 
29(1)  European Competition Law Review 106-114, 106 
142 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Report on the 
functioning of Regulation 1/2003, COM (2009) 206 final 
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constrained	by	the	wider	impact	on	EU	law	as	a	whole,	whereas	the	Commission	tool	of	
amicus	curiae	and	opinions	is	a	competition‐specific	sui	generis	instrument.		
	
	
5.2.3	Consistency	
	
Advocate	General	Jacobs	was	in	favour	of	allowing	NCAs	references	“to	provide	some	
additional	safeguard	of	the	uniformity	of	Community	law”.143	This	would	minimise	
institutional	divergence	described	in	the	first	part	of	this	chapter.	The	additional	safeguard	
is	particularly	important	given	that	NCAs	have	a	duty	to	disapply	national	law	which	is	
incompatible	with	EU	competition	law,	according	to	Consorzio	Fiammiferi.144	“That	
possibility	might	...commend	a	generous	approach	towards	references	from	such	
authorities,	so	as	to	ensure	that	any	uncertainties	as	to	the	applicable	Community	rules	are	
clarified	before	national	legislation	is	disapplied.”145		
	
Preliminary	references	from	NCAs	would	iron	out	uncertainty,	inconsistencies	and	
potential	divergence	early	in	the	case.	These	are	arguments	also	used	in	the	Commission	
staff	working	paper	on	amicus	curiae	briefs	and	the	subsequently	drafted	provisions	on	
requesting	guidance	from	the	Commission.146	
	
A	preliminary	reference	would	strengthen	the	ECN	more	than	the	Commission	relieving	an	
NCA	of	its	jurisdiction.	Even	though	the	Commission	will	not	do	this	without	consulting	an	
NCA,	‘seizing’	the	case	could	be	perceived	negatively	and	antagonistically,	whereas	a	
preliminary	reference	is	more	cooperative	and	a	positive	action	in	building	the	law.		A	
further	point	is	the	relative	precedent	value,	and	attendant	benefits	of	consistent	
application	of	EU	law,	of	a	Commission	decision	and	a	preliminary	ruling	from	the	Court.		
There	are	however	levels	below	the	Art	11(6)	procedure	more	commonly	used	to	ensure	
consistency,	such	as	notifying	other	members	after	opening	proceedings	under	Art	11(3),	
and	of	an	envisaged	decision	under	Art	11(4).	This	argument	is	further	strengthened	by	
the	fact	that	Article	11(6)	has	never	been	activated	so	far.	
	
                                                 
143 A-G Jacobs’ Opinion at [45] 
144 A Kaczorowska ‘The Power of a National Competition Authority to Disapply National Law 
Incompatible with EC Law – and its Practical Consequences’ (2004) 25(9) European Competition Law 
Review 591-599, 598; Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] 
ECR 629; Case C-198/01 Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi v Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato [2003] ECR I-8055 
145 A-G Jacobs’ Opinion at [45] 
146 Commission staff working paper: Reform of Regulation 17 – The proposal for a new 
implementing regulation – Article 15(3) submissions as amicus curiae, SEC (2001) 1827 Brussels, 
13.11.2001 
 81
5.2.4	Judicial	economy	
	
One	argument	for	allowing	references	from	NCAs,	is	judicial	economy	–	it	may	be	desirable	
to	allow	questions	from	NCAs	to	deal	with	divergences,	inconsistencies	and	problematic	
application	of	the	rules	as	early	as	possible	in	a	case,	which	may	in	turn	reduce	the	need	
for	judicial	review	whereupon	the	review	court	may	in	turn	refer	a	question	to	the	CJEU.147		
	
This	reasoning	was	previously	supported	by	the	Court	in	De	Coster.	The	CJEU	did	not	take	
up	AG	Ruiz	Jarabo	Colomer’s	proposed	test	to	limit	preliminary	references	because	“if	the	
CJEU	were	to	decline	jurisdiction,	the	referring	court	would	have	to	resolve	the	issue	of	
Community	law	itself	and	there	is	no	guarantee	that	the	opportunity	for	making	a	
reference	would	arise	at	a	subsequent	stage”.148	It	could	even	be	a	more	efficient	use	of	
resources,	although	this	is	a	weaker	argument	given	the	amount	of	time	a	preliminary	
ruling	takes,	and	the	interruption	of	the	national	proceedings.	
	
The	inter	partes/adversarial	procedure	requirement	may	also	be	understood	as	an	aspect	
of	judicial	economy,	and	the	timing	of	a	preliminary	reference,	rather	than	purely	an	
element	in	the	definition	of	a	court	or	tribunal.	Judicial	economy	dictates	that	all	issues	
should	be	raised	as	early	as	possible	in	the	proceedings.	In	the	interests	of	justice”	a	
question	should	be	referred	for	preliminary	ruling	only	after	both	sides	have	been	heard,	
as	the	CJEU	itself	states	in	its	information	note	on	references	from	national	courts.149	
	
	These	practical	considerations	add	weight	to	the	Advocate	General’s	decision	to	admit	the	
referral.	A	similar	argument	was	used	to	admit	a	preliminary	reference	from	an	apparently	
non‐judicial	authority	in	the	Broekmeulen	case	150	–	but	in	that	case	there	was	no	right	of	
judicial	review	and	the	issues	could	not	be	raised	later.	
	
Advocate	General	Jacobs	links	judicial	economy	with	the	expertise	of	competition	
authorities	in	Syfait:	“It	is	at	least	arguable	that	a	specialised	competition	authority	having	
judicial	characteristics	might	be	better	placed	to	identify	the	relevant	issues	of	Community	
                                                 
147 Komninos (writing before the Syfait judgment and before Regulation 1/2003 came into force and the 
significant 2004 EU enlargement) and Gerber and Cassinis advocate allowing preliminary references 
from NCAs so the CJEU may intervene at an earlier point.  
148 Syfait judgment at [32] 
149 Information Note on references from national courts for a preliminary ruling 2011 C 160/01 [19]; Case 
106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629; C-277, 318 & 
319/91 Ligur Carni [1993] ECR I-6621 
150 C-246/80 Broekmeulen v Huisarts Registratie Commissie [1981] ECR 2311. Professional body of 
Dutch doctors against whose decisions there was no right of judicial review. 
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competition	law	than	a	generalist	court	charged	with	reviewing	the	decisions	of	the	
former	body	at	a	subsequent	stage”151		
	
	
5.2.5	Expertise	
	
The	use	of	the	Article	267	procedure	by	a	quasi‐judicial	agency	allows	the	participation	of	
domestic	authorities	with	essentially	administrative	characteristics	in	a	dialogue	that	the	
law	intended	clearly	to	take	place	exclusively	between	judges.152	In	the	Syfait	case,	the	
Advocate	General’s	starting	point	was	to	examine	how	many	members	of	the	Competition	
Commission	were	required	to	have	legal	training,	noting	that	only	two	out	of	nine	
members	were	required	to	be	trained	lawyers.	However,	he	acknowledged	that	in	
competition	law	enforcement	there	is	also	the	need	for	economic	and	commercial	
expertise.	An	argument	used	in	the	previous	case	law	(De	Coster)	for	not	allowing	a	
reference	if	the	referring	body	could	not	be	characterised	as	purely	judicial	was	that	an	
administrative	agency	would	not	have	adequate	knowledge	and	expertise	to	frame	the	
question	in	the	right	way.	This	is	not	an	argument	that	holds	true	with	national	
competition	authorities	as	the	primary	public	enforcers	of	competition	law.	
	
In	De	Coster153,	one	of	the	arguments	proposed	for	not	admitting	the	reference	was	that	
authorities	which	are	not	strictly	judicial	are	not	properly	qualified	to	understand	complex	
legal	problems	and	frame	relevant	questions	for	the	purposes	of	the	reference.	The	
Advocate	General	criticised	“the	unsettling	effect	of	the	intervention	of	an	administrative	
body	in	a	dialogue	between	courts”.154	“Article	[267]	introduces	an	instrument	for	judicial	
cooperation,	a	technical	dialogue	by	courts	and	between	courts.”155	Previously	references	
were	allowed	from	non‐judicial	bodies	to	cement	a	unified	system	of	law,	but	it	is	no	
longer	needed	as	Community	law	is	an	“accepted	reality”.156		EU	law	appears	to	have	
become	a	victim	of	its	own	success.		This	is	the	other	side	to	the	judicial	economy	
argument:	if	the	first	instance	body	has	already	submitted	a	preliminary	reference,	a	
review	court	would	be	reluctant	to	send	another	one.	Hence	“the	connection	between	the	
CJEU	and	national	courts	is	seriously	hindered	by	an	administrative	body...well‐
intentioned	but	lacking	in	independence...[hold]ing	up	the	whole	procedure.”157	The	
                                                 
151 A-G Jacobs’ Opinion at [45] 
152 A-G Colomer in De Coster at [79] 
153 De Coster v Collège des Bourgmestre et Echevins de Watermael-Boitsfort (C-17/00) [2001] ECR I-
9445 
154 At [75] et seq 
155 At [76] 
156 At [75] 
157 A-G Colomer in De Coster at [79] 
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Advocate	General	wants	to	guard	the	judicial	role.	AG	Colomer	returned	to	his	theme	more	
recently	in	Alpe	Adria	Energia:	Art	267	was	drafted	to	“strengthen	the	institutional	voice	of	
an	authority	of	the	Member	States:	the	judiciary”.158	He	criticised	the	fact	that	although	the	
reference	was	declared	inadmissible	in	Syfait,	“there	is	no	indication	…that	the	Court	acted	
in	the	interests	of	the	institutional	balance	required	by	Article	[267	TFEU]”159	(emphasis	
added).	Ironically,	the	deficient	expertise	argument	has	been	levelled	at	national	judges	in	
civil	courts	when	they	are	required	to	engage	with	economic	analysis,	unfavourably	
compared	to	the	technical	knowledge	of	national	competition	authorities.	
	
One	of	the	limitations	of	preliminary	rulings,	as	noted	by	Atanasiu	and	Ehlermann,	is	that	
they	only	give	answers	on	the	interpretation	of	the	law,	which	are	often	very	abstract,	
leaving	concrete	application	to	the	national	judge.	160	This	is	compounded	by	limited	pre‐
reform	precedents	on	the	application	of	Art	101(3)	from	the	Commission.	They	argue	that	
the	‘advisory’	nature	of	the	instrument	makes	it	“insufficient	to	guarantee	the	consistent	
application	of	Article	[101].”	It	is	interesting	that	Atanasiu	and	Ehlermann	do	not	seem	to	
consider	preliminary	rulings	to	be	sufficiently	specific,	or	even	sufficiently	binding.	This	
can	be	compared	with	the	Commission’s	non‐binding	opinions	to	national	courts,	which	
can	encompass	factual	and	economic,	as	well	as	legal,	matters.	Nevertheless,	resolution	on	
the	facts	of	the	individual	case	is	still	down	to	the	national	judge.		
	
	
5.2.6	Future	preliminary	references	to	the	General	Court?	
	
As	a	response	to	the	floodgates	argument,	the	potential	future	jurisdiction	of	the	General	
Court	in	preliminary	rulings	would	give	scope	to	broaden	the	court	or	tribunal	definition	
again.	Art	225(3)	Treaty	of	Nice,	activated	by	decision	of	the	Council	of	Ministers,	allows	
for	the	Court	of	First	Instance	(now	General	Court)	to	hear	preliminary	references	in	
specific	EU	policy	areas	including	competition,	where	it	already	has	a	wealth	of	experience	
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in	appeal	cases	and	individual/undertaking	cases	against	the	European	Commission.	As	
former	General	Court	President	Vesterdorf	has	stated,	the	General	Court	is	a	de	facto	
specialist	tribunal.161	Atanasiu	and	Ehlermann	also	advocate	giving	the	General	Court	
preliminary	ruling	jurisdiction	in	cases	concerning	Article	101	and	102,	but	claim	that	
specialised	chambers	are	not	necessary	given	the	existing	competition	expertise	in	the	
General	Court.162		
	
The	Advocate	General	in	De	Coster	posited	the	Treaty	of	Nice	provision	as	a	strong	
argument	for	a	clearer	definition,	in	order	to	give	guidelines	to	the	General	Court,	
otherwise	”the	hesitancy	of	the	first	body	will	be	matched	by	that	of	the	second.”163	
	
It	is	somewhat	paradoxical	that	while	DG	COMP	has	faced	renewed	criticism	concerning	
the	sustainability	of	its	current	structure,164	there	is	a	concurrent	trend	towards	national	
competition	regimes	emulating	that	structure.	This	due	process	criticism	and	the	coming	
into	force	of	Lisbon	treaty	and	the	Charter	on	Fundamental	Rights	makes	an	eventual	third	
level	competition	tribunal	more	likely.		In	light	of	Menarini	this	could	mean	full	review	of	
Commission	decisions,	including	an	ability	to	revisit	the	facts,	as	a	second	level	of	
adjudication.	More	relevant	for	the	purposes	of	this	chapter,	a	preliminary	reference	
function	for	that	tribunal,	or	for	the	General	Court.		
	
Lenaerts	asserts	that	preliminary	ruling	is	an	“indivisible	jurisdiction”	165	and	that		“the	
key	to	[its]	success	has	lain	in	the	centralisation	of	the	interpretative	function,	which	
promotes	uniformity.	If	other	bodies	are	invited	to	participate	there	is	a	risk	that	the	unity	
will	be	destroyed”.		This	centralisation	of	interpretation	is	arguably	threatened	in	the	
context	of	the	Commission’s	own	‘preliminary	reference	procedure’	through	Article	15	Reg	
1/2003	as	explored	in	the	following	chapter.		
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At	the	same	conference,	Baudenbacher	suggested	that	the	2004	competition	reform	would	
result	in	a	“major	shift	from	the	direct	action	to	the	preliminary	reference	procedure”.166	
This	means	a	weakening	of	the	CJEU’s/General	Court’s	judicial	review	in	public	
enforcement,	because	before,	it	would	have	been	reviewing	the	Commission,	and	only	
courts	not	parties	have	a	say	in	preliminary	references.	The	General	Court	has	a	high	
degree	of	specialist	knowledge,	which	could	assist	national	courts.	The	character	of	the	
preliminary	reference	procedure	could	change	in	the	General	Court	as	safeguarding	legal	
unity	would	be	its	secondary	task.	According	to	Baudenbacher,	instead	it	would	resolve	
the	case	with	a	“strong	focus	on	the	protection	of	individuals,	and	on	competition	as	a	
system.	This	may	lead	to	greater	generosity	in	defining	whether	an	entity	constitutes	a	
court	entitled	to	make	a	reference,	by	including,	for	instance,	arbitration	tribunals.”	
Arbitral	tribunals	not	only	fall	outside	the	Court’s	preliminary	reference	procedure,	but	
also	outside	the	remit	of	Regulation	1/2003	and	the	European	Competition	Network.	
Although	there	has	been	a	proposal	for	the	European	Commission	to	act	as	‘amicus	curiae’	
to	arbitral	tribunals167	in	an	analogous	way	to	the	mechanism	in	Article	15,	as	explored	in	
the	next	chapter.		
	
	
6.	Parallel	proceedings	and	asymmetric	channels	
	
Komninos	argues	that,	legally	speaking,	once	the	competence	of	the	national	authority	
ceases	by	the	Commission	taking	over	the	case,	the	Court	of	Justice	would	no	longer	have	
jurisdiction	to	deliver	a	preliminary	ruling.	The	reference	would	be	devoid	of	purpose,	and	
no	longer	directed	towards	settling	a	legal	dispute.168	In	this	way,	the	Commission	would	
indirectly	deprive	the	Court	of	Justice	of	its	jurisdiction.	The	contrasting	argument	is	that	
politically	and	practically,	the	Commission	would	be	highly	unlikely	to	take	the	Article	
11(6)	course	of	action	if	the	Court	had	received	a	preliminary	reference	and	had	yet	to	rule	
on	it.169	Anagnostaras’s	further	interpretation	is	that	“there	is	no	longer	jurisdiction	to	
answer	preliminary	questions	already	referred	for	a	ruling	after	parallel	proceedings	have	
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been	instituted	at	Community	level,	i.e.	by	the	Commission.”	In	effect	this	contributes	to	
the	‘hierarchy’	of	the	Commission	over	the	Court.		
	
However,	as	already	asserted,	the	Commission	cannot	legally	force	the	prosecuting	body	of	
an	NCA	to	drop	its	investigation,	or	its	judicial	authority	to	withdraw	a	preliminary	
reference.		
	
If	we	accept	that	the	Court’s	arguments	on	the	operation	of	Art	11(6)	Reg	1/2003	were	
flawed,	Syfait	does	not	constitute	a	total	bar	to	all	NCAs.	However,	at	best,	the	outcome	of	
Syfait	amounts	to	discrimination	towards	Member	States	whose	competition	regime	is	
organised	along	single	institutional	lines,	as	opposed	to	those	with	structurally	separate	
administrative	and	adjudicative	bodies,	as	they	do	not	have	the	same	opportunities	to	seek	
guidance	from	the	CJEU.	There	is	a	bias	in	favour	of	dualist	national	competition	regimes	
of	types	B	and	C.	This	has	implications	for	the	uniform	application	of	law.	For	example,	
contrast	the	inadmissibility	of	the	HCC	(type	A)	in	Syfait	with	the	acceptability	of	the	
reference	from	the	Swedish	Market	Court	(type	C)	in	the	Kanal	5	and	TV	4	case.170	
	
More	practically	the	message	in	Syfait	is	likely	to	deter	NCAs	from	submitting	a	
preliminary	reference	in	the	first	place.	By	emphasising	in	its	judgment	that	NCAs	are	
required	to	work	in	close	cooperation	with	the	Commission	(Syfait	at	[34]),	the	CJEU	
effectively	passes	over	responsibility	to	the	Commission	for	how	NCAs	should	interpret	
and	apply	competition	law.	
	
Maher	and	Stefan	do	see	a	silver	lining	in	the	judgment.171	A	benefit	of	the	judgment	is	
clearer	jurisdictional	relationships	–	the	Commission	and	NCAs;	and	the	Court	of	Justice	
and	national	courts.		However,	this	is	a	trade‐off	between	legal	certainty	‐	knowing	the	
narrow	definition	of	court	for	Art	267	purposes	‐	and	uniform	application	–	the	same	
system	for	all	competition	enforcement	agents.	Most	importantly,	in	practice	the	
jurisdictional	relationships	are	not	so	clearly	defined	if	one	also	takes	into	account	the	
other	communication	channels	in	the	EU	competition	enforcement	framework.	The	
Commission	is	not	leaving	national	courts	to	communicate	with	the	CJEU,	but	is	cultivating	
is	own	interaction	with	them,	as	shown	in	the	following	chapter.	There	are	asymmetric	
dual	channels	interpreting	EU	law.	
	
                                                 
170 C-52/07 Kanal 5 Ltd and TV 4 AB v Föreningen Svenska Tonsättares Internationella Musikbyrå 
(STIM) upa [2008] ECR I-9275  on copyright management by collecting societies 
171 I Maher & O Ştefan ‘Competition Law in Europe: The Challenge of a Network Constitution’ in D 
Oliver, T Prosser & R Rawlings (eds) The Regulatory State: Constitutional Implications (OUP, 2010), 
178-199, 193 
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7.	Conclusions	
	
This	chapter	has	considered	the	diagonal	relationship	between	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	
European	Union	and	national	competition	authorities.	It	considered	the	context	of	the	
post‐2004	system,	in	particular	multiple	enforcers	in	both	public	and	private	enforcement;	
the	challenge	of	consistent	application	of	antitrust	rules	in	decentralised	enforcement;	and	
the	quasi‐judicial	nature	of	competition	enforcement	undertaken	by	these	multiple	
enforcers.	Under	Article	35	Regulation	1/2003,	Member	States	can	decide	the	appropriate	
institutional	structures	for	public	enforcement	of	competition	law.	The	chapter	explored	
Member	States’	institutional	choices	and	the	consequences	of	being	designated	a	court	or	
an	agency	with	respect	to	obligations	under	Reg	1/2003.		
	
Then	the	discussion	turned	from	the	designation	of	courts	or	administrative	agencies	as	
competition	authorities	at	the	national	level,	to	the	criteria	in	the	EU’s	autonomous	
definition	of	a	‘court	or	tribunal’	for	the	purposes	of	the	preliminary	reference	procedure.	
These	criteria	are	important	for	determining	which	national	bodies	have	access	to	the	
CJEU’s	advice	and	interpretation	of	the	law.	Of	particular	relevance	are	the	need	for	the	
referring	body	to	have	an	inter	partes	procedure	i.e.	to	be	a	third	party	adjudicator	
between	the	parties,	to	be	independent,	and	to	have	compulsory	jurisdiction	leading	to	a	
decision	of	a	judicial	nature.		
	
The	chapter	analysed	the	Syfait	case	in	which	the	Hellenic	Competition	Commission,	as	a	
competition	authority	with	integrated	investigative	and	adjudicative	functions,	addressed	
a	reference	to	the	CJEU	but	was	ultimately	refused.	The	analysis	focused	on	the	CJEU’s	
interpretation	of	the	independence	criterion	and	on	the	Court’s	reasoning	that	the	
Commission	can	always	potentially	take	a	case	away	from	the	NCA	under	Article	11(6)	
Regulation	1/2003,	so	that	its	proceedings	may	not	lead	to	a	final	decision	of	judicial	
decision.	In	practice	this	could	bar	references	from	all	NCAs	since	they	are	all	subject	to	
Art	11(6)	within	the	European	Competition	Network.	The	chapter	argued	that	Art	11(6)	
should	not	bar	NCAs,	since	their	proceedings	are	always	initially	intended	to	lead	to	a	final	
decision	of	a	judicial	nature.	The	Commission	has	never	activated	Art	11(6).	In	addition,	
according	to	Art	35(4)	Regulation	1/2003,	the	effects	of	Art	11(6)	only	extend	to	the	
prosecuting	authority.	However,	even	if	legally	we	can	argue	for	the	Court	accepting	
preliminary	references	from	NCAs,	the	message	sent	in	Syfait	has	effectively	frozen	them	
and	the	Court	has	curtailed	its	own	jurisdiction.		
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There	is	certainly	a	bias	towards	dualist	NCAs	i.e.	those	which	separate	their	investigative	
and	decision‐making	functions.	Integrated	monist	NCAs	have	an	extra	hurdle	to	overcome	
because	they	do	not	have	the	structural	separation	of	functions	required	to	meet	the	
independence	requirement.	As	a	result	they	do	not	have	the	same	opportunity	to	seek	
guidance	from	the	CJEU.		
	
It	is	understandable	that	the	Court	uses	the	definition	of	a	court	of	tribunal	as	an	
instrument	for	controlling	its	own	workload.		If	the	General	Court,	or	a	dedicated	
competition	tribunal,	is	eventually	granted	jurisdiction	to	hear	preliminary	references,	this	
may	be	an	opportunity	for	loosening	the	admissibility	requirements.	While	this	may	lead	
to	a	more	coherent	system	for	competition	law,	there	are	implications	for	the	wider	
coherence	of	EU	law	as	a	whole.	This	raises	the	broader	question	of	whether	the	CJEU’s	
preliminary	ruling	jurisdiction	is	divisible.	
	
In	refusing	to	allow	the	participation	of	domestic	authorities	with	essentially	
administrative	characteristics	in	a	dialogue	that	the	law	intended	clearly	to	take	place	
exclusively	between	judges	(De	Coster),	the	Court	is	restricting	its	own	influence	in	the	
interpretation	of	EU	competition	law.	While	the	CJEU	preserves	its	dialogue	with	courts,	it	
excludes	NCAs	with	integrated	functions.	Responsibility	for	interpretation	falls	to	the	
Commission	in	the	context	of	the	European	Competition	Network.	Meanwhile,	the	
European	Commission	is	extending	its	sphere	of	influence	by	strengthening	its	links	with	
national	courts.	This	includes	intervening	in	national	court	proceedings	to	elucidate	its	
interpretation	of	the	law,	as	seen	in	the	following	chapter.	
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CHAPTER	4:	EUROPEAN	COMMISSION	INTERVENTION	IN	NATIONAL	COURT	
PROCEEDINGS1	
	
1.	Introduction	
	
The	previous	chapter	explored	the	diagonal	relationship	between	the	Court	of	Justice	of	
the	European	Union	and	administrative	authorities	designated	as	national	competition	
authorities.	It	found	that	the	Court	of	Justice	limits	its	own	jurisdiction	and	influence	in	the	
interpretation	of	EU	competition	law	by	excluding	national	competition	authorities	from	
access	to	the	preliminary	reference	procedure.	In	its	Syfait	judgment	on	the	admissibility	
of	the	Hellenic	Competition	Commission’s	reference,	the	Court	effectively	handed	over	
responsibility	for	interpretation	of	the	law	to	the	European	Commission	in	the	context	of	
the	European	Competition	Network.		In	this	way	the	CJEU	preserves	the	preliminary	
reference	procedure	as	a	dialogue	between	courts,	notwithstanding	the	quasi‐judicial	
functions	of	national	competition	authorities.		
	
This	chapter	now	contrasts	that	diagonal	relationship	with	the	one	between	the	European	
Commission,	as	administrative	supranational	authority	with	quasi‐judicial	functions,	and	
national	courts.	While	the	CJEU	has	restricted	its	own	jurisdiction,	meanwhile	since	the	
2004	reforms	the	European	Commission	has	extended	its	sphere	of	influence	by	
strengthening	its	links	with	national	courts.	This	includes	intervening	in	national	court	
proceedings	to	elucidate	its	interpretation	of	the	law.	As	such,	there	are	asymmetric	dual	
channels	for	opinions	on	the	interpretation	of	EU	law.		The	Commission	is	not	leaving	
national	courts	to	communicate	with	the	CJEU,	but	is	cultivating	its	own	interaction	with	
them,	as	shown	in	this	chapter.		
	
Previously,	the	Court	of	Justice’s	general	preliminary	reference	procedure	was	the	only	
formal	mechanism	to	address	potential	divergent	application	of	EU	law	among	the	
national	courts	of	the	Member	States.	This	chapter	addresses	how	the	European	
                                                 
1 A version of this chapter was published as	K Wright ‘The European Commission’s Own ‘Preliminary 
Reference Procedure’ in Competition Cases?’ (2010) 16(6) European Law Journal 736-759. An earlier 
version of the ideas and the case table appeared in K Wright ‘European Commission Opinions to National 
Courts in Antitrust Cases: Consistent Application and the Judicial-Administrative Relationship’ (2008) 
ESRC Centre for Competition Policy working paper 08-24. A more detailed version of the section on 
admissibility of European Commission interventions in national court proceedings was published as K 
Wright ‘European Commission Interventions as Amicus Curiae in National Competition Cases: the 
Preliminary Reference in X BV’ (2009) 30(7) European Competition Law Review 309-313. Between the 
submission of the thesis and the viva voce examination two further cases of Art 15(3) interventions came 
to light: 161/2012 Tessenderlo Chemie v Belgische Staat in the Belgian Constitutional Court on 
20.12.2012 on tax deductibility of fines, with similar issues and outcome to the X BV case, and a Slovak 
case concerning a fine for abuse of a dominant position in the Supreme Court (see ECN Brief 05/2012, 
pp. 56-57). 
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Commission	has	added	to	this	general	institutional	link	through	the	specific	amicus	curiae	
instrument	of	opinions	and	own‐initiative	interventions	to	national	courts	in	competition	
cases,	under	Art	15	Reg	1/2003.	Given	that	national	civil	courts	are	not	involved	in	the	
European	Competition	Network	(except	where	designated	competition	authorities	for	the	
purposes	of	public	enforcement),	Art	15	is	designed	as	a	tool	to	minimise	divergent	
application	of	the	competition	rules	following	decentralisation	of	enforcement.	Under	
Article	15(1),	EU	Member	State	courts	may	ask	the	European	Commission	for	its	opinion	
on	questions	relating	to	the	application	of	the	EU	antitrust	rules.	This	could	therefore	be	
described	as	the	European	Commission’s	own	‘preliminary	reference	procedure’.		There	
are	dual	channels	for	advice	for	national	courts	in	competition	law	cases	–	through	the	
Commission,	and	through	the	CJEU.	2	
	
Under	Article	15(3),	the	European	Commission	and	national	competition	authorities	may	
also	make	own‐initiative	written	interventions,	and	oral	submissions	with	the	permission	
of	the	judge,	in	legal	proceedings	between	private	parties.		Art	15(3)	allows	the	European	
Commission	to	intervene	on	issues	relating	to	Articles	101	or	102	TFEU	“where	the	
coherent	application	of	Article	[101]	or	[102	TFEU]	so	requires”.3	In	this	second	case,	the	
Commission’s	clear	purpose	is	to	influence	judicial	proceedings,	whether	at	the	request	of	
the	court	or	not.4	This	situation	calls	into	question	the	institutional	balance	at	the	
supranational	level	in	terms	of	the	respective	roles	of	the	Commission	and	the	Court	of	
Justice,	and	diagonally	in	terms	of	the	effect	on	national	judicial	autonomy.		
	
The	Commission’s	advice	is	formally	non‐binding.	In	a	number	of	cases,	the	Commission	
draws	attention	to	its	own	soft	law	instruments	such	as	notices	and	guidelines.		The	
Commission’s	authorship	of	soft	law	instruments	at	the	legislative	level	suggests	its	
primacy	over	interpretation	of	those	instruments	at	the	enforcement	level,	and	could	lend	
weight	to	its	intervention.	The	opinion	itself	is	a	soft	law	instrument.	Drawing	from	
Senden’s5	categorisation	of	such	instruments,	the	Commission’s	opinion	performs	a	‘post‐
law’	function,	interpreting	and	elucidating	existing	law.	However,	the	Commission’s	
                                                 
2 Even in C-234/89 Delimitis v Henninger Bräu [1991] ECR I-935, the CJEU had stated that “on the one 
hand” a court could request a preliminary ruling” and “on the other” could contact the Commission. 
(Summary judgment at [5]) 
3 Under the same provision national competition authorities may also intervene in their own Member 
State courts “on issues relating to the application of Article [101] or [102 TFEU]”. 
4 At the supranational level, Harlow asserts that the Commission appearing as amicus curiae to the CJEU 
in preliminary reference proceedings is “a strategy designed to enhance its position next to the Court”. C 
Harlow ‘Three Phases in the Evolution of EU Administrative Law’ in P Craig & G de Burca (eds) The 
Evolution of EU law, 2nd edn (OUP, 2011) 439-464,  449 
5 L Senden, ‘Soft Law and its Implications for Institutional Balance in the EC’ (2005) 1(2) Utrecht Law 
Review 79-99, 82 
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opinion	can	also	become	binding	through	the	national	court’s	judgment	if	the	national	
judge	in	effect	transposes	the	Commission’s	advice.	
	
The	attitude	and	receptiveness	of	the	judge	is	another	important	factor	in	the	impact	of	
the	Commission’s	opinion.	Clearly	the	judge	is	likely	to	be	more	receptive	where	s/he	has	
requested	the	opinion,	compared	to	when	the	Commission	intervenes	at	its	own	initiative.	
Therefore	this	chapter	seeks	to	investigate	the	incidence	of	the	Commission’s	
interventions,	and,	where	possible,	the	impact	on	national	judicial	decision‐making,	
against	this	theoretical	background	and	in	practice.	It	sets	out	a	detailed	presentation	of	
the	practice	that	is	emerging	in	the	post‐2004	regime	by	seeking	to	trace	all	the	cases	in	
which	the	European	Commission	has	provided	observations,	either	at	the	request	of	the	
national	judge	or	at	the	Commission’s	own	initiative.		This	information	is	currently	
incomplete	and	scattered	across	a	number	of	sources.	This	chapter’s	contribution	is	
therefore	to	present	a	more	coherent	and	up‐to‐date	account	of	the	practice	emerging	
under	Art	15,	as	well	as	placing	it	within	the	wider	theoretical	context.	This	should	make	
the	Commission’s	interventions	more	transparent.	Transparency	is	desirable	for	
legitimacy,	legal	certainty,	and	if	Commission	opinions	are	to	have	the	most	impact	for	
promoting	convergent	application	of	EU	antitrust	rules	among	national	judges.		
	
The	mechanism	of	Art	15	is	also	a	concrete	test	of	the	operation	of	interpretative	pluralism	
introduced	in	Chapter	2.	The	Commission’s	legal	advice	to	courts	is	stated	to	be	“without	
prejudice	to	the	interpretation	of	the	Court	of	Justice”,	which	is	the	ultimate	interpreter	of	
EU	law.	The	two	supranational	institutions	interpret	the	same	body	of	(EU)	law.	However,	
there	is	room	for	the	Commission	to	give	its	own	interpretation	of	the	CJEU’s	case	law	as	
well	as	its	own	soft	law	instruments.		To	what	extent	does	the	Commission	challenge,	or	
complement,	the	role	of	the	Court	of	Justice?	
	
	
1.1	Outline	of	the	chapter	
	
The	chapter	is	structured	as	follows.	First	it	sets	the	context	of	the	broader	relationship	
between	the	European	Commission	and	national	judges	in	EU	competition	law,	before	
describing	the	relevant	provisions	of	Regulation	1/2003	and	its	accompanying	Notice	on	
cooperation	between	the	Commission	and	national	courts	(the	Courts	Notice).6		Secondly	
it	introduces	Art	15	Reg	1/2003	as	a	tool	for	consistent	application	of	the	competition	
                                                 
6 Commission Notice of 27 April 2004 on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the 
EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, 54-64 (‘Courts 
Notice’) 
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rules	following	decentralised	enforcement.	This	draws	on	original	research	on	the	pre‐
legislative	history	on	Art	15.	The	third	section	investigates	the	legal	nature	of	the	
Commission	opinion	as	an	EU	instrument,	drawing	on	the	soft	law	literature.	Having	
explored	this	theoretical	context,	the	fourth	section	looks	at	how	Art	15	works	in	practice.	
Using	DG	Competition	and	national	competition	authority	Annual	Reports	and	DG	
Competition	and	national	court	databases,	I	seek	to	identify	and	trace	the	decisions	in	
which	the	Commission	has	delivered	opinions	(Art	15(1)).	In	each	case	I	aim	to	discover	in	
what	circumstances	national	judges	use	this	tool;	what	questions	were	asked	of	the	
Commission;	the	content	and	nature	of	the	Commission’s	advice,	for	example	purely	
factual,	economic	or	legal;	and	the	impact	of	the	Commission’s	opinion	on	the	judge	–	how	
closely	s/he	follows	it.	This	will	feed	into	a	discussion	on	the	relationship	with	and	
implications	for	the	judicial	preliminary	reference	procedure.		
	
I	then	investigate	cases	where	the	Commission	has	intervened	at	its	own	initiative	as	
amicus	curiae	under	Art	15(3),	its	reasons	for	doing	so,	and	how	the	national	court	dealt	
with	the	Commission’s	observations.	The	case	of	X	BV	warrants	particular	attention,	in	
which	a	national	court	requested	a	preliminary	ruling	from	the	CJEU	questioning	the	
admissibility	of	the	Commission’s	Art	15(3)	intervention.	The	CJEU’s	response	gives	the	
Commission	scope	to	intervene	in	a	national	court	case	related	to	the	effective	application	
of	Articles	101	and	102	TFEU,	even	if	the	court	is	not	directly	applying	them.	It	therefore	
affects	traditional	notions	of	judicial	independence	and	procedural	autonomy	(both	stated	
as	rationales	for	the	impossibility	of	a	network	of	national	courts).	First,	the	case	suggests	
an	emphasis	on	effective	–	not	only	coherent	‐	application	of	the	Community	rules,	over	
judicial	independence.	Second,	it	implies	that	a	Commission	intervention	could	extend	to	
national	cases	concerning,	for	example,	contract	disputes,	follow‐on	damages	actions,	or	
criminal	proceedings	‐	intervention	not	initially	intended	by	Regulation	1/2003.		
	
I	find	23	opinions	under	Art	15(1)	and	9	interventions	under	Art	15(3),	with	varying	
degrees	of	success	in	identifying	the	parties	and	how	the	opinion	was	dealt	with	by	the	
national	court.		
	
	
2.	Relationship	between	the	European	Commission	and	national	judges	in	the	
application	of	EU	antitrust	rules	
	
Regulation	1/2003	decentralised	the	enforcement	of	EU	antitrust	rules	as	laid	down	in	
Articles	101	and	102	TFEU.	National	courts	and	competition	authorities	can	directly	apply	
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these	provisions,	including	the	possibility	to	assess	whether	conduct	falls	under	the	
exempting	conditions	of	Article	101(3),	previously	within	the	exclusive	jurisdiction	of	the	
European	Commission.	The	absence	of	a	network	with	formal	rules	for	judicial	
cooperation7	emphasises	the	importance	of	the	provisions	in	the	Courts	Notice	and	of	the	
existing	case	law	of	the	Union	Courts.		
	
Following	the	general	principle	of	primacy	of	Union	law	famously	established	in	the	Costa	
v	ENEL	case8,	in	the	competition	policy	field	Walt	Wilhelm9	confirmed	the	precedence	of	
European	competition	law	where	there	was	a	conflict	with	national	competition	law.		It	
required	a	national	authority	to	take	“proper	account”	of	a	Commission	decision	or	to	take	
“appropriate	measures”	while	the	Commission’s	investigation	was	still	in	progress.	This	
obligation	was	strengthened	in	later	case	law,	as	outlined	below.	BRT	v	SABAM10	
established	the	direct	applicability	of	Article	101	TFEU	(and	102	TFEU	by	analogy)	in	
individual	cases,	implying	that	they	confer	rights	on	individuals	which	national	courts	
must	protect.	The	CJEU	reaffirmed	this	more	recently	and	concretely	in	Courage	v	
Crehan11,	by	recognising	the	right	to	damages	to	compensate	loss	as	a	result	of	breach	of	
the	Union	competition	rules.	From	a	procedural	perspective,	Van	Schijndel	concerns	when	
national	courts	should	raise	points	of	their	own	motion	which	have	not	been	raised	by	the	
parties	to	the	case.	If	domestic	law	confers	on	national	courts	a	discretion	to	apply	of	their	
own	motion	binding	rules	of	law,	they	must	also	apply	the	EU	competition	rules,	even	
when	the	party	with	an	interest	in	application	of	those	provisions	has	not	relied	on	them.	
However,	“Union	law	does	not	require	national	courts	to	raise	of	their	own	motion	an	
issue	concerning	the	breach	of	provisions	of	Union	law	where	examination	of	that	issue	
would	oblige	them	to	abandon	the	passive	role	assigned	to	them	by	going	beyond	the	
ambit	of	the	dispute	defined	by	the	parties	themselves.”12	
	
In	the	interests	of	consistent	enforcement	of	EU	competition	law	throughout	the	Union,	
and	of	the	effective	protection	of	Union	rights,	Article	3	of	Regulation	1/2003	encapsulates	
a	convergence	rule,	meaning	that	national	competition	rules	may	not	lead	to	a	different	
                                                 
7 There are fora such as the Association of European Competition Law Judges and the European Judicial 
Training Network. The Commission provides funding for training judges in developments in EU 
competition law and assessing economic evidence – see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/training.html  (accessed 3.8.2010). 
8 Case 6/64 Costa v Enel [1964] ECR 585 
9 Case C-14/68 Walt Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1 
10 Case C-127/73 Belgische Radio en Televisie and Société Belges des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs 
de Musique v SV SABAM and NV Fonior [1974] ECR 51 
11 Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297. Since Regulation 1.2003 came into force, 
the CJEU followed up in joined Cases C-295/04-C-298/04 Manfredi and Others v Lloyd Adriatico 
Assicurazioni SpA and Others [2006] ECR I-6619 
12 Courts Notice, [3] citing joined cases C-430/93 & C-431/93 Van Schijndel [1995] ECR I-4705, at 13-
15, 22 
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outcome	than	that	of	EU	competition	law	where	there	is	an	effect	on	trade	between	
Member	States.	It	also	builds	on	the	principle	of	parallel	application	already	established	in	
Walt	Wilhelm.	Where	a	national	court	applies	national	competition	laws	to	practices	
within	the	meaning	of	Article	101	and	102	which	may	affect	trade	between	Member	
States,	it	must	also	apply	Article	101	and	102.	If	an	agreement,	decision	or	practice	is	not	
prohibited	under	Article	101,	the	court	cannot	apply	stricter	national	rules	to	prohibit	it	
(but	it	may	apply	stricter	rules	than	Article	102	on	unilateral	conduct),	and	it	may	not	
allow	a	practice	which	is	prohibited	by	Article	101	or	102.	In	this	way	Reg	1/2003	partly	
codifies	existing	case	law.	
	
Delimitis	had	ruled	that	“conflicting	decisions	[by	national	courts	against	those	envisaged	
by	the	Commission]	would	be	contrary	to	the	general	principle	of	legal	certainty	and	must,	
therefore,	be	avoided.’”13	In	line	with	that	ruling	and	with	Masterfoods,14	Article	16(1)	Reg	
1/2003	states	that	in	situations	of	consecutive	application	of	the	competition	rules	by	
codifying	that	where	national	courts	rule	on	agreements,	decisions	or	practices	under	
Article	101	or	102	of	the	Treaty	which	are	already	the	subject	of	a	Commission	decision,	
they	cannot	take	decisions	running	counter	to	that	adopted	decision.15	In	cases	of	
concurrent	application,	that	is,	if	the	Commission	is	contemplating	a	decision	and	a	
national	court	is	also	dealing	with	the	matter,	the	national	court	must	‘avoid’	adopting	a	
decision	that	would	conflict	with	the	Commission’s.16	NCAs	have	a	lesser	obligation,	as	
they	are	only	bound	by	existing,	not	envisaged	decisions	(Article	16(2)),	likely	because	
they	are	subject	to	closer	coordination	with	the	Commission	through	the	European	
Competition	Network.		
	
According	to	Advocate	General	Cosmas	in	Masterfoods,	there	is	no	risk	of	conflict	where	
the	proceedings	dealt	with	by	the	Commission	and	the	national	court	are	not	‘completely	
identical.’17	Following	the	CJEU’s	Courage	v	Crehan	judgment	mentioned	above,	Crehan	
asserted	his	right	to	damages	in	the	English	courts.	In	Inntrepreneur	v	Crehan,18	the	House	
of	Lords	interpreted	the	Advocate	General’s	Masterfoods	statement	as	meaning	that	there	
                                                 
13 Case C-234/89 Delimitis v Henninger Bräu [1991] ECR I-935 [47] 
14 Case C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000] ECR I-11369 [60] 
15 The original proposal said “Member States shall use every effort to avoid any decision that conflicts 
with decisions adopted by the Commission.” (emphasis added). In the drafting negotiations, one Member 
State requested the insertion of ‘insofar as the facts of the case are the same’ – see Council document 
5158/01 of 11 January 2001, interinstitutional file 2000/0243 (CNS): Note from the General Secretariat of 
the Council of Ministers to national delegations. 
16 See A Komninos, ‘Effect of Commission Decisions on Private Antitrust Litigation: Setting the Story 
Straight’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 1387-1428 for discussion of the impact of a 
Commission decision on national proceedings in various scenarios. 
17 Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas delivered on 16 May 2000 in Masterfoods, at [16] 
18 Inntrepreneur Pub Company and Others v Crehan [2006] UKHL 38 
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was	a	requirement	to	accept	the	factual	basis	of	a	decision	reached	by	a	Union	institution	
only	when	the	specific	agreement,	decision	or	practice	before	the	national	court	has	also	
been	the	subject	of	a	Commission	decision,	involving	the	same	parties.19	In	Crehan,	Lord	
Hoffman	suggested	that	‘the	decision	of	the	Commission	is	simply	evidence	properly	
admissible	before	the	English	court	which,	given	the	expertise	of	the	Commission,	may	
well	be	regarded	by	that	court	as	highly	persuasive.’20	(emphasis	added).	This	could	be	
read	as	the	highest	national	court’s	reluctance	to	defer	to	an	administrative	agency.	On	the	
other	hand,	the	expertise	of	the	Commission	was	noted.	Lord	Hoffman,	rebuffing	the	Court	
of	Appeal’s	reasoning,	explicitly	stated	that	‘deference’	was	not	an	appropriate	concept	for	
a	court	exercising	concurrent	jurisdiction	with	the	Commission	in	the	post‐2004	system.		
	
There	are	also	conflicting	attitudes	in	other	Member	States.21		In	Rutamur,22	the	Madrid	
Audiencia	Provincial	(appeal	court)	ruled	that	the	criteria	laid	down	by	DG	COMP	for	
determining	agency	agreements	were	not	binding	on	national	courts	in	civil	disputes.	
Similarly,	nor	were	the	determinations	of	the	Tribunal	de	Defensa	de	la	Competencia	(part	
of	the	Spanish	NCA)	as	it	is	not	a	real	Tribunal,	but	a	mere	administrative	body.23	
Conversely	in	another	case,	a	first	instance	court	referred	to	and	followed	Masterfoods,	
and	even	referred	to	a	Commission	opinion	given	in	a	different	case.24	As	will	be	seen	
                                                 
19 That case concerned the Commission’s finding of fact (foreclosed market) in previous decisions 
involving beer ties in the same market. According to Art 288 TFEU “A decision which specifies those to 
whom it is addressed shall be binding only on them.” One of the difficulties with the Inntrepreneur v 
Crehan case was precisely that the Commission had never taken a final decision on whether or not 
Crehan’s specific agreement infringed Article [101(1)]. Once the European Commission noted that 
Crehan’s damages claim was pending in the English courts, it suspended its concurrent investigation and 
in effect referred the case to the domestic courts. There was no Community interest in the Commission 
continuing its proceedings, and as such the national judge was in fact respecting the Commission by 
making his own ruling on the matter. Additionally, the House of Lords judgment determined that there 
was no obligation to stay the proceedings or adopt interim measures, for example suspending national 
proceedings to seek a preliminary reference from the European Court of Justice – it was only “well 
advised” – Advocate General Van Gerven in C-128/92 H J Banks & Co Ltd v British Coal Corporation 
[1994] ECR I-1209, at [61]. 
20 Inntrepreneur v Crehan at [69] 
21 E.g. Case 1235/2004 L'Andana y Estaciones de Servicio L'Andana v REPSOL, Spanish Supreme Court, 
23.12.2004, reported in H Brokelmann	‘Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC under Regulation 1/2003: 
The Case of Spain and Portugal’ (2006) 29(4) World Competition 535-554, 552 
22 Judgment No. 368/05 of 5 July 2005 handed down by Audiencia Provincial of Madrid Section 21º. 
Rutamur SA/Repsol Comercial de Productos Petrolíferos SA 
23 P Ibáñez Colomo ‘A Spanish Court considers a distribution contract to be a “genuine” agency 
agreement therefore not caught by Art. 81.1 EC (Rutamur / Repsol)’ 5.7.2005, e-Competitions, N°326, 
www.concurrences.com. See also H Brokelmann	‘Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC under 
Regulation 1/2003: The Case of Spain and Portugal’ (2006) 29(4) World Competition 535-554, 552: 
“Some courts even expressly declare that they are not bound by precedents of the [Tribunal de Defensa de 
la Competencia] or the Commission…arguing that these are mere administrative bodies whose decisions 
are subject to judicial review. Others declare that they are not bound by judgments of courts of other 
branches that their civil branch and not even by rulings of the ECJ…”  
24 Judgment No. 14/05 of 22 March 2005 handed down by Juzgado de lo Mercantil No. 2 of Madrid 
Gebe/ BP Oil España, reported in P Ibáñez Colomo, ‘A Spanish Tribunal finds that a distribution 
agreement may not be a 'genuine' agency agreement and thus may fall within the scope of Art. 81.1 EC 
(Gebe / BP Oil España)’, 22 March 2005, e-Competitions, N°23, www.concurrences.com 
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below,	there	have	been	a	number	of	requests	for	an	opinion	from	Spain	on	nullity	of	
agreements	between	service	stations	and	their	oil	company	suppliers.	There	may	be	so	
many	requests	because	of	the	uncertainty	or	disagreements	about	the	precise	obligation	to	
follow	Commission	findings	or	decisions.25	
	
In	the	Treaty,	the	only	direct	institutional	link	between	the	national	courts	and	the	
European	institutions	is	their	relationship	with	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	
through	the	preliminary	reference	procedure	under	Article	267	TFEU,	where	a	court	asks	
for	a	ruling	on	the	interpretation	of	the	Treaty	or	other	legislative	acts.	The	Commission,	
historically	the	primary	enforcer	of	competition	law	in	the	EU,	has	therefore	attempted	to	
complement	the	formal	judicial	link	of	the	preliminary	reference	procedure	with	a	parallel	
strengthening	of	its	own	relations	with	the	national	courts.26	These	cooperation	
instruments	are	based	on	the	principle	of	loyal	cooperation	between	the	European	
institutions	and	the	Member	States	in	achieving	the	objectives	of	the	Treaty,	deriving	from	
Article	10	EC	(now	Article	4(3)	TEU)	and	giving	rise	to	an	obligation	of	mutual	assistance.	
This	is	acknowledged	in	paragraph	15	of	the	Courts	Notice:	‘…Article	10	EC	…	implies	that	
the	Commission	must	assist	national	courts	when	they	apply	Community	law	[Delimitis].	
Equally,	national	courts	may	be	obliged	to	assist	the	Commission	in	the	fulfilment	of	its	
tasks	[Roquette	Freres27].’	Delimitis	had	already	recognised	the	Commission’s	duty	to	
loyally	cooperate	with	Member	States	under	Article	10	EC	by	providing	requested	
“economic	and	legal”	information	to	them,	in	a	forerunner	to	Art	15(1)	Reg	1/2003.28	
	
	
3.	Article	15	of	Regulation	1/2003	as	a	tool	for	consistent	application	of	the	rules	
	
Under	Regulation	1/2003,	the	Commission	may	become	involved	in	a	national	court	case	
in	a	number	of	ways:	by	transmitting	information;	by	giving	an	opinion	(both	under	Article	
15(1));	or	by	submitting	written	or	oral	observations	at	its	own	initiative	(15(3)).	The	
possibility	of	asking	for	a	Commission	opinion	had	been	included	in	the	superseded	1993	
                                                 
25 C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd (t/a Mars Ireland) v HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000] ECR I-11369 [60] 
– discussed in greater length in chapter 5 
26 Recital 21 of Regulation 1/2003 recognises that: “Consistency in the application of the competition 
rules …requires that arrangements be established for cooperation between the courts of the Member 
States and the Commission. This is relevant for all courts of the Member States that apply Articles [101] 
and [102] of the Treaty, whether applying these rules in lawsuits between private parties, acting as public 
enforcers or as review courts...” 
27 Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères SA v Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la 
répression des fraudes [2002] ECR 9011 [31] 
28 Delimitis [53]; see also Case C-2/88 Zwartveld [1990] ECR I-3365, [18] 
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Courts	Notice,	where	it	was	characterised	as	an	‘interim	opinion’	giving	‘useful	guidance’.29	
The	own‐initiative	intervention,	which	the	commission	calls	an	‘amicus	curiae’	
intervention,	is	a	novel	development.	
	
Article	15(1)	provides	that		‘In	proceedings	for	the	application	of	Article	101	or	Article	102	
of	the	Treaty,	courts	of	the	Member	States	may	ask	the	Commission	to	transmit	to	them	
information	in	its	possession	or	its	opinion	on	questions	concerning	the	application	of	the	
Community	competition	rules.’	Paragraphs	27‐30	of	the	current	Courts	Notice	elaborate	
on	the	principles	and	procedure	to	be	followed.	In	the	spirit	of	the	independence	of	the	
courts,	the	Commission	should	not	consider	the	merits	of	case	before	the	national	court.		It	
should	assist	the	court	in	a	neutral	manner	‐	it	is	not	involved	in	the	inter	partes	element	of	
the	case	and	may	not	consult	the	parties	before	formulating	its	opinion.	30	In	apparently	
safeguarding	the	independence	of	the	Court	by	not	hearing	the	parties,	this	may	leave	the	
national	court’s	decision,	or	the	Commission	opinion	itself,	open	to	challenge.	This	is	
relevant	at	two	stages:	first,	when	the	judge	decides	whether	to	request	an	opinion	and	
how	that	request	is	drafted,	and	secondly,	after	the	national	judge	receives	the	
Commission’s	intervention.	As	the	process	may	not	be	in	front	of	the	parties,	the	national	
court	may	rely	on	the	Commission’s	opinion	without	cross‐examination.	As	such,	the	
rights	of	the	defendant	to	a	fair	trial	could	be	unduly	restricted.31	A	judge	might	consider	
the	Commission’s	opinion	in	chambers	rather	than	in	open	court.	The	parties	may	not	
have	an	opportunity	to	challenge	the	facts	which	the	national	court	presents	to	the	
Commission	in	its	request	or	the	circumstances	upon	which	the	Commission	bases	its	
opinion.	Whether	this	would	raise	concerns	for	the	parties’	rights	would	depend	upon	how	
the	Commission’s	opinion	is	dealt	with	in	the	national	proceedings,	that	is	how	much	
weight	the	national	judge	accords	to	it,	and	whether	there	are	sufficient	procedural	
safeguards.	Given	that	the	Regulation	does	not	provide	for	a	procedural	framework,	courts	
must	deal	with	the	Commission's	opinion	in	accordance	with	the	relevant	national	
procedural	rules,	while	respecting	the	general	principles	of	Union	law,	in	particular	the	
principles	of	effectiveness	and	equivalence,	invoked	in	paragraph	35	of	the	Courts	notice.	
Applying	the	principle	of	equivalence,	in	Member	States	where	the	parties	have	rights	to	
be	heard	on	the	interventions	of	NCAs,	they	should	also	have	the	right	to	respond	to	
                                                 
29 Commission Notice of 13 February 1993 on cooperation between national courts and the Commission 
in applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, OJ C 39, 6. 
30 If the Commission has been “contacted by any of the parties in the case pending before the court on 
issues which are raised before the national court, it will inform the national court thereof, independent of 
whether these contacts took place before or after the national court’s request for cooperation.” Courts 
Notice [19] 
31 B Francis, ‘Subsidiarity and Antitrust: the Enforcement of European Competition Law in the National 
Courts of Member States’, (1995) 27 Law and Policy of International Business 247-276, 272. Although 
this article relates to the superseded 1993 Courts Notice, the author’s observation still holds. 
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submissions	of	the	Commission.32	For	example,	in	France	where	a	court	requests	an	
opinion	from	the	Competition	Authority	it	may	only	give	that	opinion	after	hearing	the	
parties	(Article	L462‐3	Code	du	Commerce).	Similarly	in	the	Netherlands,	the	parties	have	a	
right	to	respond	to	submissions	of	competition	authorities.		
	
Closely	linked	is	the	question	of	the	opinion’s	evidentiary	status	in	the	relevant	national	
procedural	law.	It	has	been	suggested	that	under	some	Member	States’	procedural	law	it	
could	be	deemed	hearsay	or	inadmissible	opinion.33	Alternatively,	it	could	have	the	status	
of	expert	evidence	subject	to	cross‐examination	by	the	parties.	Van	der	Wal	states	that	
where	the	Commission		‘…acts	as	a	legal	or	economic	adviser	to	the	national	court	…	
documents	drafted	in	the	exercise	of	that	function	must	be	subject	to	national	procedural	
rules	in	the	same	way	as	any	other	expert	report.’34		
	
In	terms	of	procedure,	the	opinion	is	drafted	by	the	European	Competition	Network	unit,	
A‐4,	in	the	Directorate‐General	for	Competition	(DG	COMP)	unless	a	related	investigation	
is	on‐going	elsewhere,	when	it	will	be	referred	to	the	relevant	department.	The	unit	
formally	consults	the	European	Commission	Legal	Service	before	giving	the	opinion.35	The	
Courts	Notice	sets	the	Commission	a	target	deadline	of	four	months	in	which	to	provide	
the	opinion.	For	transparency,	the	Commission	stated	that	it	intended	to	post	its	opinions	
on	DG	COMP’s	website	once	it	had	received	a	copy	of	the	final	national	court	judgment	in	
the	case	as	required	under	Article	15(2)	of	Regulation	1/2003,	as	long	as	there	was	no	
legal	impediment	presented	by	national	procedural	rules.36	However,	to	date	it	has	posted	
only	five	opinions	–	three	to	the	Brussels	Court	of	Appeal,	one	to	the	Swedish	Supreme	
                                                 
32 National positions are available in the ECN convergence survey as at 14 April 2008: ‘ECN Working 
Group on Cooperation Issues - Results of the questionnaire on the reform of Member States’ national 
competition laws after EC Regulation No. 1/2003.’ In response to question 13 – ‘Does (or will) your 
national law include provisions to facilitate the use of Art 15.3?’- five Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Italy, Malta, Luxembourg) stated they were not intending to voluntarily introduce national law to 
facilitate amicus curiae interventions by NCAs and the Commission. Amendments were under 
consideration in Portugal and Slovenia, and the others had provisions through intervention of the NCA. In 
some cases, present rules were deemed sufficient (eg Austria), in Cyprus the Supreme Court would issue 
a Procedural Order, in the Czech Republic there were no specific rules but amicus interventions were 
possible according to the code of civil procedure. Denmark, Finland and Spain confirmed that there was 
no specific rule on the operation of Article 15(3), but there was no legal obstacle to its application. 
33 B Francis, ‘Subsidiarity and Antitrust: the Enforcement of European Competition Law in the National 
Courts of Member States’, (1995) 27 Law and Policy of International Business 247-276, 272 
34 Joined cases C-174/98P & C89/98P Van der Wal and the Netherlands v Commission [2000] ECRI-1, at 
[45] 
35 Interview with a DG COMP official on the European Competition Network, 13.7.2006, Brussels 
36 European Commission Annual Report on Competition Policy 2005, SEC(2006)761 final, 15.6.2006, 
74, para 221. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2005/en.pdf   
(accessed 2.8.2010) 
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Court	and	one	to	the	Supreme	Administrative	Court	of	Lithuania.37	These	and	other	cases	
in	which	opinions	were	issues	are	considered	in	more	detail	below.	
	
To	facilitate	the	monitoring	of	the	application	of	EU	antitrust	rules	throughout	the	
Community,	Article	15(2)	requires	Member	States	to	forward	to	the	Commission	a	copy	of	
any	written	judgment	of	national	Courts	deciding	on	the	application	of	Articles	101	or	102	
TFEU,	“without	delay”	after	the	decision	has	been	communicated	to	the	parties.38	It	should	
be	noted	that	the	obligation	falls	on	the	Member	State	to	transmit	a	copy	of	a	judgment	to	
the	Commission,	rather	than	on	the	court	giving	judgment.39	In	practice	it	is	usually	the	
NCA	that	informs	the	Commission	of	a	case,	although	this	is	a	matter	for	national	law	and	
procedure.40	In	the	UK,	transmission	of	judgments	is	provided	for	in	the	Civil	Procedures	
Rules	EU	Competition	Law	Practice	Direction	(2004),	point	6.	Point	5.2	places	a	duty	on	
the	parties	to	proceedings	and	the	UK	competition	authorities	to	notify	the	court	at	any	
stage	of	the	proceedings	if	they	are	aware	that	the	European	Commission	has	adopted	or	is	
contemplating	a	decision	in	relation	to	the	proceedings	and	which	would	have	legal	
effects.41	In	other	Member	States,	the	national	provisions	have	also	undergone	reform	
clarifying	the	legal	channel	for	communication	of	court	judgments.42		
	
It	should	also	be	noted	that	the	obligation	to	notify	does	not	extend	to	decisions	by	
national	courts	not	to	apply	Articles	101	and	102	after	deliberation,	or	failing	to	consider	
                                                 
37 Opinion of the European Commission to Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas, administrative 
case number A502-337/2008 UAB Schneidersöhne Baltija/UAB Libra Vitalis of 9.9.2008; Opinion of the 
European Commission to the Högsta domstolen, case number T 2808-05 Danska Staten genom 
BornholmsTrafiken vYstad Hamn Logistik Aktiebola; Avis de la Commission européenne suite à la 
demande de la Cour d’appel de Bruxelles dans l’affaire 2004-MR-6 Laurent Emond contre Brasserie 
Haacht; Avis de la Commission européenne suite à la demande de la Cour d’appel de Bruxelles dans 
l’affaire 2004-MR-7 SABAM contre « Productions et Marketing » ; Avis de la Commission européenne 
suite à la demande de la Cour d’appel de Bruxelles dans l’affaire 2004-MR-8 Wallonie Expo SA/FEBIAC 
asbl, D000554, 2.2.2005, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_requests.html (last 
accessed  7.9.2012)  
38 See national court judgments database at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/elojade/antitrust/nationalcourts/index.cfm (accessed 2.8.2010) 
39 Such an obligation on courts was mooted in the drafting of Regulation 1/2003 – see Council document 
5158/01 of 11 January 2001, interinstitutional file 2000/0243 (CNS): Note from the General Secretariat of 
the Council of Ministers to national delegations. 
40 This channel of communication was partly modelled on the German system, section 90 of the Act 
Against Restraints on Competition (ARC), with the important difference that the ARC imposes a duty on 
the national court hearing a case between private parties which impacts on competition to inform the 
Federal Cartel Office. Section 90a ARC (7th amendment 2005) incorporates the provisions of Article 15 
Regulation 1/2003 itself into the German law. 
41 Practice Direction available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/contents/practice_directions/competitionlaw_pd.htm 
(accessed 2.8.2010)  
42 Supplement to European Commission Annual Report on Competition Policy 2005: Application of the 
EC competition rules by national courts, 100. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2005/report_supplement_20061113.pdf  
(accessed 2.8.2010) 
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the	possibility	of	effect	on	trade	between	Member	States	altogether	and	only	applying	
national	competition	rules.	
	
The	national	judge	should	ascertain	whether	the	Commission	has	initiated	a	procedure	in	
an	investigation	involving	the	same	parties	or	whether	it	has	already	taken	a	decision,	to	
conform	with	its	obligation	not	to	adopt	a	decision	counter	to	one	of	the	Commission.	In	
practice,	this	may	involve	the	NCA	in	that	Member	State.	In	addition,	there	may	be	follow‐
on	cases	for	damages	in	national	courts	resulting	from	the	finding	of	an	infringement	at	EU	
level.	To	account	for	this,	Article	15(1)	also	allows	for	national	courts	to	request	
documents	or	information	held	by	the	Commission	on	a	case.	The	indicative	deadline	for	
transmission	of	information	is	one	month,	shorter	than	the	four	months	foreseen	for	an	
opinion.	Any	exchange	of	information	is	subject	to	professional	secrecy	safeguards	under	
Article	339	TFEU	and	Article	28	Regulation	1/2003.	The	national	court	must	guarantee	the	
protection	of	confidential	information	–	if	it	is	not	able	to	make	this	guarantee,	the	
Commission	is	not	obliged	to	hand	over	information	or	documents:	see	Postbank,43	which	
affirmed	that	cooperation	between	the	Commission	and	Member	States	courts	must	not	
undermine	EU	guarantees	of	the	protection	of	business	secrets.	
	
For	the	purposes	of	the	trade‐off	between	effective	enforcement	of	EU	competition	law	
and	judicial	autonomy,	the	novel	development	of	Article	15(3),	elaborated	by	paragraphs	
32‐35	of	the	Courts	Notice,	is	more	interesting.	That	provision	allows	the	Commission	the	
possibility	of	making	submissions	on	its	own	initiative	in	cases	in	national	courts	either	
orally	or	in	writing		“where	the	coherent	application	of	Article	[101	or	102]	of	the	Treaty	
so	requires.’”	An	NCA	may	also	submit	observations	before	its	national	courts	“on	issues	
relating	to	the	application	of	Article	[101	or	102	TFEU]”.The	Commission	is	free	to	submit	
a	written	amicus	brief	to	the	national	court,	but	it	is	at	the	judge’s	discretion	to	admit	oral	
submissions	in	the	proceedings.	By	the	same	token,	an	NCA	may	submit	observations	
before	its	national	courts.	There	is	a	duty	for	intervention	to	be	facilitated	by	national	
rules:	Courts	notice	point	34:	“Since	the	regulation	does	not	provide	for	a	procedural	
framework	within	which	the	observations	are	to	be	submitted,	Member	States'	procedural	
rules	and	practices	determine	the	relevant	procedural	framework.	Where	a	Member	State	
has	not	yet	established	the	relevant	procedural	framework,	the	national	court	has	to	
determine	which	procedural	rules	are	appropriate	for	the	submission	of	observations	in	
the	case	pending	before	it.”	However,	the	Regulation	does	not	prescribe	the	precise	rules	
by	which	Member	States	should	implement	Article	15.	In	some	Member	States,	the	amicus	
curiae	concept	is	not	known	at	all.		
                                                 
43 Case T-353/94 Postbank v Commission [1996] ECR II-921  
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In	the	interests	of	consistent	application	of	the	competition	rules	and	to	avoid	conflicting	
opinions	in	the	same	case,	the	Courts	Notice	states	that	the	Commission	and	a	national	
competition	authority	should	inform	each	other	when	either	submits	observations	in	the	
form	of	an	amicus	curiae	brief	to	a	national	court.	Although	there	is	no	specific	measure	for	
this,	presumably	it	would	be	done	through	the	ECN.	Again,	there	is	no	notification	
obligation	on	the	national	court	itself.		
	
I	did	original	research	into	the	pre‐legislative	history	of	Article	15	to	discover	the	
motivation	for	including	the	amicus	curiae	provision.	The	Commission	staff	working	paper	
on	amicus	curiae	briefs44	characterises	private	parties	as	“private	enforcers	of	the	public	
interest”	when	they	bring	a	claim	before	a	national	court	under	Articles	101	and	102.	The	
Commission	intends	making	submissions	in	a	limited	number	of	cases,	and	it	envisages	
NCAs,	which	are	closer	to	the	national	courts	and	often	also	closer	to	the	facts	of	the	case,	
taking	a	leading	role	in	submissions	to	courts.45	The	staff	working	paper	notes	that	co‐
ordination	or	avoidance	of	conflicting	decisions	is	much	better	achieved	through	the	ECN	
(in	which	national	court	cases	would	only	become	indirectly	involved	through	NCAs).	In	
the	negotiations	on	the	drafting	of	Article	15	of	the	Regulation,	some	Member	States	had	
proposed	that	their	national	competition	authorities	act	as	intermediaries	between	the	
courts	and	the	Commission.46	However,	the	Commission	foresees	intervening	with	amicus	
briefs	“where	the	proper	interpretation	of	Commission	notices	or	guidelines	is	in	dispute	
or	where	the	Commission	brings	in	information	on	similar	issues	being	dealt	with	by	itself	
or	by	Member	States”.47		
	
In	the	staff	working	paper,	amicus	curiae	briefs	are	explicitly	stated	to	be	a	complement	to	
preliminary	references	under	Article	267	TFEU,	as	a	means	of	alerting	national	judges	to	
decisions	in	other	Member	State	courts	or	to	deal	with	new	points	of	law.48	The	
Commission	views	amicus	curiae	submissions	as	a	means	of	safeguarding	the	public	
interest.	Presumably	it	would	become	aware	of	a	case	either	through	the	ECN	–	an	
                                                 
44 Commission Staff Working Paper: Reform of Regulation 17 – The proposal for a new implementing 
regulation – Article 15(3) submissions as amicus curiae, SEC (2001) 1827, 13.11.2001 (submitted to the 
Council working group) 
45 ibid, [8] 
46 Document: 5158/01 Secretariat to delegations, 11 January 2001 (for: Germany, Denmark, Luxembourg, 
Austria, Sweden – but Denmark requests that in normal circumstances NCAs should represent the 
Commission in national court proceedings. Conversely Germany requests that NCAs submit observations 
independently and not as the representative of the Commission. Document: 8383/1/02 [Spanish] 
Presidency to COREPER, 27 May 2002: France requests that the Commission be authorised to make 
written observations to the national court only via the national competition authority. 
47 Commission Staff Working Paper: Reform of Regulation 17 – The proposal for a new implementing 
regulation – Article 15(3) submissions as amicus curiae, SEC (2001) 1827, 13.11.2001, 4, fn 4 
48 ibid, [10] 
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example	of	the	NCA	being	closer	to	the	facts,	as	mentioned	above	‐	or	where	the	Member	
State	has	submitted	a	copy	of	the	first	instance	decision	to	it,	as	required	to	do	under	
Article	15(2)	of	Regulation	1/2003.	Unlike	national	competition	authority	envisaged	
decisions,	national	court	judgments	do	not	have	to	be	notified	by	the	Member	State	until	
after	they	are	handed	down.	The	Commission	has	stated	that	it	would	tend	to	make	amicus	
submissions	at	appeal	stage,49	where	the	impact	on	consistency	is	likely	to	be	the	greatest.		
	
Under	15(3),	while	it	is	at	a	court’s	discretion	to	request	an	opinion	from	the	Commission	
or	to	permit	oral	submissions	in	a	case,	the	court	should	accept	written	submissions	as	
amicus	curiae	from	the	Commission	or	from	its	national	competition	authority.	
Nevertheless,	the	national	judge	alone,	subject	to	the	constraints	of	national	procedural	
law,	may	decide	how	much	weight	to	give	to	that	submission	as,	like	a	Commission	
opinion,	it	is	not	formally	binding.	Under	Art	15(1),	since	the	national	court	initiates	the	
request,	on	the	face	of	it	there	is	little	concern	about	judicial	autonomy.	However,	if	the	
judge	basically	transposes	the	Commission’s	opinion,	the	Commission	may	indirectly	
influence	the	case.50		
	
The	next	section	examines	the	legal	nature	and	possible	legal	effects	of	Commission	
opinions	more	generally.	
	
	
4.	Legal	nature	of	the	Commission	opinion	as	an	EU	instrument	
	
In	general	EU	law,	there	was	wide	discretion	for	the	Commission	to	issue	opinions	and	
recommendations	under	Article	211(2)	EC:		‘In	order	to	ensure	the	proper	functioning	and	
development	of	the	common	market,	the	Commission	shall…formulate	recommendations	
or	deliver	opinions	on	matters	dealt	with	in	this	Treaty,	if	it	expressly	so	provides	or	if	the	
Commission	considers	it	necessary.’	(emphasis	added)	There	is	no	equivalent	measure	in	
the	Lisbon	Treaty.	Article	288	TFEU	lays	down	the	hierarchy	of	legislative	acts,	and	states	
that	recommendations	and	opinions	shall	have	no	binding	force.	In	principle,	it	is	
therefore	up	to	Member	State	courts	to	decide	whether	to	take	account	of	them	in	
interpreting	Community	and	related	national	legislation.	However,	the	CJEU’s	judgment	in	
Grimaldi	goes	further,	at	least	in	its	treatment	of	recommendations:		“Recommendations	
                                                 
49 ibid, [22] 
50 See e.g. Comments of A Winckler in C-D Ehlermann & I Atanasiu (eds) European Competition Law 
Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, European University Institute (Hart, 
2003), 18: “French judges, for example, tend to take on board the Commission’s advice as if it were the 
very word of law.” 
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are	not	intended	to	produce	binding	effects,	and	therefore	they	cannot	create	rights	upon	
which	individuals	may	rely	before	a	national	court.	However,	the	national	courts	are	bound	
to	take	them	into	consideration	in	order	to	decide	disputes	submitted	to	them,	in	particular	
where	they	cast	light	on	the	interpretation	of	national	measures	adopted	in	order	to	
implement	them	or	where	they	are	designed	to	supplement	binding	Community	
provisions.”51	(emphasis	added)		
	
The	CJEU	therefore	recognises	that	while	an	instrument	may	not	have	binding	force,	it	
may	still	have	legal	significance.	In	this	context,	‘binding	Community	provisions’	would	
clearly	include	Articles	101	and	102	of	the	Treaty,	and	the	provisions	of	Regulation	
1/2003.	Whereas	the	Commission	had	non‐specific,	implicit	powers	to	issue	opinions	
under	Art	211	EC	(now	repealed)	“whenever	necessary”,	it	has	been	granted	explicit	
powers	to	deliver	opinions	through	Regulation	1/2003.	But	what	is	the	status	of	those	
opinions?			
	
From	a	purely	textual	approach	there	is	an	argument	that	the	binding	force	of	opinions	is	
analogous	to	that	of	recommendations,	as	they	are	mentioned	in	the	same	clause	of	Article	
288	TFEU.	However,	they	have	been	distinguished	based	on	their	origin,	addressee,	and	
content.	Whereas	recommendations	are	made	on	the	institutions’	own	initiative,	opinions	
are	usually	adopted	in	response	to	another	party’s	initiative	‐	as	in	Article	15(1),	at	the	
request	of	the	court.52	However,	the	national	court	does	not	have	a	specific	right	to	a	reply,	
and	the	Commission	has	a	certain	discretion	over	the	information	or	advice	it	imparts	–	
governed	by	First	and	Franex:	“if	a	national	court	needs	information	that	only	the	
Commission	can	provide,	the	principle	of	loyal	cooperation…will,	in	principle,	require	the	
Commission…to	provide	that	information	as	soon	as	possible,	unless	refusal	to	provide	
such	information	is	justified	by	overriding	reasons	relating	to	the	need	to	avoid	any	
interference	with	the	functioning	and	independence	of	the	Community	or	to	safeguard	its	
interests.”	53	(emphasis	added)		In	terms	of	content,	“recommendations	are	invitations	to	
take	certain	measures,	sometimes	accompanied	by	additional	provisions	of	a	procedural	
nature,”	whereas	opinions	are	“expressions	of	opinion	from	the	Commission	or	the	Council	
on	a	certain	factual	or	legal	situation.”54	Unlike	a	recommendation,	an	opinion	does	not	
function	as	an	alternative	to	legislation,55	but	tends	to	apply	to	a	specific	case.	
                                                 
51 Case C-322/88 Grimaldi v Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles [1989] ECR 4407, at [19] 
52 B Beutler and R Bieber, Die Europäische Union: Rechtsordnung und Politik (Nomos, 1993) 192-3, 
199, cited in L Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart, 2004), 161  
53 Case C-275/00 European Community v First NV and Franex NV [2002] ECR I-10943, at [49] 
54 H Smit and P Herzog, The Law of the European Community: A Commentary on the EEC Treaty, 
Volume 5, (Matthew Bender & Co, 2002), 629, cited in Senden (2004) 161-162 
55 Senden (2004), 161-162  
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If	opinions	have	no	binding	force,	but	nevertheless	courts	are	required	to	take	them	into	
consideration,	they	can	be	characterised	as	soft	law	instruments.	Soft	law	is	defined	as	
“rules	of	conduct	that	are	laid	down	in	instruments	which	have	not	been	attributed	legally	
binding	force	as	such,	but	nevertheless	may	have	certain	(indirect)	legal	effects,	and	that	
are	aimed	at	and	may	produce	practical	effects.”56	Senden	contends	that	individual	soft	
law	acts	may	be	capable	of	having	“incidental”	binding	force,	by	virtue	of	another	decision	
or	instrument.57	As	mentioned	above,	the	Courts	notice	(paragraph	27)	states	that	
Commission	opinions	can	be	sought	where	Regulations,	decisions,	notices,	and	guidelines	
(the	latter	two	themselves	soft	law	instruments)	do	not	offer	sufficient	guidance.	In	this	
way,	any	soft	binding	force	is	not	necessarily	dependent	on	one	of	these	Community	
instruments.	For	example,	the	advice	may	become	binding	through	the	national	judgment	
by	virtue	of	the	way	in	which	the	national	judge	uses	it	for	interpretation	of	other	
obligations	or	instruments.	Snyder	also	suggests	that	a	soft	law	act	could	become	binding	
if	one	of	the	parties	in	private	litigation	invokes	it.58		In	practice,	as	discussed	below,	in	a	
number	of	opinions	the	Commission	has	indicated	its	existing	notices	and	guidelines,	
previous	decisional	practice,	and	CJEU	case	law.	In	those	cases,	it	appears	not	to	be	
establishing	‘rules	of	conduct’	in	a	constitutive	way	but	clarifying	and	summarising	them	in	
a	declaratory	manner.		
	
As	Bast	notes,	“non‐binding	instruments	do	not	have	obligatory	force,	although	they	can	
indirectly	possess	such	a	force	in	conjunction	with	other	legal	norms,	in	particular	the	
principle	of	the	protection	of	legitimate	expectations.”59	Parties	to	the	dispute	before	the	
court	that	has	received	a	Commission	opinion	may	have	legitimate	expectations	
concerning	the	content	of	the	opinion.	Although	the	Commission	is	in	principle	not	to	go	
into	the	merits	of	the	case,	it	gives	strong	indications	of	the	factors	to	be	considered	and	
the	decisional	precedents	to	be	applied	‐	including	soft	law	instruments	like	notices	and	
guidelines,	which	could	themselves	become	binding	through	the	national	court’s	
judgment.	
	
The	question	arises	whether	opinions	to	national	courts	under	Regulation	1/2003	are	
really	opinions	as	understood	by	Article	288	TFEU.		Beyond	its	notice	on	cooperation	with	
                                                 
56 L Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart, 2004), 112, developed from F Snyder, ‘The 
Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques’ (1993) 56(1) 
Modern Law Review 19-54, 32: “rules of conduct which, in principle, have no legally binding force but 
which nevertheless may have practical effects.” 
57 Senden (2004), 236 
58 Snyder (1993), 33 
59 J Bast, ‘Legal Instruments’,  in A. Von Bogdandy and J. Bast, (eds), Principles of European 
Constitutional Law (Hart, 2006), 373-418,  409 
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national	courts	in	the	State	aid	field,60	there	appears	to	be	no	other	policy	area	where	the	
Commission	offers	an	opinion	in	national	judicial	proceedings.	The	opinion	to	a	national	
court	appears	to	be	a	sui	generis	instrument.	The	only	other	circumstances	in	which	
opinions	are	used	by	the	Commission	as	a	Community	legal	instrument	are	before	
adoption	of	national	legislation;	as	a	reasoned	opinion	on	own	or	third	party	initiative,	
usually	to	Member	States	before	infringement	proceedings	under	Article	258	TFEU;	and	
for	internal	purposes	in	the	legislative	decision‐making	process,	especially	under	the	co‐
decision	procedure.61		
	
To	my	knowledge,	none	of	the	opinions	to	national	courts	identified	below	have	been	
published	in	the	Official	Journal,	as	EU	instruments	are	required	to	be	under	the	Rules	of	
the	Procedure	of	the	Commission.62	This	shows	a	lack	of	transparency,	and	contrasts	with	
the	availability	of	the	preliminary	rulings	of	the	Court	of	Justice.	If	opinions	are	capable	of	
influencing	the	outcome	of	cases	in	national	courts,	there	is	an	argument	for	closer	
scrutiny.		Scott	notes	that	“…existing	case	law	operates	to	successfully	guard	against	the	
danger	that	the	Commission	might	seek	to	smuggle	in	new	legal	obligations	[in	post‐
legislative	guidance]	by	disguising	them	in	non‐binding	form.”63	The	test	for	whether	an	
act	is	challengeable	in	EU	law	is	that	it	has	binding	legal	effects	regardless	of	form,64	
bringing	about	a	distinct	change	in	applicant’s	legal	position.65		As	the	Commission	opinion	
in	this	context	is	explicitly	stated	to	be	non‐binding,	it	might	be	hard	to	show	that	an	
opinion	itself	had	such	binding	effects	separate	from	the	national	court	judgment.	The	fact	
that	DG	COMP	formally	consults	the	Commission	Legal	Service	before	giving	its	opinion	
does	however	imply	its	sensitivity	to	the	possibility	of	legal	consequences	arising.			
	
                                                 
60 Commission Notice on the enforcement of State aid law by national courts, OJ C 85, 9.4.2009, 
(especially Part 3), superseding Commission Notice on cooperation between national courts and the 
Commission in the State Aid field, O J C 312, 23.11.1995, 8. 
61 L Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart, 2004), 186-7; Craig and de Burca also discuss 
Commission opinions only in relation to comitology procedures, and to Member State infringement 
proceedings: P Craig and G de Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (OUP, 3rd edn, 2002) 397 et 
seq 
62 Rules of Procedure of the Commission, C (2000) 3614, OJ 2000 L 308, 8.12.2000, 26, as amended. 
Articles 17 [Secretary General] and 18 [Authentication of Commission instruments]: The Secretary 
General must ensure that all Community instruments mentioned in Article 249 EC [now 288 TFEU] are 
notified to those concerned and published in the Official Journal. 
63 J Scott ‘In Legal Limbo: Post-Legislative Guidance as a Challenge for European Administrative Law’ 
(2011) 48(2) Common Market Law Review 329-355, 344 
64 22/70 Commission v Council  (ERTA ) [1971] ECR 263; T-3/93 Air France v Commission [1994] ECR 
II-323 
65 60/81 IBM v Commission [1981] ECR 2639 
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If	we	categorise	EU	soft	law	instruments	according	to	their	function	‐	preparatory	and	
informative;	interpretative	and	decisional;	and	steering	instruments66	‐	Commission	
opinions	fit	most	comfortably	into	the	second	category.	As	Senden	notes,	the	Commission	
adopts	interpretative	notices	and	communications	of	general	application	giving	the	
Commission’s	opinion	on	how	EU	law	should	be	interpreted,	often	summarising	the	
European	courts’	case	law.	In	this	way,	they	have	a	‘post‐law’	function.67	Commission	
opinions	do	not	correspond	easily	with	the	definition	of	a	soft	law	instrument	establishing	
rules	of	conduct	in	Snyder’s	and	Senden’s	formulations.		In	addition,	they	apply	in	specific	
judicial	proceedings.	
	
This	interpretative	or	decisional	instrument	is	an	important	instance	of	the	concurrent	
powers	of	the	Commission	and	the	Court	of	Justice.	Senden	characterises	as	“concurrent	
powers”	arising	outside	the	area	of	decision‐making,	the	Commission’s	power	to	adopt	
interpretative	instruments	and	the	CJEU’s	power	to	interpret	Union	law.68		This	implies	
that	the	Commission	should	communicate	the	CJEU’s	case	law,	somehow	without	giving	its	
own	interpretation	of	it.	Snyder	remarks	that	the	combination	of	Article	211	EC	(the	
power	to	issue	recommendations	and	opinions)	and	the	duty	of	loyal	cooperation	under	
Article	10	EC	(now	4(3)	TEU)	gives	the	Commission	“both	the	power	and	the	duty	to	
explain	ECJ	judgments	and	spell	out	their	implications	for	national	governments	and	
private	parties.”69	(emphasis	added).		
	
The	use	of	soft	law	can	affect	the	institutional	balance	in	the	Union.	Art	19	TEU70	(ex	Art	
220	EC)	suggests	that	the	Court	of	Justice	has	a	monopoly	over	interpretation	of	Union	
law–	or	at	least	the	‘final	say’	as	ultimate	arbiter.	But	the	authoring	of	soft	law	rules	and	
their	day‐to‐day	application	is	carried	out	by	the	Commission.	The	Commission’s	
                                                 
66 L Senden, ‘Soft Law and its Implications for Institutional Balance in the EC’ (2005) 1(2) Utrecht Law 
Review 79-99, 81 
67 L Senden, ‘Soft Law and its Implications for Institutional Balance in the EC’ (2005) 1(2) Utrecht Law 
Review 79-99, 82. Joanne Scott also adopts Senden’s terminology in J Scott ‘In Legal Limbo: Post-
Legislative Guidance as a Challenge for European Administrative Law’ (2011) 48(2) Common Market 
Law Review 329-355, 329. She separates ‘interpretative’ and ‘decisional’ instruments: “Whereas the 
former merely interpret EU law, the latter are said to indicate the manner in which an EU institution 
intends to exercise its discretion… Post-legislative guidance of this kind may be thought of as instruments 
of ‘hybridity’ within the language of ‘new governance’ scholarship in that they represent soft law 
elaborations of hard law norms.”	In fact in her case study (on climate change), Scott considers decisional 
guidelines, rather than guidance in an interpretative instrument which may be presented on a case by case 
basis.   
68 Senden (2005), 93 
69 F Snyder, ‘The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and 
Techniques’ (1993) 56(1) Modern Law Review 19-54, 33 
70  ‘1. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall include the Court of Justice, the General Court 
and specialised courts. It shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is 
observed.’ (Although only ‘the Treaties’ are mentioned, it is assumed that all law should follow the 
Treaties.) 
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authorship	of	soft	law	instruments	at	the	legislative	level	suggests	its	interpretative	
supremacy	at	the	enforcement	level.71	Where	there	is	a	clash	between	a	soft	law	
instrument	and	existing	case	law,	the	former	would	be	in	breach.72	The	Commission	is	
careful	to	stipulate	that	its	opinions	are	given	without	prejudice	to	the	interpretation	of	
the	CJEU	through	the	possibility	or	obligation	of	the	court	to	have	recourse	to	the	
preliminary	reference	procedure.	However,	in	applying	and	enforcing	the	law	the	
Commission	may	add	its	own	–	subjective	–	views	on	how	a	particular	case	law	or	Treaty	
or	secondary	law	provision	should	be	understood,73	or	extending	it	scope.	In	those	
circumstances,	I	submit	that	it	would	overstep	the	boundaries	of	its	powers	and	
circumvent	the	role	of	the	CJEU.	74			
	
Despite	the	varying	degrees	of	persuasive	force	of	Commission	instruments	and	guidance,	
if	its	opinions	are	sought	in	a	greater	number	of	cases,	it	is	possible	that	precedents	will	
accumulate,	creating	a	body	of	soft	law.	Aside	from	the	normative	questions,	the	practical	
impact	may	depend	on	the	extent	to	which	such	opinions	only	summarise	existing	law,	or	
become	more	novel	and	interventionist.	As	noted	above,	Commission	opinions	could	
become	binding	indirectly	through	the	national	court’s	judgment,	particularly	if	it	
essentially	transposes	the	Commission’s	advice.	The	judgment	would	be	effective	between	
the	parties,	but	a	universal	binding	effect	could	result	if	a	principle	expressed	in	a	
Commission	opinion	is	treated	as	a	precedent	in	the	national	case	law.	There	is	already	
evidence	for	this	in	the	Spanish	case	law	(Gebe	Oil,	mentioned	above).	
	
The	opinion	referred	to	in	Article	15(1)	Regulation	1/2003	is	dependent	on	a	request	from	
a	national	judge.	However,	the	amicus	curiae	intervention	envisaged	in	Article	15(3)	is	at	
the	Commission’s	own	initiative.	The	arguments	for	how	Commission	opinions	may	
become	binding	hold	equally	for	amicus	curiae	interventions.	But	here,	the	judge	may	be	a	
                                                 
71 Broberg and Fenger also suggest that in policy areas where the Commission can issue binding 
decisions, such as in competition and State aid, the Commission “arguably both can and should assist the 
national court.” M Broberg & N Fenger Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (OUP, 
2010)  20 
72 O Ştefan ‘European Competition Soft Law in European Courts: A Matter of Hard Principles?’ (2008) 
14(3) European Law Journal 753-772, 764 
73 L Senden, ‘Soft Law and its Implications for Institutional Balance in the EC’ (2005) 1(2) Utrecht Law 
Review 79-99, 93 
74 Broberg and Fenger make a similar point: “…for the Commission to provide the national court with a 
form of assistance that the Treaty has placed in the hands of the Court of Justice could constitute a 
‘détournement de procedure’.”  M Broberg & N Fenger Preliminary References to the European Court of 
Justice (OUP, 2010), 21. Scott also points out several reasons to be concerned with this kind of 
interpretative or decisional guidance:  “guidance may be treated as authoritative by the Member States. It 
may influence their attitude and behaviour, generating significant practical effects.” (p. 344) and it 
excludes courts “from being able to evaluate and shape the processes leading to the adoption of guidance 
of this kind.” (p. 346) J Scott ‘In Legal Limbo: Post-Legislative Guidance as a Challenge for European 
Administrative Law’ (2011) 48(2) Common Market Law Review 329-355 
108 
 
less	willing	recipient	of	the	Commission’s	advice.		The	clear	purpose	is	to	influence	judicial	
proceedings	by	lodging	observations,	whether	at	the	request	of	the	court	or	not.	In	the	
United	States	literature	on	impact	of	amicus	curiae	briefs	in	the	US	Supreme	Court,		
Kearney	and	Merrill	discuss	three	models	of	judging:	75	the	legal	model,	where	judges	seek	
to	resolve	cases	in	accordance	with	requirements	of	law	‐	amicus	curiae	briefs	would	
therefore	be	assumed	to	have	an	impact	insofar	as	they	add	new	information	not	brought	
by	the	parties;	the	attitudinal	model,	where	judges	have	fixed	ideological	preferences,	case	
outcomes	are	the	sum	of	these	preferences,	and	legal	norms	simply	rationalise	those	
outcomes	after	the	fact	–	amicus	briefs	are	therefore	expected	to	have	no	impact;	and	the	
interest	group	model,	where	judges	are	‘empty	vessels’,	deciding	cases	so	as	to	reach	
results	supported	by	the	most	influential	groups	in	society.	They	find	greatest	support	for	
the	‘legal’	model,	also	finding	that	briefs	filed	by	institutional	litigants	were	most	
successful	in	influencing	the	outcome	of	cases.	In	the	EU,	the	impact	is	likely	to	depend	on	
different	judicial	preferences	in	the	Member	States.	The	closest	comparator	would	be	the	
attitudes	of	judges	to	preliminary	rulings,	but	more	research	would	need	to	be	carried	
out.76	
	
	
5.	Article	15	in	practice		
	
5.1 Cases	in	which	the	Commission’s	opinion	was	sought:	Art	15(1)	Reg	1/2003	
	
Ideally,	cases	in	which	the	Commission	has	given	opinions	need	to	be	considered	in	the	
context	of	the	larger	set	of	judgments	in	which	national	courts	have	applied	EU	
competition	rules	(either	in	private	enforcement,	or	in	a	review	function).	It	is	difficult	to	
get	an	accurate	EU‐wide	picture	of	all	these	cases.	The	most	obvious	source	is	DG	COMP’s	
national	court	cases	database,	given	the	obligation	on	the	Member	States	to	notify	all	such	
cases	under	Art	15(2).	To	date,	since	1	May	2004	Regulation	1/2003	came	into	force,	the	
Commission	has	included	335	national	court	judgments	in	its	database77.	The	majority	of	
those	judgments	arose	from	private	enforcement	cases,	primarily	seeking	annulment	of	
                                                 
75 J Kearney and T Merrill, ‘Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court’ (1999-2000) 148 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 743-856. There are of course limitations in applying these 
findings to the EU. Many EU Member States’ judicial systems are inquisitorial rather than adversarial, 
and in the US amici may act rather as interested advocates for the parties than friends of the court. 
According to Kearney & Merrill, amicus briefs are used in the vast majority, around 85%, of the US 
Supreme Court’s argued cases. It should also be noted that this literature considers the effects on the 
Supreme Court rather than lower courts. 
76 B Rodger (ed) Article 234 and Competition Law: An Analysis (Kluwer, 2008) concerning preliminary 
references in competition cases before the reforms came into force on 1 May 2004. 
77 National court judgments database http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/antitrust/nationalcourts/  
(last accessed 7.9.2012). Spain has the highest number of reported cases, numbering 101. 
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obligations	under	an	agreement	or	contract	on	the	grounds	of	incompatibility	with	
Articles	101.	A	number	of	the	judgments	were	judicial	reviews	of	administrative	decisions.	
In	terms	of	subject	matter,	car	sales	and	distribution,	retail	sale	of	automotive	fuel,	beer	
distribution,	telecommunications,	energy,	and	construction	sectors	feature	frequently.		
	
However,	the	Commission’s	five‐year	report	on	the	functioning	of	Regulation	1/2003	
acknowledges	that	Art	15(2)	is	not	working	sufficiently	effectively.78	It	is	highly	likely	that	
there	are	hidden	cases	in	Member	State	jurisdictions	which	have	not	yet	been	notified	to	
the	Commission	or	where	the	database	has	not	been	updated.	There	are	some	
inconsistencies	between	the	database	and	the	Commission’s	Annual	Reports	on	
Competition	Policy.	There	may	be	a	number	of	reasons	for	this.	In	some	instances	
proceedings	were	on‐going	by	appeal	in	a	higher	court.	In	theory	the	Commission	should	
be	notified	of	all	first	instance	judgments,	but	this	may	not	have	happened.	In	other	cases	
the	court	was	involved	in	a	public	enforcement	capacity.	For	example,	in	Sweden	the	
competition	authority	is	not	competent	to	make	a	decision	on	fines,	and	must	refer	to	the	
Marknadsdomstolen	(Market	Court).	In	some	countries	there	is	greater	enforcement	
through	the	national	competition	authority	rather	than	the	courts.	Taken	at	face	value,	the	
figures	in	the	database	show	no	cases	at	all	applying	EC	antitrust	rules	in	ten	of	the	
Member	States.79		
	
As	far	as	Commission	opinions	are	concerned,	according	to	a	member	of	the	Commission’s	
Legal	Service	writing	in	a	personal	capacity,	up	to	the	middle	of	2008	19	opinions	had	
been	requested	from	national	courts	and	the	Commission	had	delivered	in	all	of	them.	80		
The	Commission’s	2009	communication	to	the	Council	and	European	Parliament	on	the	
                                                 
78 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Report on the 
functioning of Regulation 1/2003, COM (2009) 206 final, and accompanying Commission staff working 
paper SEC(2009)574, Brussels 29.4.2009, 79 
79 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic (although there have been a number of cases – see e.g. Case No. 62 
Ca 4/2007-115, Tupperware, Brno Regional Court, 1.11.2007), Estonia, Greece, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
80 E. Gippini Fournier, ‘Institutional Report: The Modernisation of European Competition Law: First 
Experiences with Regulation 1/2003’, in H.F. Koeck and M.M. Karollus (eds), The Modernisation of 
European Competition Law: Initial Experiences with Regulation 1/2003, FIDE XXIII Congress Linz 
2008 (Nomos, 2008) 375-483, 467.  Subsequently, the European Commission Annual Report on 
Competition Policy 2009, COM (2010) 282 final, 117-119, reports that in 2009 the Commission issued 
five opinions - one to a Belgian court, one to a Lithuanian court, and three to Spanish courts. The 2010 
annual report states that the Commission responded to two requests – one from Spain and one from 
Belgium (para 146), with some further details in the accompanying Staff Working Paper – see table 1.  
European Competition Annual Report on Competition Policy 2010, COM (2011) 328 final; 
accompanying Commission staff working paper {SEC (2011) 690 final}. No Art 15(1) opinions are 
mentioned in the 2011 annual report, European Commission Annual Report on Competition Policy 2011,  
COM (2012) 253 final 
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functioning	of	Regulation	1/2003	reports	18	opinions	as	at	31	March	2009.81	I	have	been	
able	to	locate	18	cases	to	that	date,	with	varying	degrees	of	success	in	identifying	the	
parties	and	in	tracing	the	proceedings	in	the	national	jurisdictions.	It	is	not	possible	to	
confirm	whether	some	have	been	double	counted	because	of	unknown	case	names	and	
details.	Only	five	cases	are	now	reported	on	DG	COMP’s	website.82	This	in	itself	
demonstrates	a	lack	of	transparency.	It	is	also	notable	that	generally	there	is	much	more	
detail	on	the	cases	in	the	European	Commission’s	Annual	Reports	pre‐2004.	I	have	been	
able	to	locate	a	further	five	cases	since	the	date	of	the	Commission’s	2009	report,	bringing	
the	current	total	to	23.	Table	1	below	summarises	the	cases.	
	
Given	that	the	Commission	has	not	yet	made	public	its	opinions	in	most	individual	cases,	it	
is	a	difficult	task	to	match	up	the	cases	where	the	Commission	has	delivered	an	opinion	
with	the	corresponding	national	judgments	applying	EU	antitrust	rules,	especially	where	
the	parties	are	not	disclosed	in	DG	COMP’s	national	court	judgments	database	for	
confidentiality	reasons	or	because	the	database	has	not	been	updated.	However,	matching	
is	possible	through	some	NCAs’	annual	reports,	European	Commission	Annual	Reports	on	
Competition	Policy83	and	national	case	databases.		
	
In	each	case	I	aim	to	discover	in	what	circumstances	national	judges	use	this	tool;	what	
questions	were	asked	of	the	Commission;	the	content	and	nature	of	the	Commission’s	
advice,	for	example	purely	factual,	economic	or	legal;	and	the	impact	of	the	Commission’s	
opinion	on	the	judge	–	how	closely	s/he	follows	it.	This	will	feed	into	the	discussion	on	the	
relationship	with	and	implications	for	the	judicial	preliminary	reference	procedure.	
                                                 
81 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Report on the 
functioning of Regulation 1/2003, COM (2009) 206 final, 8, and accompanying Commission staff 
working paper SEC (2009) 574, Brussels 29.4.2009, pp. 75-76, paras [277]-[278]: “As of 31 March 2009, 
the Commission has issued opinions on 18 occasions to national courts in Belgium (5), Spain (9), 
Lithuania (1), The Netherlands (1) and Sweden (2).” However, these cases are unnamed. 
82 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_requests.html (last accessed 7.9.2012) 
83 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/index.html  European Commission Annual 
Report on Competition Policy 2004, SEC (2005) 805 final vol I, 55; European Commission Annual 
Report on Competition Policy 2005, SEC (2006)761 final, 73, para [219];  
European Commission Annual Report on Competition Policy 2006, COM (2007) 358 final, 33. 
Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2038, 16.6.2008, 101- Annex To The European 
Commission Annual Report On Competition Policy 2007, COM (2008) 368; European Commission 
Annual Report on Competition Policy 2008, COM (2009) 374 final, 28, simply states that “the 
Commission received several requests for opinions which were pending at the end of the year.”   
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TABLE	1:		European	Commission	opinions	to	national	courts	under	Article	15(1)	Regulation	1/2003	
Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts
	
Commission	opinion Commission	
opinion	
sought	(1),	
delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
1.	Emond	v	Brasserie	
Hacht	
2004/MR/684	
Belgium	 Brussels	 Court	 of	
Appeal	(referred	from	
Liège	 Court	 of	 Appeal	
on	9.9.2004)85	
Beer	 ties	
(exclusive	
purchasing	
agreements	 ‐	
EPA)	
Brewery,	 Brasserie	 Hacht,	
concluded	 10‐yr	 EPA	 for	 beer	
with	 buyer,	 Emond,	 in	 1993.	 4	
yrs	 later	 concluded	 5‐yr	 EPA	 for	
beverages	 other	 than	 beer.	
Brewery	 had	 been	 guarantor	 of	
Emond’s	 bank	 loan,	 penalties	 in	
case	 of	 EPA	 breach.	 Bar	 out	 of	
business	 in	 Sept	 1999;	 Emond	
claimed	brewery	shared	liability.		
Court	decided	relevant	point	was	
Q:	 compatibility	 with	 Art	 81	 of	
concurrent	EPAs;	 if	 incompatible,	
scope	of	81(2)	nullity.	
					On	compatibility,	Com	referred	
to	 its	 de	minimis	 notices86,	 block	
exemption	 notifications87;	 CJEU’s	
Delimitis	on	how	to	assess	market	
foreclosure.	 On	 scope	 of	 nullity,	
CJEU	Courage	v	Crehan88.	
	
4.2.2005	(2)	
23.6.2005	(3)				
                                                 
84 Belgian (non-confidential) judgments from DG Comp national court judgments database:  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/national_courts/court_2005_027_be.pdf 
(accessed 17.8.2010). Opinion itself available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_requests.html;  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/brasserie_haacht.pdf (accessed 
17.8.2010).  2005 European Commission annual report, p. 67 (unnamed); supplement 2005 p. 139-140; Belgian conseil de la concurrence annual report 2004 (including 2005 cases, 
published 2006):  http://mineco.fgov.be/organization_market/competition/competition_council/annual_reports/report_competition_2004.pdf (accessed 22.6.2006 - no longer 
available online, but hard copy on file), 52-55 
85 The Court of Appeal in Brussels asked for the Commission’s opinion in the following three cases. Belgium has a domestic preliminary reference system (art 42, superseded 1999 
Protection of Economic Competition Act (LPCE)) in which lower courts can ask for an opinion, at the time from the Brussels Court of Appeal, and it is in this context that the 
Commission’s guidance was sought. The competence to deliver preliminary rulings has since been transferred to the Belgian Court of Cassation: Art 72-74 LPCE (in force 15 
September 2006). 
86 Most recently Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, OJ C 368/07, 22.12.2001, 13 
87 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the application of Article 85(3) [now 101(3)] of the Treaty to categories of exclusive purchasing agreements OJ L 
173, 30.6.1983 expired 31.5.2000, subsequent Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of 
vertical agreements and concerted practices OJ L 336, 29.12.1999 
88 C-453/99 Courage v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297 
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts
	
Commission	opinion Commission	
opinion	
sought	(1),	
delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
not	 conclusion	 of	 second	
exclusive	 purchasing	 agreement	
for	 beverages	 other	 than	 beer,	
but	 moment	 of	 its	 breach.	
Considering	 Com’s	 notices,	 EPA	
covered	 by	 block	 exemption	
notices	 as	 market	 share	 did	 not	
exceed	30%	(was	not	higher	than	
10‐15%),	non‐compete	clause	no	
longer	 than	 5	 yrs.	 Contract	
compatible	with	Art	101.	Emond	
unsuccessful.	
2.	 SABAM	 v	
Productions	 &	
Marketing	
2004/MR/789	
Belgium	 Brussels	 Court	 of	
Appeal	(referred	from	
Brussels	 Commercial	
Court)	
Collecting	
societies	
Whether	 SABAM,	 collecting	
society	 protecting	 music	 right‐
holders,	 abused	 dominant	
position	by	tying	grant	of	 licence	
to	 other	 conditions;	 refusing	 to	
give	 reasons	 for	 its	 conditions;	
creating	 entry	 barriers	 by	
unjustifiably	 favouring	 firms	
already	 in	 the	 market	 for	
organisation	of	concerts.		
P&M,	 concert	 organiser	 needed	
Q:	 compatibility	 with	 Art	 102,	
esp.	 discrimination	 (102(c)),	 of	
collecting	 society’s	 criteria	 for	
granting	 status	 of	 ‘grand	
organisateur’	 entitling	 50%	
rebate	on	royalties.	
					Com	 referred	 to	 its	 decisional	
practice	 in	 sector,	 rehearsing	
factors	 which	 can	 be	 taken	 into	
account	to	assess	whether	criteria	
themselves,	 or	 their	 application,	
4.2.2005	(2)	
3.11.2005	(3)	
                                                 
89 Belgian (non-confidential) judgments from DG Comp national court judgments database:   http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/national_courts/court_2005_038_be.pdf . 
Opinion itself available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_requests.html; http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/sabam.pdf ;  Commission annual report 2005, p. 67-68 
(unnamed); 2005 supplement, p. 140-141; Belgian conseil de la concurrence annual report 2004, p. 55-57  
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts
	
Commission	opinion Commission	
opinion	
sought	(1),	
delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
to	obtain	copyright	licences	from	
SABAM.	 Only	 SABAM	 issued	
licences	 in	 Belgium.	 Refused	 to	
grant	 P&M	 status	 of	 ‘grand	
organisateur’,	 denying	 benefit	 of	
50%	 reduced	 tariff.	 P&M	
contested	 bills,	 SABAM	 initiated	
proceedings.	 P&M	 argued	 that			
as	SABAM	was	the	only	operator	
of	 its	 kind	 in	 Belgium,	 market	
entry	difficult.	
Court	 found	 criteria	 lacked	
clarity	 and	 transparency,	
specifically	 designed	 to	
discriminate	–	criteria	not	public,	
unwritten,	 unknown	 in	 advance.	
Excessive	 differential	 between	
tariffs	 paid	 for	 copyright,	 and	
SABAM	 gave	 no	 objective	 or	
economic	 justification.	 Breach	 of	
Art	102.	
may	breach	Art	82.	Com	referred	
to	 Belgian	 as	 well	 as	 EU	
jurisprudence	 on	 dominance.	
Explicitly	 stated	 its	 opinion	 was	
not	binding	and	only	valid	where	
trade	 between	 Member	 States	
likely	 to	 be	 affected	 by	 practices	
alleged.				
	
3.	 Wallonie	 Expo	 v	
FEBIAC	
2004/MR/890	
Belgium	 Brussels	 Court	 of	
Appeal	(referred	from	
Brussels	 Commercial	
Trade	
fairs/exhibitions
Commercial	 Court	 did	 not	
mention	 EC	 law	 in	 reference	 to	
Court	of	Appeal,	maintained	 that	
Q:	compatibility	of	Arts	101&102	
with	 agreement	 between	
organiser	 of	 truck	 exhibition,	
4.2.2005	(2)	
10.11.2005	
                                                 
90 Belgian (non-confidential) judgments from DG Comp national court judgments database:  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/national_courts/court_2005_039_be.pdf . 
Opinion itself available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_requests.html, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/febiac.pdf ; Commission annual report 2005, p. 67 
(unnamed); 2005 supplement, p. 141;  Belgian conseil de la concurrence annual report 2004, p. 57-63 
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts
	
Commission	opinion Commission	
opinion	
sought	(1),	
delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
Court	 Tribunal	 de	
Commerce/Rechtbank	
van	Koophandel)	
relevant	 geographic	 market	
national,	 so	 only	 Belgian	 law	
applicable.	 However,	
Competition	 Council	 submitted	
written	 observations	 that	
capable	 of	 affecting	 trade	
between	Member	States,	Court	of	
Appeal	agreed.	
					Court	 found	 prohibition	 on	
exhibiting	 elsewhere	 within	 6	
mths	 capable	 of	 restricting	
competition.				However,	relevant	
market	 was	 national,	 option	
remained	 for	 exhibitors	 to	
participate	 in	events	abroad.	Not	
81(1)	 unlawful.	 But,	 prohibition	
on	 participation	 in	 another	
exhibition	 in	 the	6	mths	prior	 to	
one	 in	 question	 was	 unjustified	
and	 disproportionate.	 Putting	
that	 clause	 into	 effect	 would	
breach	Art	102.	
	
WEX,	 and	 federation	 of	 truck	
exhibitors,	 importers	 and	
distributors,	 FEBIAC,	 not	 to	 take	
part	 in	 any	 similar	 event	 in	
Belgium	 in	 6	 mths	 prior	 to	 the	
exhib.	
					Belgium	 system	 of	 notification	
of	 agreements	 capable	 of	
restricting	 competition	 on	
national	 market	 under	 Art7(1)	
LPCE.	 Com	 indicated	 fact	 that	
FEBIAC	 regulation	 had	 not	 been	
notified	 to	 Competition	 Council	
had	no	bearing	on	its	legality.	Still	
had	 to	 be	 examined	 under	 Art	
101	
					Recalling	its	decisional	practice	
in	 sector,	 Com	 noted	 it	 had	
generally	 exempted	 prohibition	
clauses	 in	 regulation	 of	 fairs	 and	
exhibs	 on	 basis	 of	 	 101(3),	 but	
exception	 should	 not	 be	 applied	
automatically	 ‐	 needs	 economic	
analysis	 of	 	 real	 and	 potential	
effects	 of	 clause	 on	 market,	
requiring	 delimitation	 of	
geographic	 market,	 and	 assess	
whether	 agreement	 capable	 of	
(3)
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts
	
Commission	opinion Commission	
opinion	
sought	(1),	
delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
foreclosing	competitors.										
					Opinion	 clarified	 relationship	
between	 Art	 101&102	 and	
indicated	 that	 efficiencies	 can	 be	
considered	 in	 Art	 102	
assessments.91	
4.	Unknown92	 Belgium	 Antwerp	 Court	 of	
Appeal.	 Gerechtshof	
Antwerpen	
Ports	
(indemnity	
clause)	
Fatal	accident	at	Antwerp	port	in	
1995	 where	 ship	 hit	 container	
crane.	 Central	 issue	was	 liability	
of	 pilot	 and	 company	 holding	
concession	 for	 pilot	 services	 in	
Antwerp	port.		
	
Q:	 compatibility	 with	 Art	 102	 of	
terms	 of	 concession‐holder’s	
pilotage	 contract,	 incl.	 indemnity	
and	exclusion	of	liability	clauses	‐	
whether	 contractual	 exclusion	 of	
liability	is	abuse	of	dom	pos.		
					Com	 laid	 out	 case	 law	 on	
exploitative	 abuses	 and	 unfair	
trading	 conditions	 under	 102(a),	
esp	 BRT	 v	 SABAM.	 Key	 was	
whether	 dominant	 firm	 would	
have	been	able	 to	 impose	similar	
exclusion	 of	 liability	 if	 there	 had	
been	 effective	 competition.	
Further,	 Court	 should	
proportionality	 of	 consider	
whether	 restrictive	 effects	 of	
contractual	 clause.	 Liability	
2006	
                                                 
91 Commission annual report 2005, p.75 
92 Commission annual report 2006 supplement p. 123-124 (unnamed) 
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts
	
Commission	opinion Commission	
opinion	
sought	(1),	
delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
clause	 should	 be	 considered	 in	
context	 of	 whole	 contract	 and	
relevant	circumstances.	
5.	Unknown93	 Belgium	 Unknown Unknown applicability	 of	 Articles	 101	 and	
102	to	the	exclusion	of	one	of	the	
members	 of	 a	 standards	 setting	
organisation	
Unknown 2006?	
6.	Unknown94	 Spain	 Unknown Retail	 sale	 of	
automotive	fuel	
Whether	service	station	operator	
could	use	Art	101	as	a	defence	to	
be	 released	 from	 a	 contractual	
obligation.	
Q:	 whether	 size	 and	 nature	 of	
network	 of	 Spanish	 supplier	
could	 affect	 trade	 between	
Member	 States;	 whether	
exclusive	 supply	 contract	
between	 the	 parties	 could	 be	
exempt	under	101(3).	
					Com	indicated	how	network	of	
exclusive	 supply	 contracts	 can	
lead	 to	 foreclosure,	outlined	how	
to	assess	in	line	with	Delimitis,	its	
2005	
                                                 
93 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003, COM (2009) 206 final, p. 8, and 
accompanying Commission staff working paper SEC(2009)574, Brussels 29.4.2009, p. 80. Investigated available Belgian Competition Authority annual reports 2005-2009 but could 
find no corresponding case.	http://economie.fgov.be/en/entreprises/competition/Belgian_Competition_Authority/Annual_Reports/index.jsp. 2005 and 2006 on French site: 
http://economie.fgov.be/fr/entreprises/concurrence/Autorite_belge_concurrence_Introduction/Conseil_concurrence/index.jsp (accessed 11.8.2010) 
94 Commission annual report 2005, p. 75-76 (unnamed).  
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts
	
Commission	opinion Commission	
opinion	
sought	(1),	
delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
own	 guidelines	 and	 notices,	 and	
Art	27(4)	notice95	published	in	its	
REPSOL	 investigation96.	 Re	
exemption,	 Com	 simply	 referred	
to	its	101(3)	guidelines.	
7.	Unknown97	 Spain	 Unknown	 Retail	 sale	 of	
automotive	fuel	
Unknown Q:	 compatibility	 with	 Art	 101	 of	
non‐compete	 clause,	 specifically	
resale	 price	 maintenance	 (RPM),	
whether	 agreement	 could	 be	
covered	by	block	 exemption,	 and	
whether	 service	 station	 operator	
could	be	defined	as	an	agent.		
					As	 above,	 Com	 referred	 to	
Delimitis,	 its	 own	 guidelines	 and	
notices,	 and	 the	 Art	 27(4)	 notice	
in	 REPSOL	 on	 assessing	 market	
foreclosure	 and	 individual	
exemption	 under	 81(3).	 Outlined	
criteria	 for	 assessing	 whether	
retailer	is	an	agent	by	referring	to	
2005	
                                                 
95 Article 27(4) Regulation 1/2003: “Where the Commission intends to adopt a decision pursuant to Article 9 [commitments] or Article 10 [finding of inapplicability], it shall publish 
a concise summary of the case and the main content of the commitments or of the proposed course of action. Interested parties may submit their observations within a time limit 
which is fixed by the Commission in its publication and which may not be less than one month. Publication shall have regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the 
protection of their business secrets.” 
96 COMP 38.348 – REPSOL, OJ C 258, 20.10.2004,  7-11  
97 Commission annual report 2005, p.75-76 (unnamed) 
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts
	
Commission	opinion Commission	
opinion	
sought	(1),	
delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
its	guidelines.
					Clauses	 providing	 for	 a	
hardcore	 restriction	 on	 RPM	 are	
void	 if	 not	 part	 of	 a	 genuine	
agency	 contract	 But,	 for	 Court	 to	
decide	whether	 a	 clause	 it	might	
find	 void	 could	 be	 severed	 from	
the	contract	or	whether	it	vitiated	
contract	as	a	whole.	
8.	 Clau	 v	 Cepsa	
Estaciones	 de	
Servicio,	 Case	 n°	
48/2004.98		
Spain	 Provincial	 Court	
Girona	 No.	 1,	
Audiencia	 Provincial	
de	 Girona	 (on	 appeal	
from	 Girona	 Court	 of	
First	 Instance	 No	 1,	
case	No	266/2002)	
Retail	 sale	 of	
automotive	fuel	
Contracts	 for	 start‐up	 of	 service	
station	 and	 exclusive	 sale	 of	
CEPSA	 products.	 Whether	
contract	 was	 re‐sale	 agreement	
or	a	genuine	agency	agreement.		
	
Not	known 7.6.2004	(3)	
Contract	was	
a	“re‐sale	
agreement”.	
Actually	
agency	
agreement.	
Invalid	as	did	
not	fall	under	
block	
exemption	
regulations.	
Contracts	
void.	Parties	
                                                 
98 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2004/aeccr_en.pdf Annual Report on competition 2004 part III: the Application of EC Competition Rules in the 
Member States, pp. 57-58; FIDE 2008 Spain country report (in H F Koeck and M M Karollus (eds) Fide Congress 2008, Vol. 2: The Modernisation of European Competition Law - 
Initial Experiences With Regulation 1/2003 (Nomos / facultas.wuv, 2008), p. 307 lists 5 cases “among others” in which there was a Commission opinion. However, the report gives 
no details.  
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts
	
Commission	opinion Commission	
opinion	
sought	(1),	
delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
to	reimburse	
each	other	for	
services	
provided	
9.	Inversiones	
Cobasa	v	BP	Oil99	
case	no.	103/05	
Spain	 Juzgado	 de	 lo	
Mercantil	 No.	 4	 of	
Madrid	
Retail	 sale	 of	
automotive	fuel	
Whether	 contract	 was	 re‐sale	
agreement	 or	 a	 genuine	 agency	
agreement.	
Q:	whether	any	Com	proceedings	
related	 to	 BP	 Oil	 contracts;	
whether	 these	 networks	 of	
contracts	 can	 produce	 an	 effect	
on	trade	between	Member	States;	
whether	 such	 agreements	 could	
be	exempted	by	block	exemption	
or	 individual	 under	 Art	 101(3)	
TFEU;	5	year	exclusivity	clause	
	
Com	opinion	not	known	
9.2.2005	(1)	
19.10.2005	
(3)	
legal	nature	of	
the	contract	is	
similar	 to	
above	 ‐	 not	 a	
re‐sale	
agreement	
but	 an	 agency	
contract.	Not	
genuine	
agency	
agreement	 ‐	
retailer	
assumes	some	
financial	risk.	
However,	 size	
and	 type	 of	
                                                 
99 Sixth recital of court judgment available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/national_courts/court_2005_064_es.pdf (included in DG COMP national court judgment 
database) . FIDE 2008 Spain country report, p. 307, reports that the Commission opinion was requested in	Provincial Court Madrid no. 28 and judgment was given on 6.2.2007, but 
actually it was requested in the first instance proceedings. Reference to court judgment in Supplement to Commission’s annual report on competition policy 2005 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2005/report_supplement_20061113.pdf, p. 147 
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
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Facts
	
Commission	opinion Commission	
opinion	
sought	(1),	
delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
networks	 do	
not	 affect	
trade	
between	MS,		
No	resale	
price	
maintenance	
imposed.	 On	
duration,	
contract	
benefited	
from	 block	
exemption.		
10.	 Grupo	 Texas	 v	
Cepsa	 (case	 no.	 not	
known)100	
Spain	 Provincial	 Court	 of	
Madrid	no.	10	
Retail	 sale	 of	
automotive	fuel	
Currently	unable	to	trace Unknown 17.10.2005	
(3)	
11.	 Gasonul	 v	Repsol	
(case	 no.	 not	
known)101	
Spain	 Provincial	 Court	 of	
Madrid	no.	14	
Retail	 sale	 of	
automotive	fuel	
Currently	unable	to	trace Unknown 26.3.2004	(3)	
12.	Hermela	v	Repsol	
(case	 no.	 not	
known)102	
Spain	 Provincial	 Court	 of	
Madrid	no.	14	
Retail	 sale	 of	
automotive	fuel	
Currently	unable	to	trace Unknown 30.9.2004	(3)	
13.	 UAB	 Tew	 Baltija	
Kaunos	 v	
Lithuania	 Vilnius	 District	 Court	
(Vilnius	 Apygardos	
Public	tender Whether	 long‐term	 exclusivity	
would	 allow	 tender	 winner	 to	
Q:	 compatibility	 with	 Art	 106(1)	
&	 Art	 102	 of	 municipality	
14.12.2005	
(3)	
                                                 
100 FIDE 2008 Spain country report, p. 307 
101 FIDE 2008 Spain country report, p. 307 
102 FIDE 2008 Spain country report, p. 307 
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
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Commission	opinion Commission	
opinion	
sought	(1),	
delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
savivaldybyes	
administracijos	
direcktorius	
(Director	 of	
administration	of	 the	
municipality	 of	 the	
city	of	Kaunas)	
Case	 2‐1068‐
52/05103	
	
Teismas) abuse	 dominant	 position	 by	
charging	 excessive	 prices	 to	
certain	clients.		
	
	
carrying	 out	 public	 tender	
procedure	 for	 exclusive	 15	 yr	
waste	collection	contract.		
					Com	 gave	 sectoral	 advice,	
referring	 to	 Art	 102	 waste	
management	 cases	 Københavns	
and	 Dusseldorp,	 and	 Com	 notice	
on	 definition	 of	 relevant	
market104.	 In	Københavns,	 breach	
of	 EC	 competition	 rules	 was	
justified	 under	 Art	 106(2)	
relating	to	public	undertakings.	
					Substantial	 standard	 of	 proof	
for	 finding	 breach	 of	 Art	 102	 or	
106(1)	 –	 abuse	 by	 the	 successful	
concession‐holder	would	 have	 to	
be	“inevitable	or	at	least	the	likely	
result	of	tender	conditions”.105	
14.	 Danska	 Staten	
genorn	
Bornholmstrafiken	 v	
Ystad	Harnn	 Logistik	
Sweden	 Swedish	 Supreme	
Court	(on	appeal	from	
Ystad	 District	 Court	
Tingsrätt)	 Högsta	
Ports Port	 of	 Ystad	 allegedly	 abused	
dominant	 position	 by	 charging	
excessive	prices	for	port	services.	
					Com	 opinion	 took	 similar	
Q:	 definition	 of	 the	 relevant	
market		
										Com	 advised	 should	 define	
market	 according	 to	 whether	 or	
18.10.2006	
(1),	 1.3.2007	
(2)	 [taking	
longer	 than	
                                                 
103 Commission annual report 2005, p. 76-77 (although not named); Lithuanian Competition Council Annual report 2005, English version, p. 25, available at 
http://www.konkuren.lt/en/anual/2005_eng.pdf (accessed 13.8.2010); judgment available from DG COMP national court judgments database (in  Lithuanian) at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/national_courts/court_2006_10_lt.pdf (accessed 17.8.2010) 
104 OJ C 372, 9.12.1997, 1 
105 Commission annual report 2005, p. 77 
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
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Facts
	
Commission	opinion Commission	
opinion	
sought	(1),	
delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
Aktiebolag	
Case	T‐2808/05106		
Domstolen approach	to	Swedish	High	Court,	
which	had	 ruled	 that	 the	Port	 of	
Trelleborg	 was	 not	 a	 substitute	
as	 this	 would	 increase	 ferry	
operators’	 costs	 and	 reduce	
customer	base.		
not	 other	 ports	were	 substitutes,	
referred	 to	 ECJ	 and	 Commission	
decisional	 practice	 in	 other	 port	
sector	cases	 in	assessing	demand	
and	supply	substitution.		National	
court	should	decide	whether	port	
services	offered	would	constitute	
single	 or	 several	 markets.	 CJEU	
previously	 found	 that	
organisation	of	port	activities	in	a	
single	 port	 may	 constitute	 a	
relevant	market.		
Com	 stated	 that	 its	 opinion	 was	
not	 binding,	would	 not	 carry	 out	
independent	 assessment	 of	
market	or	consider	merits	of	case,	
only	 clarify	 criteria	 and	 evidence	
for	determining	relevant	market.	
Court	 declared	 its	 lack	 of	
jurisdiction	 in	respect	of	share	of	
fees	due	to	arbitration	clause,	but	
target	 4mths	
in	 	 Courts	
notice]107	
19.2.2008	(3)	
                                                 
106 Commission annual report 2007 Staff working paper (SWP), p.142-143. F Lindblom, ‘The Swedish Supreme Court asks for the EC Commission’s opinion on the definition of the 
relevant market concerning alleged excessive prices for port services (Port of Ystad)’,  1 March 2007, e-Competitions, n°13747; C Wetter & C J Sundqvist, ‘The Swedish Supreme 
Court declares itself lacking jurisdiction as a result of an arbitration clause (BornholmsTrafikken/Ystad Hamn)’,  19 February 2008, e-Competitions, n°21218. Judgment available on 
Swedish Supreme Court’s website (in Swedish): http://www.hogstadomstolen.se/Domstolar/hogstadomstolen/Avgoranden/2008/2008-02-19%20T%202808-05%20Dom.pdf 
(accessed 17.8.2010) 
107 There is some discrepancy concerning the date: the Commission’s website states the opinion was delivered on 16.2.2007, which would keep it within the target time limit. 
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Facts
	
Commission	opinion Commission	
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sought	(1),	
delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
followed	 the	 Commission’s	
opinion	on	market	definition	and	
decided	the	port	was	dominant.	
	
15.	 Övertorneå	
kommun	 m.fl.	 v		
Ekfors	Kraft	AB	m.fl.		
A	 4/06;	 MD	
2007:26108	
	
	
Sweden	 Swedish	Market	Court	
(Marknadsdomstolen)	
Public	tender 2	municipalities	in	north	Sweden	
had	agreement	with	dominant	
electricity	provider,	Ekfors,	for	
provision	of	public	network	
services	and	lighting.	
Disagreement	about	level	of	fees,	
Ekfors	discontinued	services.	
		
	
	
Q:	 notions	 of	 ‘undertaking’;	
whether	 public	 authority	 has	
‘legitimate	 interest’	 for	 purpose	
of	 lodging	 a	 complaint	 under	Art	
7(2)	Reg	1/2003	‐		
whether	municipalities	should	
have	standing	in	domestic	court	
under	Swedish	Competition	Act.			
			Com	outlined	criteria	to	
distinguish	(non‐economic)	
public	authority	activity	from	
economic	activity.	
On	legitimate	interest,	referred	to	
Com	 notice	 on	 handling	 of	
complaints.	 Court	 found	 street	
lighting	 not	 an	 essential	 facility,	
rejected	 refusal	 to	 supply	 and	
excessive	prices	claim	
21.12.2006	
(1)	
?.?.2007(2)	
15.11.2007(3)	
                                                 
108 Commission annual report 2007 SWP, p.142; FIDE 2010 Sweden country report in G C Rodriguez Iglesias & L Ortiz Blanco (eds) The Judicial Application of Competition Law: 
Proceedings of the FIDE XXIV Congress Madrid 2010 Vol 2 (Servicio de Publicaciones de la Facultad de Derecho, Complutense University, Madrid 2010), p. 32, available at 
http://www.fide2010.eu/multisites/fide2010/templates/yoo_beyond/pdf/suecia/Suecia-2.PDF  (accessed 17.8.2010); A Flood & A Jasper ‘The Swedish Market Court rejects action 
for alleged abuse of dominant position in the electricity sector (Ekfors), 15 November 2007, e-Competitions, n°15760; J Lundström & M Lindgren ‘The Swedish Market Court holds 
that the electricity network for municipalities street and road lighting is not an essential facility and rejects alleged abusive refusal to supply and price increase (Ekfors)’  15 
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Commission	opinion Commission	
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delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
16.	Praet	 en	Zonen	v	
Vereinigen	
Productenorganisatie	
van	 de	 Nederlandse	
Mosselcultur	UA	
C02/1136,	 LJN:	 BD	
1227109	
Netherlands	 Appeal	 Court	
Gerechtshof	 ‘s	
Gravenhage	 (on	
appeal	 from		
Rechtbank	
Middelburg)	
Agricultural	
quotas	
Mussel	seed	quota	allocations	by	
an	association	of	mussel	farmers.	
Court	 of	 Appeal	 also	 invited	
Commission	 to	 submit	
observations	under	Art	15(3)	
Q:	 whether	 the	 EU	 competition	
rules	 applied,	 or	 whether	 such	
allocation	 practice	 fell	 within	
specific	 scope	 of	 Reg	 26/62	 on	
application	 of	 competition	 rules	
to	agricultural	products.					
					Com	replied	that	it	appeared	to	
be	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
agricultural	 products	 regulation.	
Court	 followed	 the	 Commission’s	
decision	as	it	had	exclusive	power	
under	Art	 2(2)	 of	 the	 agriculture	
reg	 to	determine	which	practices	
fulfilled	art	2(10)	of	the	reg.	Court	
held	 that	 the	 decision	 did	 not	
breach	101(1)	
?.?.2005(1)	
?.4.2006(2)	110	
24.4.2008(3)	
17.	 BVBA	 DD	
Bikes/BV	 Ducati	
Belgium	 Rechtbank	 van	
Koophandel	 te	
Motorcycles	
(sale,	 repair	and	
DD	 Bikes,	 former	 authorised	
dealer	 and	 repairer	 brought	
Q	 Whether	 Ducati’s	 distribution	
system	 could	 benefit	 from	 block	
2009	
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
November 2007, e-Competitions, n°16061. Judgment available on Market Court’s website (in Swedish)  at http://www.marknadsdomstolen.se/avgoranden/avgoranden2007/Dom07-
26.pdf  (accessed 17.8.2010) 
109 Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules 2005, Netherlands report, p. 22  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/national_reports/netherlands_en.pdf ; Commission annual report 2006 supplement SWP p. 123 (unnamed); T Baumé & S 
Janssen,  ‘The Dutch Court of Appeal of The Hague, after having sought the opinion of the EC Commission, holds that a decision adopted by a mussel farmers association did not 
breach Art. 81.1 EC (Vereniging Productenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Mosselcultuur / Praet en Zonen)’, 24 April 2008, e-Competitions, n°21781); judgment available (in 
Dutch) at www.rechtspraak.nl; FIDE 2008 Netherlands country report, p. 216 
110 Commission annual report 2006 staff working document, SEC (2007) 860, Brussels 25.6.2007 , p. 123, 2.1.1. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2006/part2_en.pdf  
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State	
	
Court
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Commission	opinion Commission	
opinion	
sought	(1),	
delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
North	Europe	
(case	 no.	
Unknown)111	
Dendermonde	
(Commercial	 District	
Court)	
maintenance) action	 against	 Ducati	 for	 failure	
to	be	admitted	to	network.		
exemption	 reg	 2790/1999	 on	
vertical	restraints.		
Com	 said	 first	 establish	 whether	
there	 is	 separate	 market	 for	
repair	 and	 maintenance,	 as	
opposed	 to	 sales;	 if	 so	 Ducati’s	
market	share	as	supplier	of	spare	
parts	is	relevant	–	if	exceeds	30%	
could	still	benefit	from	individual	
exemption	 under	 101(3).	 If	 no	
separate	market,	share	is	likely	to	
be	 less	 than	 30%,	 falling	 under	
BE.	
18.	 UAB	
Schneidersöhne	
Baltija/UAB	 Libra	
Vitalis	 A337/2008	 of	
9.9.2008;	 A502‐
34/2009	 of	
20.11.2009	
modifying	 NCA	
decision		
(re	Resolution	No.	
2S‐13	 of	 26	 October	
2006)112	
Lithuania	 Lietuvos	 vyriausasis	
administracinis	
(Supreme	
Administrative	Court)	
Paper	industry Assessment	 of	 information	
exchange	 relating	 to	 market	
shares	 and	 sales	 volumes	 on	
paper	wholesale	markets.	 Lower	
court	 reduced	 competition	
authority	 fine	 but	 rejected	 the	
substantive	 parts	 of	 the	 appeal.	
Parties	 admitted	 exchanges	 of	
info,	 but	 argued	 they	 did	 not	
breach	 either	 EU	 or	 national	
competition	 law,	 as	 Art	 101	
infringement	 only	 where	 the	
Assessment	 depends	 on	whether	
agreement	by	object	 or	by	effect.	
If	 by	 object,	 no	 need	 to	 consider	
market	 structure.	 If	 by	 effect,	
need	 to	 consider	both	actual	 and	
potential	 effects,	 real	 conditions	
on	the	market.	Detailed	citation	of	
EU	 courts’	 case	 law	 and	 Com	
decisions,	esp	recent	decisions	 in	
paper	cases:	C‐7/95	P	[1998]	ECR	
I‐3111	 &T‐35/92	 John	 Deere;	 C‐
238/05	 Asnef‐Equifax	 v	
(1)	9.9.2008	
(2)	2008?113	
(3)	
20.11.2009	
                                                 
111 Commission annual report supplement SWP 2009 p. 117  
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Court
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Commission	opinion Commission	
opinion	
sought	(1),	
delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
relevant	 market	 is	 oligopolistic,	
competition	on	the	market	is	not	
sufficient	and	 the	 info	exchanges	
allow	 the	 prediction	 of	
competitors’	 behaviour	 on	 the	
market.	 Qs:	 (1)	 do	 high	
concentration	 and	 oligopolistic	
market	 both	 have	 to	 be	
established	 to	 prove	
infringement	 by	 effect?	Whether	
HHI	 values	 could	 be	 used,	 even	
though	 Com’s	 guidelines	 on	
horizontal	 cooperation	
specifically	 state	 they	 do	 not	
apply	to	info	sharing	agreements	
(para	 10)	 A:	 can	 use	 the	
methodology	 for	 analysis	 of	
market	 structure	 HHI,	 and	
leading	 firm	 concentration	 ratio	
(2)	 Other	 factors?	 (3)	 seeking	
answer	 in	 given	 factual	
Asociación	 de	 Usuarios	 de	
Servicios	Bancarios	 )	 Com	dec	 in	
IV/31.370	&	31.446	OJ	1992	L	68,	
p.	 19	 UK	 Tractor	 Exchange	
Thyssen	 Stahl	 T‐141/94	 [1999]	
ECR	II‐347;	Suiker	Unie	40‐48/73	
[1975]	 ECR	 1663,	 Züchner	 v	
Bayerische	 Vereinsbank	 AG	
172/80	 [1981]	 ECR	 2021.	 Cited	
Com	101(3)	guidelines	on	market	
structure	 para	 25	 OJ	 C	 101.	
DecisiPaper	 markets	 	 27.4.2004,	
p.	 97),	 (Atlantic	 Container	 T‐
191/98,	 T‐212‐214/98	 [2003]	
ECR	II‐3275,	para	1154)	Detailed	
citation	of	EU	courts’	case	law	and	
Com	 decisions,	 esp	 recent	
merger	 decisions	 in	 paper	
markets:	 COMP/2245	 Metsä‐
Serla/Zanders;	 M.3227	
Paperlinx/Buhurmann;	 M.3822	
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
112 Commission annual report supplement SWP 2009 p. 118;  DG COMP national court judgments database (in Lithuanian): A502-34/2009 of 20.11.2009 modifying NCA decision: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/national_courts/1151910.pdf; A337/2008 of 9.9.2008 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/national_courts/752814.pdf;  
Opinion itself available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/opinion_2002_uab_en.pdf . Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania annual report 2008 p. 9 (that particular part 
in Lithuanian); Lithuanian Competition Council Annual report 2009, English version http://www.konkuren.lt/en/anual/2009_eng.pdf, p. 14 and p. 15 (accessed 13.8.2010) 
113 As with the Swedish Bornholmstrafiken case, the date of the opinion is uncertain. On its website http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_requests.html  the Commission 
dates the opinion as 20.7.2008, but according to the opinion itself the request was not received until 9.9.2008. 
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
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Commission	opinion Commission	
opinion	
sought	(1),	
delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
circumstances,	 but	 Com	
refused	to	answer	as	would	be	
going	into	merits:	“Com	has	not	
carried	 out	 an	 independent	
assessment	of	these	issues	and	
it	 cannot	 substitute	 the	
analysis	that	the	national	court	
needs	 to	make	on	 the	basis	of	
the	 facts	 and	 information	
before	it.”	(para	48).	
Stora	 Enso/Schneidersöhne	
Papier.	 Even	 if	 Com	 has	
authorised	merger,	no	obstacle	to	
NCA	 finding	
oligopolistic/concentrated	
market	 in	 applying	 Art	 101.	
Degree	 of	 market	 power	 needed	
for	 finding	 infringement	 of	 Art	
101(1)	 less	 than	 for	 finding	
dominance	 under	 Art	 102.	 Com	
merger	 decs	 not	 binding	 on	
application	 of	 antitrust	 rules.	
Advised	caution	on	interpretation	
of	 these	 decisions:	 merger	 and	
Art	101	objectives,	 and	 therefore	
analysis,	 are	 different.	 Detailed	
prelim	remarks	on	15(1)	
19.	 Bright	 Service	
SA/REPSOL	CPP114	
Spain	 Juzgado	 de	 lo	
Mercantil	 no.	 2	
Barcelona	
Retail	 sale	 of	
automotive	 fuel	
(wholesale	
market	 for	
petroleum	
products)	
Implications	 of	 Com’s	 REPSOL	
decision	 COMP/38348	 of	
12.4.2006	 –	 whether	 precludes	
NCAs	 and	 courts	 from	 assessing	
whether	 exclusive	 supply	
agreement	 part	 of	 the	
commercial	REPSOL	network	has	
infringed	competition	rules	
Commitment	 decisions,	 but	 oblig	
not	 to	 take	 a	 decision	 running	
counter	 ‐	 in	 practice	 conflicting	
with	 the	 implementation	 of	
commitments	
24.3.2009	(1)	
20.	 Dalphi	 Metal	 Spain	 Juzgado	 de	 lo	 Car	 airbags	 and	 Litigation	 following	 acquisition	 Q1:	Whether	 unilateral	 provision	 2009	(1)	
                                                 
114 Commission annual report supplement SWP 2009 p. 118 
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts
	
Commission	opinion Commission	
opinion	
sought	(1),	
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judgment	
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España/TRW	
Automotive115	
Mercantil	 no.	 1	
Madrid	
steering	 wheels	
(motor	 vehicle	
parts)	
by	TRW	of	DME’s	car	airbag	and	
steering	 wheel	 business.	 Takata	
(competitor,	 minority	 stake	 in	
DME	 and	 shareholding	 in	 all	 3	
DME	 production	 joint	 ventures)	
brought	 action	 against	 DME’s	
production	companies	which	had	
refused	 to	 give	 it	 access	 to	
transfer	 prices	 charged	 to	 DME	
for	certain	products	
of	 info	 to	 competitor	 could	
constitute	 exchange	 of	 info	 –	 A:	
mere	 receipt	 of	 info	 can	 be	 anti‐
competitive	 –	 reduces	
uncertainty	 [in	 effect,	 Com	
advises	in	favour	of	DME]	
Q2:	 exchange	 of	 historical	 data	
does	 not	 influence	 market	
conditions	–	no	infringement.	Info	
more	 than	 1	 year	 old	 can	 be	
historical,	 but	 obsolescence	must	
be	 assessed	 according	 to	 the	
industry	and	market	structure.	
[No	 cases	 appear	 to	 have	 been	
referred	to]	
29.3.2010	(2)	
21.	 Petrocat/Canal	 y	
Fils	 SL	 &	 Zero	 Sets	
SL116	
	
Spain	 Juzgado	 de	 lo	
Mercantil	 no.	 5	
Madrid	
Retail	 sale	 of	
automotive	fuel	
Whether	 long	 term	 exclusive	
supply	 contract	 (27yrs+)	
infringes	Art	101	
Assessment	 of	 foreclosure	 in	
context	 of	 overall	 comp	 situation	
and	 economic	 and	 legal	 links	
(referring	to	REPSOL	and	Spanish	
CA	 in	 CEPSA).	 Re	 clauses	 setting	
retail	 price,	 Com’s	 distinguishes	
contracts	according	to	ownership	
and	 degree	 of	 risk,	 in	 identifying	
whether	service	station	merely	an	
agent.	 If	 not	 genuine	 agent	 [see	
2009	
                                                 
115 Commission annual report supplement SWP 2009 p. 118-119; (see also Commission annual report 2010 SWP para 403) 
116 Commission annual report supplement SWP 2009 p. 119 
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cases	 above],	 would	 violate	 Art	
101.	 Art	 5(a)	 vertical	 restraints	
BE	 reg	 2790/1999	 –	 exclusivity	
agreements	 only	 exempt	 if	 mkt	
share	less	than	30%,	if	remaining	
duration	on	1	 Jan	2003	 less	 than	
5	 yrs,	 if	 sold	 by	 buyer	 from	
premises	 owned	 by	 supplier	 or	
rented	 to	 3rd	 parties	 not	
connected	 with	 buyer.	 (i.e.	 by	
agent)	 Conditions	 to	 be	
interpreted	 restrictively	 –	 “do	
not	appear	to	have	been	met	in	
this	 case”	 [Com	 makes	 factual	
finding]	
22.	 Dalphi	 Metal	 (as	
above)117	
Spain	 Juzgado	 de	 lo	
Mercantil	 nº4	 of	
Madrid	
Retail	 sale	 of	
automotive	fuel	
See	case	20	above	 Same	 as	 in	 case	 20	 above.	
Communicated	that	same	opinion	
to	the	new	court	
29.3.2010	(2)	
23.	Unknown118	 Belgium	 Tribunal	 de	
Commerce	 de	
Bruxelles/Rechtbank	
van	koophandel	
Brussel	
Smart	 mobile	
phones	
Definition	 of	 relevant	 market,		
Art	102	related	 to	sales	of	 smart	
mobile	 phones.	 Vertical	
distribution	 agreement.	 Refusal	
to	 supply	 and	 discriminatory	
practices.		
Qs:	 assessment	 of	 relevant	
market;	 vertical	 distribution	
agreement	 and	 unilateral	
practices		
Re	 assessment	 of	 the	 relevant	
market,	 Com	 stated	 need	 to	
17.12.2009	
(2)	
                                                 
117  Commission annual report 2010SWP  p. 107-8, para [403] 
118  Commission annual report2010 SWP p. 147, para [402]	 
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts
	
Commission	opinion Commission	
opinion	
sought	(1),	
delivered	
(2),	
judgment	
delivered	(3)	
assess	 degree	 of	 substitutability	
and	 interchangeability	 of	
products.	 Re	 assessment	 of	
dominant	 position	 Com	 referred	
to	 case‐law	 of	 the	 EU	 courts	 [do	
not	know	which].		
Com	 suggested	 court	 should	
examine	whether	different	
treatment	 by	 dominant	
undertaking	 of	 certain	 partners	
distorts	competition	in	the	
retail	 market	 and	 harms	
consumers.	
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Summarising	the	table,	opinions	were	delivered	in	the	following	Member	States:	Spain	
(11),	Belgium	(7),	Sweden	(2),	Lithuania	(2),	The	Netherlands	(1).	The	level	of	court	was:	
Supreme	Court:	2;	Appeal	Court:	10	(although	in	the	Belgian	cases	the	Brussels	Court	of	
Appeal	acted	in	a	domestic	preliminary	reference	capacity);	First	instance	court:	8	(3	
unknown).		
	
	
5.1.1	Content	of	the	opinions	and	implications	for	the	preliminary	reference	procedure	
	
The	preliminary	reference	procedure	has	been	characterised	as	a	dialogue	between	
courts.119	It	might	be	remarkable	that	a	judge	would	seek	an	opinion	or	accept	an	
intervention	from	the	European	Commission	as	a	(supranational)	administrative	body.	
Having	summarised	the	cases	in	which	an	opinion	was	sought,	this	section	drills	deeper	
into	the	detail	of	some	of	those	opinions,	and	consider	the	implications	for	the	preliminary	
reference	procedure.	In	some	opinions,	the	Commission	simply	restates	the	law,	whereas	
in	others	it	appears	to	go	further.	For	example,	in	the	Petrocat	case	(no.	21	in	the	table)	the	
Commission	appears	to	make	a	factual	finding.	
	
For	the	purposes	of	the	Courts	Notice,	‘courts	of	the	Member	States’	are	defined	as	“those	
courts	and	tribunals	within	an	EU	Member	State	that	can	apply	Articles	[101	and	102	
TFEU]	and	that	are	authorised	to	ask	a	preliminary	question	to	the	[CJEU]”.120	So	by	
definition,	courts	requesting	an	opinion	from	the	Commission	under	Art	15	are	also	
entitled	to	request	a	preliminary	reference	from	the	CJEU.	The	way	in	which	the	request	to	
the	Commission	is	suggested	to	be	drafted	bears	striking	similarity	with	requests	to	the	
CJEU.		The	guidance	on	DG	COMP’s	website121	states	that	the	request	should	be	limited	to	
ten	pages,	and	should	state	the	subject	matter	of	the	case,	findings	of	fact	the	court	has	
already	made,	reasons	prompting	the	court’s	request	for	assistance,	a	summary	of	the	
parties’	arguments,	and	the	questions	themselves	in	a	separate	section.	This	guidance,	
even	at	several	points	its	exact	wording,	is	clearly	modelled	on	the	CJEU’s	own	information	
note	on	references	for	a	preliminary	ruling.122	Far	from	some	national	courts	being	
concerned	about	the	Commission	being	too	interventionist,	there	are	reports	that	some	
                                                 
119 K. Alter, ‘Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical 
Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration’ in in A-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J.H.H. Weiler 
(eds), The European Courts and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart, 1997),  227-251 
120 Point 1 of the Court notice 
121 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/requests.html (accessed 13.2.2009) 
122 Information Note on references from national courts for a preliminary ruling, OJ C 160, 28.5.2011, 1 , 
[22]-[24] 
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judges	are	simply	sending	all	the	pleadings	in	the	case	and	asking	the	Commission	to	make	
a	decision123	(for	example,	in	the	Spanish	petrol	cases).	
	
The	scope	of	the	Commission’s	guidance	may	cover	economic	and	factual	questions	in	
addition	to	legal	ones,	and	in	that	sense	has	broader	scope	than	a	preliminary	ruling.	The	
opinions	delivered	so	far	have	covered	both	general	points	of	law	and	sector‐specific	
issues.	For	example,	in	the	Lithuanian	UAB	Tew	Baltija	case	the	Vilnius	District	Court	was	
faced	with	the	compatibility	with	Article	106(1)	and	Article	102	of	a	municipality	carrying	
out	a	public	tender	procedure	for	an	exclusive	15	year	waste	collection	contract.	The	
applicant	in	the	case	had	argued	that	such	long‐term	exclusivity	would	allow	the	tender	
winner	to	abuse	a	dominant	position	by	charging	excessive	prices	to	certain	clients.	The	
Commission	gave	sectoral	advice	in	its	opinion,	referring	to	the	Article	102	waste	
management	cases	of	Københavns124	and	Dusseldorp125,	in	addition	to	the	Commission	
notice	on	the	definition	of	the	relevant	market.	In	the	Københavns	case,	a	breach	of	EU	
competition	rules	was	justified	under	Article	106(2)	TFEU	relating	to	public	undertakings.	
However,	as	well	as	pointing	to	its	existing	notices,	the	Commission	also	commented	on	
the	standard	of	proof	needed	to	establish	abuse	of	a	dominant	position,	stating	that	abuse	
by	the	successful	concession‐holder	would	have	to	be		‘inevitable	or	at	least	the	likely	
result	of	tender	conditions.’126	(emphasis	added)	This	appears	to	stray	onto	the	territory	
of	judicial	deliberation.	
	
In	the	Spanish	courts	there	have	been	a	number	of	cases	on	the	validity	of	supply	contracts	
between	petrol	station	operators	and	oil	companies,	accounting	for	the	vast	majority	of	
Spanish	national	court	judgments	notified	to	the	Commission	post‐2004.127		
As	mentioned	above,	interestingly	at	least	one	Spanish	opinion	sought	was	also	the	subject	
of	a	parallel	preliminary	references	to	the	CJEU.	In	one	of	the	cases,	the	Commission	gave	a	
                                                 
123 E Gippini Fournier, ‘The Modernisation of European Competition Law: First Experiences with 
Regulation 1/2003 (Institutional Report to FIDE Congress 2008) in H F Koeck and M M Karollus (eds) 
FIDE Congress 2008, Vol. 2: The Modernisation of European Competition Law - Initial Experiences 
With Regulation 1/2003 (Nomos / facultas.wuv, 2008), 468 
124 Case C-209/98 Entreprenørforeningens Affalds/Miljøsektion (FFAD) v Københavns Kommune [2000] 
ECR I-3743 
125 Case C-203/96 Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV and Others v Minister van Volkhuisvesting, 
Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer [1998] ECR I-4075 
126 Commission annual report 2005, 77 
127 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/antitrust/nationalcourts/?ms_code=esp (last accessed 
7.9.2012). See also the Spanish NCA annual reports e.g. Annual report of the Comisión Nacional de la 
Competencia 2007, available at: 
http://www.cncompetencia.es/Inicio/ConocerlaCNC/Memorias/tabid/72/Default.aspx (last accessed 
9.9.2012) pp. 50-58, with details of cases notified to the Commission under Art 15(2) Reg 1/2003. 
However, there is no mention of Commission involvement.  For some analysis of court practice see H 
Brokelmann ‘Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC under Regulation 1/2003: The Case of Spain and 
Portugal’ (2006) 29(4) World Competition 535-554 
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definite	statement	of	the	law	–	clauses	providing	for	a	hardcore	restriction	on	resale	price	
maintenance	are	void	if	not	part	of	a	genuine	agency	contract	–	rather	than	indicating	a	
general	analytical	framework.		It	indicated	that	the	CJEU	had	previously	held	that	provided	
it	is	possible	to	sever	the	anticompetitive	provisions	of	a	contract	from	the	rest	of	the	
terms,	the	remainder	of	the	contract	is	still	valid	and	enforceable.	It	was	for	the	national	
court	to	decide	whether	a	clause	it	might	find	void	could	be	severed	from	the	contract	or	
whether	it	vitiated	the	entire	contract	according	to	Member	State’s	contract	law.	128		This	is	
an	example	of	the	Commission	restating	and	clarifying	the	law	rather	than	establishing	
‘rules	of	conduct’	in	the	soft	law	definition.	
	
In	the	Belgian	SABAM	case,	129	the	question	was	whether	a	collecting	society’s	criteria	for	
granting	the	status	of	grand	organisateur	to	certain	commercial	users,	entitling	them	to	a	
rebate	of	50%	on	royalties	payable,	were	compatible	with	Article	102	or	whether	they	
amounted	to	unlawful	discrimination	under	that	article	(102(2)(c)).	The	Commission	
referred	to	its	decisional	practice	in	the	sector,	rehearsing	factors	which	can	be	taken	into	
account	to	assess	whether	the	criteria	themselves,	or	their	application,	may	breach	Article	
102.	But	significantly,	the	opinion	referred	to	Belgian	as	well	as	EU	jurisprudence	on	
dominance.	It	is	rather	unusual	for	a	judge	to	be	educated	in	this	way	on	his	own	Member	
State’s	law.	The	Commission	could	have	been	attempting	to	demonstrate	the	similarity	in	
national	and	Union	law	in	this	area,	making	its	advice	more	likely	to	be	accepted.	It	also	
explicitly	stated	that	its	opinion	was	not	binding	and	was	only	valid	where	trade	between	
Member	States	was	likely	to	be	affected	by	the	practices	alleged.130			
	
The	mechanism	is	couched	in	terms	of	assistance	to	the	national	court,	rather	than	the	
Commission	exercising	its	power	to	issue	an	opinion	as	under	Article	211	EC.	This	is	
especially	true	given	that	judges	can	find	existing	guidance	in	case	law,	Commission	
regulations,	decisions,	notices,	and	guidelines,	while	still	upholding	their	independence.	
Nevertheless,	how	the	Commission’s	interpretation	of	the	law	is	treated	by	the	national	
judge,	and	consequently	its	legal	effect,	is	relevant	to	both	Article	15	tools.		
	
On	the	evidence	of	the	opinions	so	far,	national	courts	have	not	raised	only	points	of	
clarification	or	sought	advice	on	novel	issues,	nor	used	the	opportunity	simply	to	ascertain	
whether	the	Commission	has	initiated	proceedings	in	a	case.		
                                                 
128 Case C-56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235 and Case C-319/82 
Société de Vente de Ciments et Bétons de L’Est v Kerpen & Kerpen GmbH [1983] ECR 4173. See R 
Whish & D Bailey, Competition Law (OUP, 7th edn, 2012), 322 for a discussion. 
129 2004-MR-7 SABAM contre Productions et Marketing    
130 Mentioned in Brussels Court of Appeal’s judgment 2004-MR-7 SABAM contre Productions et 
Marketing, 2005/7059, 3 November 2005, 6 
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For	its	part,	it	is	notable	that	in	all	the	opinions	given,	the	Commission	indicates	existing	
case	law	and	guidelines	even	though	the	opinion	mechanism	was	intended	for	situations	
where	existing	guidelines	do	not	offer	sufficient	guidance	(according	to	paragraph	27	of	
the	Courts	Notice).	It	could	be	argued	that	the	Commission	is	not	seeking	to	be	too	
interventionist,	but	only	to	summarise	the	applicable	law	for	the	court.	Indeed,	there	is	
anecdotal	evidence	that	there	have	been	cases	where	the	Commission	has	refused	to	give	
an	opinion,	especially	where	the	request	was	made	by	a	lower	court.131	However,	in	some	
cases	it	does	go	further	–	as	discussed	above,	in	the	Lithuanian	case	it	commented	on	
standard	of	proof,	and	it	indicated	Belgian	domestic	competition	law	provisions	in	SABAM.		
	
Leaving	aside	the	Commission’s	own‐initiative	interventions	under	Article	15(3),	from	the	
perspective	of	incentives	and	preferences	of	judges,	132	referring	to	the	Commission	under	
Article	15(1)	is	less	drastic	and	disruptive	to	proceedings	than	a	reference	to	the	CJEU.		
An	obvious	advantage	of	consulting	the	Commission	rather	than	the	CJEU	is	a	practical	
issue	of	time	constraints	–	whereas	the	indicative	deadline	for	provision	of	an	opinion	is	
four	months,	a	preliminary	ruling	can	take	at	least	a	year.	A	shorter	stay	of	proceedings	is	
much	less	disruptive	to	the	case.	For	example,	the	Spanish	Supreme	Court	referred	
preliminary	questions	in	the	context	of	the	petrol	station	cases	in	March	2005,	on	resale	
price	maintenance	in	exclusive	fuel	purchasing	agreements,	and	agency	contracts	between	
service	station	operators	and	oil	companies,	in	particular	whether	petrol	stations	should	
be	regarded	as	resellers	or	agents.133	The	CJEU’s	ruling	was	delivered	in	December	2006,	
at	least	a	year	after	the	questions	put	to	the	Commission	in	the	same	case.		
	
Another	advantage	in	seeking	a	Commission	opinion	is	the	lack	of	admissibility	issues,	as	
any	court	or	tribunal	may	ask	advice	on	a	broad	range	of	economic,	factual	or	legal	
questions.	It	may	also	contribute	to	relieving	the	caseload	of	the	Union	Courts.	Given	the	
heavy	caseload,	the	CJEU	has	itself	tried	to	limit	unnecessary	references,	encouraging	self‐
restraint	of	national	courts.134	In	respect	of	lower	courts’	discretionary	references,	
Advocate	General	Jacobs	in	the	Wiener	case	suggested	that	lower	courts	should	only	refer	
                                                 
131 Global Competition Review Report: Modernisation in Europe 2005, country report on Germany, 55, 
response to question 29. 
132 W Mattli and A-M Slaughter, ‘The Role of National Courts in the Process of European Integration: 
Accounting for Judicial Preferences and Constraints’ in in A-M Slaughter,  A Stone Sweet and J Weiler 
(eds), The European Courts and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart, 1997), 253-276 
133 Case C-217/05 Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v Compañía 
Española de Petróleos SA [2007] 4 CMLR 5. The court stipulated that a resale price maintenance clause 
was not covered by block exemption. 
134 Another way of limiting preliminary references is through the admissibility criteria, such as the 
meaning of a court or tribunal. The way in which the CJEU limits references from quasi-judicial bodies, 
including competition authorities, was explored in the previous chapter. 
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where	there	was	a	question	of	general	importance	likely	to	promote	uniform	application	
of	law	throughout	the	EU.	135	Obligatory	references	from	the	highest	courts	are	
constrained	by	the	acte	éclairé	and	acte	clair	conditions	in	CILFIT.136		
	
Faced	with	these	messages,	the	possibility	to	ask	the	Commission	for	advice	may	actually	
empower	lower	courts.	This	relates	to	Member	States’	domestic	institutional	relationships	
between	executive	agencies	and	the	judiciary.	By	asking	for	information	directly	from	the	
Commission,	a	national	court,	if	it	so	wishes,	can	bypass	its	own	NCA,	which	could	
otherwise	raise	the	case	relatively	informally	within	the	European	Competition	Network.	
National	judges	may	be	more	comfortable	with	obtaining	information	themselves	
independently	rather	than	through	an	intermediary.	On	the	other	hand,	if	there	is	already	
such	a	tradition	in	national	procedural	law,	it	may	mean	that	Article	15	of	the	Regulation	is	
used	more	readily	in	those	Member	States.	Most	Member	States	have	provision	in	their	
national	law	for	the	NCA	to	become	involved	or	give	advice	in	private	enforcement	
cases.137	As	noted	above,	in	the	Regulation	1/2003	negotiations,	some	Member	States	had	
proposed	that	their	national	competition	authorities	act	as	intermediaries	between	the	
courts	and	the	Commission.138		
	
As	revealed	by	the	Commission	staff	working	paper	on	Art	15(3)	discussed	above,	one	
intended	purpose	of	the	amicus	curiae	mechanism	in	the	EU’s	decentralised	competition	
regime	was	to	alert	judges	to	decisions	in	other	Member	State	courts.139	A	similar	effect	
could	result	through	the	information	passed	in	opinions.	This	could	create	an	informal	
network,	through	a	flow	of	cooperation	vertically	up	between	the	Commission	and	a	
Member	State	court	and	back	down	to	another	Member	State	judge.	Until	judges	have	
effective	direct	horizontal	links	with	each	other,	cooperation	could	be	strengthened	
through	vertical	links	with	the	Commission.		The	Commission	and	NCAs	are	to	inform	each	
                                                 
135 Case C-338/95 Wiener v Hauptzollamt Emmerich [1997] ECR I-6495, at 18 
136 Case 283/81 CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 3415. Acte 
éclairé means it is not necessary to refer if a “materially identical” matter has already been decided by the 
Court of Justice. Acte clair means that the court does not need to refer if the answer to the question is “so 
obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt”. 
137 ECN convergence survey as at 14 April 2008: ‘ECN Working Group on Cooperation Issues - Results 
of the questionnaire on the reform of Member States’ national competition laws after EC Regulation No. 
1/2003.’p. 8, answer to Q13, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/ecn_convergencequest_April2008.pdf  
138 Document: 5158/01 Secretariat to delegations, 11.1.2001 (for: Germany, Denmark, Luxembourg, 
Austria, Sweden – but Denmark requests that in normal circumstances NCAs should represent the 
Commission in national court proceedings. Conversely Germany requests that NCAs submit observations 
independently and not as the representative of the Commission. Document: 8383/1/02 (Spanish) 
Presidency to COREPER, 27.5.2002: France requests that the Commission be authorized to make written 
observations to the national court only via the national competition authority. 
139 Commission Staff Working Paper: Reform of Regulation 17 – The proposal for a new implementing 
regulation – Article 15(3) submissions as amicus curiae, SEC (2001) 1827, 13.11.2001  
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other	through	the	ECN	if	they	intervene	with	an	amicus	brief	in	any	case,	indirectly	linking	
national	courts	with	the	ECN.	
	
In	this	way	it	could	succeed	in	aligning	national	court	decisional	practice	with	that	of	
national	competition	authorities	linked	through	the	ECN,	minimising	divergent	application	
between	public	and	private	competition	enforcers.		The	proposal	to	allow	the	binding	
effect	of	NCA	infringement	decisions	throughout	all	Member	States	contained	in	the	
European	Commission	White	Paper	on	damages	actions,	placing	NCA	decisions	on	a	par	
with	those	of	the	Commission,	could	contribute	to	this	effect.		One	criticism	of	the	
proposal,	however,	is	that	it	implies	a	hierarchy	of	public	enforcement	over	private	
enforcement	in	the	courts.140	This	is	discussed	in	the	following	chapter.	
	
The	implication	of	Masterfoods,	and	explicit	in	recital	13	of	the	notice	on	cooperation	
between	the	Commission	and	national	courts,	is	that	a	court	–	even	a	lower	court	‐		must	
refer	a	question	to	the	CJEU	if	it	intends	to	take	a	decision	counter	to	one	taken	by	the	
Commission.	In	this	way	it	imposes	a	stricter	requirement	than	the	discretionary	reference	
under	Article	267	TFEU	–	it	elevates	the	discretionary	reference	of	lower	courts	to	a	
mandatory	reference.	Article	16	of	Regulation	1/2003	codifies	the	Masterfoods	ruling,	that	
a	national	court	or	competition	authority	may	not	take	a	decision	contrary	to	one	already	
made	or	contemplated	by	the	Commission.	A	national	court	may	therefore	decide	to	stay	
proceedings	and	refer	a	preliminary	question	to	the	ECJ.	This	is	urged	more	strongly	in	the	
Courts	notice,	recital	13:	“…if	a	national	court	intends	to	take	a	decision	that	runs	counter	
to	that	of	the	Commission,	it	must	refer	a	question	to	the	Court	of	Justice	for	a	preliminary	
ruling…”141	
	
It	remains	to	be	seen	whether	national	judges	will	make	more	use	of	Commission	opinions	
as	an	alternative	to	preliminary	references,	or	will	use	the	two	mechanisms	concurrently	
as	in	the	Spanish	cases.	As	discussed	above,	a	Commission	opinion	could	become	binding	
indirectly	through	the	national	court’s	judgment	if	it	transposes	the	Commission’s	advice.	
This	may	be	likely,	for	instance,	where	the	judge	is	less	experienced	in	competition	law	or	
at	judging	economic	evidence,	where	the	court	is	more	willing	to	apply	an	interpretation	
                                                 
140 See A Komninos “Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? Overlap?” 
(2006) 3(1) Competition Law Review 5-26, 26, who opposes the proposal on the grounds that it would 
create a false hierarchy of public over private enforcement. Note too that NCAs are bound only by 
existing decisions of the Commission, not envisaged ones (article 16(2) of the Modernisation Regulation) 
– could this be evidence of a public over private enforcement hierarchy, or does it merely reflect the 
reality of structured cooperation within the ECN? 
141 Ultimately, if the highest court does not refer the Member State could incur State liability - remedies 
in national courts: C-6/90 Francovich and Others v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357; C-224/01 
Köbler v Austria [2003] ECR I-10239 
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of	Union	law	by	a	Union	institution	(albeit	from	the	Commission	rather	than	the	CJEU),	or	
for	reasons	of	convenience	–	if	the	Commission’s	‘expert’	interpretation	seems	reasonable,	
there	may	be	little	incentive	to	look	for	an	alternative.	In	addition,	the	national	judge	could	
use	the	opinion	for	interpretation	of	other,	either	national	or	EU,	obligations	or	
instruments.	Whereas	the	judgment	would	be	effective	between	the	parties,	a	more	
universal	effect	could	result	if	a	principle	expressed	in	a	Commission	opinion	is	then	used	
in	subsequent	cases	in	the	national	case	law.142		
	
	
5.1.2 Rights	of	the	parties	
	
In	requesting	a	Commission	opinion	under	Art	15(1),	the	national	judge	acts	as	a	
gatekeeper	in	the	same	way	as	s/he	does	when	deciding	whether	to	request	a	CJEU	
preliminary	reference.	That	is,	the	interested	party	needs	to	persuade	the	judge	of	the	
need	for	such	a	request.	Article	15	does	not	grant	rights	to	individuals.	This	is	evident	from	
some	national	cases.	
	
In	Brasseries	Kronenbourg,143	a	beer	ties	case,	the	bar	tenant	respondent,	JBEG,	requested	
that	the	proceedings	be	stayed	to	seek	the	Commission’s	opinion	on	whether	the	
cumulative	effect	of	agreements	in	a	national	market	amounts	to	an	effect	on	trade	
between	Member	States;	and	whether	the	distribution	agreement	in	question	was	covered	
by	block	exemption	Regulation	2790/99.	The	judge	refused	the	respondent’s	request,	on	
the	basis	that	national	courts	are	themselves	empowered	under	Article	6	of	Reg	1/2003	to	
apply	EU	competition	rules.144	Similarly	in	the	Belgian	Lust/	Daimler	Chrysler	case,	the	
claimant	requested	the	Commercial	Court	to	ask	for	the	Commission’s	assistance.	The	
Court	refused	as	the	Commission	had	previously	rejected	a	complaint	from	the	claimant	
due	to	lack	of	Community	interest.	145	In	Rutamar	the	claimant	requested	a	question	to	the	
Commission	but	the	court	did	not	think	it	necessary,	citing	similar	cases	of	the	Supreme	
                                                 
142 In the national context, the Dutch competition authority’s amicus curiae guidelines acknowledge that 
“The contents of these interventions are…of importance not only to the parties involved in the court 
proceedings…but also to other undertakings”: Nederlandse Mededingings Autoriteit Amicus Curiae 
Guidelines (2004), para[38]. Available at: http://www.nma.nl/images/Richtsnoeren_Amicus_Curiae22-
157243.pdf  (last accessed 7.9.2012) 
143 Case 02/01205Brasseries Kronenbourg v SARL JBEG, , Strasbourg Tribunal de Grand Instance (first 
instance civil court, commercial chamber), judgment of 4.2.2005. 
144 Supplement to Commission annual report 2005, p. 152-153 
145 Case n° A/03/1022, Decision n° 4646 SPRL Lust automobiles and Paul Lust v. DaimlerChrysler AG 
Stuttgart and SA DaimlerChrysler Belgium Luxembourg Tribunal de commerce de Mons (Commercial 
Court of Mons), judgment of  23.12.2004, See J Derenne & W Broere ‘The Belgium Commercial Court 
assesses the validity of an alleged anticompetitive car distribution agreement on the basis of Art. 81 EC 
and the EC block exemption regulation (Daimler-Chrysler)’ 23 December 2004, e-Competitions, 
N°30700, www.concurrences.com 
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Court	on	service	station	agency	agreements.		It	also	stated	that,	in	any	event,	the	
Commission’s	criteria	were	not	binding	on	the	court.146	Conversely,	in	a	Belgian	case	on	
beer	supply	exclusivity	agreements,	the	Antwerp	Court	of	Appeal	in	an	interim	ruling	
invited	the	parties	to	adopt	a	position	on	requesting	a	Commission	opinion	under	Art	
15(1),	suggesting	that	it	was	open	to	negotiation	and	that	the	parties’	wishes	were	
paramount.147	The	principle	of	equivalence	with	national	law	ironically	means	that	parties’	
rights	to	be	heard	on	European	Commission	interventions	may	vary	across	the	Union.	
	
	
5.2		Cases	in	which	the	Commission	intervened	at	its	own	initiative:	Art	15(3)	Reg	1/2003	
	
I	also	investigate	cases	where	the	Commission	has	intervened	at	its	own	initiative	as	
amicus	curiae	under	Art	15(3),	and	its	reasons	for	doing	so.	Table	2	below	summarises	the	
nine	cases.148	The	reasons	for	intervening	and	the	impact	of	the	judgment	in	some	of	the	
cases	are	analysed	in	more	detail	below.	
                                                 
146 Spanish annual report 2005, p. 143: Case 578/2003 Rutamur, SA v Repsol Comercial de Productos 
Petrolíferos SA, Audiencia Provincial de Madrid (secc. n° 21), 5.7.2005 - appeal against the sentence of 
the Court of 1st Instance nº 26, Madrid  
147 DG COMP report ‘Overview of the application of the EC competition rules by national courts in 
2006’, 2. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/elojade/antitrust/nationalcourts/Overview+of+the+application+of+
the+EC+competition+rules.pdf (accessed 23.2.2009) 
148 This number of  own-initiative interventions is confirmed in the 2011 Annual Report on Competition 
Policy, p. 15 
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TABLE	2:	European	Commission	own‐initiative	interventions	in	national	court	proceedings	under	Art	15(3)	Regulation	1/2003	
	
Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts/context Commission	
intervention	and	
reasons	
Commission	
intervention;	
judgment	
delivered		
1.	Garage	Grémeau	v	
Daimler	Chrysler	
188/07;	file	number	
05/17909149	
	
France	 Paris	Court	of	Appeal	
(Cour	d’Appel)	
Car	dealerships
(distribution)	
Vertical	distribution	agreements	
Daimler	Chrysler	France’s	refusal	
to	renew	an	agreement	with	
Grémeau,	a	car	dealer.		
					Court	of	Appeal	did	not	rule	on	
the	merits	but	suspended	the	case	
pending	criminal	proceedings	
brought	by	Daimler	Chrysler	
against	Garage	Grémeau	for	
forgery	and	fraud.	
	
	
	
Oral	as	well	as	written	
observations.	To	
influence	whether	
injunction	to	be	
granted	(while	
stressing	national	
procedural	
autonomy…).	
Potential	erroneous	
interpretation	of	
quantitative	selective	
distribution	scheme	
by	the	commercial	
chamber	of	the	French	
Supreme	Court	(Cour	
de	Cassation)	earlier	
(28.6.2005)	in	the	
case,	on	appeal	from	
the	Cour	d’appel	de	
Dijon	‐		requiring	
suppliers	to	apply	
2.11.2006	(Com	
intervention)	
7.6.2007	(Court	
judgment)	
	
                                                 
149 Commission annual report 2006, p. 33 (unnamed); SWP SEC (2007) 860, 25.7.2007 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2006/part2_en.pdf  
(accessed 3.8.2010),   (which includes annual report p. 124-125 (unnamed); FIDE 2008 France country report, p. 101, FIDE institutional 2008 report p. 468; Commission staff 
working paper SEC (2009) 574 accompanying Commission report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003, COM (2009) 206 final, p. 81-82; see case notes by J Philippe and F 
Kramer in e-Competitions, October 2007-II; and N Lenoir, D Roskis and Ch M Doremus in e-Competitions December 2007-I for a fuller discussion of the case; interlocutory court 
judgment 7.6.2007 available in DG COMP national court judgments database at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/national_courts/court_2007_20_fr.pdf  (accessed 
16.8.2010); Dijon Court of Appeal case mentioned in Commission annual report supplement 2005: application of the EC competition rules by Member States, p.57 
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts/context Commission	
intervention	and	
reasons	
Commission	
intervention;	
judgment	
delivered		
objective	criteria	for	
selection	of	dealers	
even	where	they	use	
only	a	quantitative,	as	
opposed	to	
qualitative,	selection	
system.		Qualitative	
and	quantitative	
selective	distribution	
in	the	framework	of	
the	new	block	
exemption	regulation	
1400/2002	
2.	Pierre	Fabré	Dermo‐
Cosmétique	
08‐D‐25	RG	
2008/23812150		
France	 Paris	Court	of	Appeal	
(Cour	d’Appel)	
Selective	
distribution	
agreements	‐
internet	sales	of	
cosmetics	
French	competition	authority	had	
found	that	the	cosmetic	
manufacturer’s	practice	of	banning	
its	distributors	from	selling	over	
the	internet	in	its	selective	
distribution	agreements	breached	
Article	101	TFEU	and	the	French	
provisions.	Context	of	appeal.	
	
		
Commission	
supported	French	NCA	
that	the	conduct	
amounted	to	a	
hardcore	restriction	
within	the	meaning	of	
block	exemption	
regulation,	unless	
objectively	justified	by	
exceptional	
circumstances.	
However,	the	
Commission	also	
11.6.2009	(Com	
intervention)	
29.10.2009	
(court	judgment)		
	
Paris	Court	
referred	to	
CJEU	after	
Com’s	
intervention	
	
Prelim	ruling	to	
CJEU,	C‐439/09	
                                                 
150 Commission annual report 2009, p. 120; FIDE 2010 institutional report p. 42-4; L Ferchiche, ‘A French Court of Appeal makes a reference for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ on 
whether a general and absolute ban on Internet sales by approved distributors does constitute a “hardcore restriction” on competition by object within the meaning of Art. 81.1 EC 
(Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique)’, 29 October 2009, e-Competitions, n°29700; ECN brief 1/2010, pp. 17-18 
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts/context Commission	
intervention	and	
reasons	
Commission	
intervention;	
judgment	
delivered		
opined	that	although	
it	was	a	hardcore	
restriction	by	object,	it	
may	still	be	possible	
to	qualify	for	
exemption	under	
Article	101(3)	
lodged	on	
10.11.2009		and	
delivered	
13.10.2011.	Com	
brief	mentioned	
at	[30].	CJEU’s	
conclusion	was	
in	line	with	the	
Commission’s.	
3.	X	BV	v	Inspecteur	
Belastingdienst	
06/00252,	LJN	BB3356	
(First	instance	in	Haarlem	
District	Court,	22.5.2006,	
AWB	05/1452,	LJN	
AX7112)	
08/01180,	LJN:	BL7052151	
Netherlands	 Amsterdam	Court	of	
Appeal	(first	
instance	in	Haarlem	
District	Court	
Rechtbank)	
Gerechtshof	
Amsterdam.	
	
Tax Whether	fines	imposed	for	breach	
of	EU	competition	law	tax	
deductible	from	profits.	In	
domestic	tax,	punitive	and	benefit‐
depriving	elements	of	a	fine.	
To	safeguard	
effectiveness	and	
deterrence	of	fines	
	
Preliminary	reference:	
whether	the	
Commission	can	
intervene	with	Article	
15(3)	observations	
only	where	the	
national	case	involves	
direct	application	of	
Article	101	and	102	
TFEU.		
Intervention	
attempted	
12.9.2007.	
	
24.9.2009	(Com	
intervention	date	
claimed	on	
website.	This	
could	relate	to	
when	the	
intervention	was	
finally	accepted	
following	
preliminary	
reference.)	
	
Preliminary	ref	
                                                 
151 www.rechtspraak.nl Dutch court judgments database; FIDE Netherlands report 2008, p. 217, FIDE 2008 institutional report, p. 468, 470; FIDE 2010 institutional report (A 
Bouquet ‘Institutional Report’ in G C Rodriguez Iglesias & L Ortiz Blanco (eds) The Judicial Application of Competition Law: Proceedings of the FIDE XXIV Congress Madrid 
2010 Vol 2 (Servicio de Publicaciones de la Facultad de Derecho, Complutense University, Madrid 2010) p. 42-43, Staff working paper on 2009 Commission report functioning of 
Reg 1/2003, p. 82-83; Commission annual report 2009, p. 40-41, 120; ECN brief 2/2010 , p. 15-16; Commission annual report 2010 para [147]  re intervention in Supreme Court 
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts/context Commission	
intervention	and	
reasons	
Commission	
intervention;	
judgment	
delivered		
to	CJEU		
C‐429/07		
8.12.2007;	
CJEU	ruling	
11.6.2009.	152		
	
Judgment	
delivered	in	
Amsterdam	
Court	of	Appeal	
11.3.2010	in	line	
with	Com	
opinion	as	to	
result,	but	it	is	
not	explicitly	
mentioned	‐	
Art.3.14.	of	the	
Income	Tax	Act	
2001	does	not	
allow	a	
distinction	
between	
deductible	and	
non‐deductible	
punitive	and	
benefit‐
depriving	
portions.	
Therefore	fines	
                                                 
152 C-429/07 Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst v X BV [2009] 5 CMLR 1745 (not yet reported in ECR) 
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts/context Commission	
intervention	and	
reasons	
Commission	
intervention;	
judgment	
delivered		
imposed	by	the	
Commission	for	
a	cartel	law	
infringement	are	
not	deductible	
from	taxes	in	
domestic	law.		
But	4.3.2	“no	
matter	whether	
it	is	a	fine	from	
the	European	
Commission	or	
the	Dutch	
competition	
authority”..		
4.	X	BV	(see	above)
10/01358,	LJN:	BO6770	
Hoge	Raad153	
	 Dutch	Supreme	
Court	(Hoge	Raad)	
post‐preliminary	
reference	in	the	
Amsterdam	Appeal	
Court	
See	above		
	
	
See	above
Ensuring	Court	of	
Appeal’s	judgment	not	
overturned154	
16.12.2010	(Com	
intervention)	
12.8.2011	
(Supreme	Court	
judgment	–	
appeal	
unfounded)		
5.	Beef	Industry	
Development	Society	
Competition	Authority	‐v‐	
Beef	Industry	
Development	Society	Ltd	
Ireland	 Irish	High	Court Beef Agreement	among	beef	processors	
in	Ireland	to	reduce	capacity	by	
25%	(by	getting	some	processors	
to	leave	market	in	return	for	
payment).	Previous	prelim	ref	
Ensuring	High	Court	
followed	CJEU’s	
preliminary	ruling	re	
whether	101(3)	
satisfied.156		
C‐209/07	Beef	
Industry	
Development	
Society	and	
Barry	Brothers	
                                                 
153 Available at www.rechtspraak.nl Opinion of A-G Wattel 16.11.2010. Final judgment 12.8.2011 (published 18.4.2012)  
154 Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Report from the Commission on Competition Policy 2010 {COM(2011) 328 final} SEC(2011) 690 final Brussels 10.6.2011,	
p.	409 
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts/context Commission	
intervention	and	
reasons	
Commission	
intervention;	
judgment	
delivered		
&	Another	[2006]	IEHC	
294	(27	July	2006)155	
	
from	Irish	Supreme	Court	to	CJEU	
in	March	2007,	prelim	ruling	in	
Nov	2008	confirmed	was	an	object	
agreement.	Irish	Supreme	Court	
therefore	found	breach	of	Art	
101(1)	in	Nov	2009,	remitted	to	
High	Court	to	consider	whether	Art	
101(3)	satisfied.	
	
	
	
CJEU	case	law	
Commission's	2004	
Guidelines	on	the	
application	of	Article	
101(3)	TFEU.	
	
[2008]	ECR	I‐
8637,	judgment	
20.11.2008.		
	
30.3.2010	(Com	
intervention)	
	Case	in	Irish	
High	Court	
withdrawn	by	
NCA	after	BIDS	
withdrawn	its	
claim	for	
exemption	on	
efficiency	
grounds	under	
101(3)	in	Jan	
2011.	
6.	ZS	Cargo	
Železničná	spoločnosť	
Cargo	Slovakia,	a.s157	
Slovakia	 Najvyšší	súd	
Slovenskej	
Republiky	
(Slovakian	Supreme	
Court)	
Rail	transport Art	102.	Economic	succession	and	
effectiveness	of	fines.		
	
To	ensure	
effectiveness	of	fines	
and	principle	of	
economic	succession	–	
liability.		Punishment	
and	deterrence.	No	
25.6.2010	(Com	
intervention)	
20.10.2010	
27.2.2012?	
(Court	
judgment)		
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
156 Commission	annual	report	2010	staff	working	paper,	p.	405 
155 2010 annual report para 147; SWP 2010 annual report p. 108, para 405; FIDE 2010 institutional report, p. 42-43; ECN brief 2/2010 announcing the Commission’s intention to 
intervene, p. 16; FIDE 2008 Ireland country report, p. 183-185 on the Competition Authority’s original case before the Irish High Court. 
157 Commission annual report 2010 para 147; staff working paper 2010, p. 108-9, paras 406-408; FIDE 2010 institutional report p. 42. On the Commission’s intervention: ECN brief 
05/2010 available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/05_2010/sk_cargo.pdf (accessed 14.1.2010).  On the Supreme Court’s judgment: ECN brief 02/2012 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/02_2012/sk_cargo.pdf (accessed 26.6.2012). Slovak NCA annual report 2010 p. 25-26. 
http://www.antimon.gov.sk/files/26/2011/VS%20PMÚ%20SR%202010.pdf (accessed 30.7.2011) 
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts/context Commission	
intervention	and	
reasons	
Commission	
intervention;	
judgment	
delivered		
reduction	of	fine	
purely	because	firm	is	
successor	company	to	
one	which	committed	
the	infringement	
	
Supreme	Court	
annulled	decision	of	
Regional	Court,	
upheld	fine	imposed	
by	the	Slovak	
Antimonopoly	Office	
Supreme	Court	
followed	Com’s	
arguments	
7.	Orange	Caraïbe158 France	 Cour	de	Cassation	
(French	Supreme	
Court)	
Mobile	
telephony	
Practices	by	France	Telecom	and	
affiliate	Orange	Caraïbe	in	French	
overseas	territories	in	Caribbean.	
French	NCA	fined	them	for	breach	
of	Art	101	and	102	TFEU.	Paris	
Court	of	Appeal	ruled	no	effect	on	
trade	between	Member	States	and	
annulled.	
	
	
	
Com	intervened	to	
support	French	NCA’s	
fine,	to	safeguard	EU	
jurisdiction	–	national	
court	defining	‘effect	
on	trade	between	
Member	States’	
narrowly.	Com	
referred	to	its	
guidelines	on	effect	on	
trade	concept,	
particularly	parts	on	
how	principle	applies	
when	practices	affect	
only	part	of	a	Member	
13.10.2011	(Com	
intervention)	
31.1.2011	(court	
judgment)		
	
Supreme	Court	
followed	Com’s	
interpretation	
Annulled	
decision	of	the	
Paris	Appeal	
Court	and	sent	
back	to	the	Court	
for	a	second	
review	
                                                 
158 Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Report from the Commission on Competition Policy 2011 {COM(2012) 253 final},  
 Brussels, 30.5.2012 SWD(2012) 141 final, p. 15, fn 48 – not identified in the annual report  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2011/part2_en.pdf (accessed 
26.6.2012). The case is identified at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_amicus_curiae.html,  
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts/context Commission	
intervention	and	
reasons	
Commission	
intervention;	
judgment	
delivered		
State.	
		
8.	National	Grid	Electricity	
Transmission	Plc	v	ABB	
Ltd	and	other	companies	
[2011] EWHC 1717 (Ch) 
	159	
	
United	
Kingdom	
High	Court Energy In	the	context	of	a	damages	action	
brought	by	National	Grid,	UK	
utility	company	against	a	number	
of	companies	(ABB,	Siemens,	
Alstom	and	Areva)	that	were	held	
liable	by	the	Commission	in	2007	
for	their	participation	in	the	Gas	
Insulated	Switchgear	(GIS)	cartel.	
National	Grid	sought	access	to	
information	from	those	companies’	
leniency	applications	to	the	
Commission	to	assist	in	its	
damages	claim	against	them.	
Aftermath	of	CJEU’s	preliminary	
reference	in	C‐360/09	Pfleiderer,	
in	which	it	ruled	it	was	up	to	
national	courts	to	decide	whether	
leniency	documents	should	be	
disclosed	in	the	context	of	damages	
claims	by	private	parties,	balancing	
the	rights	of	damages	claimants	
and	leniency	applicants.			
	
Intervened	to	
safeguard	leniency	
programme.		
Com	stated	that	the	
weighing	of	the	
different	interests	
implied	that	the	
information	
specifically	prepared	
for	the	purpose	of	an	
application	under	its	
leniency	programme	
should	not	be	
disclosed.		
	
	
3.11.2011	(Com	
intervention)	
4.4.2012	(court	
judgment)	
High	Court	at	
[39]applied	a	
proportionality	
test	asking	(a)	
whether	the	info	
could	be	
obtained	from	
other	sources	
and	(b)	
relevance	of	
leniency	
materials	to	the	
case	as	info	
could	not	be	
gained	
elsewhere	it	
allowed	
disclosure	of	a	
limited	part	of	
the	confidential	
version	of	the	
Commission	
                                                 
159 Staff working paper on annual report 2011, p. 15, fn 49 – not identified in the annual report http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2011/part2_en.pdf 
(accessed 26.6.2012). The case is identified at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_amicus_curiae.html,  
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Case	name	 Member	
State	
	
Court
	
Sector
	
Facts/context Commission	
intervention	and	
reasons	
Commission	
intervention;	
judgment	
delivered		
decision.	
Therefore	did	
not	entirely	
follow	
Commission’s	
opinion.		
	
9.	Unknown160	 Austria	 unknown unknown unknown	 Parallel	application	of	
EU	and	national	law:	
“In	its	observations,	
the	Commission	
argued	that	the	
effective	enforcement	
of	Article	101	TFEU	
would	be	hindered	if	a	
judgment	would	have	
as	its	subject	matter	
solely	national	law	
and	be	entirely	silent	
on	the	(non)‐
applicability	of	EU	
law,	as	this	could	be	
deemed	as	an	
assurance	for	
undertakings	that	a	
cartel	does	not	
infringe	Article	101(1)	
TFEU”	
2011
	
                                                 
160 Staff working paper on annual report 2011, p. 15 fn 47 – not identified http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2011/part2_en.pdf (accessed 26.6.2012) 
148 
 
5.2.1 Reasons	for	intervening	
	
Art	15(3)	empowers	the	Commission	to	intervene	“where	the	coherent	application	of	
Article	[101]	or	[102	TFEU]	so	requires”.	In	X	BV,	discussed	in	detail	below,	‘coherent’	was	
construed	broadly	to	mean	effective	application.	Under	this	umbrella	of	effectiveness,	
there	were	various	reasons	for	intervening	in	the	case	identified	in	Table	2.		
	
A	number	of	amicus	curiae	submissions	so	far	have	been	related	to	block	or	individual	
exemptions	which,	pre‐reform,	would	have	been	in	the	sole	jurisdiction	of	the	
Commission.	Garage	Grémeau	in	the	Paris	Court	of	Appeal	was	the	first	case	in	which	the	
Commission	intervened	under	Art	15(3),	with	oral	as	well	as	written	observations.	It	
concerned	vertical	agreements	in	the	car	sector,	and	Daimler	Chrysler’s	refusal	to	renew	
its	distribution	deal	with	Garage	Grémeau.	The	Commission	appears	to	have	intervened	to	
influence	whether	or	not	an	injunction	should	be	granted	(whilst	stressing	national	
procedural	autonomy).		It	centred	on	the	French	Supreme	Court’s	earlier	interpretation	of	
the	quantitative	selective	distribution	scheme.161	It	seems	the	Commission	took	this	as	an	
important	opportunity	to	step	in	to	clarify	and	safeguard	the	uniform	interpretation	of	
block	exemptions	in	the	car	sector	following	the	decentralisation	of	Article	101(3).		As	its	
2006	Annual	Report	on	Competition	suggests,	the	Commission’s	goal	was	also	to	
encourage	a	preliminary	reference	to	the	CJEU	for	a	binding	ruling.162			
	
In	National	Grid	in	the	English	High	Court	the	Commission	intervened	to	safeguard	its	
leniency	programme.		This	was	in	the	context	of	a	damages	action	brought	by	National	
Grid	against	a	number	of	companies	(ABB,	Siemens,	Alstom	and	Areva)	that	were	held	
liable	by	the	Commission	in	2007	for	their	participation	in	the	Gas	Insulated	Switchgear	
(GIS)	cartel.	The	claimant	was	seeking	access	to	leniency	documents.	The	CJEU	had	ruled	
in	the	Pfleiderer163	case	shortly	beforehand	that	it	was	up	to	national	courts	to	decide	
whether	leniency	documents	should	be	disclosed	in	the	context	of	damages	claims	by	
private	parties,	balancing	the	rights	of	damages	claimants	and	leniency	applicants.		There	
was	general	alarm	that	this	would	jeopardise	competition	enforcement	by	discouraging	
cartel	members	from	blowing	the	whistle	on	each	other	to	a	competition	authority	if	they	
are	then	going	to	be	liable	for	damages	in	a	private	action.	The	Commission	said	in	its	
amicus	curiae	observation	that	the	weighing	of	the	different	interests	implied	that	the	
                                                 
161 See case notes by J Philippe and F. Kramer in e-Competitions, October 2007-II; and N Lenoir, D 
Roskis and Ch M Doremus in e-Competitions December 2007-I for a fuller discussion of the case 
162 Annual Report on Competition Policy 2006 Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2007) 860, 
25.7.2007, 90. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2006/part2_en.pdf  
(accessed 3.8.2010) 
163 C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-0000 
149 
 
information	specifically	prepared	for	the	purpose	of	an	application	under	its	leniency	
programme	should	not	be	disclosed.		
	
In	Orange	Caraïbe,	concerning	mobile	telephony	in	French	overseas	territories,	the	
Commission	intervened	to	safeguard	EU	jurisdiction.	The	Paris	Court	of	Appeal	had	
overturned	the	fine	of	the	French	competition	authority	for	breach	of	Arts	101	and	102	
TFEU.	The	national	court	defined	‘effect	on	trade	between	Member	States’	narrowly,	
meaning	it	would	apply	only	to	national	competition	law.	
	
The	Irish	Beef	Industry	Development	Society	(BIDS)	case164	concerned	an	agreement	among	
the	principal	beef	processors	in	Ireland	to	reduce	processing	capacity	by	25%	to	safeguard	
the	industry.	The	Irish	Supreme	Court	had	previously	submitted	a	preliminary	reference	
to	the	CJEU165.	The	CJEU	found	it	was	an	object	agreement	and	the	case	was	then	remitted	
to	the	Irish	High	Court	in	the	context	of	public	enforcement	proceedings	to	determine	
whether	Art	101(3)	TFEU	applied.		The	Commission	intervened	in	the	High	Court	to	
ensure	that	the	preliminary	ruling	was	followed.	As	with	Garage	Grémeau	above,	this	
shows	the	potential	for	a	complementary	relationship	between	the	preliminary	reference	
procedure	and	Commission	interventions.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	questionable	to	what	
extent	national	judges	would	need	further	help	from	the	Commission	to	‘interpret’	the	
CJEU’s	ruling.	This	also	happened	in	X	BV	–	the	Commission	intervened	again	in	the	Dutch	
Supreme	Court	to	ensure	that	the	CJEU’s	ruling,	and	its	previous	intervention	in	the	
Amsterdam	Appeal	Court	was	followed.	
	
In	Pierre	Fabre,	the	Commission	intervened	in	support	of	the	French	competition	
authority’s	finding	that	internet	sales	bans	in	selective	distribution	agreements	breached	
Article	101	TFEU	and	the	French	provisions.166	In	this	way	the	Commission	attempted	to	
influence	the	substantive	law,	as	well	as	showing	the	strength	in	numbers	of	the	European	
Competition	Network.	The	French	court	submitted	a	preliminary	reference	to	the	CJEU	
after	the	Commission’s	intervention.	It	did	so	precisely	because	of	the	non‐binding	nature	
of	the	Commission’s	observations	under	15(3)	and	its	guidelines.167		In	at	least	one	
                                                 
164 Competition Authority -v- Beef Industry Development Society Ltd & Anor [2006] IEHC 294 (27 July 
2006) 
165 Case C-209/07 Beef Industry Development Society and Barry Brothers [2008] ECR -8637, judgment 
20.11.2008 
166 Case 08-D-25 RG 2008/23812, Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique Paris Court of Appeal, 29 Oct 2009   
167 C-439/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence, Ministre 
de l’Économie, de l’Industrie et de l’Emploi, judgment of the CJEU 13.10.2011, not yet reported, at [30] 
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Spanish	case	the	court	sought	both	the	Commission’s	opinion	and	the	CJEU’s	preliminary	
ruling.168		
	
	
5.2.2 Impact	of	the	intervention	in	the	judicial	proceedings	
	
In	National	Grid,	the	Commission	said	in	its	amicus	curiae	observation	that	the	weighing	of	
the	different	interests	implied	that	the	information	specifically	prepared	for	the	purpose	
of	an	application	under	its	leniency	programme	should	not	be	disclosed.	The	judge	in	the	
High	Court	took	a	more	nuanced	approach,	applying	a	proportionality	test	asking	(a)	
whether	the	information	could	be	obtained	from	other	sources	and	(b)	the	relevance	of	
leniency	materials	to	the	case	[para	39].	As	information	could	not	be	obtained	from	
another	source,	he	allowed	disclosure	of	a	limited	part	of	the	confidential	version	of	the	
Commission	decision169.	Therefore	the	judge	did	not	entirely	follow	the	Commission’s	
opinion.		
	
In	Orange	Caraïbe,	the	French	Supreme	Court	followed	the	interpretation	on	effect	on	
trade	between	Member	States	put	forward	by	the	Commission.	It	annulled	the	decision	of	
the	Paris	Appeal	Court	and	sent	it	back	to	the	Court	for	a	second	review.	
	
In	the	Irish	Beef	Industry	case,	it	is	not	possible	to	judge	the	effect	of	the	Commission’s	
intervention	as	the	case	in	the	Irish	High	Court	was	withdrawn	after	the	agreement	was	
broken	up	and	the	Beef	Industry	Development	Society	discontinued	its	claim	for	
exemption	under	Art	101(3).	Similarly,	in	Garage	Grémeau	the	court	did	not	rule	on	the	
merits	but	suspended	pending	criminal	proceedings	brought	by	Daimler	Chrysler	against	
Garage	Grémeau	for	forgery	and	fraud.	
	
	
5.3 ‘Invitations’	from	the	court	to	submit	observations	
	
In	practice,	there	have	been	instances	of	Member	State	courts	‘inviting’	the	Commission	to	
submit	a	written	intervention	in	the	proceedings,	which,	conceptually,	falls	between	the	
two	categories	of	Article	15(1)	and	Article	15(3).		In	National	Grid,	170	the	Commission	was	
                                                 
168 C-217/05 Confederación Española de Expresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v Compañía Española de 
Petróleos SA (CEEES v CEPSA) [2006] ECR I-11987. Referred to in the Spanish NCA annual report 
2007, 214 
169 National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd and other companies [2011] EWHC 1717 (Ch) 
170 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/amicus_curiae_2011_national_grid_en.pdf : 
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responding	to	the	English	High	Court’s	invitation	to	submit	observations	–	but	this	was	
still	categorised	as	a	15(3)	own	initiative	intervention,	presumably	as	the	domestic	court	
did	not	ask	specific	questions.	As	reported	in	the	Belgian	competition	authority’s	annual	
report,	the	Commission	was	similarly	invited	to	offer	observations	in	two	Belgian	cases,	
Power	Oil	and	Courtraisis,	171	but	did	not	take	up	the	opportunity	to	do	so.	The	Belgian	
authority	suggested	this	was	in	line	with	Art	15(3),	as	it	was	not	an	explicit	request	for	
advice	on	the	rules	of	Community	competition	law	within	the	meaning	of	Article	15(1)	Reg	
1/2003.172	Other	examples	include	the	Dutch	Mosselcultuur	case;173	and	Mastercard	v	OFT	
in	the	UK.174		
	
At	the	other	end	of	the	scale,	some	courts	have	been	resistant	to	Art	15(3)	interventions.	
One	such	example	is	the	X	BV	case,	the	first	in	which	a	national	court,	in	the	Netherlands,	
asked	the	CJEU	to	rule	on	the	competence	of	the	European	Commission	to	intervene	and	
addresses	important	questions	about	the	nature	of	this	mechanism.		As	such,	this	case	
merits	further	investigation.		
	
	
6.	Admissibility	and	scope	of	the	European	Commission’s	own‐initiative	Art	15(3)	
interventions	in	national	competition	cases:	the	preliminary	reference	in	X	BV175		
	
Inspecteur	van	de	Belastingdienst	v	X	BV176	is	ostensibly	a	tax	case	rather	than	a	direct	
Article	101/102TFEU	case,	which	is	why	the	Commission’s	competence	to	intervene	under	
Regulation	1/2003	was	questioned	by	the	Dutch	court.		It	tests	the	substantive	scope	for	
                                                                                                                                               
whether national court has jurisdiction to order disclosure of leniency documents submitted to the 
Commission 
171 Annual Report of the Belgian Competition Council 2005: 
http://economie.fgov.be/fr/binaries/report_competition_2005_fr_tcm326-36151.pdf (accessed 11.8.2010), 
55-56. Power Oil SA/D.D. Invest SA, Case R.G. 2003/AR/1444, 7.3.2006; Compagnie Pétrolière du 
Courtraisis SA/Maurice Coene. Case R.G. 2004/MR/9, 7.3.2006. Both were in Brussels Court of Appeal, 
in the context of preliminary questions from lower court judges.  
172 Annual Report of the Belgian Competition Council 2005, 55: “Dans ces deux affaires, la Cour avait 
également offert à la Commission européenne la possibilité de formuler des observations écrites, ce qui 
ne semblait constituer guère plus que la possibilité offerte à la Commission par l’article 15, alinéa 3 du 
Règlement 1/2003 de soumettre d’office des observations écrites, et ce qui n’était, dès lors, pas une 
demande explicite d’avis au sujet des règles communautaires du droit de la concurrence, au sens de 
l’article 15, alinéa 1 du Règlement 1/2003. La Commission n’a pas pris d’initiative allant dans ce sens.” 
173 FIDE 2008 Netherlands country report, 216 
174 The Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) contacted the Commission to ask whether it wished to make 
any observations on the appeal issues given its 2002 Visa International – Multilateral Interchange Fee 
decision OJ [2002] L 318/17 (FIDE 2008 UK country report, 367).  
175 A more detailed version of this section was published as K Wright ‘European Commission 
Interventions as Amicus Curiae in National Competition Cases: the Preliminary Reference in X BV’ 
(2009) 30 (7) European Competition Law Review 309-313 
176 Case C-429/07 Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/P/kantoor P v X BV, reference OJ C 297, 8.12.2007, 
23, opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi of 5.3.2009, CJEU preliminary ruling delivered 11.6.2009, 5 
CMLR 12 not yet reported in ECR 
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Commission	observations	as	amicus	curiae	under	Article	15	of	the	Regulation.	The	CJEU	
ultimately	ruled	that	a	Member	State	court	was	required	to	accept	the	Commission’s	own‐
initiative	written	observation.		The	CJEU’s	ruling	gives	the	European	Commission	scope	to	
intervene	in	national	court	proceedings	not	only	when	the	judge	is	actually	applying	
Articles	101	and	102	TFEU,	but	also	where	proceedings	in	some	way	link	to	the	effective	
application	of	those	Articles.	First,	the	case	suggests	an	emphasis	on	effective	(rather	than	
just	coherent)	application	of	the	EU	rules	over	judicial	independence.	Second,	it	allows	the	
Commission	to	intervene,	for	example,	in	follow‐on	damages	cases	and	in	criminal	
prosecutions	in	national	courts.	Arguably	this	extended	competence	was	never	intended	
by	the	Regulation.			
	
The	issue	was	whether	fines	for	breach	of	the	competition	rules	are	tax	deductible.	The	
case	was	linked	to	the	plasterboard	cartel	investigation,	in	which	the	Commission	imposed	
fines	(based	on	Article	103(2)	TFEU)	on	various	firms	for	breach	of	Article	101TFEU.177	
One	of	those	firms	(anonymised	as	X	KG)	had	its	fine	partially	paid	by	one	of	its	affiliates	
(X	BV).	The	dispute	came	about	in	2004	when	the	Dutch	tax	inspectorate	imposed	a	tax	
demand	on	X	BV,	which	tried	to	have	the	Commission	fine	deducted	from	its	taxable	
income.	The	Haarlem	District	Court	(Rechtbank)	considered	that	the	EU	concept	of	a	‘fine’	
differs	from	the	national	law	concept	because	the	fine	imposed	on	X	KG,	unlike	fines	
imposed	by	national	law,	consisted	of	punitive	as	well	as	benefit‐depriving	elements.	
National	proceedings	arose	as	under	Dutch	tax	law	a	fine	imposed	by	an	EC	institution	on	
a	firm	may	not	be	deducted	from	the	firm’s	taxable	income.178	Without	going	into	the	
intricacies	of	Dutch	tax	law	here,	the	District	Court	ruled	in	favour	of	X	BV.	179		
	
The	Dutch	tax	inspectorate	appealed	to	the	Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal	(Gerechtshof).180		
The	European	Commission	indicated	that	it	wished	to	submit	written	observations	under	
Article	15(3)	and	requested	case	documents	so	that	it	could	do	so,	on	the	basis	that	the	
case	concerned	the	character	of	a	Community	fine.	The	Commission	was	careful	to	specify	
that	its	wish	to	submit	observations	was	not	about	substantive	tax	law	and	national	
provisions;	it	was	not	concerned	with	whether	the	deduction	of	the	amount	of	a	fine	from	
a	company’s	taxable	profit	was	contrary	to	European	law.	
		
                                                 
177 Commission Decision 2005/471/EC of 27 November 2002 relating to proceedings under Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty against BPB PLC, Gebrüder Knauf Westdeutsche Gipswerke KG, Société Lafarge SA and 
Gyproc Benelux NV (Case No COMP/E-1/37.152 — Plasterboard), O J L 166, 8 
178 Article 3.14(c) Dutch Income Tax Act 2001 
179 Case AWB 05/1452, LJN AX7112, judgment of 22.5.2006 
180 Case 06/00252, LJN BB3356 
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In	considering	whether	it	should	send	documents	to	the	Commission	to	allow	it	to	
intervene,	the	Gerechtshof	did	not	have	the	impression	that	the	Council	of	Ministers	had	
this	type	of	case	in	mind	when	it	enacted	Regulation	1/2003,	but	rather	that	the	Council	
envisaged	cases	where	Article	101	and	102	were	directly	applied:	“real	competition	
cases”.181		
	
In	its	deliberations	the	Gerechtshof	considered	recital	21	of	Regulation	1/2003	and	
recitals	31	&	35	of	the	Courts	notice.	The	court	noted	that	recital	21	and	recital	31	of	the	
Courts	notice	refer	to	submissions	to	national	courts	“called	upon	to	apply	Article	[101	or	
102]	of	the	Treaty”;	whereas	Article	15(3)	itself	appears	to	have	broader	scope,	stating	
that	the	Member	State	competition	authorities	may	submit	observations	on	“issues	
relating	to	the	application	of	Articles	[101	and	102]	of	the	Treaty”,	and	the	Commission	
may	submit	observations	“where	the	coherent	application	of	Article	[101]	or	Article	[102]	
of	the	Treaty	so	requires’.	“[R]elating	to…”	in	Article	15(3)	suggested	that	it	had	wider	
range	than	genuine	competition	cases.182	The	Gerechtshof	also	noted	that	there	does	not	
appear	to	be	an	intentional	difference	in	scope	between	Article	15(1),	covering	requests	
from	a	national	court	to	the	Commission	for	the	transmission	of	information	or	for	an	
opinion	on	‘questions	concerning	the	application	of	the	Community	competition	rules’,	and	
Article	15(3)	providing	for	Commission	intervention	through	amicus	curiae	briefs	on	
“issues	relating	to	the	application	of	Articles	[101	and	102]	of	the	Treaty.”183	To	complicate	
matters,	the	Explanatory	Memorandum	to	the	Dutch	Competition	Act,184	Article	3.4,	
interprets	Art	15(1)	as	“questions	relating	to	the	application	of	Articles	[101]	and	[102]	of	
the	EC	Treaty’	rather	than	just	the	‘competition	rules’	(“…over	de	toepassing	van	de	
artikelen	[10]1	en	[102]…”);	it	does	not	transpose	the	wording	of	Article	15	directly.		
	
However,	the	court	observed	that	recital	31	of	the	Courts	notice	is	not	particularly	
ambiguous,	incorporating	both	of	the	above	ideas:	“…may	submit	observations	on	issues	
relating	to	the	application	of	Article	[101]	or[102]	to	a	national	court	which	is	called	upon	
to	apply	those	provisions”.185	In	addition,	the	Dutch	version	of	recital	21	of	the	
Modernisation	Regulation	could	be	interpreted	to	mean	“when	called	upon	to	apply	
                                                 
181 At 2.5.1 of the Gerechtshof judgment of 12.9.2007 
182 Gerechtshof , at 2.5.3  
183 Gerechtshof, at 2.5.4 
184 Wijziging van de Mededingingswet en van enige andere wetten in verband met de implementatie van 
EG-verordening 1/2003: Memorie van Toelichting (wet van 30 juni 2004, Stb. 345, Kamerstukken II, 
vergaderjaar 2003-4, 29276, nr 3) 
185 The Dutch version of recital 31 of the Courts notice reads: „Overeenkomstig artikel 15, lid 3, van de 
verordening kunnen de nationale mededingingsautoriteiten en de Commissie voor de nationale 
rechterlijke instanties die de artikelen 81 en 82 van het Verdrag moeten toepassen, opmerkingen maken 
betreffende onderwerpen in verband met de toepassing van deze bepalingen.“ 
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Articles	[101	and	[102]”,	which	could	arguably	require	courts	to	be	applying	Article	101	or	
102	in	the	specific	case	at	hand	for	the	Commission	to	be	competent	to	intervene.186		
	
The	Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal187	considered	that,	on	the	one	hand,	these	recitals	could	
suggest	that	Article	15(3)	was	only	applicable	in	cases	involving	a	national	court’s	direct	
application	of	Articles	101	and	102,	whereas	the	current	case	centred	on	the	application	of	
Dutch	domestic	tax	law,	only	indirectly	touching	on	the	EU	antitrust	provisions.	On	the	
other	hand,	it	considered	that	the	duty	of	loyal	co‐operation	between	the	Commission	and	
the	Member	States	arising	from	Article	10EC	(now	Art	4(3)	TEU)	and	the	principle	of	
effectiveness,	explicitly	mentioned	in	recital	35	of	the	Courts	notice,188	suggest	that	the	
scope	for	Commission	intervention	could	be	interpreted	more	widely	than	the	application	
of	Articles	101	and	102.	It	also	needed	to	be	taken	into	consideration	that	the	provisions	of	
Article	15(1)	and	(3)	Regulation	1/2003	signalled	a	change	in	the	distribution	of	
competences	of	the	EU	and	national	authorities.189	Furthermore,	the	exercise	of	the	
Commission’s	competence	to	intervene	as	amicus	curiae	could	lead	to	an	infringement	of	
the	general	principle	of	procedural	equality	of	the	parties.190	Taking	this	with	the	
ambiguous	nature	of	Article	15(3),	the	Amsterdam	Court	decided	to	stay	proceedings	and	
referred	to	the	CJEU	for	a	preliminary	ruling.191	
	
Concurring	with	the	Advocate	General’s	view,192	in	its	judgment	the	CJEU	confirmed	the	
“intrinsic	link	between	fines	and	application	of	Articles	[101	and	102	TFEU]	”	–	and	that	
“to	disassociate	the	principle	of	prohibition	of	anti‐competitive	practices	from	the	
penalties	provided	would	deprive	the	action	of	the	authorities	of	its	effectiveness.”193		
	
	
                                                 
186 “Anderzijds moeten de Commissie en de mededingingsautoriteiten van de lidstaten de bevoegdheid 
hebben schriftelijke of mondelinge opmerkingen voor de nationale rechterlijke instanties te maken, 
wanneer hun verzocht wordt artikel 81 of artikel 82 van het Verdrag toe te passen.’” 
187 Case 06/00252, LJN BB3356, judgment of 12.9.2007 
188 Commission Notice of 27 April 2004 on the cooperation between the Commission and the courts of 
the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, 54-64 
189 Gerechtshof at 2.6.3 
190 Gerechtshof, at 2.7 
191 “Is the Commission competent, under Article 15(3) of Regulation No 1/2003, to submit, on its own 
initiative, written observations in proceedings relating to the deductibility from the (taxable) profit 
realised by the party concerned in 2002 of a fine for infringement of Community competition law, which 
was imposed by the Commission on X KG [a firm] and (partially) passed on to the party concerned?” 
192 A-G’s opinion [38] 
193 Judgment at [36] 
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6.1	‘Effective’,	‘coherent’,	‘consistent’	or	‘uniform’	application?	
	
In	X	BV,	the	Advocate	General	addressed	the	meaning	of	coherent	application	in	
decentralised	enforcement.	Although	the	text	of	Article	15	does	not	mention	effective	
application,	the	Advocate	General	nevertheless	raised	the	general	principle	of	
effectiveness	and	linked	it	to	coherence.	He	noted	that	Article	15(3)	refers	to	‘coherent	
application’	of	Articles	101	and	102,	and	not	only	to	their	interpretation.	Since	application	
suggests	a	result	being	attained,	this	would	mean	that	not	only	the	coherent	application	of	
those	articles,	but	their	effective	application	could	be	at	risk.	In	linking	the	two,	he	went	on	
to	discuss	the	concepts	of	internal	and	external	coherence.	Internal	coherence	would	
relate	simply	to	the	consistent	application	of	the	conditions	of	Articles	101	and	102,	
whereas	external	coherence	would	imply	that	these	provisions	should	have	a	logical	and	
intelligible	place	in	the	more	general	framework	of	the	system	of	EU	competition	rules	or	
the	Treaty,	also	referred	to	as	‘global’	system	coherence.194		
	
The	Advocate	General’s	opinion	then	dealt	with	the	distinction	between	‘uniform’	and	
‘coherent’/’consistent’	application.	Whereas	‘consistency’	allows	for	different	degrees,	he	
considered	that	‘uniformity’	does	not	accommodate	this.		Different	language	versions	of	
Regulation	1/2003	use	both	terms,	‘uniform’	and	‘coherent’,	apparently	interchangeably.	
The	concept	of	coherence	would	be	flexible	enough	for	a	broad	interpretation	of	Article	
15(3)	encompassing	situations	where	a	national	court	would	compromise	or	would	be	
likely	to	compromise	the	uniform,	or	even	effective	application	of	Articles	101	and	102	
TFEU.		The	broad	interpretation	approach	seemed	to	the	Advocate	General	to	be	all	the	
more	appropriate	given	that	the	objectives	of	the	Regulation	are,	in	his	view,	to	provide	for	
uniform	and	effective	application	in	the	context	of	the	Commission’s	central	supervisory	
responsibility	conferred	on	it	by	EU	law.195	This	seems	to	be	the	case	even	in	a	system	of	
concurrent	competences	to	enforce	the	rules.	In	an	interesting	expression	in	the	context	of	
partnership	in	the	European	Competition	Network,	the	Court	referred	to	the	Commission	
as	“the	Community	competition	authority”196	(emphasis	added),	underlining	its	position	as	
first	among	equals.	
                                                 
194 A-G’s opinion [26]-[28]. The Advocate General referred to academic literature by N MacCormick, 
Amaya Navarro, and Bertea in support: N MacCormick ‘Coherence in Legal Justification’ in A Peczenik 
(ed) Theory of Legal Science (Reidel, 1984) 235). “They also, as a rule, distinguish between local 
systemic coherence and global systemic coherence, the former referring to a situation in which only 
certain areas of a legal system are coherently interlinked, the latter referring to the logical and intelligible 
interaction of all areas of the system: see, on this point, A Amaya Navarro An Inquiry into the Nature of 
Coherence and its Role in Legal Argument, Doctoral Thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 
2006, in particular pp. 35 to 37, and S Bertea ‘Looking for Coherence within the European Community’ 
(2005) (2) European Law Journal 157 
195 Opinion at [34] 
196 Judgment at [39] 
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Although	Article	15(3)	only	refers	to	Article	101	and	102,	an	approach	to	Commission	
observations	excluding	other	provisions	of	Community	law,	including	Article	103(2)(a)	EC	
upon	which	fines	are	based,	would	be	inappropriate	given	that	Article	103	is	a	means	for	
the	Commission	to	ensure	compliance	with	Article	101	and	allows	it	to	carry	out	its	
supervisory	task.197	While	Article	15	is	primarily	envisaged	to	be	activated	when	national	
courts	are	called	upon	to	rule	on	the	application	of	Article	101	and/or	102,	this	should	be	
considered	in	the	context	of	the	decentralised	enforcement	regime	ushered	in	by	
Regulation	1/2003.198	It	would	be	artificial	to	say	that	despite	the	intrinsic	link	that	fines	
have	with	the	application	of	Articles	101	and	102	TFEU,	a	dispute	of	national	law	raising	a	
question	concerning	the	nature	of	fines	imposed	by	a	Commission	decision	adopted	to	
ensure	compliance	with	the	prohibition	of	Article	101(1)	TFEU	cannot	a	priori	be	likely	to	
affect	the	coherent	application	of	that	Article.199	In	interpreting	and	applying	Articles	101	
and	102,	the	national	court	needs	to	have	regard	not	only	to	the	CJEU’s	interpretation	of	
these	provisions,	but	also	to	the	decisional	practice	of	the	Commission,	unless	the	national	
court	considered	that	practice	to	be	illegal.200	
	
The	Advocate	General	compared	the	wording	of	Article	15(3)	with	related	provisions	on	
the	cooperation	between	the	Commission	and	national	courts.		As	mentioned	above,	
Article	15(1)	allows	for	national	courts	to	ask	the	Commission	for	information	or	its	
opinion	concerning	the	application	of	Community	competition	rules	“in	proceedings	for	
the	application	of	Article	[101]	or	[102]”		[the	Gerechtshof	focused	on		the	‘application	of	
Community	rules’	part	of	this	clause].		Under	15(2),	Member	States	should	forward	to	the	
Commission	a	copy	of	any	written	judgment	‘deciding	on	the	application	of	Article	[101]	or	
[102]’.	However,	Article	15(3)	only	refers	to	‘coherent	application’.	Like	the	Gerechtshof,	
the	Advocate	General	also	noted	that	recital	21	of	the	Regulation	does	not	use	precisely	
the	same	wording	as	15(3).201	He	drew	attention	to	the	imprecise	drafting	of	Article	15(3)	
in	terms	of	written	and	oral	observations	and	the	circumstances	in	which	the	Commission	
and	national	competition	authorities	may	make	them.	National	competition	authorities	
may	submit	observations	on	‘issues	relating	to	the	application	of	Article	[101]	or	[102]’,	
but	it	is	not	clear	whether	this	also	applies	to	the	Commission,	or	whether	the	latter	may	
only	make	observations	where	coherent	application	requires	it.	This	imprecision	led	him	
to	conclude	that	the	words	cannot	be	imbued	with	a	rigid	definition,202	and	recital	21	
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cannot	be	used	to	limit	the	possibility	of	the	Commission	to	file	observations	provided	
Article	15(3)	is	met.203		
	
The	Advocate	General	did	not	address	the	disjuncture	in	the	wording	between	Regulation	
1/2003	and	the	Explanatory	Memorandum	to	the	Dutch	Competition	Act	as	described	in	
the	Gerechtshof’s	deliberations.204	Nor	did	he	explicitly	raise	the	soft	law	point	that	
recitals	in	a	Regulation,	or	in	a	Notice,	cannot	restrict	the	terms	of	an	Article	in	that	
Regulation.	The	opinion	did	not	refer	to	the	specific	provisions	of	the	Courts	notice,	in	
particular	recitals	31	and	35	which	were	examined	by	the	Amsterdam	Court.	He	did,	
however,	mention	it	as	an	“interpretative	text”.		
	
In	contrast	to	the	Advocate	General,	the	Court	did	make	reference	to	the	fact	that	recitals	
and	notice	provisions	should	not	prevail	over	provisions	in	the	Regulation	(1/2003)	itself.	
Referring	to	recital	21	of	Regulation	1/2003,	which	states	that	the	Commission	and	NCAs	
should	be	able	to	submit	written	or	oral	observations	to	courts	“called	upon	to	apply”	
Articles	101	or	102	TFEU	(see	Advocate	General’s	discussion	above),	“whilst	a	recital	in	
the	preamble	to	regulation	may	cast	light	on	the	interpretation	to	be	given	to	a	legal	rule,	it	
cannot	in	itself	constitute	such	a	rule.”	The	Court	added	that	“the	recital	refers	merely	to	a	
typical	situation	but	does	not	exclude	other	situations	in	which	the	Commission	may	
intervene”.	It	is	submitted	that	there	is	not	really	any	evidence	for	this.	In	addition,	“the	
content	of	a	Commission	notice	cannot	prevail	over	the	provisions	of	a	regulation.”205	
	
In	considering	the	two	different	types	of	intervention	in	Article	15(3)	“with	two	separate	
fields	of	application”	by	national	competition	authorities	relating	to	the	application	of	
Articles	101	and	102	on	the	one	hand,	and	intervention	by	the	Commission	where	the	
coherent	application	of	Articles	101	or	102	TFEU	so	requires	on	the	other	[28],	the	Court	
drew	inferences	about	the	legislative	intent::	“…the	fact	that	the	second	and	fourth	
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sentences	are	almost	entirely	identical,	emphasises	the	fact	that	the	Community	
legislature	intended	to	draw	a	distinction	between	these	two	situations…”206.		
	
According	to	my	own	research	into	the	Council	negotiations,	however,	this	does	not	seem	
to	have	been	an	explicit	issue.	Some	Member	States	took	positions	on	NCAs	acting	as	
intermediaries	of	the	Commission,	but	there	is	nothing	specific	about	the	differentiated	
circumstances	in	which	NCAs	and	the	Commission	would	intervene.	The	most	relevant	
point	is	in	document	9999/01	Secretariat	to	delegations	of	27	June	2001,	in	which	the	
Netherlands	delegation	proposed	referring	to	"the	interest	of	Community	competition	
policy"	rather	than	"Community	public	interest".	
	
When	it	submits	observations,	the	Commission	does	not	gain	the	full	status	of	intervening	
party.	Even	if	the	Commission	had	a	‘private’	interest	in	the	outcome	of	the	case,	as	argued	
by	the	Dutch	government,	it	is	extremely	difficult	to	separate	that	from	the	Commission’s	
public	interest	in	intervening	on	the	basis	that	the	coherent	application	of	EC	competition	
rules	is	compromised.207	The	Advocate	General	concluded	that	it	therefore	does	not	
encroach	on	Member	States’	procedural	autonomy.208	However,	he	also	stated	that	the	
Commission’s	intervention	does	not	affect	the	rights	of	the	parties	to	the	dispute.	In	this	
case,	the	parties	had	had	opportunities	to	respond	to	the	Commission’s	request	and	each	
other’s	observations,	as	provided	for	in	Article	89h	of	the	Dutch	Competition	Act	2004,	
which	they	did	in	April	2007,	and	at	a	hearing	in	August	2007,	when	the	Commission’s	
competence	to	submit	an	amicus	curiae	brief	was	raised.	In	other	Member	States,	
however,	the	parties’	rights	would	be	affected	particularly	if	they	had	no	right	to	reply.	
This	could	leave	the	door	open	to	a	future	preliminary	reference	on	the	admissibility	of	
Commission	interventions.	
	
	
6.2	‘Conditions’	for	intervention	
	
The	parties’	arguments	focused	on	the	meaning	of	the	Commission’s	competence	to	
submit	observations	“where	the	coherent	application	of	Article	[101]	or	Article	[102]	of	
the	Treaty	so	requires”.	X	BV	and	the	Dutch	government	favoured	a	strict	interpretation,	
with	Commission	interventions	limited	to	cases	where	the	national	judge	is	invited	to	
interpret	or	apply	one	or	other	of	Articles	101	and	102	TFEU.209	The	Commission	
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(supported	by	the	Italian	government)	argued	that	this	imposed	a	“supplementary	
condition”,	and	that	it	has	sufficient	grounds	to	submit	observations	where	the	case	could	
“compromise	the	coherent	application	of	the	Community	competition	rules”.210	It	argues	
that	recital	21	of	Regulation	1/2003,	discussed	above	(submissions	to	national	courts	
“called	upon	to	apply	Article	[101	or	102]	of	the	Treaty”),	cannot	restrict	a	wide	
interpretation	of	Article	15(3).		
	
The	literal	interpretation	followed	by	the	CJEU	itself	led	it	to	conclude	that	the	“option”	for	
the	Commission	to	submit	written	observations	on	its	own	initiative	“is	subject	to	the	“sole	
condition”	that	the	coherent	application	of	Articles	101	or	102	TFEU	requires	the	
Commission’s	intervention.	“That	condition	may	be	fulfilled	even	if	the	proceedings…	do	
not	pertain	to	issues	relating	to	the	application	of	[those	articles].”	(emphasis	added).211	In	
particular,	the	CJEU	said	that	the	effectiveness	of	the	fines	imposed	by	the	Commission	
under	Article	103(2)TFEU	is	a	condition	for	the	coherent	application	of	Articles	101	and	
102	TFEU	as	they	are	used	to	“ensure	compliance”	and	“effective	supervision”.212		
	
The	Commission	contended	it	has	a	legitimate	interest	in	submitting	observations,	
because	the	fines	sanctioning	anti‐competitive	behaviour	are	linked	to	the	application	of	
Articles	101	and	102	TFEU,	as	indicated	through	Article	103(2)(a)	TFEU,	the	legal	base	of	
the	Commission’s	power	to	impose	fines	on	undertakings	which	have	infringed	those	
articles.		
	
More	interestingly,	in	its	arguments	to	the	Court,	the	Commission	couched	the	potential	to	
intervene	in	terms	of	its	own	“significant	margin	of	appreciation”,	in	examining	whether	it	
is	necessary	for	it	to	submit	observations	in	a	case	before	a	national	court,	213	rather	than	
the	discretion	of	the	national	court	to	use	its	observations.		(This	is	interesting	as	this	
phrase	is	more	often	used	in	judicial	review	cases	when	the	Commission	makes	economic	
assessments,	and	denotes	a	wide	area	of	discretion.)	The	Advocate	General	seemed	to	
subscribe	to	this	view,	referring	to	the	‘right’	of	the	Commission	to	submit	written	
observations.214	Whereas	the	Advocate	General’s	opinion	focused	on	the	Commission	
ensuring	coherent	application	regarding	the	effects	of	one	of	its	own	decisions	(rather	
than,	for	example,	in	a	follow‐on	action	from	an	NCA),	the	CJEU	did	not	expressly	make	this	
limitation.		
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On	the	interplay	with	Article	15(2),	Advocate	General	Mengozzi	opined	that	there	should	
be	no	condition	for	intervention	that	the	judgment	had	already	been	notified	to	the	
Commission	under	Article	15(2).	Otherwise,	the	Commission	would	be	unable	to	submit	
observations	to	first	instance	courts,	or	where	it	had	found	out	about	a	possible	risk	to	
consistent	application	of	the	rules	by	other	means.215	In	this	case,	it	had	been	notified	
through	the	Dutch	competition	authority	and	the	press.	The	first	instance	judgment	had	
not	been	reported	under	Article	15(2),	perhaps	primarily	as	it	was	not	labelled	as	a	
‘competition’	case.			
	
The	Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal	subsequently	ruled216	in	line	with	the	Commission’s	
opinion	as	to	the	result	‐	fines	imposed	by	the	Commission	for	a	cartel	law	infringement	
are	not	deductible	from	taxes	in	domestic	law	–	but	any	discussion	of	effective	application	
of	EU	law	is	absent.		The	Commission’s	opinion	is	not	even	explicitly	mentioned.	Moreover,	
the	Amsterdam	Court	states	that	its	conclusion	would	be	the	same	“no	matter	whether	it	is	
a	fine	from	the	European	Commission	or	the	Dutch	competition	authority”.217	This	may	
give	a	clue	as	to	the	attitude	of	the	domestic	courts	towards	Commission	intervention.	
Having	said	that,	the	judgment	does	not	make	reference	to	the	CJEU’s	preliminary	ruling	
either.	
	
In	a	further	appeal	to	the	Supreme	Court	(Hoge	Raad),218	the	firm	and	the	Dutch	
government	both	argued	against	allowing	the	Commission’s	intervention	again.	The	
Commission	once	again	announced	its	intention	to	intervene.	X	BV	argued	that	it	should	
not	be	admissible	because	the	Commission	was	involved	with	the	facts	of	the	case.	The	
Secretary	of	State	was	also	opposed	on	the	grounds	of	the	earlier	CJEU	preliminary	
reference.	The	Dutch	Supreme	Court	rejected	the	argument	that	the	Commission	should	
only	intervene	once,	as	intervening	in	the	highest	court	would	have	the	most	effect.	
	
Responding	to	the	Dutch	government’s	substantive	concern	about	the	Commission’s	own	
interest,	the	Advocate	General	in	the	CJEU	had	stated	that	judicial	independence	is	not	
challenged,	as	the	Commission’s	opinion	is	not	binding.219	Since	the	CJEU’s	ruling	
confirmed	that	the	European	Commission	may	intervene	in	national	court	proceedings	not	
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only	when	the	judge	is	actually	applying	Articles	101	and	102	TFEU,	but	also	where	
proceedings	in	some	way	link	to	the	effective	application	of	those	Articles,	in	practice	it	
could	allow	the	Commission	to	intervene,	for	example,	in	contract	disputes,	follow‐on	
damages	cases	from	NCAs,	and,	even	in	criminal	prosecutions.	Arguably	this	extended	
competence	was	never	intended	by	the	Regulation.			
	
	
7.	Conclusions		
	
This	chapter	has	investigated	the	diagonal	relationship	between	the	European	
Commission,	as	administrative	supranational	authority	with	quasi‐judicial	functions,	and	
national	courts.	Previously,	the	Court	of	Justice’s	preliminary	reference	procedure,	a	
‘dialogue	between	courts’,	was	the	only	formal	link	between	the	courts	of	the	Member	
States	and	the	supranational	level.		This	chapter	has	shown	how	the	European	
Commission	has	added	to	this	general	(EU	law)	institutional	link	through	the	specific	(to	
competition	law)	instrument	of	opinions	and	own‐initiative	interventions	to	national	
courts	in	competition	cases,	under	Art	15	Reg	1/2003.	This	tool	is	designed	in	the	absence	
of	a	formal	judicial	network	to	promote	consistent	application	following	decentralised	
enforcement	of	the	EU	antitrust	rules	under	Articles	101	and	102	TFEU.		The	chapter	drew	
on	original	research	into	the	pre‐legislative	documents	on	Art	15	Reg	1/2003.	
	
In	the	absence	of	a	formal	judicial	network,	the	Article	15(3)	mechanism	contributes	to	
safeguarding	consistent	application	of	Community	competition	rules	in	the	decentralised	
enforcement	system.	However,	it	raises	constitutional	questions	about	the	effect	of	
concurrent	competences	on	the	institutional	balance	at	the	supranational	level	between	
the	Commission	and	the	Court	of	Justice,	and	diagonally	in	terms	of	the	effect	on	national	
judicial	autonomy.		
	
The	discussion	took	both	a	theoretical	and	a	practical	approach.	The	theoretical	element	
examined	the	legal	nature	of	the	Commission	opinion	as	an	EU	instrument,	the	ways	in	
which	the	opinion	could	become	binding	drawing	from	the	soft	law	literature,	and	the	
relationship	with	the	judicial	preliminary	reference	procedure.		
	
The	legal	effect	of	an	opinion	to	a	court	is	uncertain,	especially	as	this	type	of	opinion	is	
unique	in	the	EU	order.	It	does	not	fit	easily	into	the	category	of	soft	law	instruments	
establishing	‘rules	of	conduct.’	Commission	opinions	could	become	binding	indirectly	
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through	the	national	court’s	judgment,	particularly	if	it	essentially	transposes	the	
Commission’s	advice.		
	
Regarding	the	institutional	balance	between	the	Commission	and	CJEU,	it	could	be	argued	
that	the	Commission	is	taking	over	a	role	‐	ultimate	interpretation	of	EU	law	through	
preliminary	references	‐	granted	to	the	CJEU	in	the	Treaty.	However,	the	CJEU	itself	has	
assented	to	a	wide	jurisdiction	for	the	Commission’s	intervention,	as	demonstrated	by	its	
preliminary	ruling	in	X	BV.	The	concurrent	powers	of	the	CJEU	and	Commission	suggest	
that	where	the	Commission	authors	soft	law	instruments	at	the	legislative	level,	or	makes	
a	quasi‐judicial	decision	(such	as	imposing	a	fine)	regarding	specific	parties,	it	has	primacy	
over	interpretation	at	the	enforcement	level.	This	is	coupled	with	the	CJEU	restricting	its	
own	jurisdiction	regarding	NCAs	as	explored	in	the	previous	chapter.	
	
From	a	practical	perspective,	the	chapter	undertook	an	analysis	of	the	emerging	practice	
under	Art	15,	reporting	original	research	into	all	the	opinions	and	own‐initiative	
interventions	so	far.		I	found	23	opinions	under	Art	15(1)	and	9	interventions	under	Art	
15(3).	The	Commission	has	been	more	transparent	since	early	2012	by	making	available	
some	interventions	on	its	website.	This	is	more	evident	regarding	15(3)	interventions,	
although	one	Austrian	case	is	still	absent.	The	Commission	may	be	more	sensitive	to	the	
transparency	of	these	own‐initiative	interventions.	In	addition,	these	are	the	cases	in	
which	it	has	felt	compelled	to	intervene,	and	so	represent	competition	issues	which	it	finds	
to	be	most	important	for	coherent	application.	As	such	it	is	in	the	Commission’s	interest	to	
publish	them.	By	contrast,	only	around	a	quarter	of	the	opinions	requested	by	national	
courts	under	15(1)	have	been	publicised.	This	lack	of	transparency	raises	questions	about	
the	‘back	door’	influence	of	these	opinions	in	the	judicial	proceedings.	Moreover,	it	does	
not	help	legal	certainty	and	consistent	application	throughout	the	EU.	Ideally	these	
interventions	should	also	be	published	in	different	language	versions	for	maximum	
positive	impact	on	consistent	application.	As	a	further	positive	effect,	this	would	promote	
awareness	among	judges	of	cases	in	other	Member	States.	
	
It	is	not	always	easy	to	observe	what	happened	in	the	national	court	and	the	influence	of	
the	Commission	on	those	proceedings.	Without	interviewing	judges,	court	staff	or	those	
involved	in	the	cases	the	judgment	is	the	only	evidence.	This	depends	on	access	to	national	
databases	and	ability	to	read	the	relevant	languages.	Sometimes	the	judgment	itself	does	
not	refer	to	the	Commission’s	observations	in	any	case	(for	example,	in	the	X	BV	
Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal	judgment).	It	is	also	difficult	to	observe	those	cases	in	which	
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an	opinion	was	requested	but	the	Commission	declined,	or	where	a	party	wanted	to	
request	an	opinion	but	the	national	judge	did	not	grant	that	request.		
	
The	case	law	demonstrates	that	the	competence	of	the	Commission	to	intervene	in	
national	court	proceedings	is	not	strictly	limited	to	cases	directly	applying	Art	101	or	102	
TFEU.		I	also	find	a	third	category	between	Art	15(1)	and	15(3):	cases	in	which	the	
Commission	was	‘invited’	to	intervene	but	no	specific	questions	were	put	to	it.	A	number	
of	15(3)	submissions	so	far	have	been	related	to	block	or	individual	exemptions	which,	
pre‐2004	reform,	would	have	been	in	the	sole	jurisdiction	of	the	Commission.	
	
National	judicial	autonomy	favours	minimal	Commission	intervention.	The	converse	
argument	is	why	does	the	Commission	not	intervene	in	more	cases?	There	is	a	certain	
amount	of	demand	from	parties	and	their	legal	representatives	for	the	Commission	to	
make	more	use	of	these	instruments,	as	responses	to	the	consultation	on	the	first	five	
years	of	the	functioning	of	Regulation	1/2003	suggest.220	The	Commission	itself	may	not	
want	to	do	so	for	fear	of	raising	its	caseload.	In	relation	to	the	European	Competition	
Network	one	Commission	official	said	that	intervening	all	the	time	(e.g.	by	taking	over	a	
case	from	an	NCA	under	Art	11(6)	Reg	1/2003)	would	be	the	“worst	case	scenario”221.	A	
question	for	further	research	is	how	the	Commission	decides	where	to	intervene.		
	
Given	the	small	but	not	insignificant	number	of	cases	so	far	where	the	Commission’s	
opinion	was	sought,	it	remains	to	be	seen	how	judges	will	avail	themselves	of	this	
mechanism	relative	both	to	the	preliminary	reference	procedure,	and	to	the	possibility	of	
calling	on	the	national	competition	authority	which	operates	within	the	framework	of	the	
ECN.		That	is	likely	to	depend	on	individual	judges	and	judicial	preferences	in	different	
Member	States.	Art	15(3)	Reg	1/2003	also	allows	national	competition	authorities	to	
intervene	in	national	judicial	proceedings	in	their	own	Member	State.	Together	with	the	
proposal	discussed	in	the	following	chapter,	this	could	bring	national	courts	indirectly	into	
the	European	Competition	Network.		That	could	have	positive	benefits	for	the	consistent	
application	of	the	EU	competition	rules,	but	also	brings	judicial	autonomy	into	question.	
The	following	chapter	discusses	the	extension	of	the	Masterfoods	rule	on	the	effect	of	
European	Commission	decisions.	It	explores	the	proposal	in	the	forthcoming	draft	
directive	on	damages	actions	to	introduce	the	binding	effect	of	national	competition	
authorities’	decision	on	national	courts	throughout	the	EU.	That	is,	for	foreign	NCAs	to	
bind	civil	courts.	
                                                 
220 2009 Report on the functioning of Reg 1/2003, 9 
221 Interview with DG COMP from ECN unit 13.7.2006 
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CHAPTER	5:	BINDING	THE	JUDICIAL	WITH	THE	ADMINISTRATIVE:	
The	Proposal	for	the	Binding	Effect	of	National	Competition	Authority	Decisions	on	
National	Courts1	
	
1.	Introduction	
	
The	previous	two	chapters	explored	the	diagonal	relationships	between	judicial	and	
administrative	bodies	on	the	supranational	and	national	levels:	respectively	between	
national	competition	authorities	(NCAs)	and	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union,	
and	between	the	European	Commission	and	national	courts.	In	terms	of	the	institutional	
diagram	in	the	introduction	to	this	thesis,	the	Masterfoods	rule,	according	to	which	
Member	State	courts	cannot	take	a	decision	running	counter	to	one	by	the	Commission,	
encapsulated	a	link	between	the	European	Commission	and	the	national	courts.	This	
chapter	investigates	the	extension	of	that	rule	–	the	proposal	in	the	European	
Commission’s	White	Paper	and	draft	directive	on	damages	actions	for	breach	of	EU	
antitrust	rules	to	make	NCA	decisions	binding	on	civil	courts	throughout	the	EU	(‘the	
binding	effect	rule’)2.		This	specific	example	is	used	to	explore	the	impact	of	EU	antitrust	
measures	on	the	relationship	between	competition	authorities	and	courts	–	and	judicial	
and	administrative	bodies	more	broadly	‐	on	the	national	level.		On	the	institutional	
diagram,	this	represents	the	line	between	national	competition	authorities	and	national	
courts	adjudicating	in	cases	between	private	parties,	which	would	normally	be	in	the	
domain	of	national	procedural	rules.	This	chapter	contributes	to	the	question	of	the	
impact	of	the	2004	and	more	recent	competition	reforms	on	national	courts	and	judicial	
autonomy.	
	
The	binding	effect	proposal	is	put	forward	in	the	context	of	a	wider	package	of	
recommendations	to	overcome	substantive	and	procedural	hurdles	and	enable	victims	of	
infringements	of	EU	competition	law	to	exercise	their	rights	to	compensation.		It	aims	to	
incentivise	claimants	to	bring	private	enforcement	cases	in	civil	courts	by	alleviating	their	
                                                 
1 A shorter version of this chapter was published as K Wright, ‘Binding the Judicial with the 
Administrative: Some Aspects of the European Commission’s White Paper on Damages Actions for 
Breach of EC Antitrust Rules’ (2008) European Current Law, November 2008 xi-xv. Some ideas also 
appeared in K Wright ‘Book review: M Danov, Jurisdiction and Judgments in Relation to EU 
Competition Law Claims’ (2012) 37(3) European Law Review 355-358 
2 White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules COM (2008) 165, 2.4.2008, 
Chapter 4; and Article 12 of the (leaked) draft directive according to E Truli ‘White Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules: the Binding Effect of Decisions Adopted by National 
Competition Authorities’ (2009)  5(3) European Competition Journal 795-821, 801, fn 42 
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burden	of	proof.3	On	pragmatic	grounds	the	rule	would	avoid	re‐litigation	of	issues	in	
public	and	private	enforcement,	4	and	could	contribute	to	consistent	application	of	the	EU	
competition	rules	by	indirectly	linking	national	courts	to	the	European	Competition	
Network	(ECN).	
	
However,	such	a	proposal	carries	much	broader	constitutional	significance	in	terms	of	the	
interaction	between	judicial	and	administrative	institutions	and	their	decisions.	These	
constitutional	consequences,	and	in	particular	the	asymmetric	effects	between	courts	and	
NCAs,	have	been	less	emphasised.	The	proposed	rule	creates	an	apparent	hierarchy	of	
administrative	decisions	over	court	judgments,	narrowing	the	field	of	civil	courts’	
jurisdiction	and	impeding	judicial	autonomy.	These	constitutional	consequences	will	be	
explored	in	this	chapter.	
	
Chapter	2	discussed	the	judicial	functions	of	norm	interpretation	and	precedent‐setting	
which	may	also	be	carried	out	by	administrative	agencies.	In	light	of	these	judicial	
functions,	the	previous	chapter	(chapter	4)	explored	the	interpretative	function	through	
European	Commission	intervention	in	national	court	proceedings.	That	chapter	discussed	
the	Commission’s	‘preliminary	reference	procedure’	and	how	a	Commission	opinion	may	
become	indirectly	binding	through	national	court	judgements	which	transpose	the	advice.	
In	this	chapter,	the	binding	effect	of	NCA	decisions	relates	to	another	aspect	of	the	judicial	
function	discussed	in	chapter	2:	precedent‐setting.		The	legal	force	of	these	decisions	will	
be	exerted	on	courts	themselves.			
	
The	chapter	is	informed	by	my	original	research	on	the	legislative	process	behind	Reg	
1/2003,	in	respect	of	the	effect	of	Commission	decisions	on	national	courts,	and	on	
horizontal	relations	between	national	competition	authorities	within	the	European	
Competition	Network.	This	original	research	was	conducted	by	consulting	Council	of	
Ministers	documents	on	the	Reg	1/2003	negotiations	as	well	as	through	interviews	with	
European	Commission	and	national	competition	authority	officials.	I	have	also	looked	
                                                 
3 The White Paper also covers issues of standing and collective redress, access to evidence, fault 
requirements, damages, defences, limitation periods, costs, leniency programmes, and the relationship 
between public and private enforcement of EU competition law.  
4 Avoiding re-litigation and enhancing judicial economy is the headline presented by the Commission 
justifying the rule: ‘What does the White Paper suggest to avoid the re-litigation of issues already 
decided?’ in the Policy paper on compensating consumer and business victims of competition breaches – 
frequently asked questions, MEMO/08/216, Brussels 3.4.2008, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/216&format=HTML&aged=0&lang
uage=EN&guiLanguage=en, accessed 13.7.2010. 
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comprehensively	at	the	consultative	process	behind	the	proposed	binding	effect	rule	with	
reference	to	responses	to	the	White	Paper	on	damages	actions.	
	
According	to	the	European	Commission’s	work	programme5,	the	directive	containing	this	
proposal	will	be	formally	proposed	towards	the	end	of	2012,	making	the	discussion	in	this	
chapter	particularly	timely.	Having	looked	at	the	current	interactions	between	national	
courts,	the	Court	of	Justice,	the	European	Commission	and	national	competition	
authorities,	this	chapter	looks	ahead	to	this	forthcoming	legislation	which	will	affect	
institutional	interactions	between	judicial	and	administrative	authority	at	the	national	
level.		
	
	
1.1	Outline	of	the	chapter	
	
The	rest	of	this	chapter	is	structured	as	follows.	I	first	lay	out	the	background	to	the	
binding	effect	proposal	and	its	relationship	with	the	2004	reforms	and	the	right	to	
damages.	Secondly	I	consider	the	proposed	binding	effect	rule	in	more	detail	with	its	
purpose	and	scope.	In	investigating	the	scope	of	the	rule,	I	consider	its	explicit	terms	and	
other	open	questions,	evaluating	the	extent	of	limits	on	civil	courts’	jurisdiction.	Thirdly,	in	
considering	the	basis	for	the	rule,	I	discuss	the	extension	of	the	Masterfoods	rule;	the	
horizontal	application	of	the	duty	of	loyal	cooperation	between	sub‐state	bodies;	and	the	
analogy	with	the	Brussels	I	Regulation	on	recognition	of	court	judgments	across	Member	
States	(I	return	to	the	specific	Treaty	legal	base	in	the	final	section.)	The	fourth	section	
investigates	the	asymmetric	effects	to	which	the	rule	could	give	rise,	taking	into	account	
the	lack	of	binding	effect	between	NCA	decisions	within	the	European	Competition	
Network	and	a	reverse	of	the	principle	of	equivalence,	according	to	which	national	NCA	
decisions	would	be	treated	less	favourably	than	NCA	decisions	from	another	Member	
State.	Having	considered	the	desirability	of	the	rule	and	some	of	its	unintended	
consequences,	the	fifth	section	turns	attention	to	the	possibility	and	likelihood	of	the	rule	
being	adopted.	This	section	assesses	the	current	status	in	the	Member	States	of	national	
competition	authority	decisions	in	court	proceedings	between	private	parties;	objections	
and	obstacles	to	adoption	of	the	rule	in	the	Member	States;	and,	more	practically,	the	
current	state	of	play	of	the	draft	directive	and	its	legal	base	issues.	The	chapter	concludes	
with	an	evaluation	of	conditions	for	the	rule’s	adoption.	
                                                 
5 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Commission Work Programme 2012: 
Delivering European Renewal, Brussels, 15.11.2011 COM (2011) 777 final  
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2.	Background	to	the	rule	and	relationship	with	the	2004	reforms	
	
In	December	2005	the	European	Commission	published	a	Green	Paper,6	itself	responding	
to	the	results	of	a	2004	comparative	study	identifying	and	analysing	the	obstacles	to	
successful	damages	actions	in	the	EU	Member	States.	The	Green	Paper	found	a	"total	
underdevelopment"7	of	actions	for	damages	for	breach	of	EC	competition	law,	and	an	
“astonishing	diversity"	in	the	approaches	taken	by	the	different	Member	States.8	This	was	
followed	by	the	publication	of	the	European	Commission’s	White	Paper	on	damages	
actions	for	breach	of	the	EC	antitrust	enforcement	rules	in	April	2008.9	The	binding	effect	
rule	is	only	one	of	its	proposals;	the	White	Paper’s	chapters	cover	measures	on	parties’	
standing	to	bring	a	claim	and	collective	redress,	access	to	evidence,	fault	requirements,	
damages,	defences,	limitation	periods,	costs,	leniency	programmes,	and	the	relationship	
between	public	and	private	enforcement	of	EC	competition	law.	According	to	leaks	of	the	
draft	directive,	its	content	is	not	expected	to	be	substantially	different	from	the	provisions	
of	the	White	Paper.10		
	
The	European	Commission	aims	to	stimulate	private	enforcement	of	EU	competition	law	
in	national	courts,	complementing	public	enforcement	by	DG	Competition	and	national	
competition	authorities.	One	of	the	aims	of	the	2004	reforms	was	to	encourage	private	
enforcement.	11	In	decentralising	enforcement	to	national	courts	as	well	as	competition	
authorities,	the	door	was	open	to	claimants	to	act	as	enforcers	(‘private	attorney	
                                                 
6 Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM (2005) 672 
7 Which may not be true in some Member States, for example, Germany – see S Peyer ‘Myths and Untold 
Stories - Private Antitrust Enforcement in German’ (2010) CCP Working Paper  10-12 
8 The Ashurst Study: Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC 
competition rules. Comparative report prepared by Denis Waelbroeck, Donald Slater and Gil Even-
Shoshan, 31 August 2004,  available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/comparative_report_clean_en.pdf, 
accessed 21.7.2010,  1 
9 White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM (2008) 165 final, 
accompanied by a Staff Working Paper SEC (2008) 404 and an Impact Assessment Report SEC(2008) 
405.	The White Paper was subject to a consultation, closing in July 2008, to which the response was 
mixed. Subsequently the Commission drew up a draft directive, which it had intended to formally propose 
it in October 2009. The draft directive was however leaked in 2009.  The current state of play on the 
directive is discussed in the final section of this chapter. 
10  In October 2009 the out-going Commission decided not to formally propose the draft directive, after 
the European Parliament’s March 2009 resolution (2008/2154(INI) P6_TA(2009)0187 urged the 
Commission to identify a legal basis for the adoption of the proposed measures (there was no reference to 
a legal base in the White Paper). The state of play on the directive, now expected before the end of 2012 
according to the Commission’s work programme, is discussed in the final section of this chapter. 
11 E.g. recital 7 Regulation 1/2003; D Woods, A Sinclair & D Ashton ‘Private enforcement of Community 
competition law: modernisation and the road ahead’ European Commission Competition Policy 
Newsletter no 2 Summer 2004, 31-37 
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generals’12)	close	to	infringements,	and	to	directly	claim	redress	for	competition	law	
infringements	as	a	result	of	which	they	incurred	harm.	Enforcement	by	national	courts	
had	always	been	possible,	but	practically	difficult	due	to	the	bifurcation	of	Article	101	
TFEU.	Only	the	Commission	was	authorised	to	grant	exemptions	under	Article	101(3),	
leaving	the	national	courts’	jurisdiction	incomplete.	In	addition,	the	requirement	for	firms	
to	notify	the	Commission	of	their	agreements,	and	the	backlog	in	decision‐making	on	those	
notifications,	meant	that	proceedings	were	still	pending	in	the	Commission.		The	abolition	
of	the	notification	procedure,	in	addition	to	the	competence	to	rule	on	the	whole	of	Article	
101,	increased	the	ambit	of	national	courts’	competence	in	antitrust	enforcement.	This	
chapter	shows	how	that	ambit	could	narrow	again	with	the	binding	effect	rule.	
	
There	is	an	important	balance	to	be	struck	to	ensure	that	public	and	private	enforcement	
are	complementary.	The	principal	aim	of	public	enforcement	must	be	deterrence	as	a	
whole13	(e.g.	through	punishment	such	as	fines	or	even	imprisonment).	But	competition	
authorities	are	less	well	placed	to	compensate	individuals	who	are	harmed	by	competition	
law	breaches,	and	the	Commission	itself	is	not	empowered	to	grant	damages.	As	such,	in	
private	enforcement	the	court	is	called	upon	to	compensate	the	individual.	Private	
enforcement	in	civil	courts	also	has	a	role	to	play	in	deterrence,	but	its	primary	purpose	is	
compensation.	As	explained	in	the	Staff	Working	Paper	accompanying	the	White	Paper,	
“This	notion	of	complement	covers	two	categories	of	cases.	Firstly,	it	covers	those	cases	
where	the	public	authorities,	for	reasons	of	limited	resources	and	public	priorities,	do	not	
take	any	enforcement	action,	or	limit	their	enforcement	activities	to	specific	aspects	of	a	
particular	behaviour.	In	that	case,	private	actions	for	damages	can	extend	the	enforcement	
of	EC	law	through	what	are	known	as	stand‐alone	actions.	Secondly,	private	enforcement	
covers	cases	where	a	private	party	claims	damages	for	harm	arising	from	an	infringement	
established	by	a	public	authority.	These	are	known	as	follow‐on	actions.	The	Commission	
ensured	that	the	measures	contained	in	the	White	Paper	are	“designed	in	such	a	way	as	
not	to	jeopardise	public	enforcement.”14	
	
                                                 
12 Particularly used in the US context where private actions in competition enforcement are more 
prevalent. In the EU literature see e.g. A Andreangeli 'From Complainant to "Private Attorney General": 
the Modernisation of EU competition enforcement and private antitrust action before national courts' in J 
Peay and T. Newburn (eds) Policing: Politics, Culture and Control. Essays in Honour of Robert Reiner 
(Hart Publishing, 2012) 229-54; K Cseres ‘Governance Design for European Private Law: lessons from 
the Europeanization of Competition Law in Central and Eastern Europe’ in F Cafaggi (ed) Making 
European Private Law: Governance Design (Edward Elgar, 2008) 138-196,  143 
13 A Komninos ‘Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? Overlap?’ (2006) 
3(1) Competition Law Review 5-26; W Wils ‘The Relationship Between Public Antitrust Enforcement 
and Private Actions for Damages’ (2009) 32 World Competition 3 
14 White Paper staff working paper [21] 
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The	White	Paper	therefore	puts	forward	policy	options	to	overcome	perceived	substantive	
and	procedural	hurdles	and	enable	victims	of	infringements	of	EC	competition	law	to	
exercise	their	rights	to	compensation.		As	the	Commission	states,	the	primary	objective	of	
the	White	Paper	is	to	“improve	the	legal	conditions	for	victims	to	exercise	their	right	under	
the	Treaty	to	reparation	of	all	damage	suffered	as	a	result	of	a	breach	of	the	EC	antitrust	
rules.	Full	compensation	is,	therefore,	the	first	and	foremost	guiding	principle.”15		
	
Individual	rights	to	compensation	had	been	recognised	by	the	CJEU	in	Courage	and	
Crehan16		and	Manfredi17.	In	Courage,	the	CJEU	stated	that	“the	practical	effect	of	the	
prohibition	laid	down	in	Article	[101(1)	TFEU]	would	be	put	at	risk	if	it	were	not	open	to	
any	individual	to	claim	damages	for	loss	caused	to	him	by	a	contract	or	by	conduct	liable	
to	restrict	or	distort	competition”.18		Further,	in	Manfredi,	“…any	individual	can	claim	
compensation	for	the	harm	suffered	where	there	is	a	causal	relationship	between	that	
harm	and	an	agreement	or	practice	prohibited	under	Article	[101	TFEU]”.19	The	judgment	
also	stated	that	“In	the	absence	of	Community	rules	governing	that	field,	it	is	for	the	
domestic	legal	system	of	each	Member	State	to	set	the	criteria	for	determining	the	extent	
of	the	damages	for	harm	caused	by	an	agreement	or	practice	prohibited	under	Article	[101	
[or	102]	TFEU],	provided	that	the	principles	of	equivalence	and	effectiveness	are	
observed.”20		
	
The	Court	did	lay	down	minimum	standards	on	the	type	of	damages	that	can	be	claimed.	
According	to	the	Court,	“it	follows	from	the	principle	of	effectiveness	and	the	right	of	any	
individual	to	seek	compensation	for	loss	caused	by	a	contract	or	by	conduct	liable	to	
restrict	or	distort	competition	that	injured	persons	must	be	able	to	seek	compensation	not	
only	for	actual	loss	(damnum	emergens)	but	also	for	loss	of	profit	(lucrum	cessans)	plus	
interest.”21	
	
On	a	more	cynical	understanding,	it	has	been	suggested	that	the	European	Commission	is	
using	the	CJEU’s	case	law	as	a	springboard	to	introduce	changes	to	Member	States’	
                                                 
15 White Paper, 3 
16 Case C-453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297 [28]-[29], [36] 
17 Joined Cases C-295/04 C-295/04, C-296/04, C-297/04 and C-298/04Manfredi [2006] ECR I-6619 
[100]   
18 Courage v Crehan  [26] 
19 Manfredi [61] 
20 Manfredi [98] In its White Paper [186], the Commission states that “Although the judgment only refers 
to Article 81 EC [101 TFEU] because of the facts underlying the case, the reasoning of the Court is such 
that it can also be applied to Article 82 [102 TFEU] cases.”  
21 Manfredi  [95] 
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procedural	law,	whilst	arguing	that	competition	enforcement	is	‘special’22:	“the	traditional	
tort	rules	of	the	Member	States,	either	of	a	legal	or	procedural	nature,	are	often	inadequate	
for	actions	for	damages	in	the	field	of	competition	law,	due	to	the	specificities	of	actions	in	
this	field….	In	addition,	the	different	approaches	taken	by	the	Member	States	can	lead	to	
differences	in	treatment	and	to	less	foreseeability	for	the	victims	as	well	as	the	defendants,	
i.e.	to	a	high	degree	of	legal	uncertainty.”23		As	early	as	the	annual	Florence	workshop	on	
EU	competition	law	in	2001,	it	was	suggested	that	legislation,	possibly	a	regulation	based	
on	Art	83	EC	[now	Art	103	TFEU],	“would	have	to	lay	down	specific	rules	on	remedial	
relief”,	going	beyond	the	negative	integration	measures	of	the	principles	of	equivalence	
and	effectiveness.	24	However,	it	was	acknowledged	that	reform	and	harmonisation	of	
procedural	rules,	perhaps	even	more	so	than	substantive	ones,	was	politically	sensitive.	
Doubts	still	remain	about	EU	competence	in	national	procedural	matters25.		
	
The	proposal	to	allow	the	binding	effect	of	NCA	finding	of	infringement	on	courts	
throughout	all	Member	States	is	promoted	in	the	context	of	the	draft	directive	as	a	whole:		
the	principal	aim	of	the	proposal	is	to	encourage	damages	actions	by	alleviating	the	
burden	of	proof	on	the	claimant,	avoiding	re‐litigation	of	issues;	boosting	judicial	
economy;	and	promoting	consistent	application.		However,	less	attention	has	been	given	
to	judicial	autonomy	and	the	effects	of	the	rule	on	internal	Member	State	institutional	
structures.		
	
There	are	various	policy	options	pertaining	to	this	proposal	in	the	Commission’s	impact	
assessment,	which	are	part	of	a	package	with	other	aspects	of	the	White	Paper:	Options	
1&2	‐	findings	of	NCA	binding	if	not	appealed	or	if	confirmed	on	appeal;	Option	3	‐	binding	
only	on	courts	of	the	Member	State	whose	competition	authority	issued	the	decision;	
Option	4:	non‐regulatory	approach	–	based	on	best	practice	and	recommendations	only;	
Option	5:	no	action	–	maintain	the	status	quo.		The	first	is	the	Commission’s	preferred	
option.	From	the	2005	Green	Paper26,	the	Commission	has	already	rejected	the	option	of	
                                                 
22 F Marcos & A Sánchez Graells (2006) ‘Towards a European Tort Law? Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC Antitrust Rules: Harmonising Tort Law Through the Back Door?’ Presented at the IV 
International Congress ‘European Private Law Beyond The CFR’, Lleida, Spain, 25-26. 10.2007. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028963. Also published in (2008) 16(3) European Review 
Private Law 469-488 
23 Staff Working Paper [5] 
24 C-D Ehlermann & I Atansiu (eds) European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private 
Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, European University Institute (Hart, 2003),  Introduction, p. xxxii 
25 See C Leskinen ‘The Competence of the European Union to Adopt Measures Harmonizing the 
Procedural Rules Governing EC Antitrust Damages Action’ (2008) Working Paper Instituto de Empresa 
Law School, Madrid for a discussion of potential legal bases. 
26 Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672, 19.12.2005 
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the	NCA	infringement	decision	creating	only	a	rebuttable	presumption	in	damages	actions	
rather	than	irrefutable	proof.	A	number	of	critics	of	the	proposal,	particularly	on	grounds	
of	judicial	independence,	would	however	advocate	the	rebuttable	presumption	option.	
This	chapter	revisits	and	analyses	those	concerns.	
	
	
3.	The	proposed	rule	and	its	purpose	
	
Currently,	where	national	courts	rule	on	agreements,	decisions	or	practices	under	Art	101	
or	102	TFEU	which	are	already	the	subject	of	a	European	Commission	Decision,	they	
cannot	take	decisions	running	counter	to	that	decision.	If	the	Commission	is	contemplating	
a	decision,	the	national	court	must	avoid	adopting	a	decision	that	would	conflict	with	it.27	
This	rule	was	established	by	the	European	Court	of	Justice	in	Masterfoods	Ltd	(t/a	Mars	
Ireland)	v	HB	Ice	Cream	Ltd	(C‐344/98),28	and	subsequently	codified	by	Art	16	of	
Regulation	1/200329	which	decentralised	enforcement	of	EC	antitrust	rules.	In	a	
decentralised	system,	this	rule	contributes	to	the	consistent	application	of	Community	
law.	It	also	implies	that	when	the	European	Commission	finds	a	breach	of	the	competition	
rules,	victims	of	that	infringement	can	rely	directly	on	the	Commission's	Decision	as	
binding	proof	in	civil	proceedings	for	damages.	However,	the	current	proposal	would	go	
beyond	this	existing	acquis	communautaire.	Even	as	it	stands,	the	obligation	in	the	
Masterfoods	rule	is	not	entirely	unambiguous,	as	discussed	below.	
	
Now,	in	the	White	Paper	and	draft	Directive,	the	Commission	proposes	that	when	national	
courts,	in	actions	for	damages,	rule	on	conduct	under	Article	101	or	Article	102	TFEU	
which	is	already	the	subject	of	a	final	decision	finding	an	infringement	of	those	Articles	by	
a	national	competition	authority	within	the	European	Competition	Network,	they	cannot	
take	decisions	running	counter	to	that	decision.	The	rule	would	mean	that	where	a	
national	competition	authority	finds	an	infringement	of	the	EU	antitrust	rules,	a	
complainant	would	be	able	to	rely	on	that	finding	as	irrefutable	proof,	not	just	as	a	
presumption,	when	bringing	a	damages	claim	based	on	that	breach	in	a	national	court	in	
any	Member	State,	without	the	necessity	for	further	proof.		The	national	court	would	not	
be	permitted	to	reinvestigate	the	facts	which	led	to	the	finding	of	infringement.	The	
                                                 
27 See A Komninos, ‘Effect of Commission Decisions on Private Antitrust Litigation: Setting the Story 
Straight’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 1387-1428 for discussion of the impact of a 
Commission decision on national proceedings in various scenarios, at 1404-1422 
28  C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd (t/a Mars Ireland) v HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000] ECR I-11369 
29 Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules of competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of 
the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1 
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relevant	section	of	the	White	Paper	is	2.3,	with	reasons	explained	more	fully	in	Chapter	4	
of	the	Staff	Working	Paper	accompanying	it:	“National	courts	that	have	to	rule	in	actions	
for	damages	on	practices	under	Article	[101	or	102]	on	which	an	NCA	in	the	ECN	has	
already	given	a	final	decision	finding	an	infringement	of	those	articles,	or	on	which	a	
review	court	has	given	a	final	judgment	upholding	the	NCA	decision	or	itself	finding	an	
infringement,	cannot	take	decisions	running	counter	to	any	such	decision	or	ruling”.30		
	
The	proposed	rule	would	put	NCA	decisions	on	a	par,	with	some	caveats,	with	those	of	the	
Commission	in	national	courts,	and	therefore	goes	beyond	the	existing	acquis	
communautaire.	Existing	EU	law	states	that	where	national	courts	rule	on	agreements,	
decisions	or	practices	under	Art	101	or	Art	102	TFEU	which	are	already	the	subject	of	a	
European	Commission	Decision,	they	cannot	take	decisions	running	counter	to	that	
decision.	If	the	Commission	is	contemplating	a	decision,	the	national	court	must	avoid	
adopting	a	decision	that	would	conflict	with	it,	according	to	Masterfoods31		codified	in	Art	
16	Reg	1/2003.	The	Masterfoods	rule	as	a	basis	for	binding	effect	of	NCA	decisions	is	
discussed	in	further	detail	below.	The	caveats	are	first,	it	would	apply	only	to	proceedings	
involving	the	same	infringers	and	same	practices.	Secondly,	only	final	decisions	would	be	
binding,	implying	that	all	appeals	would	have	to	be	exhausted	and	time	limits	expired.	
Thirdly,	it	is	without	prejudice	to	the	national	court’s	right,	or	obligation	in	the	case	of	
highest	courts,	to	seek	clarification	on	the	interpretation	of	Article	101	or	102	TFEU	by	
preliminary	reference	to	the	ECJ.	
	
The	rationales	for	the	rule	are	to	promote	legal	certainty	and	consistent	application	of	EC	
competition	rules;	to	avoid	re‐litigation	of	issues,	boosting	judicial	economy;	and	to	
alleviate	the	burden	of	proof	on	the	complainant	in	bringing	a	damages	action,	to	
encourage	greater	private	enforcement	throughout	the	Community	to	complement	public	
enforcement	by	competition	authorities.	Although	it	is	not	specifically	stated	in	the	White	
Paper,	the	rule	could	indirectly	bring	national	courts	into	the	European	Competition	
Network;	but	leaving	the	competition	authorities	in	primary	position.	National	judges	
could	still	contribute	to	the	development	of	EC	competition	law	‐	the	burden	of	proving	
causal	link,	effects	of	the	infringement	and	quantum	of	the	damages	should	remain	with	
the	complainant	for	determination	by	the	court	‐	but	in	a	more	limited	way.	
	
	 	
                                                 
30 White Paper, 6; Staff Working Paper, 45 
31  C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd (t/a Mars Ireland) v HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000] ECR. I-11369 
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4.	Hierarchy	of	administrative	over	judicial	decisions?		
	
Making	NCA	decisions	binding	on	national	judges	in	effect	creates	an	institutional	
hierarchy	of	the	decisions	of	administrative	authorities	over	courts.32	Actual	or	perceived	
general	hierarchy	of	decisions	of	administrative	bodies	over	civil	court	judgments,	or	of	
public	over	private	enforcement,	should	be	avoided.	Komninos	recognises	this,	but	on	the	
grounds	that	public	and	private	enforcement	are	two	separate	limbs	of	antitrust	
enforcement	independent	of,	if	complementary	to,	each	other	somewhat	hopefully	argues	
that	the	proposed	rule	“does	not	bring	into	question	the	principle	of	independence	since	
such	measures	are	only	intended	to	function	as	incentives	for	follow‐on	civil	actions”.33	
	
Even	if	there	is	no	real	hierarchy	of	public	over	private	enforcement,	the	binding	effect	
rule	certainly	limits	the	ambit	of	judicial	competence.	“An	absolute	rule	runs	counter	to	
national	rules	of	evidence	which	permit	or	require	the	national	judge	freely	to	evaluate	
every	piece	of	evidence.”34	The	Commission	plays	down	these	concerns	arguing	that	in	
practice,	the	requirement	that	the	NCA	decision	should	be	final	before	its	binding	effect	
applies	means	that	it	would	have	been	upheld	by	an	appeal	or	review	court.	It	would	often	
‐	although	not	always	‐	be	a	judgment	confirming	the	NCA	decision	that	binds	the	judge	
hearing	the	civil	case	on	damages	claims.	35	This	argument	is	obviously	less	strong	if	the	
decision	was	not	in	fact	appealed,	even	if	the	Member	State	allowed	the	possibility	for	an	
appeal.	It	also	neglects	the	question	of	different	levels	of	intensity	of	judicial	review	across	
the	Member	States.	More	broadly,	it	creates	a	precedent	of	administrative	decisions	over	
judicial	rulings,	which	could	have	an	effect	beyond	competition	law	in	Member	States’	
systems.		
	
	
	 	
                                                 
32 It is important to take in account the different roles of courts in the competition enforcement system. 
Under Art.35 of the Modernisation Regulation a Member State may designate a court as a national 
competition authority or choose a bifurcated system where an administrative authority carries out the 
investigation but a judicial body makes the determination of an infringement, but this would be in a first 
instance public enforcement capacity rather than in a strictly reviewing function. Chapter 3 investigated 
the significance of these configurations for access to the preliminary reference procedure. 
33 A Komninos “Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? Overlap?” (2006) 
3(1) Competition Law Review 5-26, 26. 
34 AECLJ Association of European Competition Law Judges response to White Paper	
35 Staff Working Paper [149] 
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5.	The	scope	of	the	rule	
	
To	determine	in	what	respects	the	proposed	rule	limits	the	ambit	of	judicial	competence,	a	
consideration	of	the	scope	of	the	rule	is	necessary.	The	White	Paper	outlines	the	scope	and	
conditions	of	the	binding	effect	of	NCA	decisions	on	national	courts	throughout	the	EU.	
The	staff	Working	Paper	accompanying	the	White	Paper	goes	into	more	detail	and	
explains	that	the	rule	as	currently	proposed	is	based	on	the	Masterfoods	rule	as	codified	in	
Art	16(1),	but	“should	be	more	limited	than	this	rule	in	several	respects”:36		it	relates	to	
the	same	infringers	and	practices37;	only	final	decisions	are	binding,	meaning	that	appeals	
are	exhausted	and	limitation	periods	expired,38	and	it	is	also	without	prejudice	to	the	right	
(or	obligation)	of	a	national	court	to	address	a	preliminary	reference	to	the	CJEU.39		In	
addition,	the	rule	would	apply	only	to	findings	of	infringement,	and	not	to	findings	that	
there	is	no	infringement	of	EU	competition	rules.40	
	
These	conditions	provoke	some	open	questions:	the	meaning	of	same	infringers	and	same	
practices;	the	remedy	sought	in	the	civil	court	proceedings;	the	effect	of	other	decisions	
not	finding	an	infringement;	and	the	meaning	of	final	determination.			
	
	
5.1	‘Same	infringers	and	same	practices’	
	
	The	first	point	is	the	definition	of	‘same	infringers	and	same	practices’.		The	White	Paper	
clarifies	that	the	NCA	decision’s	probative	effects	“can	only	relate	to	the	same	agreements,	
decisions	or	practices	that	the	NCA	found	to	infringe	Art	101	or	102	TFEU	and	to	the	same	
individuals,	companies	or	groups	of	companies	which	the	NCA	found	to	have	committed	
this	infringement	(normally	the	addressee(s)	of	the	decision)”41	[emphasis	added].	This	
brings	to	mind	the	situation	in	Crehan42,	which	concerned	whether	the	Commission’s	
finding	of	market	foreclosure	in	an	investigation	involving	other	parties,	but	on	the	same	
market,	could	be	questioned	by	the	national	court.	
	
                                                 
36 Staff Working Paper [143] 
37 Staff Working Paper [154] 
38 Staff Working Paper [149], [155]-[157] 
39 Staff Working Paper [150] 
40 Staff Working Paper [152]-[153] 
41 Staff Working Paper [154] 
42 Crehan v Inntrepreneur Pub Company CPC [2004] EWCA Civ 637; Inntrepreneur Pub Company and 
Others v Crehan [2006] UKHL 38 
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There	is	a	clearly	a	need	to	identify	the	alleged	infringer	in	both	sets	of	proceedings.	
However,	identicalness	of	all	parties	to	the	NCA	and	court	proceedings,	normally	needed	
for	res	judicata	to	take	effect,43	cannot	be	required	for	binding	effect	because	the	claimants	
in	the	civil	proceedings	may	not	necessarily	have	been	party	to	the	investigation	and	
proceedings	before	the	NCA.44	This	lends	weight	to	the	argument	that	a	decision	may	
create	a	binding	precedent	beyond	a	specific	case.	The	situation	could	become	complicated	
where	there	are	multiple	plaintiffs	and	defendants,	especially	if	they	are	spread	across	the	
European	Union.45	There	may	be	problems	of	assigning	responsibility	in	groups	or	
associations	of	undertakings,	particularly	where	some	parties	were	not	addressees	of	the	
decision.			
	
To	conform	with	Art	6(1)	ECHR	and	Art	47	of	the	EU	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights,	
binding	effect	of	an	NCA	should	be	employed	only	when	the	defendants	in	the	follow‐on	
action	were	heard	in	the	proceedings	leading	to	the	foreign	NCA	decision	–	if	not	as	
addressees	of	the	decision	at	least	as	participants.	Section	33(4)	of	the	German	Act	against	
Restraints	of	Competition,	taken	as	a	model	for	the	proposed	binding	effect	rule	in	the	
White	Paper46,	does	not	limit	binding	effect	of	administrative	decisions	to	claims	against	
parties	addressed	by	the	decision.	However,	it	has	been	suggested	that	in	practice	German	
judges	may	interpret	the	provision	narrowly	to	limit	binding	effect	to	decisions	where	the	
defendants	have	had	the	right	to	be	heard.47		
	
	
                                                 
43 Res judicata precludes re-litigation of the same issue between the same parties where there has been a 
final judgment no longer subject to appeal. 
44 Staff Working Paper [154] 
45 As far as defendants are concerned this would include parties who are deemed to be part of the same 
undertaking under EU law (e.g. subsidiaries). See e.g. Provimi Ltd v Roche Products Ltd et al (2003) 
QBD (6 May 2003), which enabled non-UK plaintiffs to use UK courts to pursue claims against non-UK 
defendants. This concerned follow-on damages actions arising out of  the Vitamins (Empagran, Hoffman 
La Roche) cartel. An English or foreign claimant seeking damages for loss suffered as a result of a breach 
of European competition law, can sue for its entire loss in the English courts, irrespective of where the 
loss was suffered, provided there is an English subsidiary which implemented the anti-competitive 
conduct even if there is no contractual relationship between that subsidiary and the claimant. Subsidiaries 
(both UK and non-UK) of the German company Trouw, sued various companies (UK subsidiary, EU 
selling subsidiaries, and parent company of Roche) in English High Court, even though had only 
purchased from foreign subsidiaries and not the English ones. See J Joshua ‘After Empagran: Could 
London Become a One-Stop Shop for Antitrust Litigation?’ (2005) 4.14(3) Competition Law Insight 1-6; 
F Bulst, ‘The Provimi Decision of the High Court: Beginnings of Private Antitrust Litigation in Europe’ 
(2003) 4(4) European Business Organization Law Review 623-650. 
46 According to W Wils ‘The Relationship Between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for 
Damages’ (2009) 32 World Competition 3, as cited by E Truli ‘White Paper on Damages Actions for 
Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules: the Binding Effect of Decisions Adopted by National Competition 
Authorities’ (2009)  5(3) European Competition Journal 795-821, 800, fn 35 
47 W Wurmnest, ‘A New Era for Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany? A Critical Appraisal of the 
Modernized Law against Restraints of Competition’ (2005) 6(8) German Law Journal 1173. 
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5.2	Damages	actions	only	
	
The	wording	of	the	rule	as	proposed	in	the	White	Paper	begins	“When	national	courts	in	
actions	for	damages	rule…”.	This	raises	the	question	of	what	happens	if	a	claimant	is	
seeking,	for	example,	a	declaration	and/or	an	injunction	in	the	civil	court	proceedings.	The	
reference	to	follow‐on	actions48	also	implies	that	the	binding	effect	rule	would	only	apply	
to	damages	actions	subsequent	to	an	NCA’s	decision,	not	other	types	of	remedy	such	as	
declarations	under	Art	101(2)	for	nullity,	and	injunction	applications.	The	NCA	may	
already	have	issued	a	cease	and	desist	order,	although	it	may	not	relate	specifically	to	the	
effect	of	the	anticompetitive	conduct	on	that	particular	claimant.		
	
	
5.3	Findings	of	infringement	and	other	types	of	decision	
	
Only	findings	of	infringement	are	to	be	binding,	not	other	types	of	NCA	decision.	The	
Commission’s	justification	for	this	is	that	the	rule	covers	the	type	of	decisions	NCAs	are	
empowered	to	make	under	Art	5	Reg	1/2003.49	In	particular,	findings	that	there	is	no	
infringement	are	not	included.	Such	a	finding	could	take	a	number	of	forms.	One	is	the	
situation	where	there	is	anticompetitive	behaviour	according	to	Art	101(1)	TFEU,	but	this	
is	mitigated	under	the	conditions	of	Art	101(3),	in	which	case	the	practice	would	not	be	
prohibited.	A	further	example	is	the	case	of	decisions	that	find	there	is	anticompetitive	
conduct,	but	it	is	below	a	certain	threshold	and	the	effects	are	therefore	minimal	(de	
minimis	decisions50).		
	
The	most	pressing	example	is	where	a	firm	admits	anticompetitive	conduct	but	the	NCA	
grants	leniency.51	If	there	is	no	formal	infringement	decision,	this	gives	rise	to	further	
potential	clashes	between	private	enforcement	and	the	leniency	programmes	upon	which	
public	enforcement	is	based.	Joshua	claims	(albeit	without	giving	evidence)	that	“most	if	
                                                 
48 Staff Working Paper [153] 
49 Staff  Working Paper [152]-[153]. Decisions under Art 5 Reg 1/2003 are : requiring that an 
infringement be brought to an end; ordering interim measures; accepting commitments; imposing fines, 
periodic penalty payments or any other penalty provided for in their national law. 
50 See e.g. Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (de minimis) 
OJ C 368, 22.12.2001, 13-15 
51 External impact study ‘Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU: Welfare Impact 
and Potential Scenarios’, December 2007, pp. 510-511,  available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf#page=441, 
last accessed 24.8.2012. 
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not	all	infringement	decisions	involve	successful	immunity	applications”.52		What	about	
leniency	leading	to	a	de	facto	non‐infringement	decision	for	the	first	comer	who	is	entitled	
to	total	immunity?		Indeed,	if	there	is	no	guarantee	of	anonymity,	the	fact	that	a	firm	had	
come	forward,	admitted	guilt	and	been	granted	leniency	would	be	evidence	that	the	firm	
had	been	involved	in	anticompetitive	conduct.	With	the	European	Competition	Network’s	
model	leniency	programme,	differences	across	the	EU	have	been	minimised.	However,	
Member	States	require	different	evidence	in	order	to	consider	full	immunity.	53	As	an	
example,	the	Hungarian	law	allows	a	beneficiary	of	immunity	to	avoid	paying	damages	to	
claimants	in	follow‐on	proceedings	until	the	claimants	have	first	sought	the	damages	from	
the	other	undertakings	in	respect	of	the	same	infringement.54		
	
	
5.4	‘Final	determination’		
	
Only	final	determinations	are	binding,	which	“either	have	been	accepted	by	their	
addressees	(by	refraining	from	an	appeal),	or	which	were	confirmed	upon	appeal	by	the	
competent	review	courts.”55	After	this,	decisions	would	be	considered	res	judicata	
preventing	re‐litigation	of	the	same	issues	which	had	been	decided	upon	in	the	public	
enforcement	proceedings.	
	
This	implies	that	before	limitation	periods	for	appeal	are	over,	even	if	an	infringement	
decision	had	been	reached,	a	national	court	would	be	free	to	revisit	the	facts	of	the	case.		
Whereas	the	national	court	has	an	obligation	to	stay	proceedings	pending	a	Commission	
decision	by	virtue	of	Art	16(1)	Reg	1/2003,	it	would	not	have	the	same	obligation	in	
respect	of	a	foreign	NCA’s	decision.	If	an	appeal	is	pending	national	civil	courts	are	
“encouraged	to	consider	whether	staying	their	proceedings	is	appropriate”56.		
	
Staying	the	proceedings	could,	however,	undermine	the	judicial	economy	benefits	of	the	
rule.	Truli	suggests	that	“courts	should	continue	with	the	adjudication	of	the	damages	
                                                 
52 J Joshua ‘After Empagran: Could London become a one-stop shop for antitrust litigation?’ (2005) 
4.14(3) Competition Law Insight 1-6, 3 
53 See ECN Model Leniency Programme Report on Assessment of the State of Convergence, 15.10.2009, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/model_leniency_programme.pdf  (last accessed 
11.8.2012), and 2006 Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases. 
OJ C 298, 8.12.2006, p. 17 
54Art 88D Hungarian Competition Act. See C Cauffman ‘The Interaction of Leniency Programmes and 
Actions for Damages’ (2011) 7(2) Competition Law Review 181-220,  204 
55 Staff Working Paper [149]. White Paper p. 5 
56 Staff Working Paper  [157] 
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claim	to	the	extent	that	the	Member	State	has	a	procedural	instrument	to	reverse	the	
decision.”57		This	would	solve	the	problem	where	an	NCA’s	findings,	which	the	court	had	
followed,	were	subsequently	overturned	on	appeal;	or	where	the	NCA’s	finding	of	
infringement	was	confirmed	on	appeal	and	the	civil	court	had	come	to	a	different	
conclusion.	If	not	all	Member	States	have	such	a	reversal	mechanism	this	could	cause	
uneven	effects.	In	addition,	Komninos	argues	that	the	EU	principle	of	effectiveness	gives	
“no	legal	basis	for	the	reopening	of	the	contested	judgment,	if	such	recourse	is	unknown	
under	national	procedural	law”.58	
	
One	element	to	consider	is	the	effect	of	time	limits	for	appeals,	and	whether	this	includes	
only	the	first	appeal.	59	Multiple	defendants	may	also	affect	the	limitation	period.	One	
approach	would	be	for	the	NCA’s	decision	to	bind	a	civil	court	in	respect	of	defendants	
who	have	not	appealed	a	decision,	but	not	in	respect	of	those	who	have	appealed.60	
However,	in	the	UK,	the	Emerson	judgment	61	means	that	all	appeals	of	all	co‐defendants	
would	have	to	be	complete	before	the	binding	effect	came	into	play.	In	order	for	this	to	
work	coherently	across	the	Union	there	may	need	to	be	some	harmonisation	of	limitation	
periods.	
	
Another	related	issue	is	the	precise	subject	of	the	appeal.		The	majority	of	appeals	are	
against	the	level	of	the	fine,	rather	than	against	the	substance	of	the	finding	of	
infringement	itself.	The	Staff	Working	Paper	states	that	if	the	pending	appeal	is	against	the	
amount	of	the	fine	only,	there	is	no	risk	of	conflicting	decisions	and	it	would	not	be	
necessary	for	national	courts	to	consider	staying	proceedings.62	It	could	be	argued	that,	
conversely,	this	proposal	may	encourage	appeals	on	the	substance,	particularly	if	there	
were	differential	treatment	between	co‐defendants	who	have	and	have	not	appealed	as	
suggested	above.	This	would	arise	if	firms	considered	that	the	legal	costs	were	worth	it	
relative	to	the	risk	of	damages	claims	to	which	they	could	be	exposed.	In	turn,	an	increase	
in	appeals	would	put	pressure	on	NCA	resources	required	to	defend	the	decision.	
	
                                                 
57 E Truli ‘White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules: the Binding Effect of 
Decisions Adopted by National Competition Authorities’ (2009)  5(3) European Competition Journal 
795-821, 803 
58 Komninos (2007), 1422 
59 For example, the Czech Office for the Protection of Competition’s White Paper response notes that an 
NCA’s decision is reviewed by the Regional Court, but it is still possible to appeal to Supreme 
Administrative Court, proceed to review by the Constitutional Court and then potentially to the European 
Court of Human Rights.  
60 Truli, 804 
61 Emerson Electric Co v Morgan Crucible Co plc (1077/5/7/07) [2008] CAT 8 [66] 
62 Staff  Working Paper [157] 
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The	final	issue	related	to	appeals	is	the	level	of	scrutiny	at	appeal.	Some	Member	States	
may	provide	for	full	reinvestigation	of	the	facts,	in	which	the	court	can	substitute	its	own	
decision	for	that	of	the	competition	authorities.	Other	Member	States	may	adhere	to	a	
judicial	review	which	does	not	allow	for	a	full	re‐examination.	The	judge	in	Member	State	
B	who	is	bound	by	NCA	A’s	decision	may	want	to	be	assured	that	the	procedural	standards	
both	at	the	investigation	stage	in	the	NCA,	and	at	the	appeal	stage,	are	broadly	on	a	par	
with	those	in	Member	State	B.		
	
The	effect	of	a	Commission	decision	can	be	removed	by	the	Court	of	Justice	by	an	action	
for	annulment	under	Art	263	TFEU	or	a	preliminary	reference	requested	by	a	national	
court	under	Art	267	TFEU.63	However,	an	NCA’s	decision	and	its	cross‐border	effects	could	
not	be	declared	void	by	the	Court	of	Justice,	only	by	a	national	court.	As	far	as	the	
preliminary	reference	procedure	is	concerned,	the	CJEU	could	be	called	upon	to	resolve	
any	of	the	issues	of	scope	discussed	above.	In	particular,	it	could	interpret	whether	a	
national	court	has	grounds	for	refusing	to	recognise	an	NCA	decision.	However,	the	CJEU	
would	be	unlikely	to	look	into	the	circumstances	behind	the	individual	case,	and	would	be	
reluctant	to	give	a	ruling	on	whether	Member	State	A’s	procedural	safeguards	are	
adequate	relative	to	Member	State	B.	
	
	
5.5	Limiting	the	ambit	of	judicial	competence?			
	
If	the	binding	effect	rule	is	adopted,	national	courts	would	not	be	permitted	to	
reinvestigate	the	facts	which	led	to	the	finding	of	infringement.	This	narrows	the	ambit	of	
judicial	jurisdiction.	However,	national	judges	could	resist	this	‘trespass’	in	a	number	of	
ways.		Some	of	these	relate	to	the	scope	of	the	binding	effect	rule	proposal;	other	factors	
relate	to	different	standards	across	Member	States.	
	
The	first	is	a	different	set	of	facts	in	the	public	enforcement	and	civil	judicial	proceedings,	
e.g.		conduct	in	a	different	time	frame;	different	effects	on	that	Member	States’	market.	
This	would	require	the	court	to	ascertain	whether	the	facts	on	which	the	infringement	was	
based	are	exactly	relevant	to	the	case	in	the	civil	proceedings.		
	
A	further	example	is	fault	requirements:	according	to	the	Commission’s	preferred	policy	
option,	in	Member	States	where	there	is	no	strict	liability,	fault	is	presumed	as	soon	as	the	
                                                 
63 Also acknowledged in Staff working paper at [141] 
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infringement	has	been	established.	In	this	context,	fault	would	therefore	be	attributed	by	
the	NCA’s	decision.	If	fault	conditions	were	different	in	the	‘receiving’	Member	State	court,	
the	judge	might	need	to	reopen	the	question.		
	
Where	the	NCA	made	a	finding	of	no	infringement,	the	rule	would	still	allow	a	judge	to	
make	a	positive	finding,	although	in	many	Member	States	a	finding	of	no	infringement	is	
persuasive.	However,	this	is	subject	to	the	points	made	above	about	decisions	other	than	
infringement	decisions.	
	
The	civil	court	would	have	full	jurisdiction	in	stand‐alone	(as	opposed	to	follow‐on)	cases	
where	a	plaintiff	brings	a	case	directly	to	court	without	an	existing	NCA	investigation	and	
attempts	to	prove	the	infringement	herself.	The	court	would	also	have	jurisdiction	on	
applications	for	other	(non‐damages)	relief	such	as	injunctions.	
	
A	further	example	is	where	the	finding	of	infringement	is	made	exclusively	relating	to	
national	rules,	not	on	EU	rules	or	if	based	on	national	law	which	is	stricter	than	Article	102	
TFEU.	This	relates	to	the	geographic	market.		Art	3	Reg	1/2003	requires	parallel	
application	of	EU	law	and	national	law	where	there	is	an	effect	on	trade	between	Member	
States,	but	Art	3(2)	allows	Member	States	to	adopt	on	their	own	territory	stricter	national	
laws	which	sanction	unilateral	conduct	by	undertakings.		
	
Article	34(1)	of	the	Brussels	I	Regulation64,	applying	to	the	recognition	of	foreign	
judgments,	allows	a	court	to	exceptionally	refuse	recognition	of	another	Member	State’s	
judgment	on	grounds	of	public	policy	e.g.	where	fair	legal	process	may	have	been	impeded	
contrary	to	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	and	the	Charter	on	Fundamental	
Rights	of	the	European	Union	and	the	case	law	of	the	Community	courts.	If	a	provision	
analogous	to	Art	34(1)	were	adopted,	this	would	be	another	channel	for	the	judge	to	look	
into	a	foreign	NCA’s	decision.	The	analogy	with	the	Brussels	I	Regulation	is	discussed	in	
more	detail	below.	
	
The	figure	below	gives	an	example	of	the	possible	effect	of	different	standards	in	two	
Member	States	on	the	ambit	of	judicial	jurisdiction.	This	could	apply	to	different	fault	
requirements,	standards	of	proof,	investigation	standards,	or	levels	of	judicial	review.	The	
shaded	area	represents	what	is	recognised	in	both	Member	States,	with	the	bold	line	
                                                 
64 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1 
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denoting	the	standard	as	set	in	that	Member	State.	For	example,	in	the	case	of	fault65,	
Member	State	1	might	have	a	strict	liability	standard,	but	Member	State	2	might	require	
further	evidence	of	negligence	or	intention.	According	to	the	Commission’s	preferred	
policy	option	on	fault	in	the	White	Paper,	in	Member	States	where	there	is	no	strict	
liability,	fault	is	presumed	as	soon	as	the	infringement	has	been	established.	In	this	
context,	fault	would	therefore	be	attributed	by	the	NCA’s	decision.	In	the	event	of	
excusable	error,	the	defendant	can	be	exonerated.	Under	the	other	policy	options	
(rebuttable	presumption	of	fault,	with	exoneration	for	excusable	error;	or	alternatively	
strong	probative	value	of	a	finding	of	infringement),	courts	would	have	more	scope	for	
making	a	determination	depending	on	national	causation	rules.	The	binding	effect	of	the	
NCA	infringement	would	not	necessarily	lead	to	a	penalty	or	damages.	
	
This	is	one	way	in	which	courts	could	retain	the	ambit	of	their	discretion	if	they	were	
uncomfortable	with	the	binding	effect	rule.	If	a	judge	saw	that	the	standard	of	proof	was	
lower	in	the	Member	State	originator	of	the	decision	it	was	asked	to	recognise,	s/he	could	
require	further	proof	to	meet	the	standard	in	the	recognising	home	Member	State.	
	
On	standard	of	proof,	different	types	of	damages	‐	e.g.	punitive,	exemplary,	restitutionary	‐	
may	require	different	standards	of	proof.	A	further	point	is	the	different	levels	of	proof	in	
administrative	proceedings	and	criminal	or	civil	actions	for	damages.	This	would	be	less	of	
an	issue	if	the	standard	of	proof	were	higher	in	administrative	proceedings	than	in	private	
enforcement	proceedings.66	Given	the	requirement	of	parallel	application,	decisions	may	
be	based	on	both	EU	and	national	law	provisions,	which	may	carry	different	standards	of	
proof.	This	is	particularly	relevant	to	cases	applying	national	laws	which	are	stricter	than	
Article	102.		It	is	questionable	whether	it	would	be	possible	to	separate	out	the	facts	which	
apply	only	to	the	infringement	of	the	EU	rules.67	
	
	
                                                 
65 The Staff Working Paper [163] notes that “Member States take diverse approaches on the interaction 
between competition law and the general rules on liability for damages, in particular as regards the 
question of fault (culpa). It is also noteworthy that the concept of fault is not a homogeneous one across 
Member States.”  
66 National report on Sweden in G C Rodriguez Iglesias & L Ortiz Blanco (eds) The Judicial Application 
of Competition Law: Proceedings of the FIDE XXIV Congress Madrid 2010 Vol 2 (Servicio de 
Publicaciones de la Facultad de Derecho, Complutense University, Madrid 2010);  see also W Wils ‘The 
Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages’ (2009) 32(1) 
World Competition 3-26, 17  - “Procedural guarantees for the defendant tend to be stronger in public 
enforcement proceedings than in civil litigation” 
67 This point is also made in the American Bar Association’s response to the White Paper on damages 
actions.   
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Fig	2:	Example	of	the	possible	effect	of	different	standards	in	Member	States	on	the	ambit	
of	judicial	jurisdiction	
	
	
Only	the	finding	of	infringement	itself	should	be	binding,	not	findings	on	the	effects	of	the	
infringement.		The	burden	of	proving	causal	link,	effects	of	the	infringement	and	quantum	
should	remain	with	the	complainant	for	determination	by	the	court.	An	infringement	
confirmed	in	one	jurisdiction	by	an	NCA	may	not	have	had	effects	in	another.	
	
If	the	proposed	rule	were	adopted,	the	national	judge	would	still	be	responsible	for	
assessing	the	causal	link	between	the	infringement	and	damage	to	the	complainant,	effects	
of	the	infringement,	and	quantum.	However,	in	practice	these	judicial	domains	are	also	
subject	to	limitation,	as	the	Commission	has	issued	a	guidance	paper	on	quantification	of	
damages.	68	In	addition,	the	Commission	is	studying	the	possibility	of	NCAs	acting	as	
amicus	curiae	for	the	purpose	of	quantifying	damages69.			
	
                                                 
68 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_actions_damages/draft_guidance_paper_en.pdf	
Consultation on the guidance paper was open from June until September 2011 and the Commission 
intends to issue a final version based on those comments. The intention to draw up non-binding guidance 
for courts was signalled in the White Paper, p. 7 and accompanying Commission staff working paper , p. 
60. It is based on the report  ‘Quantifying antitrust damages: towards non-binding guidance for courts’, 
study prepared for the European Commission by Oxera economic consultancy and a multi-jurisdictional 
team of lawyers 21.1.2010 , available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification_study.pdf (accessed 19.8.2010) 
69 ‘Provision of non-binding assistance for quantification of damages’ at 4.1.4 of the White Paper Impact 
Assessment Report SEC (2008) 405, 2.4.2008, p. 28. Also relevant is the external study for the impact 
assessment, ‘Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and potential 
scenarios’ – pp 200-201, 227-228, 485, table 33 of the Study, p. 242.  
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The	aim	of	the	Guidance	paper	is	“to	offer	assistance	to	courts	and	parties	involved	in	
actions	for	damages	by	making	more	widely	available	information	relevant	for	quantifying	
harm	caused	by	infringements	of	the	EU	antitrust	rules”.70	The	guidance	to	courts	is	
“purely	informative,	does	not	bind	national	courts	and	does	not	alter	the	legal	rules	
applicable	in	the	Member	States	to	damages	actions	based	on	infringements	of	Article	101	
or	102	TFEU.”71	However,	the	draft	also	suggests	that	the	guidance	could	be	used	when	
applying	national	law	‐	i.e.	not	only	where	Article	101	or	102	are	concerned	–	and	in	
settlement	proceedings	or	alternative	dispute	resolution	as	well	as	in	the	courtroom.72			
There	may	also	be	spill‐over	effects	for	the	calculation	of	damages	in	other	areas	of	law.73			
	
Despite	the	non‐binding	nature	of	the	guidance,	some	respondents	to	the	White	Paper	
consultation	also	raise	concerns	in	principle	about	any	guidelines	restricting	the	ability	of	
national	judges	to	come	to	their	own	assessment	of	quantification	of	damage.74	This	is	
somewhat	assuaged	by	the	fact	that	rather	than	providing	precise	formulae,	the	guidance	
paper	provides	a	range	of	suggested	methods	and	models.	It	is	therefore	a	“toolkit”75	for	
courts	rather	than	a	template.	It	also	provides	examples	from	different	jurisdictions	and	
legal	precedents	from	the	European	courts,	which	may	make	the	guidance	more	amenable	
to	national	judges.	It	would	still	be	for	the	judge	to	decide	on	the	level	of	evidence	needed	
to	assess	quantum.	The	guidance	paper	indicates	that	nothing	in	it	should	change	the	
standard	of	proof	or	“level	of	detail	required	of	factual	submissions”	as	established	in	
national	law.76			
	
What	is	more	likely	to	affect	the	courts’	ability	to	accurately	calculate	damages	is	access	to	
evidence.	In	calculating	harm,	direct	evidence,	such	as	documents	on	agreed	sales	figures	
or	price	increases,	would	be	helpful	to	the	court.	This	type	of	evidence	is	likely	to	be	
                                                 
70 Draft guidance paper p. 2 
71 Draft Guidance paper [7] 
72 Draft guidance paper  [6]  
73 This was the aim of the Oxera reports authors, although it is not mentioned in the subsequent draft 
guidance paper: In a communication about the report, the report’s authors say that “the methods and 
models presented here can be used for damages estimations in those different legal contexts as well” 
Oxera Agenda briefing: Quantifying damages: a step towards practical guidance 
http://www.oxera.com/cmsDocuments/Agenda_January%2010/Antitrust%20damages.pdf, p. 6 
74 Bird & Bird White Paper response:	“we would caution against proposals which could limit national 
courts’ ability to develop their own jurisdictional practice for damages claims by making any ‘soft law’ or 
guidelines too prescriptive.”; AFEP Association Française des Entreprises Privées White Paper response: 
“future attempts at quantification on the part of the Commission would deprive the court of its 
compensatory function, once again emptying the role of the court of its substance”. Possibly this is a 
misunderstanding – the Commission is not intending to calculate the quantum, but to give methods for 
doing so. However, it does demonstrate the attitude to ‘non-binding advice’ in some quarters. 
75 Oxera study, p. 4 
76 Draft guidance paper [8] 
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gained	through	leniency	applications	in	public	enforcement	by	competition	authorities.	
Claimants	in	damages	actions	will	find	it	easier	to	prove	their	loss,	as	well	as	the	
infringement	itself,	if	they	have	access	to	these	leniency	documents.	In	Pfleiderer,	the	CJEU	
ruled	that	Regulation	1/2003	did	not	preclude	the	possibility	of	leniency	documents	being	
disclosed	for	the	purpose	of	a	private	action,	leaving	it	to	national	courts	to	determine	the	
conditions	under	which	such	access	must	be	permitted	or	refused	by	balancing	the	
interests	protected	by	EU	law	–	that	is,	the	effectiveness	of	leniency	programmes	and	the	
right	to	claim	damages.77		However	the	Pfleiderer	judgment	led	to	alarm	that	it	would	
jeopardise	competition	enforcement	by	discouraging	cartel	members	from	reporting	each	
other	to	a	competition	authority	if	they	are	then	going	to	be	liable	for	damages	in	a	private	
action.	The	heads	of	European	competition	authorities	responded	with	a	declaration	
affirming	the	fundamental	importance	of	the	protection	of	leniency	material.78		This	is	on	
the	grounds	that	most	private	actions	are	currently	follow‐on	actions.	In	the	recent	case	of	
National	Grid	in	the	English	High	Court,	the	European	Commission	intervened	in	the	
context	of	a	damages	action	brought	by	National	Grid	(UK	utility	company)	against	a	
number	of	companies	that	were	held	liable	by	the	Commission	in	2007	for	their	
participation	in	the	Gas	Insulated	Switchgear	(GIS)	cartel.79	The	Commission	stated	that	
the	information	specifically	prepared	for	the	purpose	of	an	application	under	its	leniency	
programme	should	not	be	disclosed.	80		However,	the	High	Court	took	a	more	nuanced	
approach,	applying	a	proportionality	test	assessing	(a)	whether	the	information	could	be	
obtained	from	other	sources	and	(b)	relevance	of	leniency	materials	to	the	case.81	As	the	
materials	were	relevant	and	could	not	be	obtained	from	another	source,	the	Court	allowed	
disclosure	of	a	limited	part	of	the	confidential	version	of	the	Commission	decision.82	As	a	
result	of	these	cases,	the	interface	between	leniency	and	damages	claims	is	an	issue	that	
will	be	addressed	in	the	draft	directive.83	
                                                 
77 Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, 14.6.2011, not yet reported [32] 
78 ECN resolution on protection of leniency material in the context of civil damages actions, 23.5.2012 , 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/leniency_material_protection_en.pdf  (last accessed 
11.8.2012) 
79 The Commission’s intervention was discussed in more detail in the previous chapter 
80 Hearing 3.11.2011 in National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd and other companies: 
[2011] EWHC 1717 (Ch). Commission’s intervention available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/amicus_curiae_2011_national_grid_en.pdf  (last accessed 
11.8.2012) on whether national court has jurisdiction to order disclosure of leniency documents submitted 
to the Commission 
81 National Grid judgment at [39] 
82 National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd and other companies: ChD (Mr Justice Roth): 
hearing 4.4.2012 
83 p. 3Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the European parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Commission Work 
Programme 2012 COM(2011) 777 final , Brussels, 15.11.2011 available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp2012_annex_en.pdf , last accessed 10.8.2012  
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6.	Bases	of	the	rule	
	
This	section	considers	the	possible	bases	of	the	binding	effect	rule.	No	Treaty	legal	basis	
was	identified	in	the	White	Paper	or	the	leaked	draft	proposal,	which	is	one	reason	for	its	
stalled	progress.	The	possible	Treaty	bases	are	considered	in	more	detail	in	the	final	
section	of	this	chapter.	This	section	considers	which	wider	principles	form	the	foundation	
for	the	binding	effect	rule.	There	are	three	possibilities.	The	first	is	the	explicit	extension	of	
the	Masterfoods	rule	that	a	judgment	by	a	national	court	must	not	run	counter	to	a	
decision	by	the	Commission.	It	can	be	argued	that	the	Commission	is	delegating	its	power	
in	the	framework	of	the	European	Competition	Network,	and	granting	a	similar	effect	to	
decisions	of	NCAs.	The	second	is	the	duty	of	loyal	cooperation	based	on	Art	4(3)	TEU,	
according	to	which	the	Union	and	Member	States	should	assist	each	other.	Of	particular	
interest	is	the	horizontal	nature	of	the	duty	of	loyal	cooperation,	that	is,	between	
institutions	at	the	sub‐national	level.	The	third,	lesser	basis,	is	an	analogy	with	the	
Brussels	Regulation,	Regulation	44/2001’s	provisions	on	the	recognition	and	enforcement	
of	judgments	in	civil	and	commercial	matters.			
	
	
6.1	Extension	of	the	Masterfoods	rule	
	
Since	the	binding	effect	rule	is	explicitly	an	extension	of	the	Masterfoods	rule,	it	is	
important	to	revisit	that	rule	and	its	interpretations.	The	existing	Masterfoods	rule,	also	
codified	in	Art	16	Reg	1/2003,	establishes	that	where	a	national	court	rules	on	an	
agreement,	decision	or	practice	under	Article	101	or	102	TFEU	which	is	already	the	
subject	of	a	European	Commission	decision,	it	cannot	take	decisions	running	counter	to	
that	decision.	If	the	Commission	is	contemplating	a	decision,	the	national	court	has	a	duty	
to	avoid	adopting	a	decision	that	would	conflict	with	it.84		
	
According	to	my	original	research,	different	interpretations	of	Masterfoods	and	resistance	
to	its	effect	are	evident	in	the	pre‐legislative	negotiations	leading	to	Reg	1/2003.	The	
negotiation	history	of	the	Regulation	in	the	Council	of	Ministers	can	be	traced	through	the	
legislative	amendments	in	the	travaux	préparatoires.	By	searching	the	register	of	Council	
                                                                                                                                               
 
84 A Komninos EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by 
National Courts (Hart, 2008) 112-137. L Kjølbye, 'Case C-344/98, Masterfoods v HB Ice Cream' (2002) 
39(1) Common Market Law Review 175–184 
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documents,85		it	is	possible	to	trace	the	progress	of	the	proposal,	meeting	by	meeting,	
through	the	Council.	In	some	cases,	the	positions	of	Member	States	are	discernible	through	
annotations.	The	original	proposal	read	“Member	States	shall	use	every	effort	to	avoid	any	
decision	that	conflicts	with	decisions	adopted	by	the	Commission”86.		Germany,	Denmark,	
the	Netherlands,	Finland	and	Austria	requested	deletion	of	this	Article	as	superfluous	
given	the	existing	Masterfoods	judgment.	Denmark,	France,	Greece,	the	Netherlands	and	
Portugal	also	requested	clearer	formulation	of	the	obligation	to	avoid	conflict	with	
Commission	decisions.	Austria	requested	specific	reference	to	the	CJEU’s	role.87	France	
asked	for	clarification	of	the	meaning	of	"decisions	adopted	by	the	Commission",	and	later	
requested	deletion	of	the	paragraph	that	national	courts	should	not	adopt	a	decision	
running	counter	to	one	by	Commission,	without	prejudice	to	the	preliminary	reference	
procedure	under	Art	267	TFEU.88	Italy	requested	insertion	of	"insofar	as	the	facts	of	the	
case	are	the	same".89	Finland	suggested	an	alternative	–	to	move	the	rule	to	a	‘whereas’	
clause	in	recitals.90	Later	Luxembourg	also	proposed	deleting	the	codification	of	
Masterfoods,	and	was	the	last	Member	State	to	sustain	this	position.91	
	
According	to	Commission	officials	involved	in	the	negotiations,	Member	States	were	not	
convinced	about	the	need	to	codify	the	judgment,	hoping	that	the	CJEU	would	change	its	
mind.	Some	Member	States	would	only	agree	if	the	Commission	had	“properly	
investigated”.	This	would	imply	national	courts	being	able	to	look	behind	the	
Commission’s	decision	to	its	evidence	and	reasoning.	Another	interviewee	acknowledged	
that	the	Masterfoods	rule	may	raise	a	separation	of	powers	issue,	but	the	important	thing	
was	that	it	reduced	the	risk	of	divergence	of	judicial	interpretation.92	This	risk	of	
divergence	had	been	an	important	argument	against	modernisation	which	the	
Commission	wanted	to	dispel.	A	senior	DG	COMP	official	went	as	far	as	to	say	that	the	
Masterfoods	judgment	was	the	“saviour”	of	DG	COMP	giving	up	its	monopoly	in	
enforcement.93		
	
                                                 
85 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=549&lang=EN 
86 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and amending Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 2988/74, 
(EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87 (‘Regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty’) COM(2000) 582 final  - 2000/0243(CNS) OJ 2000 C 365 E/28 
87 Document: 5158/01 Secretariat to delegations, 11.2001; Document: 9999/01 Secretariat to delegations, 
27.6. 2001 (incorporating Document: 9999/01 corrigendum Secretariat to delegations 6. 7.2001) 
88 Document: 13563/01 (Belgian) Presidency to COREPER, 20.11. 2001 
89 Document: 5158/01 Secretariat to delegations, 11.1.2001 
90 Document: 8383/1/02 (Spanish) Presidency to COREPER, 27.5.2002 
91 Document: 13983/02 Working Party to COREPER, 8.11. 2002 
92 Interview with a DG COMP official in the Modernisation working group, Brussels, 19.7.2005 
93 Interview with a senior DG COMP official, Brussels, 6.9.2005 
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The	wording	of	Art	16	Reg	1/2003	is	identical	to	a	paragraph	in	the	Masterfoods	judgment	
to	lend	legitimacy	to	the	obligation.94	Interestingly,	the	CJEU	itself	did	not	use	the	word	
‘binding’.	Nonetheless,	this	is	how	the	obligation	is	explicitly	interpreted	in	the	notice	on	
cooperation	between	the	Commission	and	national	courts95:	“Where	the	Commission	
reaches	a	decision	in	a	particular	case	before	the	national	court,	the	latter	cannot	take	a	
decision	running	counter	to	that	of	the	Commission.	The	binding	effect	of	the	
Commission's	decision	is	of	course	without	prejudice	to	the	interpretation	of	Community	
law	by	the	Court	of	Justice.	Therefore,	if	the	national	court	doubts	the	legality	of	the	
Commission's	decision,	it	cannot	avoid	the	binding	effects	of	that	decision	without	a	ruling	
to	the	contrary	by	the	Court	of	Justice”96.	(emphasis	added)	It	could	be	argued	that	the	
Courts	notice	is	a	soft	law	instrument	that	does	not	have	the	same	weight	as	case	law	and	
the	Regulation	itself.	But	it	is	a	document	which	is	meant	to	clarify	cooperation	between	
the	Commission	and	national	courts	in	practical	terms.	
	
There	is	also	evidence	that	Member	States	themselves	consider	Commission	decisions	to	
be	binding.	The	explanatory	notes	to	the	UK’s	Enterprise	Bill	2001	explains	the	new	
section	58A	and	the	infringement	decisions	which	will	be	binding	on	courts:	“No	mention	
is	made	of	those	decisions	of	the	European	Commission	(and	other	similar	decisions)	that	
are	binding	in	any	event	by	virtue	of	EC	law.”97	How	the	courts	actually	deal	with	this	is	
demonstrated	by	the	House	of	Lords	judgment	in	Crehan,	discussed	below.	
	
There	can	be	different	interpretations	of	the	precise	obligation.	Saying	that	courts	should	
not	take	a	decision	‘running	counter	to’	one	of	the	Commission	does	not	necessarily	mean	
that	that	decision	is	‘binding’.	A	common	interpretation	is	that	it	is	not	a	positive	duty	to	
blindly	follow	the	Commission’s	reasoning,	but	a	negative	duty	to	abstain	from	
contradicting	it.98	“Masterfoods	and	Article	16	do	not	state	that	national	courts	are	‘bound’	
by	Commission	decisions,	but	that	they	cannot	take	decisions	‘running	counter’	to	them.	It	
requires	in	my	view,	in	each	case,	to	examine	if	the	decision	intended	by	the	national	court	
                                                 
94 Interview with a DG COMP official in the Modernisation working group, Brussels, 14.9.2005  
95 Commission Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member 
States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ 2004 C 101/04 
96 Courts notice [13]. See also the scenarios in Komninos (2007), 1404-1422 
97 UK Enterprise Bill explanatory notes 115-EN, in respect of clause 18: findings of infringement [78] 
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmbills/115/2002115.htm  last accessed 
20.8.2012 
98 Komninos (2007), 1392 and 1395   
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would	prevent	the	binding	legal	effects	generated	by	the	decision	itself	from	taking	
place…”99	(emphasis	in	original).			
	
However,	the	White	Paper	does	use	the	word	‘binding’	in	respect	of	the	proposed	effect	of	
NCA	decisions.	If	Commission	decisions	are	not	formally		binding,	why	should	foreign	NCA	
decisions,	which	are	horizontal	in	relation	to	other	Member	States	rather	than	vertical	as	
in	the	case	of	EU	institutions,	benefit	from	binding	effect?	Is	there	an	institutional	
hierarchy?	
	
According	to	the	CJEU	in	Masterfoods,	the	Commission’s	primacy	over	national	judicial	
proceedings	is	justified	so	that	the	Commission	can	fulfil	the	role	assigned	to	it	by	the	
Treaty.100		Komninos	rightly	argues	that	the	notion	of	bindingness	is	not	compatible	with	a	
system	of	parallel	competences	in	enforcement	by	the	Commission,	NCAs	and	national	
courts.	In	a	section	on	‘non‐applicability	of	the	supremacy	rule	to	NCAs’	decisions’,	he	
posits	that	“this	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	decisions	of	NCAs	cannot…positively	or	
negatively	bind	civil	courts,	even	acting	in	the	framework	of	the	ECN	and	applying	
competition	law	under	Reg	1/2003.”101	Such	a	duty	may	be	prescribed	by	national	law,	but	
not	by	EU	law.102	
	
Komninos	denies	any	institutional	hierarchy,	but	claims	that	national	courts’	obligation	is	
based	on	supremacy	of	EU	law:	“…primacy	is	not	one	of	the	Commission,	as	competition	
authority,	over	civil	courts,	but	rather	of	the	Commission,	as	supranational	Community	
organ,	over	national	courts.”	[emphasis	in	original].But	as	he	acknowledges,	this	argument	
does	not	hold	for	precedence	of	NCA	decisions	over	national	courts.	Gippini	Fournier	
makes	a	similar	point:	“As	a	matter	of	law,	the	only	thing	that	distinguishes	a	decision	of	
the	Commission	applying	Article	[101	or	102]	in	an	individual	case	from	a	similar	decision	
being	taken	by	a	NCA	is	that	the	Commission’s	decision	is	a	Community	act	and	contains	
provisions	forming	part	of	the	Community	legal	order….It	is	not	to	the	Commission	that	
national	courts	must	pay	deference,	but	to	the	provisions	of	Community	law	that	its	
decisions	constitute…”103	
	
                                                 
99 E Gippini Fournier, ‘The Modernisation of European Competition Law: First Experiences with 
Regulation 1/2003 (Institutional Report to FIDE Congress 2008)’  in H F Koeck and M M Karollus (eds) 
The Modernisation of European Competition Law - Initial Experiences With Regulation 1/2003: 
Proceedings of the FIDE XXIII Congress Linz 2008  vol 2 (Nomos / facultas.wuv, 2008), 121 
100 Masterfoods [46], discussed by Komninos (2007), 1389 
101 Komninos (2007) 1396 
102 Komninos (2007) 1397 
103 E Gippini Fournier (2008), 120 
 189
The	White	Paper	conclusion	itself	also	uses	the	term	‘binding’:	“Binding	effect	of	NCA	
decisions:	Whenever	the	European	Commission	finds	a	breach	of	Article	81	or	82	of	the	EC	
Treaty,	victims	of	the	infringement	can,	by	virtue	of	established	case	law	and	Article	16(1)	
of	Regulation	1/2003,	rely	on	this	decision	as	binding	proof	in	civil	proceedings	for	
damages.”	[emphasis	added]	Since	this	is	‘by	virtue	of	existing	case	law’,	it	suggests	that	
those	provisions	also	denote	binding	effect	of	Commission	decisions.	
	
A	decision	of	the	Commission,	along	with	other	EU	institutions,	is	presumed	valid	and	its	
validity	cannot	be	questioned	by	national	courts.	If	the	national	court	doubts	the	legality	of	
the	Commission’s	decision,	it	cannot	avoid	the	effects	of	that	decision	without	a	ruling	to	
the	contrary	by	the	CJEU,	according	to	Foto	Frost104	and	reaffirmed	in	the	Courts	Notice	
recital	13.	The	effect	of	a	Commission	decision	can	only	be	removed	by	a	judgment	of	the	
Community	courts	in	the	context	of	an	action	for	annulment	under	Article	263,	or	in	a	
preliminary	ruling	under	Art	267	TFEU.	
	
Only	where	the	national	court	cannot	reasonably	doubt	the	content	of	the	Commission’s	
contemplated	decision,	or	where	the	Commission	has	already	decided	on	a	similar	case,	
may	the	national	court	decide	on	the	case	pending	before	it	without	asking	the	
Commission	for	information	or	awaiting	its	decision105.	This	echoes	the	doctrine	of	
precedent,	where	the	judge	interprets	the	case	in	line	with	existing	law	by	following	the	
decisions	in	cases	with	similar	facts.	It	implies	that	Commission	decisions	may	not	only	be	
binding	on	national	courts	in	the	same	case	with	the	same	parties,	but	binding	in	other	
cases	too.			
	
This	is	tied	to	the	question	of	whether	the	competition	authority’s	decision	and	the	civil	
court	proceedings	relate	to	the	same	facts	and	the	same	parties.	According	to	Advocate	
General	Cosmas	in	Masterfoods,	there	is	no	conflict	between	a	judgment	of	the	national	
court	and	a	decision	of	the	European	Commission	where	the	proceedings	are	not	
‘completely	identical’	(para	16).	In	the	English	case	of	Inntrepreneur	v	Crehan,106	
concerning	beer	tie	arrangements	between	a	brewery	and	a	pub	leaseholder,	the	House	of	
Lords	interpreted	the	Advocate	General’s	statement	as	meaning	that	there	was	a	
requirement	to	accept	the	factual	basis	of	a	decision	reached	by	a	Community	institution	
only	when	the	specific	agreement,	decision	or	practice	before	the	national	court	has	also	
been	the	subject	of	a	Commission	decision,	involving	the	same	parties.	The	issue	in	Crehan	
                                                 
104 Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199 [12]-[20] 
105 Courts Notice recital 12 
106 Inntrepreneur Pub Company and Others v Crehan [2006] UKHL 38 
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concerned	the	Commission’s	finding	of	foreclosure	in	the	beer	tie	market	in	the	context	of	
an	investigation	into	other	parties.107	
	
Perhaps	more	problematically,	in	Masterfoods	the	Advocate	General	also	said	that	a	
conflict	only	arises	“when	the	binding	authority	which	the	decision	of	the	national	court	
will	have	conflicts	with	the	grounds	and	operative	part	of	the	Commission’s	decision.”	It	is	
arguable	that	that	‘grounds’	of	the	decision	could	encompass	findings	of	fact	open	to	
reconsideration	by	the	national	judge.	In	Crehan	in	the	House	of	Lords,	Lord	Hoffman	
ruled	that	“where	there	is	no	question	of	a	conflict	of	decisions	[where	the	UK	court	is	not	
considering	the	same	agreement	or	conduct	between	or	by	the	same	parties]	the	decision	
of	the	Commission	is	simply	evidence	properly	admissible	before	the	English	court	which,	
given	the	expertise	of	the	Commission,	may	well	be	regarded	by	that	court	as	highly	
persuasive.	As	a	matter	of	law,	however,	it	is	only	part	of	the	evidence	which	the	court	will	
take	into	account.	If,	upon	an	assessment	of	the	evidence,	the	judge	comes	to	the	
conclusion	that	the	view	of	the	Commission	was	wrong,	I	do	not	see	how,	consistently	with	
his	judicial	oath,	he	can	say	that	as	a	matter	of	deference	he	proposes	nevertheless	to	
follow	the	Commission.”108	
	
This	links	to	the	question	of	which	part	of	the	decision	has	legal	effect.	Is	it	only	the	finding	
of	the	infringement	itself	which	is	binding,	or	also	the	underlying	facts	and	reasoning	‐	the	
‘grounds’	which	the	Advocate	General	in	Masterfoods	referred	to	above	‐		leading	to	that	
finding?	Gippini	Fournier’s	opinion	is	that	“The	Commission’s	reasoning	leading	it	to	a	
particular	decision,	including	its	interpretation	of	Article	81	or	Article	82	and	its	findings	
of	fact	are	clearly	not	‘binding’	as	such…It	is	in	the	operative	part	of	the	decision	that	
specific	provisions	are	found…	This	is	the	part	of	the	decision	that	becomes	part	of	
Community	law	and	is	vested	with	supremacy	as	long	as	the	decision	stands.”	109	However,	
it	is	not	always	straightforward	to	separate	these.		
	
According	to	the	General	Court	in	the	case	of	Vlaamse	Televisie	Maatschappij	in	the	context	
of	State	aid,	the	operative	part	of	a	decision	“must	be	construed	in	the	light	of	the	
                                                 
107 Whitbread [1999] OJ L 88/26 dated 24 February 1999,  recital 127. Commission Decision of 24 
February 1999 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty (Case No IV/35.079/F3 - 
Whitbread) (notified under document number C(1999) 346) 
108 Crehan HL [69] 
109 Gippini Fournier (2008), 120 
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statement	of	the	reasons	upon	which	it	is	based”.110	This	raises	the	question	of	whether	
this	means	that	the	Commission’s	reasoning	is	also	binding;	or,	whether	subsequent	cases	
can	be	distinguished	based	on	those	reasons,	and	as	such	whether	the	court	can	look	into	
that	reasoning.111	
	
As	discussed	above,	there	is	an	argument	that	the	obligation	not	to	take	a	decision	running	
counter	to	one	by	the	Commission	applies	by	virtue	of	supremacy	of	EU	law,	with	the	
decision	under	the	ultimate	control	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice	–	the	relationship	is	
not	one	of	deference	of	the	national	court	to	the	Commission,	but	of	primacy	of	Union	over	
national	law.		This	makes	less	sense	if	the	national	court	is	also	applying	EU	competition	
rules	rather	than	national	law.	It	would	be	applying	EU	rules	if	there	were	any	effect	on	
trade	between	Member	States,	in	accordance	with	the	requirement	for	parallel	application	
under	Walt	Wilhelm112	and	in	Art	3	Reg	1/2003.	The	Masterfoods	obligation	would	not	
come	into	play	otherwise.	If	national	courts	are	Union	courts113,	then	a	national	court’s	
interpretation	of	EU	law	is	just	as	valid	as	the	Commission’s.	There	may	be	a	question	over	
whether	the	national	court’s	judgment	is	“under	the	ultimate	control”	of	the	Court	of	
Justice,	in	the	sense	that	a	national	court	judgment	cannot	be	annulled	by	the	Court	of	
Justice,	unlike	a	decision	of	the	Commission	under	Article	263	TFEU.	However,	the	
national	court’s	interpretation	could	be	subject	to	the	preliminary	reference	procedure	
under	Art	267	TFEU.	
	
As	NCA	decisions	do	not	currently	enjoy	the	status	of	EU	law,	there	is	a	weaker	basis	for	
the	binding	effect	of	a	foreign	NCA	decision	in	the	national	courts	of	the	other	Member	
States.	An	argument	could	be	made	that	this	is	a	delegated	power	alongside	the	
Commission’s	delegated	powers	of	enforcement	to	NCAs	through	the	European	
Competition	Network.		Another	basis	is	the	more	general	principle	of	loyal	cooperation.	
	
	 	
                                                 
110 Case T-266/97 Vlaamse Televisie Maatschappij NV v Commission [1999] ECR II-2329 [151]. This 
judgment does not mention Masterfoods directly but follows the Suiker Unie case [1975]. The 
Commission cites the case in the Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper  [140] 
111 There are also cases in which Commission statements falling short of a final decision have persuasive 
effect on courts, such as Postbank and Synthetic Rubber/ENI, in which the Commission’s statement of 
objections was relied upon by claimants – see A Bouquet ‘Institutional Report’ in G C Rodriguez Iglesias 
& L Ortiz Blanco (eds) The Judicial Application of Competition Law: Proceedings of the FIDE XXIV 
Congress Madrid 2010 Vol 2 (Servicio de Publicaciones de la Facultad de Derecho, Complutense 
University, Madrid 2010),  42-43; Truli, 797 
Chapter 4 of this thesis also dealt with the possible legal effects of Commission pronouncements short of 
a decision, such as opinions in court proceedings.   
112 Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1 
113 I Maher ‘National Courts as European Community Courts’ (1994) 14(2) Legal Studies 226-243 
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6.2	Duty	of	loyal	cooperation	
	
The	duty	of	loyal,	or	sincere,	cooperation	in	Art	4(3)	TEU114	is	concentrated	on	the	Union	
and	Member	States	assisting	each	other.	One	aspect	of	this	is	the	vertical	nature	of	the	
duty,	between	the	Union	institutions	and	the	Member	States.	The	previous	version	in	Art	
10	EC115	focused	on	the	obligation	of	the	Member	States	towards	the	Union,	rather	than	a	
mutual	duty.	The	Member	States	still	have	the	obligation	to	“refrain	from	any	measure	
which	could	jeopardise	the	attainment	of	the	Union’s	objectives”.				
	
However,	loyal	cooperation	also	implies	a	horizontal	element	‐	the	duties	of	Member	
States	to	assist	each	other	in	carrying	out	tasks	which	flow	from	the	Treaties.	Of	particular	
interest	for	this	chapter	is	the	horizontal	nature	of	the	duty	between	institutions	at	the	
sub‐national	level.	116	This	horizontal	duty	has	been	established	in	the	CJEU’s	case	law,	for	
example	in	Case	42/82	France	v	Com	(Italian	wine)).117	Cooperation	between	national	
competition	authorities	and	national	courts	is	“primarily	a	matter	of	national	law”	118	–	
primarily,	but	not	exclusively.		The	relationship	between	national	competition	authorities	
and	national	courts	is	subject	to	a	horizontal	duty	of	loyal	cooperation	where	EU	law	is	
applied,	and	in	cross‐border	matters.119	Conversely,	Komninos	argues	that	Art	10EC	[now	
Art	4(3)	TEU]	cannot	create	such	a	horizontal	duty	of	cooperation	between	national	
competition	authorities	and	national	courts	because	when	applying	EU	law	both	are	acting	
                                                 
114 “Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full 
mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties.  
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union.  
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure 
which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.” 
115 “Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment 
of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the 
Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. 
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this 
Treaty.” 
116 J Temple Lang 'The Duties of National Authorities under Community Constitutional Law' (1998) 23 
European Law Review 109 
117 E.g. Case 42/82 France v Commission [1983] ECR 1013 (Italian wine)). See S Brammer Co-operation 
Between National Competition Agencies in the Enforcement of EC Competition Law (Hart, 2009), 422 for 
further discussion 
118 K Lenaerts and D Gerard ‘Decentralisation of EC Competition Law: Judges in the Frontline’, (2004) 
27(3) World Competition 313-349, 331-332 
119 J Temple Lang ‘The Duties of Co-operation of National Authorities and Courts under Article 10EC – 
two more reflections’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 84, 87 
 193
as	EU	institutions.120	As	such	there	can	be	no	resolution	of	a	hierarchical	dispute	by	using	
the	duty	of	loyal	cooperation.	
	
The	duty	emanating	from	Art	4(3)	TEU	is	not	a	stand‐alone	one,121	and	must	be	used	in	
conjunction	with	another	Treaty	or	legislative	provision.	Regulation	1/2003	has	made	
some	specific	duties	of	cooperation	explicit.	The	question	is	whether	the	general	duty	of	
loyal	cooperation	in	EU	law	stretches	to	requiring	recognition	of	NCA	decisions.	Despite	
the	provisions	of	Article	11	providing	for	Member	States	to	notify	each	other	when	they	
open	an	investigation,	and	to	share	envisaged	decisions	30	days	before	they	are	adopted,		
the	Regulation	does	not	directly	address	the	question	of	recognition	or	enforcement	of	
NCAs’	decisions.	In	respect	of	relations	between	agencies	in	the	European	Competition	
Network,	Brammer	argues	that	there	should	be	“deference”	to	other	NCA	decisions	on	the	
basis	of	loyal	cooperation,	which	would	amount	to	a	case‐by‐case	consideration	of	the	
effects	of	the	decision,	but	apparently	not	full	binding	effect.122		The	closest	provision	to	
one	of	mutual	recognition	is	Art	13	Reg	1/2003	which	gives	an	NCA	grounds	to	suspend	or	
refuse	to	open	proceedings	if	another	NCA	is	dealing	with	the	case.	Given	that	Member	
States	civil	courts	are	not	members	of	the	ECN,	there	are	no	provisions	on	court	
recognition	of	NCA	decisions.	This	brings	us	to	the	analogy	with	the	Brussels	Regulation	as	
a	basis	for	the	binding	effect	rule.		
	
	
6.3	Analogy	with	the	Brussels	Regulation		
	
The	proposal	for	Member	State	courts	to	recognise	and	give	effect	to	administrative	
authority	decisions	from	other	Member	States	brings	to	mind	Regulation	44/2001,	the	
Brussels	I	Regulation,	123		on	the	recognition	of	foreign	judgments.	The	model	of	the	
Regulation	is	acknowledged	in	the	White	Paper	proposal.	The	possibility	of	mutual	
recognition	of	NCA	decisions	under	a	multilateral	treaty	analogous	with	the	Brussels	
Regulation	was	also	suggested	by	respondents	to	the	White	paper	on	the	reform	of	
                                                 
120 A Komninos “Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? Overlap?” (2006) 
3(1) Competition Law Review 5-26, 25. I make a similar point above concerning the Masterfoods rule 
and national courts as EU courts. 
121 J Temple Lang ‘The Duties of Co-operation of National Authorities and Courts under Article 10EC – 
Two More Reflections’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 84-93 
122 S Brammer Co-operation Between National Competition Agencies in the Enforcement of EC 
Competition Law’ (Hart 2009) , 432  drawing from AG van Gerven in C-128/92 H J Banks & Co Ltd v 
British Coal Corporation [1994] ECR I-1209 (cited in Court of Appeal Crehan v Inntrepreneur Pub 
Company CPC [2004] EWCA Civ 637). Brammer also limits the categories of decision to prohibition and 
fining, excluding non-action and commitment decisions.   
123 Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ 2001, L 12/1 
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Regulation	17,	which	eventually	became	the	proposal	for	Regulation	1/2003.124	However,	
this	related	to	mutual	recognition	as	between	NCAs,	rather	than	courts,	and	pre‐dated	the	
provisions	of	the	ECN.	Responses	to	the	most	recent	consultation	on	damages	actions	
argue	that	“greater	maturity	of	the	ECN	and	further	development	of	the	concept	of	mutual	
recognition	in	Community	law”	is	needed	before	the	binding	effect	rule	is	adopted.125	
	
	The	Brussels	I	Regulation	aims	to	facilitate	cross‐border	damages	actions.	For	example,	
Art	6(1)	allows	tort	victims	to	cumulate	damages	actions	against	all	co‐defendants	before	
one	court	where	at	least	one	co‐defendant	is	domiciled,	rather	than	having	to	start	several	
actions	in	different	Member	States.		Art	33(1)	of	the	Regulation	is	relevant	for	the	binding	
effect	rule	discussed	in	this	chapter,	as	it	provides	that	“A	judgment	given	in	a	Member	
State	shall	be	recognised	in	the	other	Member	States	without	any	special	procedure	being	
required.”		
	
Art	34(1)	allows	a	court	to	exceptionally	refuse	recognition	of	another	Member	State’s	
judgment	on	grounds	of	public	policy	e.g.	where	fair	legal	process	may	have	been	impeded	
contrary	to	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	and	the	Charter	on	Fundamental	
Rights	of	the	European	Union	and	the	case	law	of	the	Community	courts.126	The	Brussels	
Regulation	is	therefore	relevant	in	providing	a	template	for	the	conditions	in	which	a	
national	court	could	refuse	to	recognise	an	NCA’s	decision.	The	Commission	has	already	
stated	that	it	would	not	object	to	that	public	policy	exception	being	included.127		
	
It	is	submitted	that	any	rule	requiring	national	courts	to	recognise	and	give	effect	to	
national	competition	authority	decisions	should	have	at	least	the	same	safeguards	of	Art	
34(1)	of	the	Brussels	Regulation.	The	conditions	for	recognising	the	binding	effect	of	the	
decision	of	an	administrative	body	should	not	be	less	strict	than	recognition	of	another	
court’s	judgment.	This	is	for	two	reasons.	First,	it	would	create	a	level	playing	field	and	a	
complete	system	of	enforcement	regardless	of	the	type	of	decision.	If	this	were	not	the	
case,	decisions	of	administrative	bodies	would	be	afforded	a	privileged	position	relative	to	
                                                 
124 White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, 
Commission Programme No 99/027, Brussels, 28.04.1999. Summary of responses at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/others/wp_on_modernisation/summary_observations.html (last 
accessed 16.8.2012) 
125 Addleshaw Goddard response to White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules 
COM (2008) 165, 2.4.2008; see also UK Competition Law Association; AFEC, Association Française 
d'Etude de la Concurrence; APDC Association des Avocats Pratiquant le Droit de la Concurrence; 
Slaughter & May responses  making similar points 
126 C-7/98 Krombach v Bamberski [2000] ECR I-1935 [21] 
127 Staff Working Paper [162] 
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judgments	of	civil	courts.	Secondly,	courts	are	the	arbiters	of	due	process	standards.	There	
should	be	at	least	the	same	safeguards	for	rights	of	defence,	particularly	as	a	review	or	
appeal	court	may	not	have	positively	confirmed	the	NCA’s	decision	if	it	has	not	been	
appealed.	It	would	be	strange	to	allow	a	court	to	look	into	whether	another	court’s	process	
was	fair,	but	not	allow	it	to	look	into	administrative	proceedings	in	a	similar	way,	
particularly	if	those	proceedings	had	not	been	subject	to	appeal	or	judicial	review.			
	
Rendering	an	NCA	infringement	decision	binding	would	increase	efficiency	by	doing	away	
with	intermediate	proceedings	–	there	would	be	no	need	to	secure	a	Court	ruling	in	
another	Member	State	then	use	the	Brussels	Regulation	to	recognise	the	judgment	cross‐
border.	In	practice,	if	the	NCA’s	decision	is	upheld	by	a	review	or	appeal	court	it	would	be	
simply	a	matter	of	recognising	another	Member	State	court’s	judgment.	This	‘court	to	
court’	dialogue	may	be	more	palatable	and	familiar	to	judges.		
	
While	competition	enforcement	can	borrow	from	the	Brussels	Regulation,	the	Brussels	
Regulation	can	also	borrow	from	competition	enforcement.	In	terms	of	jurisdictional	rules	
and	preventing	parallel	proceedings,	Danov	proposes	transposing	the	principle	of	the	‘well	
placed	to	act’	authority	from	the	case	allocation	rules	of	the	European	Competition	
Network	which	would	allow	another	court	to	decline	jurisdiction128	More	interestingly,	in	
the	context	of	recognising	foreign	judgments	in	relation	to	EU	competition	law	claims,	he	
advocates	that	NCAs	should	be	regarded	as	courts	for	the	purposes	of	Brussels	I	when	
determining	an	infringement	of	Article	101	or	102	TFEU129	“to	avoid	the	risk	of	
irreconcilable	decisions	being	rendered	on	the	same	antitrust	issue	in	two	different	
Member	States	by	different	bodies	(an	NCA	and	a	court)”.	This	is	clearly	more	
constitutionally	problematic.	It	is	true	that	this	“would	be	a	strong	argument	where	a	
judicial	body	had	been	designated	as	an	NCA”	130	;	in	practice,	however,	most	Member	
States	NCAs	are	now	integrated	administrative	bodies,	carrying	out	both	investigative	and	
adjudicative	functions.	
	
Art	1	of	the	Brussels	I	Regulation	states	that	the	‘Regulation	shall	apply	in	civil	and	
commercial	matters	whatever	the	nature	of	the	court	or	tribunal’	[emphasis	added].		
As	a	result,	Danov	suggests	that	“the	context	in	which	the	decision	of	the	NCA	is	made	
would	be	more	important	than	the	constitutional	status	of	the	public	authority	before	
                                                 
128 M Danov Jurisdiction and Judgments in Relation to EU Competition Law Claims (Hart, 2010), 130. 
See also K Wright book review (2012) 37(3) European Law Review 355-358 
129 Danov, 131, 281-282 
130 Danov, 203-4 
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which	the	proceedings	are	brought.”131	That	is,	the	subject	matter	of	the	proceedings	
would	be	decisive,	not	whether	the	action	is	pending	before	a	court	or	an	administrative	
body.	132	
	
One	consequence	would	be	that	a	court	should	stay	proceedings	to	avoid	conflict	with	a	
first‐seised	NCA	decision,	echoing	the	binding	effect	proposal.	From	the	other	side,	even	if	
a	court	is	first	seised,	there	is	currently	no	obligation	for	a	‘non‐court’	such	as	an	NCA	to	
stay	proceedings.	Danov	rightly	asserts	that	in	the	ongoing	review	of	the	Brussels	I	
Regulation	the	different	results	deriving	from	the	different	constitutional	statuses	of	
courts	and	administrative	public	authorities	need	to	be	addressed.	These	effects	also	need	
to	be	addressed	in	relation	to	the	current	binding	effect	proposal.	
	
The	binding	effect	rule	implies	that	civil	courts	must	be	aware	of	all	NCA	(infringement)	
decisions	throughout	EU	‐	and	show	that	they	have	been	taken	into	account	in	the	
judgment.	In	practice	it	would	be	for	the	claimant	to	bring	the	foreign	infringement	
decision,	on	which	s/he	would	rely,	to	the	attention	of	the	court.	Alternatively,	the	NCA	
which	had	become	aware	of	another	NCA’s	decision	through	the	ECN	could	intervene	in	
the	proceedings.	The	defendants	could	not	similarly	rely	on	a	non‐infringement	decision.	
Although	a	non‐infringement	decision	could	be	used	as	persuasive	evidence,	this	
asymmetric	effect	depending	on	the	type	of	decision	raises	the	question	of	equality	of	
arms.	Faced	with	a	binding	decision	from	the	opponent,	the	only	option	would	be	to	
attempt	to	undermine	the	NCA’s	original	decision,	by,	for	example,	pointing	to	lower	
procedural	safeguards,	or	less	rigorous	judicial	review.	This	would	allow	the	defendant	to	
take	advantage	of	a	provision	analogous	to	Art	34(1)	Brussels	Reg.	While	such	a	provision	
is	an	essential	safeguard,	it	could	be	overused.	
	
Rather	than	encouraging	coherence	and	mutual	recognition	of	standards,	a	binding	rule	as	
opposed	to	a	rebuttable	presumption	could	reopen	the	question	of	different	investigation	
                                                 
131 Danov, 123 
132 Danov 124 
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standards	among	NCAs.133	This	threatens	to	undermine	the	trust	and	mutual	cooperation	
which	counterparts	in	the	ECN	currently	enjoy.134		
	
As	a	positive	effect,	the	binding	effect	rule	could	link	civil	courts	enforcing	competition	
rules	between	private	parties	with	the	European	Competition	Network,	made	up	of	
national	competition	authorities	charged	with	public	enforcement.		It	could	contribute	to	
aligning	the	decisional	practice	of	national	competition	authorities	and	courts,	minimising	
divergent	application	of	competition	rules	between	public	and	private	competition	
enforcers.	In	practice	a	court	would	become	aware	of	a	finding	of	infringement	through	
the	claimant’s	or	defendant’s	pleadings,	or	by	a	domestic	or	foreign	NCA	giving	an	opinion,	
joining	as	an	intervening	party	or	intervening	as	amicus	curiae	(subject	to	national	
procedural	rules),	having	become	aware	through	the	ECN.	It	could	function	in	tandem	with	
the	tools	in	Art.15	Reg	1/2003,	as	explored	in	the	previous	chapter,	providing	for	the	
European	Commission	and	national	competition	authorities	to	intervene	in	judicial	
proceedings	with	information	or	observations.	The	Commission	and	NCAs	are	to	inform	
each	other	through	the	ECN	if	they	intervene	with	an	amicus	brief	in	any	case,	which	
would	indirectly	link	national	courts	with	the	ECN.135	It	has	been	suggested	that	national	
courts	should	be	able	to	address	questions	to	foreign	NCAs	to	clarify	any	questions	on	the	
meaning	of	their	decision	or	circumstances	of	their	decision.136	The	idea	of	NCAs	as	amicus	
curiae	has	also	been	proposed	in	the	context	of	quantification	of	damages	in	civil	courts,	as	
discussed	above.	
	
These	amicus	curiae	mechanisms	still	leave	courts	reliant	on,	or	even	limited	by,	
competition	authorities.	The	benefits	of	convergence	between	public	and	private	enforcers	
are	unlikely	to	be	realised	if	there	are	asymmetric	effects	in	the	interactions	between	
enforcers.	That	is,	if	NCA	decisions	are	binding	on	courts,	but	not	binding	on	fellow	NCAs.	
	
                                                 
133 The different standards among NCAs, particularly different levels of resources and experience, was a 
consideration leading up to the 2004 reforms. This was one reason for the European Commission building 
in the ability to take over a case under Art 11(6) Reg 1/2003, and the reference in Art 35 Reg 1/2003 to 
Member States designating competition authorities “in such a way that the provisions of this regulation 
are effectively complied with”. Source: interview with a DG COMP official from the ECN unit 
13.7.2006) 
134 On trust in the ECN, see H Kassim and K Wright ‘The European Competition Network: a Regulatory 
Network with a Difference’ Paper presented at European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) 
Standing Group on Regulatory Governance Third Biennial Conference, Dublin, 17-19 June 2010 
reporting the results of interviews with NCA officials working in the ECN; Interview with a DG COMP 
official from the ECN unit 13.7.2006. 
135 See the previous chapter  
136 Joint Working Party of Bars and Law Societies of England & Wales response to White Paper on 
damages actions 
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7.	Asymmetric	effects	and	the	European	Competition	Network	
	
A	(presumably)	unintended	consequence	of	the	proposal	is	an	asymmetry	between	the	
effects	of	decisions	of	administrative	bodies	undertaking	public	enforcement	in	the	ECN	
and	those	of	civil	court	judgments.	There	are	different	effects	deriving	from	the	different	
constitutional	statuses	of	courts	and	administrative	authorities.	Looking	at	the	respective	
relationships	of	courts	and	NCAs	with	the	European	Commission,	the	Masterfoods	and	
Article	16(1)	Reg	1/2003	obligation	on	courts	already	extends	further	than	an	NCA’s	duty	
under	Art	16(2)	not	to	counter	an	existing	decision.	Courts	should	also	stay	proceedings	in	
respect	of	future	contemplated	decisions	of	the	Commission.	This	could	be	evidence	of	a	
public	over	private	enforcement/administrative	over	judicial	hierarchy.	Or	it	may	simply	
reflect	the	reality	of	more	structured	cooperation	between	the	Commission	and	NCAs	
within	the	ECN,	in	particular	the	obligations	under	Article	11	Reg	1/2003.137		
	
The	European	Competition	Network	is	based	on	a	system	of	parallel	competences,	where	
each	network	member	retains	full	discretion	in	deciding	whether	or	not	to	investigate.138	
As	a	result,	if	the	binding	effect	proposal	were	adopted,	NCA	decisions	would	be	binding	
on	courts,	but	not	on	fellow	NCAs.	Under	Art.13	of	the	Modernisation	Regulation,	the	fact	
that	one	NCA	is	investigating	is	sufficient	grounds	for	another	to	suspend	proceedings	or	
to	reject	a	complaint.	However,	it	has	“no	obligation	to	do	so”.139		
	
The	summary	of	responses	on	the	White	paper	on	the	reform	of	Regulation	17,	which	
eventually	became	the	proposal	for	Regulation	1/2003,	gives	an	indication	of	how	
territorial	effect	of	NCA	decisions	was	perceived	at	the	time.	140	Only	five	Member	States	
responded	specifically	on	this	point.	Of	those,	three	agreed	that	NCA	decisions	should	have	
binding	effect	throughout	the	EU,	and	the	other	two	were	opposed.	Not	surprisingly,	firms	
and	their	legal	representatives	were	more	in	favour	of	EU‐wide	effect	on	the	grounds	of	
legal	certainty.	A	number	did	propose	a	rule	in	which	fellow	NCAs	and	the	European	
Commission	would	have	a	deadline	for	objecting	to	an	NCA’s	decision,	after	which	if	no	
                                                 
137 To notify the Commission and other Member States at the opening of the first investigative procedure 
11(3), and 30 days before the adoption of a decision requiring that an infringement be brought to an end, 
accepting commitments, or withdrawing the benefit of a block exemption (11(4)) 
138 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities OJ C 101, 
27.4.2004, 43-53 [5]. The Notice sets out rules for case allocation, cooperation and consistent application 
of the EU antitrust rules between Member States’ competition authorities and the Directorate General for 
Competition of the European Commission. 
139 Network Notice [22] 
140 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/others/wp_on_modernisation/summary_observations.html 
(last accessed 16.8.2012) 
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objection	were	raised	that	decision	would	automatically	be	effective	throughout	the	EU.	(It	
must	be	remembered	that	this	consultation	took	place	before	the	rules	of	the	European	
Competition	Network	were	fully	in	place.)	This	would	be	salient,	for	example,	where,	
based	on	EU	as	well	as	national	law,	the	NCA	in	Member	State	A	investigated	and	imposed	
fines	on	cartel	members	X	and	Y	in	Member	State	A;	meanwhile	the	NCA	in	Member	State	
B	started	proceedings	against	firm	Z,	a	member	of	the	same	cartel.	The	NCA	in	MS	B	then	
proposed	a	finding	of	no	infringement.	This	would	undermine	enforcement.	
	
However,	the	provisions	of	Regulation	1/2003	and	its	accompanying	Network	Notice141	
were	drafted	so	that	positive	decisions	at	national	level	cannot	have	a	binding	effect	on	
other	Member	State	NCAs.	Clearly	the	current	proposal	for	binding	effect	on	courts	was	
not	envisaged	at	the	time	Regulation	1/2003	was	drafted.	In	the	Commission’s	
explanatory	memorandum	for	the	proposal	which	became	the	Regulation	1/2003,	it	stated	
that:	“If	the	competition	authority	of	a	Member	State	finds	that	behaviour,	acting	on	a	
complaint	or	on	its	own	initiative	does	not	infringe	Article	[101]	as	a	whole	or	Article	
[102],	it	can	close	the	proceedings	or	reject	the	complaint	by	decision,	finding	that	there	
are	no	grounds	for	action.	Such	decisions	bind	only	the	authority	adopting	the	decision.	
The	effect	of	other	types	of	decisions	adopted	by	the	national	competition	authorities	within	
their	own	Member	State	is	not	regulated	in	the	proposed	Regulation.	This	is	a	matter	of	
national	law.	Decisions	adopted	by	national	competition	authorities	do	not	have	legal	effects	
outside	the	territory	of	their	Member	State,	nor	do	they	bind	the	Commission”.142		(emphasis	
added)	This	provision	limits	itself	to	the	types	of	decisions	which	NCAs	have	the	
competence	to	deliver	under	Article	5	Reg	1/2003.143		In	other	words,	non‐infringement	
decisions	are	effective	only	on	the	territory	of	the	Member	State	of	the	NCA	which	makes	
it,	and	not	throughout	the	EU.	One	NCA	cannot	prevent	another	NCA	from	subsequently	
finding	an	infringement	of	Article	101	or	102	TFEU	in	respect	of	its	own	territory.	Only	the	
Commission,	under	Article	10	Regulation	1/2003,	is	competent	to	make	a	finding	that	the	
                                                 
141 Notice on co-operation within the Network of Competition Authorities [2004] OJ C101/43 
142 Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and amending 
Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 2988/74, (EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87 
(“Regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty”), COM (2000) 582 final - 2000/0243 (CNS), 
[2000] OJ C 365E/284, 16-17 
143 These are: requiring that an infringement be brought to an end; ordering interim measures; accepting 
commitments; imposing fines, periodic penalty payments or any other penalty provided for in their 
national law. The Commission’s staff working paper [152]-[153] explicitly gives Art 5 Reg 1/2003 as a 
reason for excluding other types of decisions 
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EU	competition	rules	are	inapplicable	in	a	given	case	which	binds	NCAs	and	national	
courts.144		
Given	the	case	allocation	rules	within	the	ECN,145	ideally	a	single	NCA	or	a	lead	authority	
should	adopt	a	decision,	but	there	is	no	guarantee	that	the	ECN	will	continue	to	work	in	
this	way.	It	is	conceivable	that	several	NCAs	within	the	ECN	could	be	investigating	the	
same	conduct,	and	may	adopt	different	decisions.	If	strongly	divergent	decisions	were	
envisaged,	for	example,	one	finding	an	infringement	and	one	finding	no	infringement	
affecting	trade	between	Member	States	(as	opposed	to	only	in	the	national	market),	or	
differing	as	to	the	degree	(fault,	effects)	of	the	infringement,	the	Commission	would	need	
to	intervene	and	possibly	take	over	the	case	as	foreseen	under	Art.11(6)	Reg	1/2003.	It	
could	be	expected	that	a	defendant	would	raise	any	finding	of	no	infringement	as	evidence,	
and	divergent	decisions	would	require	the	civil	court	to	investigate	the	facts	of	the	alleged	
infringement.	
	
Member	State	NCA	decisions	are	notified	first	through	the	ECN,	so	all	NCAs	would	have	
had	the	opportunity	to	raise	objections	or	risks	of	divergence	after	an	NCA	had	notified	its	
envisaged	decision	to	the	other	members	of	the	ECN	as	required	under	Art.11(4)	Reg	
1/2003.	However,	there	would	have	been	no	court	input	at	that	stage	except	where	a	court	
was	designated	as	an	NCA	in	a	public	enforcement	role.	In	order	for	a	court	to	be	bound,	it	
would	need	to	know	about	the	existence	of	a	relevant	decision.	The	court	would	be	
dependent	on	the	parties,	or	an	intervening	NCA,	to	bring	such	a	decision	to	the	court’s	
attention.	What	if	a	court	does	not	know	about	an	NCA	decision	in	another	Member	State	
and	goes	ahead	and	makes	a	potentially	divergent	judgment?		Could	a	litigant	raise	it	later	
pleading	a	change	of	circumstances,	therefore	leaving	the	court	decision	uncertain	and	
vulnerable	to	appeal?146		There	are	implications	here	for	the	principle	of	res	judicata,	and	
the	point	at	which	a	decision	becomes	‘final’	and	therefore	binding.	Further	litigation	to	
establish	the	scope	and	application	of	foreign	NCAs’	decisions	could	also	arise	as	an	
unintended	consequence	of	the	binding	effect	rule.	
	
If	NCAs	in	different	Member	States	are	not	formally	bound	by	each	other’s	decisions,	there	
is	an	asymmetry	and	a	consistency	gap	if	national	judges	are	to	be	bound	by	the	decisions	
                                                 
144 see Commission staff working paper accompanying the report on functioning of Reg 1 SEC (2009) 
574, p. 36 
145 This is based on the notion of the ‘well-placed to act’ authority: [5]-[15] of the Network Notice 
146 C-453/00 Kuehne & Heitz [2004] ECR I-837 concerned the obligation to re-examine final 
administrative decisions adopted in violation of subsequent EU law and confirmed by a national court. 
Importantly, the case places obligations on administrative bodies to reopen their decisions, rather than 
courts.  
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of	foreign	NCAs.	Time	will	tell	whether	the	softer	cooperation	mechanisms	of	the	
European	Competition	Network	compensate	for	this	lack	of	hard	binding	effect.	
	
	
7.1	Reverse	principle	of	equivalence?	
	
According	to	the	principle	of	equivalence	national	procedural	rules	governing	actions	to	
ensure	the	protection	of	individual	rights	under	EU	law	should	not	be	subject	to	less	
favourable	conditions	than	those	governing	similar	actions	under	domestic	law.147		
	
At	least	half	of	the	Member	States	do	not	provide	for	their	national	courts	being	bound	by	
decisions	of	their	own	NCAs.	It	would	be	strange	if	national	courts	were	bound	by	
decisions	of	the	Commission	and	foreign	NCAs,	but	not	their	domestic	authority.	Domestic	
law	would	have	to	bridge	this	anomaly.	Imposing	the	option	of	binding	effect	of	an	NCA	
decision	in	the	domestic	context	only	in	the	courts	of	that	Member	State	is	likely	to	be	met	
with	resistance	on	the	grounds	of	subsidiarity	and	national	procedural	autonomy.	By	
allowing	complainants	to	rely	on	an	infringement	finding	by	a	foreign	NCA,	the	binding	
effect	rule	actually	discriminates	in	favour	of	claims	based	on	EU	rules	through	decisions	
from	other	Member	States.		
	
Taking	the	example	of	the	UK,	in	a	2007	report	on	private	actions,	the	Office	of	Fair	
Trading	recommends	the	insertion	of	a	provision	into	the	Competition	Act	1998	requiring	
UK	courts	and	tribunals	to	“have	regard	to”	the	UK	competition	authorities'	decisions	and	
guidance	when	determining	competition	issues.	It	specifically	recommends	that	courts	
should	merely	“have	regard”	to	UK	NCAs’	decisions	and	guidance,	not	proposing	that	
courts	be	bound,	but	only	that	they	“give	serious	consideration”	to	the	decision.	148	
Without	fettering	judge’s	jurisdiction,	where	judges	depart	from	a	policy	statement	or	
decision	“It	is	important	that	departures	or	differences	by	UK	NCAs	are	adequately	
explained	in	the	interests	of	legal	certainty”	particularly	reconciling	different	
precedents.149	However,		oddly	in	a	separate	part	of	the	same	report	the	OFT	does	support	
binding	effect	of	other	Member	State	NCAs’	decisions,	which	it	states	is	best	achieved	at	
the	EU	level.150		
                                                 
147 Case 33/76 Rewe Zentralfinanz eG v Landwirtschaftskammer fur das Saarland [1976]  ECR 1989 
148 ‘Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and business: recommendations 
from the Office of Fair Trading’, OFT916resp, November 2007, p.41, [10.6]-[10.7]. 
149 OFT recommendations [10.7] 
150 OFT recommendations [12.6]-[12.7] This apparently contradictory position is a source of confusion – 
in its response to the White Paper on damages actions the OFT fully supports the binding effect proposal, 
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As	Van	Gerven	argues	in	a	more	general	discussion	of	the	principle	of	equivalence,	
“National	courts	may	feel	the	need	to	undo…’reverse	discrimination’	in	favour	of	
Community	rights,	by	improving	judicial	protection	given	to	purely	national	rights.”151	
This	could	of	course	be	a	good	thing	for	complainants.	But	the	consequences	could	be	
unevenness	of	the	status	of	certain	bodies’	decisions	in	competition	law	relative	to	other	
policy	areas.	A	similar	point	is	made	in	the	European	Parliament’s	resolution	on	the	White	
Paper:	EU	measures	“must	not	lead	to	arbitrary	or	unnecessary	fragmentation	of	
procedural	national	laws”.152		
	
Even	absent	the	binding	effect	rule	in	the	draft	directive,	as	a	consequence	of	a	horizontal	
duty	of	loyal	cooperation	it	could	be	argued	that	the	principle	of	equivalence	requires	a	
horizontal	cross‐border	binding	effect.	That	is,	if	a	Member	State	allows	binding	effect	of	
its	own	NCA	decisions	on	its	own	civil	courts,	must	it	afford	decisions	from	other	NCAs	the	
same	status	where	those	decisions	are	based	on	EU	competition	rules?	So	far	Germany	is	
the	only	country	where	decisions	of	foreign	NCAs	are	binding	(section	33(4)	Act	Against	
Restraints	on	Competition).		
	
The	figure	below	shows	asymmetric	national	and	cross‐border	effects	of	the	binding	effect	
rule	effects	with	reference	to	two	Member	States.	In	Member	State	1,	NCA	1’s	decisions	are	
binding	on	the	courts	in	its	own	Member	State,	and	by	virtue	of	the	EU‐level	binding	effect	
rule.	In	Member	State	2,	the	courts	are	bound	by	the	decisions	of	NCA	1	by	virtue	of	the	EU	
rule,	but	not	by	decisions	of	NCA	2	in	their	own	Member	State.	
	
	
	
                                                                                                                                               
but Allen & Overy, among others “urge[s] adopting a similar approach to that in the OFT’s 
Recommendations, requiring national courts to have regard to decisions of NCAs without being bound to 
follow them.” 
151 W Van Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 501-
536, 534; the Nederlandse Raad voor de rechtspraak, Dutch Council for the Judiciary also makes this 
point in its response to the White Paper 
152 European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)) P6_TA(2009)0187 
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Fig	3	:	Asymmetric	national	and	cross‐border	effect	of	the	binding	effect	rule	
	
	
8.	The	possibility	of	the	binding	effect	proposal	
	
Having	analysed	the	elements	of	the	binding	effect	proposal	and	its	implications,	this	
section	addresses	the	possibility	of	the	rule	becoming	effective	across	the	Union.	It	first	
lays	out	the	current	legal	effect	on	civil	courts	of	national	competition	authority	decisions	
in	different	Member	States	to	assess	the	work	that	needs	to	be	done.		This	is	done	through	
consideration	of	Member	State	competition	law	statutes,	the	2004	Ashurst	Comparative	
Study	(now	somewhat	out	of	date),153	submissions	to	the	European	Commission’s	
consultation	on	the	White	Paper	on	damages	actions,	the	FIDE	XXIV	Congress	2010	
country	reports	on	topic	2:	the	judicial	application	of	European	competition	law154,	and	an	
                                                 
153 Ashurst report: ‘Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC 
competition rules’ Comparative report prepared by Denis Waelbroeck, Donald Slater and Gil Even-
Shoshan, 31 August 2004, including national reports, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/study.html  
154 16 Member States’ reports were available as at 20.7.2010, at: 
http://www.fide2010.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=58&Itemid=71&lang=en, 
accessed 20.7.2010. Now published as G C Rodriguez Iglesias & L Ortiz Blanco (eds) ‘The Judicial 
Application of Competition Law’ Proceedings of the FIDE XXIV Congress Madrid 2010 Vol 2 (Servicio 
de Publicaciones de la Facultad de Derecho, Complutense University, Madrid 2010). Questions 9, 10, 11, 
12, 13, 15 are relevant: e.g. Q9: ‘Has the national court to stay its proceedings once the national 
competition authority (NCA) has initiated proceedings on the same matter, until a decision has been 
reached?’. Q10: ‘Has the NCA to stay its proceedings once a national court has initiated proceedings on 
the same matter, until a decisions has been reached?’, Q11: ‘Are national courts bound by the final 
decisions adopted by a NCA declaring that a certain practice amounts to an infringement? Is the response 
the same where the NCA rules that the practice does not infringe competition law?’, Q12: ‘Is the NCA 
bound by the final decisions adopted by a national court declaring that a certain practice amounts to an 
infringement? Is the response the same where the national court rules that the practice does not infringe 
competition law?’, Q13: ‘If not [see Q12], what is the value for a national court of a final decision 
adopted by a NCA and vice versa?’, Q15: ‘Does your legal/constitutional system allow courts to be bound 
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independent	study	recently	prepared	for	the	European	Parliament	on	Collective	Redress	
in	Antitrust.	These	reports	do	not	all	agree	with	each	other,	as	most	rely	on	individual	
rapporteurs,155	but	they	give	an	indication	of	how	the	rule	would	play	out	in	practice	and	
amendments	that	would	need	to	be	made	to	national	laws.	Secondly,	this	section	evaluates	
the	obstacles	to	the	binding	effect	rule	being	adopted,	in	particular	the	objections	on	
constitutional	grounds,	which	will	be	the	most	difficult	to	surmount.	Finally,	this	section	
considers	the	current	state	of	play	of	the	draft	legislation	on	damages	actions	which	
contains	the	binding	effect	proposal,	including	the	discussion	on	its	Treaty	legal	base.		
	
	
8.1	Current	legal	effect	of	NCA	decisions	
	
All	Member	States	provide	for	decisions	of	national	competition	authorities	to	be	
submitted	as	evidence	in	civil	court	proceedings.	156		However,	these	decisions	or	other	
evidence	from	competition	authorities	are	not	considered	binding	in	all	Member	States.	It	
may	only	be	one	element	among	other	types	of	evidence	that	the	judge	can	take	into	
account;	it	may	be	a	particularly	persuasive	piece	of	evidence,	either	legally	or	in	practice;	
the	decision	may	give	rise	to	a	rebuttable	presumption	of	(non‐)infringement,	open	to	the	
other	party	to	challenge	with	their	own	evidence;	the	national	competition	authority’s	
decision	may	be	formally	binding,	leaving	no	room	to	reopen	an	investigation	into	the	
finding	of	infringement;	or	even	foreign	NCA	decisions	may	be	binding	on	a	court	in	the	
‘home’	Member	State.157	As	such	there	are	different	degrees	of	persuasiveness	in	the	
Member	States.	In	some	cases	it	also	depends	on	the	type	of	decision	(e.g.	non‐
infringement	as	well	as	infringement,),	and,	where	several	bodies	are	designated	NCAs,	
which	of	those	bodies	made	the	decision.		
	
	 	
                                                                                                                                               
by administrative decisions – as provided for in Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 in respect to the 
Commission’s decisions? In the absence of a specific legal provision such as Article 16… what is or 
could be the value for a national court of a final decision adopted by a NCA of [an]other Member State? 
And of a judgment of the court of another Member State?’ 
155 This may also reflect the difference between law in statute and court practice, and changes in 
legislation. 
156 See Ashurst Study, 69 
157 See the independent study prepared by Lear for the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary 
Affairs Committee, ‘Collective Redress in Antitrust’, IP/A/ECON/ST/2011-19, PE 475.120, 12.6.2012, 
24-25 
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8.1.1	Binding	effect	of	foreign	NCA	decisions	
	
The	only	Member	State	currently	to	allow	the	binding	effect	of	foreign	NCA	decisions	is	
Germany158	under	s.33(4)	of	the	Act	against	Restraints	of	Competition159,	a	provision	
which	the	Commission	has	clearly	drawn	upon	in	its	drafting	of	the	White	Paper	proposal.	
The	German	experience	could	provide	a	useful	indication	of	how	the	rule	would	work	in	
practice.	However,	so	far	there	appear	to	have	been	no	cases	relying	on	a	foreign	NCA	
decision.160	Section	33(4)	of	the	German	Act	against	Restraints	of	Competition	does	not	
limit	binding	effect	of	administrative	decisions	to	claims	against	parties	addressed	by	the	
decision.	Wurmnest	suggests	that	in	practice	German	judges	may	interpret	the	provision	
narrowly	to	limit	binding	effect	to	decisions	where	the	defendants	were	addressees	of	the	
foreign	NCA	decision	or	have	had	the	right	to	be	heard.161	
	
	
8.1.2	Binding	effect	of	domestic	NCA/administrative	decisions	
	
Some	Member	States	allow	for	the	binding	effect	of	decisions	of	their	domestic	NCAs.	
Article	88B	of	the	Hungarian	Competition	Act	provides	that	any	statement	on	the	existence	
or	absence	of	an	infringement	made	in	a	decision	of	the	Hungarian	Competition	Authority	
shall	be	binding	on	a	court	hearing	a	related	lawsuit.	In	the	Czech	Republic,	the	courts	are	
                                                 
158 The Lear study for the European Parliament, p. 25, claims that Sweden also allows for binding effect 
of foreign NCA decisions, but gives no precise source. The FIDE 2010 report explains that such a 
proposal would be against the Swedish Constitution according to the Instrument of Government Section 
11:2 and 11:7: “[n]o public authority, including the Swedish Parliament, may determine how a court of 
law is to adjudicate an individual case or otherwise apply a rule of law in a particular case”. (The 
Instrument of Government, Section 11:2). Similarly, “[n]o public authority may determine how an 
administrative authority is to decide in a particular case involving the exercise of public authority vis-à-
vis a private subject or a local authority, or the application of law”(The Instrument of Government, 
Section 11:7).. Consequently, the proposal in the White Paper as regards the binding effect of National 
Competition Authorities’ decisions upon the judiciary are incompatible with the Swedish Constitution, 
and would thus require a constitutional reform to be implemented in Sweden.” 
159 “Where damages are claimed for an infringement of a provision of this Act or of Article 81 or 82 of 
the EC Treaty, the court shall be bound by a finding that an infringement has occurred, to the extent such 
a finding was made in a final decision by the cartel authority, the Commission of the European 
Community, or the competition authority - or court acting as such - in another Member State of the 
European Community. The same applies to such findings in final judgments resulting from appeals 
against decisions pursuant to sentence 1. Pursuant to Article 16(1), sentence 4 of Regulation (EC) No. 
1/2003 this obligation applies without prejudice to the rights and obligations under Article 234 of the EC 
Treaty.”  7th Amendment 2005 of the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, (GWB). English 
version available at 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/GWB/0911_GWB_7_Novelle_E.pdf . The 
most recent 8th Amendment was adopted in March 2012.  
160 Informally confirmed by S Peyer 
161 W Wurmnest ‘A New Era for Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany? A Critical Appraisal of the 
Modernized Law against Restraints of Competition’ (2005) 6(8) German Law Journal 1173 
 206
bound	by	administrative	decisions	(not	only	in	competition)	finding	an	administrative	
offence	(art	135(1)	Civil	Procedure	Code)162.	Infringement	decisions	are	not	binding	but	
the	court	should	give	reasons	if	it	deviates	(art	135(2)).		In	Austria,	both	infringement	and	
non‐infringement	decisions	of	the	Cartel	Court	are	binding	on	the	court	deciding	on	the	
damages	claim	where	the	parties	and	the	facts	are	identical.	163	In	Estonia	decisions	are	
binding	regarding	the	act	and	the	infringer	in	criminal	and	administrative	offences,	but	the	
facts	and	reasoning	are	not	binding	otherwise.	Other	Member	States	in	which	
infringement	decisions	are	binding	are	Greece,	Poland,	Slovenia	and	Sweden	(these	two	
only	regarding	individual	exemption	decisions)	.164	
	
In	the	UK,	Section	58A	of	the	Competition	Act	1998165	makes	findings	of	infringement	by	
regulators	and	the	CAT	binding	on	civil	courts,	again	once	appeals	have	been	exhausted.	
Section	58A	provides	that	where	a	follow‐on	damages	claim	is	brought	in	the	High	Court,	
the	court	is	bound	(subsection	(2))	by	an	infringement	decision	of	the	OFT	or	the	CAT	
(subsection	(3))	when	it	becomes	final.166	Section	58,	meanwhile,	provides	that	any	finding	
of	fact	by	the	OFT	which	is	“relevant	to	an	issue	arising	in	[competition	law]	proceedings	
[before	the	court]	is	binding	on	the	parties”,	unless	the	court	otherwise	directs.		
	
This	wording	of	section	58	is	clearly	broader	than	that	of	58A	in	several	ways:	‘relevant	to	
an	issue	arising	in	proceedings’	is	broader	than	a	fact	material	to	the	finding	of	
infringement;	findings	of	fact	are	binding	on	the	parties	rather	than	the	court;	and	the	
court	has	discretion	in	directing	that	those	findings	of	fact	are	not	binding.	It	has	been	
suggested	that	this	discretion	would	likely	be	exercised	“in	circumstances	where	the	party	
concerned	has	not	had	a	proper	opportunity	to	test	the	evidence	on	which	the	finding	of	
fact	was	made.”167	This	echoes	the	German	example	above.	
	
The	question	of	precisely	which	part	of	the	decision	is	binding	was	raised	in	passing	in	the	
first	private	enforcement	case	to	go	to	full	hearing	before	the	CAT,	and	subsequently	to	the	
Court	of	Appeal	on	the	basis	of	damages,	Enron	Coal	Services	(in	liquidation)	v	English,	
                                                 
162 FIDE 2010 proceedings 
163 FIDE 2010 proceedings 
164 Ashurst study, 69-70 
165 Introduced by section 20 of the UK Enterprise Act 2002 
166 Limitation periods in subsection (4) 
167 C Brown and D Ryan, UK country report for FIDE Congress 2010, available at 
http://www.ukael.org/associates_21_2528442727.pdf, p 10 fn 62 
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Scottish	and	Welsh	Railways	Limited.168	This	touched	on	the	extent	to	which	the	CAT	is	
bound	by	findings	of	fact	contained	in	an	infringement	decision,	as	opposed	to	only	the	
finding	of	infringement	itself.	The	parties	disagreed	on	whether	the	Office	of	the	Rail	
Regulator’s	decision	had	found	the	defendant	to	have	overcharged	causing	loss	to	the	
claimant,	on	which	the	claimant	based	its	claim	for	damages.	For	the	CAT	to	entertain	a	
claim,	there	had	to	be	a	decision	of	a	regulator	of	the	kind	in	section	47A(6),	which	in	turn	
would	be	binding	upon	the	CAT.	The	Court	of	Appeal	took	a	restrictive	approach.	Patten	LJ	
stated:	
	
“The	use	of	the	word	‘decision’	makes	it	clear	that	s.47A	is	differentiating	between	findings	
of	fact	as	to	the	conduct	of	the	defendant	made	as	part	of	the	overall	decision	and	a	
determination	by	the	regulator	that	particular	conduct	amounts	to	an	infringement	of	the	
Chapter	II	prohibition	[the	domestic	equivalent	of	Article	102TFEU	on	abuse	of	
dominance].	It	is	not	open	to	a	claimant…	to	seek	to	recover	damages	through	the	medium	
of	s.47A	simply	by	identifying	findings	of	fact	which	could	arguably	amount	to	such	an	
infringement.”169	(emphasis	added).	This	seems	to	suggest	that	for	a	finding	of	fact	to	be	
binding,	it	would	have	to	be	material	to	the	finding	of	infringement.		
	
There	is	no	rule	requiring	the	civil	courts	to	take	into	account	OFT,	that	is	domestic,	
decisions	which	do	not	involve	the	same	parties	and	conduct.	However,	relevant	decisions	
and	statements	of	the	Commission	are	to	be	taken	into	account,	even	when	courts	are	
applying	only	domestic	law,	as	laid	down	in	Section	60(3)	Competition	Act	1998.	“in	
practice,	however,	courts	do	take	into	account	relevant	decisions	of	the	OFT	in	much	the	
same	way	as	they	have	regard	to	relevant	decisions	of	the	Commission.”170	Non‐
infringement	decisions	are	not	explicitly	mentioned	in	the	UK	Competition	Act,	but	are	
also	likely	to	be	persuasive	where	a	court	is	hearing	a	damages	action	based	on	the	same	
conduct.	
	
	
	 	
                                                 
168 [2009] EWCA Civ 647. On 1 July 2009, the Court of Appeal upheld an appeal against a judgment of 
the CAT by English Welsh & Scottish Railway Limited (EWS) that partly refused an application by EWS 
to strike out part of the damages claim brought by Enron Coal Services Limited. 
169 Enron [31] 
170 C Brown and D Ryan FIDE 2010 report, p. 10, fn 64 
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8.1.3	Persuasive/evidential	value	of	domestic	NCA	decisions	
	
In	other	Member	States,	NCA	findings	of	infringement	are	treated	as	particularly	
persuasive,	but	technically	rebuttable	e.g.	Belgium,	Lithuania,	Malta,	Cyprus,	Latvia,	
Denmark,	Italy,	Finland,	France,	Poland.		In	still	others,	the	NCA’s	decision	is	just	another	
piece	of	evidence	to	be	taken	into	account	e.g.	in	Portugal	pursuant	to	Articles	671	and	674	
of	the	Portuguese	Procedural	Code171;	Spain	where	there	is	no	requirement	to	have	regard	
to	the	NCA’s	decision,	and	decisions	of	administrative	authorities	in	general	have	no	
binding	effect	on	civil	courts;	in	Luxembourg	it	would	depend	on	the	“strength	and	nature	
of	reasoning”172;	and	in	Sweden	it	would	be	evidence	only	regarding	decisions	other	than	
individual	exemptions.	
	
	
8.1.4	Reform	to	constitutions	needed		
	
Of	course,	the	Commission	cannot	adopt	the	binding	effect	rule	without	support	from	the	
Member	States.	Responses	to	the	White	Paper	consultation173	suggest	that	its	passage	will	
be	difficult	‐		several	contributions	strongly	state	that	to	bring	the	proposed	rule	into	effect	
would	require	constitutional	change,	as	it	is	against	the	fundamental	notion	of	judicial	
independence	and	lack	of	hierarchy	of	administrative	institutions	over	the	judiciary.174	
There	is	also	the	problem	of	different	standards	of	appeal	and	judicial	review	in	Member	
States.	Others	argue	that	as	a	prerequisite	for	the	binding	effect	rule	more	work	needs	to	
be	done	within	the	ECN	on	the	mutual	recognition	of	decisions	and	harmonising	rules	of	
procedure	before	NCAs.175	
	
                                                 
171 Ashurst Study, 69-70. However, according to the FIDE Portugal country report 2010, “A final decision 
adopted by an NCA, with the same value than a judgment in the country where it was issued, must be 
considered by the Portuguese Courts as if it was a decision from a foreign court.” (response to Q15). This 
raises the question of whether decisions from Member States with courts designated as competition 
authorities (e.g. Ireland) would be favoured. 
172 FIDE 2010 country report 
173 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments.html .  
174 Very few judges or courts made direct representations to the White Paper consultation. Exceptions 
were the Association of European Competition Law Judges (AECLJ) and the Italian Supreme Court. It 
was a similar situation in the context of the 2004 reforms: one judge noted that German judges took no 
active part in the discussions. The principals were the European Commission, Bundeskartellamt, 
Monopolkommission and academics – comment of  J Gröning in C-D Ehlermann (ed) European 
Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy (Hart, 2001), 487 
175 Addleshaw Goddard,  AFEC, Association Française d'Etude de la Concurrence; APDC Association 
des Avocats Pratiquant le Droit de la Concurrence; UK Competition Law Association; Slaughter & May 
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The	constitutional	barriers	will	be	most	difficult	to	overcome.		Examples	include	France	–	
opponents	of	the	proposal	draw	attention	to	the	judicial	independence	principle	in	Art	64	
of	the	French	constitution.176	According	to	the	Portuguese	Competition	Authority,	there	
would	also	be	constitutional	obstacles	in	Portugal	based	on	separation	of	powers	and	
independence	of	the	judiciary,	meaning	that	an	NCA	decision	would	need	to	be	actively	
confirmed	by	a	court.177	In	Sweden,	“[n]o	public	authority,	including	the	Swedish	
Parliament,	may	determine	how	a	court	of	law	is	to	adjudicate	an	individual	case	or	
otherwise	apply	a	rule	of	law	in	a	particular	case”.178		
	
The	first	unofficial	version	of	the	draft	directive	on	antitrust	damages	actions	redrafts	the	
rule	in	Article	12:	“Where	national	courts	rule,	in	actions	for	damages,	on	agreements,	
decisions	or	practices	under	Article	[101	or	102]	of	the	Treaty	which	are	already	the	
subject	of	a	final	infringement	decision	by	a	national	competition	authority	or	by	a	review	
court,	Member	States	shall	ensure	that	the	national	courts	cannot	take	decisions	running	
counter	to	such	infringement	decision.	This	obligation	is	without	prejudice	to	the	rights	
and	obligations	under	Article	[267]	of	the	Treaty.”179	The	fact	that	the	Article	is	entitled	
‘Effect	of	national	decisions’	without	the	use	of	the	word	‘binding’	suggests	that	the	
Commission	is	aware	of	the	controversies.	In	addition,	the	reference	to	the	ECN	is	played	
down	and	more	emphasis	is	placed	on	the	role	of	review	courts.	
	
Another	possibility	would	be	to	create	an	irrebuttable	presumption,	which	in	practice	has	
the	same	‘binding’	effect,	but	semantically	respects	the	independence	of	the	court	to	make	
a	finding.	180		
	
	
9.	The	current	state	of	play	of	legislation	on	damages	actions	
	
Following	the	consultation	on	the	White	Paper	in	2008‐2009,	the	draft	directive	on	
damages	actions	was	due	to	be	proposed	by	the	Commission	in	October	2009.181	However,	
                                                 
176 	Association des Avocats Pratiquant le Droit de la Concurrence White Paper response, p 12. French 
constitution of 4 October 1958 
177 Autoridade da Concorrência Portuguesa response to White Paper on damages actions 
178 The Instrument of Government, Section 11:2, as reported in FIDE 2010 country  report 
179 Reported in Truli, 801 
180  Italian Supreme Court Corte Suprema di Cassazione and 	Luxembourg Competition Authority, 
Conseil de la Concurrence and  Inspection de la Concurrence responses to the White Paper on damages 
action: Out of respect for separation of powers it is not advisable to use ‘binding’ but “présomption 
irréfragable, présomption par laquelle le juge et les parties seront liés”  
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the	proposal	was	delayed	until	the	new	College	of	Commissioners	had	taken	office	due	to	
objections	from	the	European	Parliament	in	a	resolution	of	March	2009,	largely	on	the	lack	
of	legal	base	and	insistence	on	its	involvement	in	the	legislative	procedure.182				
	
The	EP	resolution	specifically	addresses	comments	on	the	binding	effect	of	NCA	decisions,	
but	is	ambiguous.	It	states	that	a	national	court	should	not	be	bound	by	a	decision	of	the	
national	competition	authority	–	but	this	is	without	prejudice	to	rules	that	provide	for	
binding	effect	of	a	decision	applying	Article	101	or	102	TFEU	relating	to	the	same	subject	
matter	adopted	by	a	member	of	the	European	Competition	Network.	The	second	part,	
recommending	training	and	exchange	programmes	to	encourage	acceptance	of	another	
NCA’s	decision,	suggests	that	the	Parliament	is	referring	to	the	effect	of	decisions	between	
NCAs,	not	on	civil	courts.183	The	reference	to	training	and	exchange	programmes	also	
suggests	soft	convergence	rather	than	hard	binding	rules.	
	
The	draft	directive		on	actions	for	damages	for	breaches	of	antitrust	law	now	features	in	
the	European	Commission’s	work	programme	for	2012,	explaining	that	“The	objective	of	
this	legislative	initiative	would	be	to	ensure	effective	damages	actions	before	national	
courts	for	breaches	of	EU	antitrust	rules	and	to	clarify	the	interrelation	of	such	private	
actions	with	public	enforcement	by	the	Commission	and	the	national	competition	
authorities,	notably	as	regards	the	protection	of	leniency	programmes,	in	order	to	
preserve	the	central	role	of	public	enforcement	in	the	EU.	The	right	of	victims	of	antitrust	
infringements	to	such	damages	has	already	been	established	by	the	Court.”	184	The	
directive	is	due	to	be	proposed	in	the	fourth	quarter	of	2012.	The	work	programme	states	
it	will	progress	under	the	ordinary	legislative	procedure,	which	means	that	the	European	
                                                                                                                                               
181 See e.g. ‘Plans for Private Antitrust Damages Actions Directive Suffer Setback’ 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=71e1fd5c-7f47-40a1-9a8f-
951fe751fb5d last accessed 10.8.2012 
182 European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)) P6_TA(2009)0187. Objections to no legal base [2], requesting 
co-decision (now known as ordinary legislative procedure post-Lisbon) [5]. 
183 European Parliament March 2009 resolution [14] 
184 The 2012 work programme was released on 25.11.2011, available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/key-
documents/index_en.htm. See also Joaquín Almunia Vice President of the European Commission 
responsible for Competition Policy Work Programme for 2012 Presentation at ECON, European 
Parliament 22 November 2011, SPEECH/11/785, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/785&format=HTML&aged=0&lan
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en. The content of the work programme is in its annex:  
Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the European parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Commission Work 
Programme 2012 COM(2011) 777 final , Brussels, 15.11.2011 available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp2012_annex_en.pdf , last accessed 10.8.2012, p. 3 
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Parliament	will	have	a	greater	role	in	the	legislation’s	passage	than	mere	consultation.	
However,	the	precise	legal	base	is	“still	to	be	determined”.	185	
	
The	roadmap	on	antitrust	damages	actions	links	this	legislative	proposal	directly	to	action	
on	collective	redress	more	broadly	in	other	types	of	claims.186	Any	action	on	collective	
redress	will	take	a	horizontal	approach	across	policy	areas,	and	is	jointly	championed	by	
the	Commission	Directorates	General	of	Justice;	Competition;	and	Health	and	Consumer	
Policy.		A	communication	is	due	around	the	same	time	as	the	draft	directive	on	damages	
actions,	with	the	possibility	of	further	legislative	or	non‐legislative	action	based	on	the	
Treaty	on	the	European	Union	(TEU).	187	The	linking	of	these	two	initiatives	may	help	to	
address	concerns	raised	by	the	European	Parliament	and	by	respondents	to	the	White	
Paper	consultation	about	the	fragmentation	of	national	procedural	law	by	treating	
competition	as	a	‘special’	policy	area.	188	
	
The	view	of	the	European	Parliament	is	important	as	the	draft	legislation	will	be	adopted	
under	the	ordinary	legislative	procedure,	according	to	the	Commission’s	work	
programme.	This	suggests	that	Art	103	TFEU,	the	legal	base	for	antitrust	only	provisions,	
will	not	be	the	only	basis,	as	that	operates	under	the	special	legislative	procedure,	in	which	
                                                 
185 http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/forward_programming_2012.pdf (last accessed 9.8.2012) 
Commission actions expected to be adopted 18/07/2012 - 31/12/2012:.2009/COMP/023 Proposal for a 
Directive on rules governing actions for damages for infringements of the competition law provisions. 
Interestingly, the description of the legislation now opens with the sentence about the CJEU establishing 
the right to compensation, perhaps to underline its existing jurisprudential basis. 
186http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/2009_comp_023_damages_breaches_antitrust_
en.pdf, last accessed 10.8.2012 
187 Commission work programme 2012 annex, 20: 2012/JUST+/017 Communication on general 
principles of the EU framework for collective redress “The potential initiative will ensure that the 
European approach to collective redress is coherent and consistent. It will be a horizontal initiative 
covering several policy areas. The aim of the initiative is to improve the enforcement of EU law and 
access to justice for citizens and companies in situations where shortcomings exist under the status quo. 
Depending on the policy option chosen, it will take the form of legislative or non-legislative action.” 
188 See for example Nederlandse Kabinet – Dutch government, including Dutch competition authority -
response to White Paper on damages actions;  European Parliament March 2009 resolution [6]. The 
Parliament adopted a further resolution in response to the Commission’s collective redress consultation 
on 2.2.2012:	European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on 'Towards a Coherent European 
Approach to Collective Redress' (2011/2089(INI)) P7_TA(2012)0021, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang=en&procnum=INI/2011/2089 (accessed 
11.8.2012). Since this resolution the Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee has 
commissioned an independent study, ‘Collective Redress in Antitrust’ European Parliament Directorate-
General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic And Scientific Policy ‘Collective Redress 
in Antitrust’ IP/A/ECON/ST/2011-19, PE 475.120, 12.6.2012, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=7435
1 (accessed 11.8.2012) which strongly suggests that decisions should be binding on courts (81, 90).  The 
report also proposes limiting the exposure of leniency applicants to damages claims, and requiring 
claimants to notify their claim to the relevant NCA when they begin an action in a civil court, which 
would allow, but not oblige, an NCA to intervene (14, 90). It also supports a regulation rather than a 
directive (12). However, this is not an adopted report of the Parliament itself. 
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the	European	Parliament	has	only	a	consultative	role.	Art	103	could	be	justified	on	the	
grounds	that	the	Court	of	Justice	has	recognised	the	right	to	claim	damages	for	harm	
caused	by	breach	of	Art	101	and	102	TFEU,	and	that	legislation	is	needed	to	give	full	effect	
to	that	right.	However,	given	the	consequences	for	national	procedural	rules	more	broadly,	
it	may	be	used	in	conjunction	with	other	Treaty	articles.	189			
	
If	a	horizontal	approach	is	taken,	incorporating	collective	redress	and	measures	for	other	
consumer‐related	actions,	this	gives	more	weight	to	other	legal	bases.	These	would	most	
likely	be	Article	81	TFEU190	on	judicial	cooperation	in	civil	matters,	and	Article	114191	on	
approximation	of	laws.	Art	169	TFEU	on	consumer	protection	could	also	be	used.	It	seems	
highly	unlikely	that	the	proposal	could	be	based	on	these	different	articles	only,	without	
Article	103	TFEU,	given	that	competition	law	is	the	focus	of	the	proposal.	A	mix	of	legal	
bases	could	also	give	rise	to	competence	disputes	as	Articles	81,	114	and	169	require	the	
ordinary	legislative	procedure,	involving	co‐decision	between	Council	and	Parliament,	
whereas	Art	103	only	requires	a	consultative	role	for	the	Parliament	under	the	special	
legislative	procedure.		
	
From	the	perspective	of	institutional	balance,	Art	103(d)	refers	to	antitrust	legislation	
defining	respective	functions	of	the	Commission	and	the	Court	of	Justice	for	the	purposes	
of	applying	Articles	101	and	102	TFEU.		However,	it	is	doubtful	whether	this	provision	can	
be	used	as	a	basis	for	determination	of	the	relationship	between	administrative	and	
judicial	power	at	the	national	level.	192	
	
	
	 	
                                                 
189 See C Leskinen ‘The Competence of the European Union to Adopt Measures Harmonizing the 
Procedural Rules Governing EC Antitrust Damages Action’ (2008) Working Paper Instituto de Empresa 
Law School, Madrid for a discussion of potential legal bases and  
C Leskinen ‘Antitrust Damages Actions: Recent Developments’ 
http://blogeuropa.eu/2009/05/13/antitrust-damages-actions-recent-developments/#more-503 13.5.2009 
190 “1.The Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications, 
based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases. Such 
cooperation may include the adoption of measures for the approximation of the laws and regulations of 
the Member States.” In particular (f): “the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil 
proceedings, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the 
Member States”; (a)the mutual recognition and enforcement between Member States of judgments and of 
decisions in extrajudicial cases;  (e)effective access to justice 
191 “Save where otherwise provided in the Treaties, the following provisions shall apply for the 
achievement of the objectives set out in Article 26 [ensuring the functioning of the internal market]” 
192 See, to this effect, Irish Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment response to White Paper on 
damages actions. 
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10.	Conclusions		
	
This	chapter	has	explored	the	proposal	for	the	binding	effect	of	national	competition	
authority	decisions	on	civil	courts	throughout	the	EU.		This	rule	is	proposed	to	incentivise	
claimants	to	bring	private	enforcement	cases	in	civil	courts	by	alleviating	their	burden	to	
prove	an	infringement.	The	rule	would	also	avoid	re‐litigation	of	issues	in	public	and	
private	enforcement,	and	could	contribute	to	consistent	application	of	the	EU	competition	
rules	by	indirectly	linking	national	courts	to	the	European	Competition	Network	(ECN).	
The	binding	effect	rule	could	also	link	civil	courts	enforcing	competition	rules	between	
private	parties	with	the	European	Competition	Network	through	amicus	curiae	
interventions,	as	explored	in	the	previous	chapter.	NCAs	could	be	called	upon	by	a	court	to	
assist	if	more	explanation	of	a	finding	of	infringement	were	needed.		
	
However,	such	a	proposal	carries	much	broader	constitutional	significance	in	terms	of	the	
interaction	between	judicial	and	administrative	institutions	and	their	decisions.	The	
proposed	rule	creates	an	apparent	hierarchy	of	administrative	decisions	over	court	
judgments,	narrowing	the	field	of	civil	courts’	jurisdiction	and	limiting	judicial	autonomy.		
It	also	implies	a	certain	burden	on	judges:	that	civil	courts	courts	must	be	aware	of	all	NCA	
infringement	decisions	throughout	EU	‐	and	show	that	they	are	taken	into	account	in	their	
reasoning.	
	
My	original	research	into	the	legislative	process	behind	Reg	1/2003	informs	this	chapter	
in	respect	of	the	horizontal	relations	between	national	competition	authorities	within	the	
European	Competition	Network,	and	the	effect	of	Commission	decisions	on	national	
courts.	Drawing	on	this	research	the	chapter	has	shown	the	asymmetric	effects	deriving	
from	the	status	of	civil	courts	and	national	competition	authorities.	NCA	decisions	would	
be	binding	on	national	courts,	but	there	would	be	no	similar	horizontal	binding	effect	on	
fellow	NCAs	within	the	European	Competition	Network.	The	assumption	is	that	a	hard	rule	
binding	NCAs	with	each	other’s	decisions	is	not	needed	given	the	cooperation	rules	within	
the	ECN,	but	there	is	no	guarantee	that	the	ECN	will	continue	to	operate	according	to	these	
rules.	There	are	also	uneven	effects	concerning	Member	States	courts	being	bound	by	
decisions	of	a	foreign	NCA	but	not	by	those	of	the	domestic	NCA.		
	
The	explicit	basis	for	the	binding	effect	rule	is	an	extension	of	Masterfoods	codified	in	Art	
16	Reg	1/2003,	which	obliges	EU	Member	State	courts	not	to	make	a	ruling	running	
counter	to	one	made	or	contemplated	by	the	European	Commission.	This	chapter	has	
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considered	the	different	understandings	of	Masterfoods,	as	a	positive	obligation,	or	as	a	
negative	duty	of	abstention.	Commission	decisions	derive	their	effect	by	virtue	of	
supremacy	of	EU	law,	but	the	basis	of	extension	to	binding	effect	of	foreign	administrative	
decisions	in	EU	law	less	clear.	The	binding	effect	rule	could	be	understood	as	a	delegation,	
or	devolution,	of	the	Commission’s	enforcement	powers.	But	if	national	courts	are	also	EU	
courts,	national	judge’s	interpretation	of	EU	law	is	as	valid	as	the	Commission’s,	and	by	
extension	an	NCA’s.	
	
There	is	an	analogy	with	the	Brussels	I	Regulation	on	jurisdiction	and	recognition	of	
judgments	between	Member	States.		The	binding	effect	rule	should	have	at	least	the	same	
safeguards	as	Art	34(1)	Brussels	Reg,	which	would	allow	a	civil	court	to	look	behind	an	
authority’s	decisions	in	exceptional	circumstances.		If	this	were	not	the	case,	decisions	of	
administrative	bodies	would	be	afforded	a	privileged	position	relative	to	judgments	of	
civil	courts.	However,	questioning	other	Member	States’	compatibility	with	fair	legal	
process	standards	may	undermine	trust	currently	fostered	in	the	ECN.	Binding	effect	
should	be	employed	only	where	the	defendants	in	the	follow‐on	action	were	heard	in	
proceedings	leading	to	the	foreign	NCA	decision	–	if	not	addressees	of	the	decision	at	least	
as	participants.		
	
Currently	the	only	Member	State	to	impose	the	binding	effect	of	foreign	NCA	decisions	is	
Germany.	In	a	number	of	Member	States	there	are	constitutional	obstacles	to	the	rule	
being	adopted	based	on	respect	for	the	principle	of	judicial	autonomy.	One	way	around	
this	may	be	a	semantic	one	–	packaging	the	finding	of	infringement	as	an	‘irrebuttable	
presumption’	as	at	least	symbolic	gesture	to	independence	of	the	judiciary.		In	particular,	
the	word	‘binding’	should	be	avoided,	drawing	upon	the	interpretations	of	Masterfoods.		
This	uncertainty	could	however	lead	to	satellite	litigation	to	determine	the	precise	effect	
of	a	foreign	NCA	decision	in	individual	cases.	
	
By	looking	comprehensively	into	the	consultative	process	behind	the	proposed	binding	
effect	rule	through	responses	to	the	White	Paper	on	damages	actions,	the	chapter	also	
identified	resistance	to	adoption	of	the	rule	and	obstacles	in	the	Member	States.	
	
As	also	shown	in	chapter	4	on	Commission	intervention	in	national	court	proceedings,	
there	are	trade‐offs	between	judicial	autonomy	and	effective	enforcement	of	EU	
competition	law,	and	effective	enforcement	takes	priority.	This	contributes	to	an	
institutional	hierarchy	of	administrative	authorities,	carrying	out	public	competition	law	
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enforcement,	over	civil	courts.	This	EU	proposal	will	affect	institutional	interactions	
between	administrative	authorities	and	courts	at	the	national	level,	with	potential	impact	
beyond	competition	law	enforcement.			
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CHAPTER	6:		CONCLUSIONS	AND	DIRECTIONS	FOR	FURTHER	RESEARCH	
	
This	thesis	explored	the	constitutional	implications	of	interaction	between	courts	and	
administrative	authorities,	between	the	supranational	and	national	levels,	in	EU	
competition	law	enforcement.	With	a	focus	on	the	role	of	courts,	it	considered	the	impact	
of	the	2004	and	more	recent	competition	reforms	on	national	courts	and	judicial	
autonomy.		In	so	doing	it	investigated	how	the	European	Commission	can	impact	on	
judicial	decision‐making	at	the	national	level,	and	to	what	extent	the	European	
Commission	challenges,	or	complements,	the	judicial	role	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	
European	Union	in	the	interpretation	of	competition	law.	The	thesis	also	considered	how	
the	interaction	of	different	mechanisms	for	coherent	interpretation	and	application	of	EU	
competition	law	impacts	on	the	relationship	between	judicial	and	administrative	
authorities.	The	thesis	revealed	asymmetric	effects	deriving	from	the	different	
constitutional	statuses	of	courts	and	administrative	public	authorities.	
	
From	a	theoretical	perspective,	the	thesis	took	forward	the	understanding	of	the	relatively	
new	concept	of	interpretative	pluralism.	The	thesis	confirms	Maduro’s	suggestion	that	
courts	do	not	have	a	monopoly	on	the	interpretation	of	the	law.	However,	contrary	to	his	
idea,	one	institution	does	need	to	have	the	‘last	word’.	It	also	takes	forward	Komarek’s	call	
for	research	into	courts’	deference	to	administrative	agencies’	interpretation	of	the	law.				
If	there	is	an	institutional	hierarchy	of	administrative/executive	agencies	over	courts,	then	
this	challenges	the	institutional	balance	and	judicial	autonomy	at	the	national	level.	
	
Contributing	to	this	theoretical	contribution,	the	thesis	investigated	the	emerging	practice	
in	the	post‐2004	regime.	This	was	evident	in	the	contrast	between	chapter	3	on	NCAs’	
apparent	lack	of	access	to	the	CJEU,	and	chapter	4	on	European	Commission	intervention	
in	national	court	proceedings.	Chapter	4	set	out	a	detailed	presentation	of	how	Article	15	
Regulation	1/2003	operates,	tracking	all	cases	in	which	the	Commission	has	provided	an	
opinion	or	intervened	in	national	judicial	proceedings.	This	shows	the	shape	of	the	
Commission’s	role	in	the	decentralised	system.	In	addition,	with	the	potential	for	private	
enforcement	in	national	courts	increased,	it	is	important	to	investigate	what	actually	
happens	in	the	Member	States.	More	broadly,	it	contributes	to	knowledge	on	how	EU	law	
is	applied	in	Member	State	courts.		
	
Chapter	2	laid	the	basis	for	the	case	studies	by	exploring	concepts	in	the	interactions	
between	institutions.	It	explored	the	EU	principle	of	institutional	balance	at	the	
supranational	level	between	the	CJEU	and	the	European	Commission.	It	is	questionable	
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whether	there	can	be	a	‘diagonal’	institutional	balance	between	the	supranational	and	the	
national	levels,	which	activates	the	judicial	autonomy	of	Member	State	courts.	However,	
there	is	a	duty	of	loyal	cooperation	between	the	EU	institutions	and	authorities	and	courts	
at	the	sub‐state	level.		The	chapter	then	went	on	to	consider	different	types	of	coherence,	
at	the	global,	system,	and	single	case	level;	the	judicial	functions	of	upholding	coherence	
and	the	claims	of	different	types	of	authority.	It	concluded	with	an	assessment	of	
interpretative	pluralism	in	a	system	of	concurrent	competences.		
	
Chapter	3	considered	the	diagonal	relationship	between	national	competition	authorities	
and	the	Court	of	Justice	through	their	(lack	of)	access	to	the	Court’s	preliminary	reference	
procedure	under	Art	267	TFEU.		The	preliminary	reference	procedure	is	important	as	the	
primary	means	for	encouraging	coherence	of	EU	law	through	the	CJEU’s	interpretation.		
It	first	set	the	context	by	surveying	the	post‐2004	landscape	of	EU	competition	law	
enforcement,	in	particular	multiple	enforcers	and	the	challenge	of	consistent	application	
of	antitrust	rules	in	decentralised	enforcement;	and	the	quasi‐judicial	nature	of	
competition	enforcement	undertaken	by	these	multiple	enforcers.	It	went	on	to	consider	
the	Member	States’	designation	of	institutional	structures	for	public	enforcement	of	
competition	law	under	Article	35	Regulation	1/2003	and	assessed	the	significance	of	these	
designations	for	obligations	under	Reg	1/2003.		Then	the	discussion	turned	from	the	
designation	of	courts	or	administrative	agencies	as	competition	authorities	at	the	national	
level,	to	the	criteria	in	the	EU’s	autonomous	definition	of	a	‘court	or	tribunal’	for	the	
purposes	of	the	preliminary	reference	procedure.	It	considered	how	the	CJEU	including	its	
Advocates	General	have	defined	and	developed	the	concept	through	specific,	albeit	
occasionally	flexible,	criteria.	These	criteria	are	important	for	determining	which	national	
bodies	have	access	to	the	CJEU’s	advice	and	interpretation	of	the	law.	Of	particular	
relevance	are	the	need	for	the	referring	body	to	have	an	inter	partes	procedure	i.e.	to	be	a	
third	party	adjudicator	between	the	parties,	to	be	independent,	and	to	have	compulsory	
jurisdiction	leading	to	a	decision	of	a	judicial	nature.		
	
The	chapter	focused	on	the	Syfait	case	in	which	the	Greek	Competition	Commission,	as	a	
competition	authority	with	integrated	investigative	and	adjudicative	functions,	addressed	
a	reference	to	the	CJEU	but	was	ultimately	refused.	The	chapter	analysed	whether	the	
judgment	bars	all	NCAs	from	access	to	the	CJEU.		The	analysis	focused	on	the	CJEU’s	
interpretation	of	the	independence	criterion	and	the	Court’s	reasoning	that	the	
Commission	may	always	potentially	relieve	an	NCA	of	its	competence	under	Article	11(6)	
Regulation	1/2003,	implying	that	proceedings	initiated	before	the	NCA	will	not	necessarily	
culminate	in	a	‘decision	of	a	judicial	nature’.		In	practice	this	latter	criterion	could	bar	
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references	from	all	NCAs,	regardless	of	their	design,	since	they	are	all	subject	to	Art	11(6)	
within	the	European	Competition	Network.	The	chapter	argued	that	the	CJEU’s	judgment	
was	flawed	as	the	effects	of	Art	11(6)	apply	only	to	the	prosecuting	authority,	according	to	
Art	35(4)	Regulation	1/2003.	In	addition,	the	Commission	had	not	in	practice	activated	Art	
11(6).	However,	even	if	the	legal	argument	can	be	made	for	the	Court	to	accept	
preliminary	references	from	NCAs,	it	is	argued	that	the	message	sent	in	Syfait	has	
effectively	frozen	them	and	the	Court	has	curtailed	its	own	jurisdiction.		
	
There	is	certainly	a	bias	towards	dualist	NCAs	i.e.	those	which	separate	their	investigative	
and	decision‐making	functions.	Integrated	monist	NCAs,	the	most	prevalent	NCA	model	in	
the	EU,	have	an	extra	hurdle	to	overcome	because	they	do	not	have	the	structural	
separation	of	functions	required	to	meet	the	independence	requirement.	As	a	result	they	
do	not	have	the	same	opportunity	to	seek	guidance	from	the	CJEU.		A	consequence	of	this	
is	uneven	access	to	the	judicial	tool	of	the	preliminary	reference	procedure,	dependent	on	
institutional	structure.		
	
Chapter	3	found	that	there	are	asymmetric	avenues	to	the	supranational	level	for	national	
courts	and	competition	authorities.	From	the	CJEU’s	perspective,	it	seems	motivated	to	
preserve	its	dialogue	between	courts	only	and	to	exclude	quasi‐judicial	NCAs	with	
integrated	functions.	If	the	CJEU	adopts	a	narrow	definition	of	a	court	or	tribunal,	it	
constrains	its	own	jurisdiction.	By	emphasising	in	Syfait	that	NCAs	are	required	to	work	in	
close	cooperation	with	the	Commission	in	the	context	of	the	European	Competition	
Network,	the	CJEU	effectively	passes	over	responsibility	to	the	Commission	for	how	NCAs	
should	interpret	and	apply	competition	law.	
	
Meanwhile,	the	European	Commission,	as	a	supranational	administrative	authority	with	
quasi‐judicial	functions,	has	extended	its	sphere	of	influence	by	strengthening	its	links	
with	national	courts.	Chapter	4	investigated	this	other	diagonal	relationship.	Previously,	
the	Court	of	Justice’s	preliminary	reference	procedure,	a	‘dialogue	between	courts’,	was	
the	only	formal	link	between	the	courts	of	the	Member	States	and	the	supranational	level.		
Chapter	4	showed	how	the	European	Commission	has	added	to	this	general	(EU	law)	
institutional	link	through	the	specific	(to	competition	law)	instrument	of	opinions	and	
own‐initiative	interventions	to	national	courts	in	competition	cases,	under	Art	15	Reg	
1/2003.	This	was	placed	within	the	context	of	the	broader	relationship	between	the	
European	Commission	and	national	judges	in	EU	competition	law	through	case	law,	in	
particular	the	effect	of	Commission	decisions	and	other	pronouncements	on	national	
courts.	Informed	by	original	research	into	the	legislative	background	of	Art	15	Reg	
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1/2003,	it	explained	how	this	tool	is	designed	in	the	absence	of	a	formal	judicial	network	
to	promote	consistent	application	following	decentralisation.		Chapter	4	argued	that	this	
raised	constitutional	questions	about	the	effect	of	concurrent	competences	on	the	
institutional	balance	at	the	supranational	level	between	the	Commission	and	the	Court	of	
Justice,	and	diagonally	in	terms	of	the	effect	on	national	judicial	autonomy.		
	
The	discussion	took	both	a	theoretical	and	a	practical	approach.	Through	the	soft	law	
literature,	the	theoretical	element	examined	the	legal	nature	of	the	Commission	opinion	as	
an	EU	instrument.	It	argued	that	the	Commission’s	opinion	in	this	context	is	a	unique	
instrument	and	as	such	its	legal	effects	are	uncertain.	It	does	not	fit	easily	into	the	category	
of	soft	law	instruments	establishing	‘rules	of	conduct.’	However,	it	could	become	binding	
through	the	national	court’s	judgment.	Having	explored	the	theoretical	context,	the	
chapter	contributed	original	research	on	how	Art	15	works	in	practice.	It	sought	to	trace	
all	of	the	opinions	and	own‐initiative	interventions	to	date.	The	chapter	reported	23	
opinions	under	Art	15(1)	and	9	interventions	under	Art	15(3),	with	varying	degrees	of	
success	in	identifying	the	parties	and	how	the	opinion	was	dealt	with	by	the	national	
court.		The	chapter	found	a	de	facto	third	category	between	Art	15(1)	and	15(3):	cases	in	
which	the	Commission	was	‘invited’	to	intervene	but	no	specific	questions	were	put	to	it.	
In	relation	to	Art	15(3),	the	chapter	discussed	the	Commission’s	reason	for	intervention,	
where	it	could	be	observed,	whether	the	national	judge	followed	the	Commission.	
	
The	preliminary	ruling	in	X	BV	was	analysed	in	detail,	as	it	related	to	the	admissibility	of	
Art	15(3)	interventions.	The	CJEU’s	response	gave	the	Commission	wide	scope	to	
intervene	in	a	national	court	case	related	to	the	effective	application	of	Articles	101	and	
102	TFEU,	even	if	the	court	is	not	directly	applying	them.	Chapter	4	found	that	the	case	
suggests	an	emphasis	on	effective	–	not	only	coherent	‐	application	of	the	EU	rules,	and	
that	it	implies	that	a	Commission	intervention	could	extend	to	national	cases	concerning,	
for	example,	contract	disputes,	follow‐on	damages	actions,	or	criminal	proceedings	‐	not	
initially	intended	by	Regulation	1/2003.		
	
Some	interventions	are	available	on	the	Commission’s	website,	but	they	are	not	formally	
published,	for	example	in	the	Official	Journal.	The	Commission	has	made	available	most	of	
its	own‐initiative	observations.	These	are	the	cases	in	which	it	has	felt	compelled	to	
intervene,	and	so	represent	competition	issues	which	it	finds	to	be	most	important	for	
coherent	application.	As	such	it	is	in	the	Commission’s	interest	to	publish	them.	By	
contrast,	only	around	a	quarter	of	the	opinions	requested	by	national	courts	under	15(1)	
have	been	publicised.	This	lack	of	transparency	raises	questions	about	the	‘back	door’	
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influence	of	these	opinions	in	the	judicial	proceedings.	Moreover,	it	does	not	help	legal	
certainty	and	consistent	application	throughout	the	EU.	The	chapter	therefore	called	for	
transparency	through	the	publication	of	observations,	ideally	in	different	language	
versions.	This	would	also	promote	awareness	among	judges	of	cases	in	other	Member	
States.		
	
Time	will	tell	how	judges	respond	to	this	mechanism	relative	both	to	the	preliminary	
reference	procedure	(one	parallel	reference	from	a	Spanish	court	was	found),	and	to	the	
possibility	of	calling	on	the	national	competition	authority	which	operates	within	the	
framework	of	the	ECN.		That	is	likely	to	depend	on	individual	judges	and	judicial	
preferences	in	different	Member	States.	Art	15(3)	Reg	1/2003	also	allows	national	
competition	authorities	to	intervene	in	national	judicial	proceedings	in	their	own	Member	
State.	Together	with	the	proposal	discussed	in	chapter	5,	that	could	bring	national	courts	
indirectly	into	the	European	Competition	Network.		That	could	have	positive	benefits	for	
the	consistent	application	of	the	EU	competition	rules,	but	also	brings	judicial	autonomy	
into	question.		
	
Chapter	5	discussed	the	proposal	in	the	forthcoming	EU	directive	on	damages	actions	to	
introduce	the	binding	effect	of	national	competition	authorities’	decision	on	national	
courts	throughout	the	EU.	The	chapter	was	informed	by	original	research	on	the	
legislative	process	behind	Reg	1/2003,	in	respect	of	the	effect	of	Commission	decisions	on	
national	courts,	and	on	horizontal	relations	between	national	competition	authorities	
within	the	European	Competition	Network;	and	researching	the	consultative	process	
behind	the	proposed	binding	effect	rule	through	responses	to	the	White	Paper	on	damages	
actions.	The	chapter	explained	the	context	of	the	rule	‐	to	incentivise	claimants	to	bring	
private	enforcement	cases	in	civil	courts	by	alleviating	their	burden	to	prove	an	
infringement.		It	then	went	on	to	highlight	much	broader	constitutional	significance	in	
terms	of	the	interaction	between	judicial	and	administrative	institutions	and	their	
decisions.	It	argued	that	the	proposed	rule	creates	an	apparent	hierarchy	of	administrative	
decisions	over	court	judgments,	narrowing	the	field	of	civil	courts’	jurisdiction.	It	also	
implies	a	certain	burden	on	judges:	that	civil	courts	must	be	aware	of	all	NCA	infringement	
decisions	throughout	EU	‐	and	show	that	they	are	taken	into	account	in	their	reasoning.		
	
This	chapter	demonstrated	the	asymmetric	effects	deriving	from	the	status	of	civil	courts	
and	national	competition	authorities.	NCA	decisions	would	be	binding	on	national	courts,	
but	there	would	be	no	similar	horizontal	binding	effect	on	fellow	NCAs	within	the	
European	Competition	Network.	The	assumption	is	that	a	hard	rule	binding	NCA	with	each	
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other’s	decisions	is	not	needed	given	the	cooperation	rules	within	the	ECN,	but	there	is	no	
guarantee	that	the	ECN	will	continue	to	operate	according	to	these	rules.	There	are	also	
possible	uneven	effects	concerning	Member	States	courts	being	bound	by	decisions	of	a	
foreign	NCA	but	not	by	those	of	the	domestic	NCA.		
	
The	chapter	considered	the	basis	for	this	rule.	Explicitly,	it	is	an	extension	of	Masterfoods	,	
which	obliges	EU	Member	State	courts	not	to	make	a	ruling	running	counter	to	one	made	
or	contemplated	by	the	European	Commission.	As	such	the	chapter	revisited	the	different	
understandings	of	Masterfoods.	Commission	decisions	derive	their	effect	by	virtue	of	
supremacy	of	EU	law,	but	extension	to	binding	effect	of	foreign	administrative	decisions	in	
EU	law	less	clear.	The	binding	effect	rule	could	be	understood	as	a	delegation,	or	
devolution,	of	the	Commission’s	enforcement	powers.	The	chapter	argued	that	if	national	
courts	are	also	EU	courts,	and	in	the	system	of	concurrent	competences,	national	judges’	
interpretation	of	EU	law	is	as	valid	as	the	Commission’s,	and	by	extension	an	NCA’s.	
	
The	chapter	also	examined	the	horizontal	duty	of	loyal	cooperation	between	sub‐state	
bodies,	and	the	analogy	with	the	Brussels	I	Regulation	on	jurisdiction	and	recognition	of	
judgments	between	Member	States.		It	argued	that	the	binding	effect	rule	should	have	at	
least	the	same	safeguards	as	Art	34(1)	Brussels	Reg,	which	would	allow	a	civil	court	to	
refuse	to	recognise	an	authority’s	decisions	in	exceptional	circumstances	.	If	this	were	not	
the	case,	decisions	of	administrative	bodies	would	be	afforded	a	privileged	position	
relative	to	judgments	of	civil	courts	–	another	example	of	asymmetric	effects.	However,	
questioning	other	Member	States’	compatibility	with	fair	legal	process	standards	may	
undermine	trust	currently	fostered	in	the	ECN.		
	
The	chapter	concluded	with	an	assessment	of	the	possibility	of	the	rule	being	adopted,	
including	issues	surrounding	legal	base	of	the	directive	and	views	in	the	Member	States.	
Currently	the	only	Member	State	to	impose	the	binding	effect	of	foreign	NCA	decisions	is	
Germany.	In	a	number	of	Member	States	there	would	need	to	be	constitutional	reform	for	
the	rule	to	be	adopted.		The	chapter	suggested	that	one	way	around	this	may	be	a	semantic	
one	–	packaging	the	finding	of	infringement	as	an	‘irrebuttable	presumption’	as	at	least	
symbolic	gesture	to	independence	of	the	judiciary.		In	particular,	the	word	‘binding’	should	
be	avoided,	drawing	upon	some	Member	State	courts’	interpretations	of	Masterfoods.	As	
also	shown	in	chapter	4,	there	are	trade‐offs	between	judicial	autonomy	and	effective	
enforcement	of	EU	competition	law,	and	effective	enforcement	appears	to	take	priority.	
This	EU	proposal	will	affect	institutional	interactions	between	administrative	authorities	
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and	courts	at	the	national	level,	with	potential	impact	beyond	competition	law	
enforcement.			
	
While	apparently	empowering	(national)	courts,	the	post‐2004	regime	still	limits	the	
ambit	of	judicial	competence	in	favour	of	administrative	bodies.	In	some	cases,	it	is	the	
Court	of	Justice	deferring	to	the	authority	of	the	Commission	which	limits	the	CJEU’s	own	
jurisdiction	and	the	autonomy	of	national	courts.	The	CJEU	has	effectively	ruled	out	
preliminary	references	from	national	competition	authorities	on	the	basis	of	their	
relationship	with	the	Commission	in	the	European	Competition	Network,	thus	limiting	its	
own	jurisdiction.	The	Commission	has	its	own	soft	‘preliminary	ruling	procedure’	with	
national	courts,	parallel	to	the	role	of	the	CJEU,	and	is	also	able	to	intervene	with	legal	
opinions	at	its	own	initiative	in	national	judicial	proceedings.	The	Court	of	Justice	has	
confirmed	the	Commission’s	wide	jurisdiction	to	intervene	in	cases	in	some	way	related	to	
the	competition	rules,	not	necessarily	only	applying	Article	101	or	102	TFEU.	In	an	
extension	of	national	courts’	obligation	not	to	rule	counter	to	a	European	Commission	
decision,	they	are	now	to	be	bound	by	national	competition	authority	decisions.		
	
A	plurality	of	interpretations	–	and	interpreters	–	of	the	law	suggests	a	looser	concept	of	
unity	or	coherence.	However,	the	interpretation	of	national	judges	is	supervised.	As	the	
case	studies	show,	in	the	decentralised	system	‘coherent’	application	of	the	rules	appears	
to	mean	‘effective’	application.	While	coherence	is	a	central	aspect	of	the	rule	of	law	as	
overseen	by	judges,	effectiveness	can	be	supervised	by	administrative	authorities.	
Traditional	judicial	independence	considerations	are	also	trumped	by	the	need	for	
effectiveness	and	efficiency.	
	
All	these	developments	suggest	that	there	should	be	more	emphasis	on	horizontal	
relationships	between	courts,	led	by	judges	themselves.1	This	would	not	only	lend	itself	to	
coherent	–	and	effective	–	application	of	competition	law,	but	would	also	allow	courts	to	
push	back	against	the	apparent	dominance	of	administrative	authorities	in	this	area.		
	
One	way	of	doing	this	would	be	through	databases	of	judgments	as	a	basis	of	mutual	
guidance	to	allow	courts	to	network	themselves.	There	is	already	some	movement	in	this	
                                                 
1 In a broader context, Carol Harlow has suggested that national courts should network themselves to 
come to their own idea of justice, but, interestingly, versus the CJEU. Paper presentation, ‘Cause Groups 
and Legal Accountability in EU Governance’, UACES Annual Conference, Bruges, Sep 2010. She also 
draws attention to judicial networks in other areas - C Harlow & R Rawlings ‘Promoting Accountability 
in Multi-Level Governance: A Network Approach’ (2006) European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) 
No. C-06-02, 11 
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direction.2	They	should	not	only	be	available	to	specialist	competition	law	judges,	
however.	The	diversity	of	languages	and	legal	concepts3	need	not	be	a	barrier	as	
secondary	support	could	be	drawn	from	existing	databases	on	terminology	could	be	used,	
for	example	the	IATE	database.4	Resources	for	continuing	translation	of	judgments	remain	
an	issue,	however.	
	
	
Directions	for	further	research	
	
More	work	needs	to	be	done	on	judicial	preferences	and	responsiveness	to	the	
Commission’s	–	and	NCA’s	‐	involvement	in	national	court	proceedings.	The	cases	
uncovered	under	Art	15(1)	in	this	thesis	give	an	indication	of	the	Member	States	which	are	
most	amenable	to	this	kind	of	interaction.	From	the	other	side,	it	is	not	currently	clear	how	
the	Commission	decides	whether	to	intervene	under	Art	15(3),	and	the	areas	of	priority.	
As	noted	in	the	Report	on	the	Functioning	of	Regulation	1/2003,5	there	may	actually	be	a	
demand	for	the	Commission	to	intervene	in	more,	rather	than	fewer	cases.	There	is	a	limit	
to	what	can	be	observed	through	the	record	of	the	judgment	of	the	national	court.	This	
would	lend	itself	to	interviews	with	court	staff,	judges,	others	involved	in	cases,	and	the	
interveners.	Ideally	this	would	need	a	team	of	national	rapporteurs.		This	research	on	
judicial	preferences	could	be	compared	with	national	courts’	practice	on	preliminary	
rulings.6		
	
                                                 
2 e.g. Through the Association of European Competition Law Judges (AECLJ): “a more long term 
objective of the AECLJ, (as and when funding becomes available) is the creation of a database of 
judgments in the competition law field from each of the Member States to provide a readily accessible 
body of relevant materials for Members.” http://www.aeclj.com/3587/The-work-of-the-Association.html 
(last accessed 19.9.2012) ; Oxford University Press online national competition law case-reporting 
service;  European Commission funded projects at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/call_2010_results_en.pdf (accessed 23.10.2011) including 
‘Colloquium on European competition law for judges: Implementation, 
Decentralisation, Cooperation, Consistency (I.D.C.C.) and setting-up of an internet site on 
European Competition Law (E.A.S.E. – European Antitrust-Law search engine by Sept 2013’ 
3 K Lenaerts and D Gerard ‘Decentralisation of EC Competition Law: Judges in the Frontline’ (2004) 
27(3) World Competition 313-349, 336 
4 InterActive Terminology for Europe – The EU’s multilingual term base 
http://iate.europa.eu/iatediff/SearchByQueryLoad.do?method=load (last accessed 19.9.2012) 
5 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Report on the 
functioning of Regulation 1/2003, COM (2009) 206 final 
6 In competition law, see B Rodger (ed) Article 234 and Competition Law: An Analysis (Kluwer, 2008), 
relating to pre-2004 cases. Stone Sweet suggests that under-researched questions are “to what extent does 
the law and politics of litigating European law vary across jurisdictional and national boundaries? Are 
some jurisdictions more receptive than others to enforcing E[U] law?” A-M Slaughter, A Stone Sweet & J  
Weiler (eds), The European Courts and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart, 1997) 330.  
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In	EU	law	enforcement	more	broadly,	the	diagonal	relationship	between	the	European	
Commission	and	national	courts	does	not	seem	to	have	been	researched.	Is	it	possible	to	
generalise	about	the	role	of	the	European	Commission,	given	its	historical	particular	
dominance	in	competition	enforcement?	What	about	other	EU	policy	areas?	
	
In	a	still	wider	literature	on	judicial	politics,	this	could	relate	to	research	into	the	impact	of	
amicus	curiae	interventions,	and	administrative	agencies’	interpretations	of	the	law	more	
broadly,	on	judicial	decision‐making.	
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